Mr. Jensen's U.S. History Website
  • Home
  • College US
    • Coming Soon . . .
    • APHIST Video
    • NWU Dual Credit Info
  • US History 9
    • Coming Soon . . .
    • Online Reviews
    • US 9 Video
  • U.S. History Blog
    • U.S. History Blog (May 2020 - May 2021)
    • U.S. History Blog (May 2019 - May 2020)
    • U.S. History Blog (May 2018 - May 2019)
    • U.S. History Blog (May 2017 - May 2018)
    • U.S. History Blog (May 2016 - May 2017)
    • U.S. History Blog (May 2015 - May 2016)
    • U.S. History Blog (May, 2014 - May, 2015)
  • "Good News"
  • My WHS Google Site

The Attempted Assassination of President Ronald Reagan

4/2/2016

0 Comments

 
                  Source: H.W. Brands. Reagan: The Life (2015)
Picture
      On 30 March 1981, President Ronald Reagan addressed the leaders of the Building & Construction Trades Department (pictured) of the AFL-CIO at the Washington Hilton, just up Connecticut Avenue from the White House. Union leaders listened respectfully but skeptically; many were disappointed that Reagan didn't endorse federal spending for mass transit and energy projects, which would employ 600,000+ idle workers.
     Nancy Reagan was initially told that Reagan wasn't shot outside the Hilton; but she went to George Washington Hospital as fast as she could anyway. When Nancy arrived, Michael Deaver (one of the members of Reagan's "Troika") told her that Reagan had been shot (the shooter was John Hinckley, Jr.). Reagan later said that he felt a blow in his upper back that was unbelievably painful, and initially thought he had a broken rib. When Reagan started coughing up blood, the Secret Service agent next to him ordered the limousine to the George Washington Hospital . . . during the few minutes to the George Washington, Reagan's condition worsened.

       Inside the double-doors of the hospital, Reagan collapsed; he was held up by Secret Service agents. The George Washington Hospital staff thought that Reagan was suffering from a heart attack, and prepared intravenous lines. Reagan regained consciousness and complained that he couldn't breathe. When the bullet hole was discovered after rolling the President to his right, it was deduced that he had been hit by a ricocheted bullet; a small "wicked disc" remained in Reagan's body. The doctor in charge, Dr. Benjamin Aaron, decided to remove the bullet. When Nancy was allowed into pre-op to see her husband, Reagan said, "Honey, I forgot to duck".
Picture
Picture
      Secretary of State Alexander Haig called Chief-of-Staff James Baker III (pictured below with Reagan after the President's recovery) just before Baker left the White House to go to the hospital. Haig was alarmed that the President was incapacitated, even temporarily, with Vice-President George Bush out of D.C. in somewhere in Texas. Haig told Baker he would ensure the chain-of-command by gathering the Cabinet officials most crucial to national security: Defense, Treasury, CIA, National Security Advisor, and the Attorney General, and he would continue to try and reach the Vice-President.
     Baker, as Chief-of-Staff, had to decide whether-or-not to invoke the 25th Amendment; should Vice-President Bush be the acting-President while Reagan was undergoing surgery . . . Baker decided not to do so. Baker didn't want Bush to become an acting-President; Baker liked Bush very much, but Baker and the other Reagan loyalists didn't think Bush's conservative bona fides were nearly stout enough. Also, their was the fact that Baker and Bush were very good friends, and appearances mattered, even when the President was fighting for his life.

Picture
      Press Secretary James Brady's assistant, Larry Speakes, froze under the pressure of the cameras, and didn't have up-to-the-minute information, which created the impression that no one was in charge of the federal government while Reagan was undergoing surgery. Secretary of State Haig was watching the press conference; Haig felt that it was imperative to show that the U.S. had an effective government during the crisis. Haig raced out of the Situation Room and dashed to the Press Room, and took over for Speakes.
     




  
     Haig was asked who was making decisions in the Executive Branch; Haig had intended to calm down the room (and nation), but he arrived out-of-breath, and his words had the opposite effect. Also, Haig made a mistake in terms of the line-of-succession according to the 25th Amendment; the Secretary of State was 5th, not 3rd, in the line-of-succession (after the President is the Vice-President, then the Speaker-of-the-House, then the President Pro-Tem of the Senate, THEN the SecState). Haig's "I am in control here" line was too easily used by TV to portray the SecState in the wrong manner; Haig's main intent was to let the USSR know that there were indeed people in charge of the government and the military. Haig regretted not composing himself before he took the podium and his choice of words . . . but he succeeded in pointing out that he was the senior Cabinet official present, and the government was functioning.

Picture
     Reagan's surgery began smoothly; fresh blood replaced the lost blood, and a breathing tube kept him oxygenated, and the President's vital signs were stable . . . but the bullet proved to be very elusive. Multiple eyes and doctors were involved trying to find the bullet to no avail. During the searches, the bullet kept moving slightly, avoiding detection . . . finally, the bullet was found and removed (an intern had to hold the President's heart in his hands for the bullet to be found and removed).
     The rest of the surgery was straightforward, but still risky, in that an artery needed to be repaired, and a lung sutured (the surgery lasted 70 minutes on a President that was almost 70 years old). Reagan recovered, but Nancy never did; she would remain paranoid when her husband needed to leave the White House for any significant sojourn for the rest of his Presidency . . . Reagan was released after only thirteen days at George Washington Hospital.

Picture
     Reagan recuperated over the next two weeks at the White House, but Nancy could never relax; she knew of the "fatal pattern" of Presidents that were elected in years ending with a zero since 1840 (divisible by 20) . . . Nancy constantly worried that death in office still awaited her husband. The First Lady started to consult an astrologer, Joan Quigley (pictured) whom she had met years ago in California from a mutual friend, Merv Griffin. 
     Quigley claimed to have 30 March 1981 pegged as a "bad day" for Reagan; Nancy became addicted to contacting Quigely when Reagan resumed normal activities as President. Nancy involved Michael Deaver, who made sure that the astrologer remained secret; neither he or Nancy wanted to embarrass the President that she constantly used an astrologer to predict "good days" or "bad days" for her husband.

Picture
     A month-and-a-day after being shot, Reagan asked for, and received permission, to address Congress. Reagan had to fight through extended arms and hands to reach the podium. Reagan reveled in the atmosphere, and reciprocated that good feeling . . . he was performing in front of a receptive audience, a feeling he craved (it was the main reason why he entered politics).
Soon enough during his address, Reagan launched into the topics of less federal spending, finding ways to reduce inflation and to lower taxes (pictured behind Reagan: VP Bush to the left, and Speaker of the House Tip O'Neill to the right).
     Six months after his election, the economy was still in "Stagflation" mode; inflation had scarcely abated and interest rates were punishingly high; 8 million Americans were out of work, and real wages were down. Reagan stated that the effort to improve the economy started with the federal budget; in Reagan's view, government was too big and it spent far too much.
     Reagan's proposed budget had moved along until House Democrats presented their version that kept social spending levels intact, raised taxes, and cut proposed increases in defense spending. Reagan responded that he proposed nothing more than to stop tax increases; he didn't advocate tax cuts as of yet. Reagan's address was in the aftermath of the first Space Shuttle Mission, which had just successfully concluded . . . Reagan stated that "we have much greatness before us"; t
he near-death experience from the attempted assassination only heightened Reagan's sense of mission as President

0 Comments

President Ronald Reagan: 20 January - 30 March 1981

3/26/2016

0 Comments

 
                         Source: H.W. Brands. Reagan: The Life (2015)
Picture
      20 January 1981, Inauguration Day: Outgoing President Jimmy Carter considered himself far more competent than the incoming President, Ronald Reagan. Carter still resented losing to Reagan in the Election of 1980; Carter's mood didn't improve in the least since the Iranian government refused to release the 52 American hostages as long as he was in office. 
     For the first time, a President was inaugurated on the West side of the Capitol Building. Only a handful of people have spoken to a larger crowd than Reagan on his first Inaugural. It was unseasonably warm and cloudy; but when Reagan reached the podium, the sun started to shine. 
     Reagan and his staff decided to cut taxes and get control of federal government spending. Reagan proposed to take the U.S. across the Rubicon with tax cuts ahead of spending cuts. Cutting taxes was the easy part, so Reagan and his staff decided to get those cuts through Congress first, saving the tougher battle on reducing government spending for later. David Stockman, the head of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) suggested significant spending cuts in every Cabinet department except one . . . Defense. The Defense Department, under SecDef Caspar Weinberger, was able to get most of what it wanted due to Reagan's philosophy of building up the military in order to better deal with the USSR.

Picture
      Presidents have influence on domestic affairs, but they have actual power in foreign affairs. That being said, Reagan in his first term had more influence on domestic affairs compared to most other Presidents, in that he was a believer in Theodore Roosevelt's "Bully Pulpit". Reagan believed that the "Bully Pulpit" gave him an advantage over the Legislative branch. Reagan was the most compelling and effective communicator as President since Franklin Roosevelt, and he knew it. Reagan knew how to read a room, and he was able to reach a vast audience through television. Reagan's message was always the same: smaller government and lower taxes.
    On 18 February 1981, Reagan formally proposed his budget in the House of Representatives. Reagan stated that unless Congress acted now, the economy would  get worse; America was experiencing double-digit unemployment and inflation at the same time ("Stagflation"). Reagan wanted a four-part plan passed by Congress. First, Reagan called for $498B in federal government spending cuts. Reagan went on to say that these were cuts in projected increases; there still would be an absolute increase of $41B in government spending. To some, it already appeared that the new President was weakening his stance on cutting federal government spending.

Picture
      Reagan further weakened his stance by announcing what areas of government would be exempted from spending cuts. Social safety nets such as Social Security and Medicare would be exempted. Reagan than announced that the Defense Department (pictured: President Reagan with his SecDef, Caspar Weinberger in 1981) would see increases in their budget; the President justified this decision by saying that the U.S. faced unprecedented challenges in terms of national security.
     Federal aid for education would be cut, as would federal support for the arts. Concerning education, Reagan said that less federal money was a good thing, in that the cuts would lead to greater local control. Funding for the Energy Department's synthetic fuel research would be reduced, and the Import-Export Bank would lose 1/3 of their funding. Recipients of food stamps would be vigorously scrutinized in order to eliminate freeloaders. Medicaid payments to states would be capped, and the U.S. Postal Service would receive less federal money.

Picture
     Part two of Reagan's proposed budget to Congress centered on tax cuts; specifically, Reagan wanted 10% across-the-board tax cuts. Every year for the next three years, taxes would be cut for all individual income taxpayers. Reagan disagreed that these tax cuts would increase inflation; like spending, these were cuts in projected tax increases. Reagan (pictured in February 1981; Reagan and David Stockman, Director of the OMB, to the right) argued that tax cuts would reduce inflation by increasing overall output, which then would lead to greater revenue for the federal government (that was basically what President Calvin Coolidge did in his administration).
     Reagan predicted that the economy would not only recover under these tax cuts, but would be rolling along and expanding by 1985. Reagan also wanted to encourage investment in business by adjusting the complex-and-outdated tax brackets. But Reagan also stated that changing the tax brackets was a strategy that could be debated and implemented later.

Picture
     Part three dealt with deregulation; Reagan believed that government regulation equaled hidden taxes. Reagan made it clear that no regulations would be removed that were essential for health and safety. But Reagan was clear that many government regulations would have to go, and there would not be any new regulations created. Reagan announced that Vice-President George Bush would lead a committee that would focus on government regulations.
     Lastly was Monetary Policy; Reagan argued that to curb inflation, the growth of the money supply (MS) must be slowed. The Federal Reserve was not in the purview of the President, but Reagan wanted to clearly communicate that he wanted/expected cooperation by the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Paul Volcker (pictured with Reagan in July 1981, just weeks after the attempted assassination on the President on 30 March 1981).
     Not since the New Deal had a President presented such a sweeping economic program to Congress. It was Reagan's plan, but it required the assent of Congress; Reagan told Congress that the federal government must get out of the way of the American people in order to restore risk-taking, investment, consumer spending, and overall confidence in the economy.

Picture
      Reagan enjoyed holding news conferences and dealing with reporters, at least in early years of his Presidency. Reagan took care to learn all of the names of the reporters that were assigned the White House as their primary beat. Reagan's mastery of details was much less than Carter, but his presence as President was far greater. The first press conference was one week after the Inauguration. Helen Thomas asked Reagan if he would punish or reconcile with Iran; Reagan answered that there would be no punishment, and no reconciliation. 
     Sam Donaldson of ABC News (the reporter that Reagan would come to detest the most) asked about his stance with the USSR; Reagan answered that the US would take a much harder line with the Soviets compared to recent Presidents. Walter Cronkite of CBS News (pictured at Reagan's left on 3 March 1981 - Cronkite was still "The Most Trusted Man in America") was just days away from retirement, and his last hurrah was interviewing Reagan on television. Cronkite asked if bashing the USSR would be productive, and Reagan responded that Leonid Brezhnev already wanted a US/USSR summit. Reagan further commented that he was in no hurry for a US/USSR summit, in that he needed to talk with America's allies in advance. Reagan went on to say that the summit could be canceled if the USSR misbehaved.

Picture
      Despite a comfortable White House routine in terms of personal and Presidential activities (Reagan LOVED creating and keeping schedules), both the President and the First Lady, Nancy, felt confined, and very often went to Camp David on weekends to be outdoors. Fridays and Saturdays were movie nights at Camp David; the favorites of the President and First Lady were the classic "oldies" from their time in Hollywood . . . they watched more modern movies with much less enthusiasm.
     The Reagans returned to the White House on Sunday afternoon, and they already missed Camp David. To the Reagans, Camp David was more soothing and comforting than Rancho del Cielo, their ranch in California. That being said, every few months, Air Force One would whisk the President and First Lady to their ranch in California . . . reporters and cameras were banned.  By late-March 1981, President Ronald Reagan had developed a White House routine that he loved to follow, and he was able to
​re-energize at Camp David on weekends
(pictured: President Reagan and Vice-President George Bush on a trail at Camp David in 1981).
​     On 30 March 1981, Reagan addressed the leaders of the Building and Construction Trades Department of the AFL-CIO at the Washington Hilton, just up Connecticut Avenue from the White House . . . the President had no way to know that John Hinckley, Jr. was lying in wait to assassinate Reagan in order to impress the teen-aged actress Jodie Foster . . . 

0 Comments

Turning the Tide of WW II: Defeating the "Tyranny of Distance"

3/23/2016

0 Comments

 
         Source: Paul Kennedy. Engineers of Victory: The Problem Solvers Who      
                                             Turned the Tide in the Second World War (2013)

Picture
      In World War II, Japan overreached, while the US overcame the vastness of the Pacific. Japan had never before been defeated in a war, but in WW II, their vast empire was brought to an end by external means, chiefly by beyond-impressive deployment of US resources.  The US was better at exploiting distance, time, and opportunity; the maritime-oriented US held the advantage over Japan's fixation on land campaigns in Asia . . . America, not Japan was able to conquer the "Tyranny of Distance" in the Pacific Ocean.
     It seemed to be all wine-and-roses for Japan until July 1941, when the US, Britain, and the Dutch froze all of Japan's commercial assets, essentially cutting off Japan's imports of oil (of which Japan imported 88%). The Empire of the Sun could either buckle or strike out to gain what it needed to supply their home islands and its war machine. The leaders of Japan believed that if they gave in to the US/British/Dutch, their nation would revert back to a medieval state. That scenario was totally unacceptable to that generation of Japan's military leaders, such as Nagumo, Tojo, and Yamamoto (all three served their nation in WW I).

      To Japan's leaders, their nation could only go forward and achieve its destiny, and in the process end Western influence in the Pacific. Therefore, it made perfect sense to take, by force, the oil tin, and rubber in Samatra and Malaya, and then to strike at Hong Kong, the Philippines, Borneo, Java, and Singapore. Japan's goal was to eliminate US/British/Dutch military forces/bases, and to create a strategic "Perimeter Rim" that swept from the Aleutian Islands to the Burma-India border.
     Japan's most decisive act WAS NOT their attacks on 7-8 December 1941 on Pearl Harbor, the Philippines, and Hong Kong, but their invasion of mainland China in 1937. Everything else that followed was of operational or diplomatic consequence, including closer ties with Nazi Germany, neutrality with the USSR, moving into Southeast Asia, going for oil in the Dutch East Indies, and taking Hong Kong and Singapore. As far as the attack on Pearl Harbor, Japan wanted to prevent any US advance in the Pacific, especially south . . . the main cause of all that occurred in the Pacific before and after 7/8 December 1941 was Japan's invasion of China in 1937.
​     Japan had a strong army that was oriented toward conquest on the Asian continent, as well as dealing with Russia . . . the US/British were of much less interest to the Japanese military until the economic blockades. The Japanese army was large and disciplined, and very well-trained with modern weapons, but had little interest in fast armored warfare (e.g. tanks). The Japanese army had a tremendous focus on sea-to-land warfare, crossing rivers, warfare in jungles and mountains; taking distant islands in the Pacific was not yet a priority. Japan saw no point in creating an expensive long-range strategic bombing force, since there weren't any real strategic targets to bomb in Shanghai or Vladivostok.
Picture
Picture
      Japan eventually advanced in the Pacific in an "Expanding Torrent"; their arc widened as they advanced. In the Pacific (and in Russia), that meant thousands of miles compared to Western Europe . . . the further Japan spread by force in SE Asia, China, and islands in the Pacific, their troop-density decreased. It was the same dilemma that Hitler forced on the Wehrmacht in Russia, Europe, and North Africa. But even in Russia, the distances weren't as great as in the Pacific / East Asia / SE Asia, and Germany possessed far-greater military and industrial resources compared to Japan.
     Therefore, by June 1942, Imperial Japan had overstretched itself in the Pacific and Asia, and had even put most of their troops in the wrong places, but didn't realize their strategic blunders. Japan had achieved great territorial gains, the nation was safe, and the booty from its conquests were pouring in to the home islands, and there were no breakthrough counter-attacks by the US/Great Britain. So, to Imperial General Headquarters, the situation in June 1942 was not disastrous, or even serious. The loss of four aircraft carriers at Midway was "regrettable", and the loss of Guadalcanal seemed too distant to matter. By the end of 1942, alarm bells were not ringing at Imperial General HQ, and by the end of 1943, they only heard the alarm bells at a distance.

      It was on the Allies to alter the landscape in the Pacific, since Japan didn't need to go much further. It would fall entirely on the shoulders of the US to take the offensive and force a Japanese surrender; that officially became the strategy in the Summer of 1942. But how, where, and with what means to win the War in the Pacific; it proved to be very difficult to transform from a largely defensive strategy in the Pacific to an offensive one, especially given the vastness of the Pacific. Turning the tide of WW II in the Pacific would be very different than in Europe.
     There were four alternatives that were debated at the highest levels in the US Military as to the main strategy in the Pacific. One option was to base the Allied counter-offensive on mainland China. A second option was to focus on SE Asia, and a third was to focus in the SW Pacific from Australia north to the Philippines. The last option that was debated was "Island Hopping" in the Pacific, taking key Japanese island strongholds, shrinking their defense perimeter. In the end, only one option in the Pacific would work: Admiral Nimitz's thrust of the US Navy across the Pacific ("Island Hopping") in order to take islands close enough to be able to strategically bomb Japan into surrender. The other three options were ancillary or secondary to the US Navy and the Marines, much to General Douglas MacArthur's immense irritation in the SW Pacific.
     By 1942, it was obvious that only the US could end Japan's domination of the Central, West, and South Pacific. American munitions factories were mostly located on the West Coast at about the same latitude as Japan, and there was no intervening land between San Francisco and Tokyo. It made sense to advance on a line that was somewhat south of the Tropic of Cancer, from Hawaii to the Gilbert and Marshall Islands, then to the Carolines, and then the prize, the Marianas, before turning north to Japan. Hawaii gave the US control of the Central Pacific, not only as a bulwark against Japanese expansion, but also as a launching point for a massive counter-offensive.
Picture
Picture
      The United States had the tools necessary to overcome "The Tyranny of Distance"; first, the Marines had the plans ready to take key Japanese-held islands one-by-one, and had also been able to develop weapons/tactics for amphibious warfare in the Pacific. Second was the evolution of the fast carrier groups; the US Navy had dependable carriers with decent planes, which gave them a chance against Japan's superior carriers/planes at the start of the war. 
     The attack on Pearl Harbor opened the US Navy's eyes (as well as the US Gov't) to the amazing destructive reach of a carrier group . . . they were determined to use that strategy against Japan. Third was the development of the B-29 Superfortress, a bomber so advanced that not only could it carry and immense bomb load thousands of miles, but it could fly at an altitude of 30,000 feet, which meant it could not be attacked by enemy fighters or ant-aircraft shells. Once the Marianas were taken and secured from Japan, B-29 airbases provided an enormous advantage to end the war sooner.
     





  
     During 1943-1945, only the US could have built the B-29; Hitler called the Superfortress a "Wonder Weapon". The wiring/aluminum for a B-29 equaled that of a squad of Messerschmitts. Fourth were the Seabees, the US Navy Construction Battalions; the Seabees were the engineers that created what was needed in the face of geographic challenges. And fifth, the US Submarine Service within the Navy . . . what was needed was command and organization to bring all the elements together in order to defeat Japan.

Picture
     The two greatest contributions in gaining supremacy in the air in the vast Pacific were the Essex-class aircraft carriers and the F6F Hellcat fighters designed to be used on those carriers.
Together, they tipped the balance in the Pacific in part because they came into full service in the middle of the crucial period of mid-1943 to early-1944, just when the US counter-attack was gaining momentum. Both complemented the other, with the Hellcat being a great defender of the carriers that launched them, as well as being an absolute terror to Japanese forces.
     There were many turning points in the Pacific, such as Guadalcanal and Midway; a turning point that to this day has been under the radar occurred 30 May 1943, when the USS Essex arrived at Pearl Harbor. The Essex was the first of the brand-new, tough, powerful and sophisticated aircraft carriers that would make a huge impact in the Pacific. The new Yorktown (named in honor of the original) arrived in late-July 1943 with some of the new light carriers. The Essex-class carriers proved to be superior to Japanese carriers; the weapons system was a miracle. The new US carriers had radar-controlled gunnery and detection, armored hangars, and were capable of speeds up to 30 knots, and have 90-100 planes. 
     A total of 31 Essex-class carriers were on order in 24 gigantic shipyards. The new carriers were going to Admiral Chester Nimitz in the Central Pacific, not to MacArthur in the SW Pacific, in order to increase the odds of taking key islands. An added benefit: the US Navy would have time to plan how to use the new Essex-class carriers. It was decided to cluster the carrier groups in order to make the more effective; hundreds upon hundreds of aircraft would be able to descend on Japanese carriers/ships, plus the ability to defend the carrier groups was greatly increased.

Picture
     Taking the Marianas would not have meant so much if it wasn't for the B-29 Superfortress. The B-29 was created with the traditional belief that the "bomber will always get through". In the Pacific, it would be true, since the B-29 could fly higher & faster than any Japanese plane.
The B-29 weighed twice that of a B-17 Flying Fortress; its pressurized cabin meant altitudes up to 30,000 feet, and its maximum airspeed was 350 mph. The B-29's over Japan unleashed brutal, unprecedented devastation in that part of the world. The most destructive runs of the B-29's were the low-flying firebombings of Tokyo in March 1945; 130,000 Japanese were killed - the Tokyo firebombing occurred at the same time as the firebombings in Western Europe (e.g. Dresden). 
     The B-29 was a very complicated weapon, which featured a great number of difficult development problems. The only runways for the 141 foot wingspan and the 120,000 pound weight existed in specifically-designed runways that were only in the Pacific. At Boeing, the Design-and Development teams had their abilities and imaginations stretched to the limit. Major problems included how to pressurize different cabins but not the bomb bays; designers created a pressurized "crawl tunnel" that linked the cabins. The biggest problem was with the engines; all the early engines were inadequate and unreliable. The B-29 project was almost scrapped due to the seemingly insurmountable obstacles, but General "Hap" Arnold kept the program going. 
     Even when the B-29 was completed, it was the devil to get a B-29 to successfully take-off; even the Enola Gay came close to running out of runway. But once the B-29 reached its desired altitude, it was untouchable . . . the only real threats were within the B-29 itself, with its complex mechanisms that needed to work flawlessly in concert with each other.
​

Picture
     The B-29's took off from the Marianas to devastate Tokyo in the greatest firestorm of all of WW II in the Spring of 1945. After Tokyo, cities such as Nagoya, Osaka, and Kobe suffered the same fate. USAAF General Curtis LeMay ordered B-29 strategic bombing runs that not only destroyed Japanese industry, but also 2 million buildings with 13 million homeless. While the strategic bombing was achieving desired objectives, it was taking the lives of hundreds of thousands of Japanese civilians (as were the simultaneous firebombings in Europe), mainly women, children and seniors.
     The US surge in the Pacific occurred later than that of the Allies in Western Europe, since the "tools of war" took longer to develop and produce in large numbers. But once assembled, the US counter-attack in the Pacific went remarkably fast. Even in the extreme early stages of the US counter-attack, in one day at Guadalcanal, 11,000 of 19,000 Marines landed without immediate opposition, quickly gaining the upper-hand.
     The US Navy and Marines learned much in the months after the disastrous victory at Tarawa. The Marines had figured out their amphibious-warfare techniques, the Essex-class carriers and groups were in place, the F6F Hellcats were aloft, the Seabees were building, and the B-29's were bombing Japan. The single-most important amphibious operation in the Pacific occurred on 15 June 1944, when 127,000 US troops, mostly Marines, began to land on the Mariana Islands; it was far-more threatening to Japan than anything MacArthur's forces were accomplishing in the SW Pacific. The US had acquired the islands that were close enough in order to bomb Japan into submission and surrender.

0 Comments

Turning the Tide of WW II: Seizing an Enemy-Held Shore

3/23/2016

0 Comments

 
         Source: Paul Kennedy. Engineers of Victory: The Problem Solvers Who      
                                              Turned the Tide in the Second World War (2013)

      November 1942: Operation Torch was the largest Allied amphibious invasion of WW II to that point, much larger in scope than the Dieppe Raid. 75,000 Allied troops in the first stage, with many more to come; Torch was a joint Allied operation (US & Britain) featuring three armed services (land, sea, air). 
     British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President Franklin Roosevelt had been trying to bring about "jointness" since the Atlantic Charter. Overall command of Torch went to the American General Dwight Eisenhower, who was headquartered at Gibraltar. Also different from Dieppe was the distance and scope of Torch; so many different ships had to be in place at the right time, including landing craft for the soldiers to reach the beaches.
Picture
Picture
     The Allies took naval bombardment and control of the air very seriously with Torch; four fleet carriers and five smaller carriers were deployed, which meant the Allies had control of the skies until the enemy airfields were taken. After the air bases were taken, then British Hurricane and Spitfire squadrons had an operational platform. 
     By 12 November 1942, the approaches to Casablanca in Morocco were secured, but the landings in Algiers and Oran were much more difficult due to increased enemy resistance. However, in three days, all three target areas in North Africa were secured, and the Allied ground forces started moving inland. 
     The Allies learned quite a few important lessons in terms of amphibious campaigns in North Africa: first, be sure to have control of the air, and if there were enemy air bases, take them. Second, be sure to have a command ship (a "Floating Headquarters"; the US didn't have a command ship during Torch). Third, it was sheer folly to attack an enemy in a fortified harbor, even if taking enemy-held beaches was very difficult. Complicating matters was that weather and geography was a potential additional enemy for the Allies when moving on an enemy shore. Lastly, the Allies didn't yet know how their strategies/tactics would work against entrenched German troops on a beach . . . Torch, despite the casualties, and been a relatively easy campaign for the Allies.

Picture
      The deadly rehearsals in the Mediterranean were absolutely key for the planned Operation Overlord; also, there was a rushed timetable, in that even a somewhat-reluctant Churchill knew that Overlord had to occur at the latest in early-1944. However, the Allied amphibious campaigns logically went from North Africa to Sicily; the takeover of Sicily was a major blow to the Axis, in that it led to the overthrow of Mussolini and the eventual surrender of Italy. Another positive by-product of Sicily was that US forces gained valuable experience taking entrenched beaches.
     However, Operation Overlord looked beyond-foreboding, in that the Allies experienced extreme resistance in Italy from German troops . . . the assumption was that German resistance would be far-greater in France. The Western Allies had no way of knowing that they would be able to take five separate beach-landings from the Germans, and start to pour inland like a breached dam, meeting resistance and swirling past obstacles. The ground forces would surge through gaps and places of least resistance, covered by air power, tanks (for the British), and mobile artillery. By the end of June 1944, Allied forces were twenty miles inland . . . by 25 August 1944 US and Free French troops were in Paris. So, why was Operation Overlord successful in the face of the feared German resistance . . . it started with Command-and-Control . . . without it, Operation Overlord would fail.

Picture
     The "Mediterranean Gang" was brought to London to run the show for Operation Overlord, including General Eisenhower, and field commanders such as Bernard Montgomery (pictured with Eisenhower), Omar Bradley, and George Patton. Eisenhower decided to land on five beaches, not the original three; nothing was left out in terms of planning and details. The overall mastermind of Overlord was a modest British naval officer, Bertram Ramsay, who orchestrated the British withdrawal from Dunkirk in 1940. The strategic planners of Overlord (Ramsay, Eisenhower, et al) knew that certain things were required: command of the air and sea, as well as excellent deception and intelligence. To Ramsay and Eisenhower, take one of the three away, and Overlord's chances of success drastically diminished.
     Air, sea, and deception/intelligence were factors that they could at least largely control; out of their control was the weather and the nature of German positioning and their response to the landings . . . the capacity of the Wehrmacht to strike fast (like at Anzio) had to be blunted. Also, German communications had to be crippled to-and-from the Atlantic / English Channel shores. Therefore, Eisenhower ordered the US Army Air Force (USAAF) and Ramsay the Royal Air Force (RAF) to strategically bomb bridges, roads, railroads, and known key communication centers in order to paralyze military transportation/communication networks for the Wehrmacht.

Picture
     General Erwin Rommel had placed much in defense at Normandy, but the Germans didn't know where or when the Allied offensive would occur; Pas-de-Calais or Normandy? The Allied deceptions were very effective in clouding the picture for Rommel, and the weather was bad enough that Rommel actually went back home for his wife's birthday. The fickle weather gave the Allied forces a crucial window of opportunity, and a huge stroke of luck. On D-Day +10, one of the worst storms of the 20th Century hit Normandy, setting back the Allied timetable to Berlin. Had the monstrous storm occurred on D-Day +4 (10 June), the Allies would have been beached crabs, and open for counter-attack by German forces.
     In the end, Hitler had made a series of decisions that benefited the Allies, in that he created a strategic situation that Germany would be weak everywhere, and strong nowhere, which was the exact opposite of Frederick the Great's military philosophy. Therefore, German defenses at Normandy were not strong enough on the shores, and not strong or mobile enough inland. So while the Allied invaders were very smart, well-orchestrated, and in command of the air and sea, they were also very, very lucky.

Picture
     The only aspect left that wasn't guaranteed was what would happen on the beaches; and if the beaches were taken, then what would happen on the advance inland in France. Eisenhower worried about the beaches the most, and the Germans pinned all their hopes on the same. During the first three days of Operation Overlord, both sides were proven right, and Rommel was proven correct in that the first three days after the beach-landings would be the most decisive.
     There were three amphibious landing forces in five beaches for D-Day, 6 June 1944. The westernmost of the beaches was Utah Beach; at the end of the day, US forces had moved five miles inland. Having reached that point, the US troops at Utah would not be easily dislodged; Utah was by far the smoothest amphibious attack in all of WW II - the 8th and 27th Infantry regiments lost a total of 12 men (pictured: General Patton in 1943 - to the right was General Theodore Roosevelt Jr., who would be the first high-ranking officer to set foot on Utah Beach).

Picture
     The biggest part of Overlord were the British and Canadian beaches code-named Gold, Juno, and Sword. The British and Canadians were thorough, careful, fastidious, well-orchestrated, and not very bold. The British had deep respect for their old foe Germany, and the British could not afford another Dunkirk, Crete, Dakar, or Dieppe. In comparison to the US, British resources/manpower were overstretched; Overlord, no matter what, would be Britain's last great offensive of WW II.
     Therefore, Britain was massively invested in deception, intelligence, Command-and-Control, signals, beachmasters (the US had none), mine clearance, as well as specially-designed tanks. Nicknamed "Hobart's Funnies", the British had a tank for almost any purpose, such as flail tanks, flamethrower tanks, and tanks that laid a layer of "carpet" so vehicles could get off the beach (pictured). With these specially-designed tanks on the beach, Germans fighting from concrete bunkers were not safe . . . at Gold, Juno, and Sword beaches, Rommel's "Outer Crust" strategy (keep the Allies on the beaches) quickly failed.

Picture
      The third part of D-Day was Omaha Beach, which was an entirely different story than the other four beaches. The casualty numbers in comparison were dismal; most American soldiers came came ashore with only the weapons they carried, and had no choice but to move inland facing far-too-many deadly beach obstacles in the face of deadly crossfire from the Germans.
Only 5 of 32 tanks made it to the beach, and over 60% of the howitzers sunk.
     American destroyers came within 1000 yards offshore to fire on the German bunkers, endangering the ships to minefields in the water near the shore. The initial landing at Omaha featured 34,000 men and 3300 vehicles with a similar number in reserve. Desperate shelling by the destroyers plus USAAF tactical bombing plus re-establishing order on the beaches finally cracked the German coastal defenses at Omaha. US troops got off the beaches, up the bluffs, and held a position only a mile inland. The German panzers could have easily pushed the Americans back to the beach, but Hitler refused to authorize any movement. 
     The 1st and 29th Infantry Divisions had taken Omaha Beach at bitter cost, and it was a close-call; Eisenhower was clearly disturbed the next day when he personally surveyed the situation. The 1st & 29th had 2400 killed, wounded, or captured; compared to large Civil War battles, or to such World War I disasters as the first day of the Somme, or Operation Bagration in the Eastern Front, those casualties pale in contrast . . . but Omaha Beach was by far the most deadly of the five beach landings on D-Day.

Picture
     Omaha Beach had to be taken, otherwise a gap would have existed for the Germans to exploit, which would have made taking Cherbourg, a major port, very difficult if not impossible.
There was poor battlefield management at Omaha Beach, with too much self-confidence in play, which was never wise against the Wehrmacht. The naval bombardment beforehand was light, and cloud cover doomed the USAAF/RAF bombing runs. With the high waves/tides, it was sheer folly to order the tanks and howitzer craft in the sea 5000 yards away. The US had no flail or wire-cutting tanks, and General Bradley and his staff was unaware that the German 352nd had just moved behind Omaha beach in support. 
     The US troops at Omaha Beach achieved their objective without the luck, support, planning, and weapons that were present at the other four beaches. Depending on sources, between 132,000 and 175,000 Allies swarmed ashore at Normandy on 6 June 1944, taking approximately 5000 casualties, which was far-less than planning estimates. On 27 August 1944, Eisenhower was in Paris (which had been liberated two days prior); the Wehrmacht fought ferociously in defense with remarkable tactical efficiency, most notably in the Battle of the Bulge. For the rest of WW II in Europe, amphibious attacks were no longer needed; much of what was used at D-Day was sent to the Pacific.



0 Comments

Turning the Tide in WW II: Stopping the Nazi Blitzkrieg

3/23/2016

0 Comments

 
         Source: Paul Kennedy. Engineers of Victory: The Problem Solvers Who      
                                             Turned the Tide in the Second World War (2013)

Picture
      1 September 1939: the Nazi Blitzkrieg of Poland. The formula: the Luftwaffe took control of the air, and destroyed Polish air bases, scattered Polish army columns, and then devastated Warsaw. At the same time, 14 mechanized divisions of the Wehrmacht swept past Polish army and cavalry, and raced to the important targets of Lodz, Krakow, and Lvov. 
     During the Spring of 1940, the Nazis used the "Phony War" to improve their strategy and tactics. In early-1940, the Nazi Blitzkrieg was too much for Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway . . . and the Fall of France shocked the entire world. By June 1940, Great Britain stood alone against Nazi Germany.
     
​     The geopolitical and military shape of WW II was transformed. Stalin was beyond-anxious, in that he knew the USSR was nowhere-near-ready for a major Nazi offensive. The U.S. was engaged in an incredibly divisive national debate in terms of Isolationism or Intervention, which paralyzed any meaningful assistance to Britain. Mussolini joined Hitler, and Japan recalculated their options in Asia and the Pacific. In just the first ten months of WW II, the world was turned upside-down by the Nazi Blitzkriegs.

Picture
      It seemed that nothing could stop the Nazi Blitzkrieg, but that would change between 
late-1941 and the Summer 1944. One reason was geography: for example, a decisive victory with a Blitzkrieg was unlikely in mountain ranges, as the Wehrmacht found out in Yugoslavia and Greece in 1941 . . . difficult geographical & physical circumstances favor the underdog.
     Wide deserts with hundreds of miles of shifting sands restrict aggressive generals like Rommel in history, and give advantage to more conservative generals such as Montgomery. Also, great rivers slow down Blitzkriegs, and swift-and-decisive victories won't happen if the defensive forces are stronger, too entrenched and too numerous, regardless of the geography. And, the Blitzkrieg will falter if the attackers get too spread-out horizontally or vertically.
     But the Nazis had a lot of the newest military weapons and technology, which made their Blitzkrieg seem revolutionary. The internal combustion engine and armored vehicles with railroads and aircraft were joined together to do something that seemed brand new . . . by the end of 1941, it did seem that the Nazi Blitzkrieg was invulnerable.

Picture
     In order to defeat the Blitzkrieg, an opponent would need to deploy stronger, tougher, better-equipped forces to match, halt, and then counter-attack German forces. However, this could only be done by large and powerful nations, which during WW II meant Great Britain, the USSR, and the US . . . but none of those nations were ready for large-scale modern combat during the first-half of WW II. 
    All three nations, however, possessed the inherent resources of strength, technology, and innovation. All three nations enjoyed a decent geographic distance from Germany (for Britain, it was the English Channel), which allowed the three Allies to develop their capabilities and allow engineers, inventors, and manufacturing to reach capacity. Only superior numbers of "everything" could beat the Blitzkrieg; the tenacity and operational effectiveness of a seasoned Germany army division was hard to equal in WW II.
     But superior numbers were not the entire picture; by late-1943 in North Africa, Britain introduced superior radar, decryption, and orchestration of tactical air power with ground forces. Also, Great Britain had Special Forces, while the Germans and Italians had ZERO. Also, the Allies would soon have more powerful and adaptable aircraft (e.g. the P-51 Mustang). Flail tanks (pictured above) and acoustic mine detectors arrived on the scene, as well as a better-integrated command-and-control system. By late-1943/early-1944, the Allies had figured out how to defeat the Nazi Blitzkrieg . . . superior numbers of troops in advantageous strategic locations with more advanced weapons and technology combined with great organization.

Picture
     The Eastern Front was the worst of WW II; unprecedented ferocity, wholesale destruction, mass deportations, immense loss of life due to combat, starvation, exposure, disease, massacres . . . the Eastern Front was "Holocaust Central", in that nearly all Nazi concentration and extermination camps, death marches, ghettos, and most of the pogroms occurred in that theater of WW II. Of the 70+ million deaths from WW II, 30+ million died on the Eastern Front, including far-too many civilians (pictured below: Nazi concentration camps in Europe).
     The Eastern Front was decisive in determining the outcome of WW II, serving as the main reason for not only the defeat of the Blitzkrieg, but of Nazi Germany as well . . . so how did the USSR defeat the all-powerful Nazi War Machine? The Eastern Front was unique in that mechanization was combined with Asiatic-horde-like warfare; the clash between Teutons and Slavs was now entwined with technological competition. Both Germany and the USSR reached deep into their own very advanced technological/productive resources to bring forth newer and more destructive weapons. Those new/improved weapons, combined with millions of troops, and the strategies/tactics in the vastness of Russia, led to the extended nightmare of the Eastern Front.

Picture
     The first thing that slowed down the Blitzkrieg in Russia was the weather. During the first months of Operation Barbarossa, the weather was perfect for the Blitzkrieg, but by October and November 1941, it slowed down . . . there was nothing the Germans could do about Russian mud in the early-winter of 1941, which ironically was also the coldest since Napoleon's invasion of Russia. 
     By 1 November 1941, one major German army was out of fuel, artillery was frozen, and soldiers were crippled by frostbite. By the Spring of 1942, the ground conditions were even worse, due to Rasputitsa - "Quagmire Season". Surface snow had melted, but couldn't drain in that the soil was still frozen below; two feet of unfrozen soil turned into a muddy nightmare, and the Wehrmacht was literally stuck in the mud (pictured above). As the Germans discovered, Rasputitsas occurred in the Fall and Spring, but the mud was much, much worse during Spring.

Picture
     It wasn't just the weather that slowed down the Blitzkrieg; the Red Army fought back enough to slow their advance, in part due to "Scorched Earth" tactics. For a German soldier, there was nothing scarier than to be lying, frozen & exhausted, in a defensive position only to see regiments of battle-hardened white-clad ghosts from the Red Army approach. 
     The Wehrmacht made immense gains (625 miles by December 1941), but were unable to break through to Moscow. German political and military leaders grossly underestimated the ability of the USSR to oppose the Blitzkrieg, and there was no consideration at all for the geography/climate. The Germans had no real useful intelligence of their opponent, in part because the Nazis believed that the USSR was relatively primitive across-the-board. This time for the Blitzkrieg, there would not be an equivalent of the Fall of France in Russia.
     The numbers of Russian troops in opposition to the Blitzkrieg was breathtaking, and the story stayed the same through 1942 and 1943. The Wehrmacht constantly tried to encircle and destroy the growing USSR forces, but with no success. The Wehrmacht believed that the lines of the Red Army were thinly held and could be outflanked, but the reality was that defensive positions reached 1000+ miles across and 200+ miles deep. Also, the battlefront was littered with broken bridges, poisoned wells, booby traps, ruined crops, PLUS the climate of summer heat, autumn mud, hellish winters, and even worse mud in the spring, as well as the incredible endurance of the USSR. By early-1943, the Nazis were guilty of overreach: there was no way to provide what was necessary for German troops in far-away locations in the Eastern Front.

Picture
      On 5 July 1943, the German Blitzkrieg struck Kursk, and immediately faced enormous strength-in-depth defenses . . . Stalin knew the Germans were coming. 12 July 1943 featured the greatest tank battle in world history; USSR losses were much greater, but the Wehrmacht had to abandon the field because the were unable to break through enemy lines. The Kursk campaign cost Germany 1600+ tanks; dozens of divisions were destroyed or rendered useless.
     Two days before the climactic tank battle, the Allies landed in Sicily, and Hitler re-tasked some forces from the Eastern Front. Also on 12 July 1943, the Red Army attacked the Wehrmacht with Operation Kutozov . . . by the Summer of 1943, fatigue finally set in on the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front. The Red Army started to advance against the Wehrmacht from the North, Central, and South; the pattern was that the USSR attacked, the Wehrmacht resisted and pulled back, and the Red Army advanced. Most WW II historians regard Stalingrad as the turning point in the Eastern Front, but that isn't entirely accurate, in that it took more than Stalingrad to defeat the Wehrmacht.

Picture
      In the Summer of 1943, the USSR defeated the Wehrmacht at Kursk; the USSR had the advantage of only fight on one (massive) front, while Germany was fully engaged on three fronts . . . Germany couldn't be strong everywhere. 
     The Nazi Blitzkrieg was stopped at Kursk not only by the greatest tank battle in history, but also with the greatest minefield (pictured: Red Army soldiers removing mines after Kursk). Nothing frustrated swift panzer attacks more than deeply sown minefields. The Red Army laid tens of thousands of mines across the entire Kursk Salient (the line of battle that projects closest to the enemy), and soon those mines were more-than-hidden by summer wheat. Anti-tank mines averaged 2400 per mile, and anti-personnel mines averaged 2700 per mile, and the minefields were 16 to 25 miles deep . . . there was no chance for a Panzer Blitzkrieg at Kursk.

Picture
      The practical problems facing Germany in the Eastern Front included running out of ammunition/fuel, dealing with minefields, and Red Army anti-tank platoons. There were no longer any weak places that would allow a Blitzkrieg strike; panzer divisions kept trying to find weak spots in order to flank the Red Army, but they simply didn't exist. And there was also the positive impact of the Lend-Lease Act, especially with trucks and jeeps; American vehicles were brought over by the Royal Navy and drastically increased the mobility of the Red Army. The USSR was the only nation that had both tank and anti-tank forces that moved quickly.
     Operation Bagration was launched on 22 June 1944 (3 years to the day after Operation Barbarossa), which was a massive assault on the German central line in the Eastern Front. The ground-based forces used by the Red Army in Operation Bagration were several-times larger than the combined totals of all forces involved in the Marianas and D-Day attacks . . . nothing was small-scale on the Eastern Front. The size of the USSR forces exceeded anything from before . . . Operation Bagration finally broke the back of the Wehrmacht.

Picture
     The Red Army during Operation Bagration numbered 1.7 million combat/support troops, 24k artillery, 4000 tanks/assault guns, and 6334 aircraft. German strength was 800k troops, 95k artillery, 553 tanks/assault guns, and 839 aircraft (for comparison, General Rommel at El Alamein had 27k troops) . . . By the Summer of 1944, the USSR had finally reached its full military potential. 
     By now, the Soviet T-34 tank was virtually unstoppable, and it wasn't uncommon for the Red Army to outnumber soldiers in the Wehrmacht by a ratio of 10:1. Also, Stalin by 1944 had relinquished much of his inflexible command style to his major generals, while Hitler refused to do the same. German losses during Operation Bagration were astounding: 670k killed, wounded, or captured; although the USSR losses were greater, Russia had millions of men from which to draw for the singular purpose of defeating Nazi Germany in "The Great Patriotic War"
     When Operation Bagration began, the Red Army was 750 miles from Berlin; at the same time, General Patton was 650 miles from Berlin . . . June 1944 represented the end for the Third Reich. By August 1944, the end of Operation Bagration was in sight, and Berlin became the focus for the Red Army. Somebody needed to march into Berlin and end the war, and the Red Army was the one to do so. Therefore, 85% of all Wehrmacht losses during WW II were against the USSR. By mid-to-late 1943, German U-Boats could not win the Battle of the Atlantic, nor could German Panzers win in Russia . . . Germany would fight on, ferociously, but moving forward with a Blitzkrieg was over.

0 Comments

Turning the Tide of WW II: Gaining Command of the Air

3/23/2016

0 Comments

 
        Source: Paul Kennedy. Engineers of Victory: The Problem Solvers Who      
                                            Turned the Tide in the Second World War (2013)

Picture
     By the Fall of 1943, the Luftwaffe was clearly winning the battle in the skies over Europe. On 30 March 1944, ten weeks before D-Day and fourteen months after Casablanca, 795 Royal Air Force (RAF) bombers were sent to attack Nuremberg in Germany: 95 bombers failed to return, a dozen were scrapped on their return, and 59 were very badly damaged. But those losses paled in comparison to the losses of trained crews . . . by early-1944, things were going backwards for the Allies in terms of strategic bombing in Nazi Germany.
     It was amazing that the Allies didn't learn much from the Battle for Britain (overall plane/crew #'s pictured). The Germans "royally" failed in that not nearly enough bombers were sent to "get through" British defenses, the bombers didn't fly high enough, didn't have enough bombs, and had poor discipline in formation. The Allies felt when it was their turn to strategically bomb Germany, they would be much smarter with larger numbers of bombers flying at greater speeds and altitudes. Among other bombers, the Allies would fly B-24 Liberators and
B-17 Flying Fortresses at 24,000 feet (opposed to the Luftwaffe's 12,000 feet), which would minimize the loss of bombers. The Allies also assumed that the German people wouldn't be as tough as the British, which was the same conclusion reached by Hitler/Goering towards the enemy before the Battle for Britain. From late-1942 to early-1944, strategic bombing in Europe reached a level of stalemate much like trench warfare in World 
War I . . . no real attention was paid to the really important aspects of strategic bombing, such as distance, targeting, and detection.

Picture
      Spring 1942: British and Nazi stupidity. The RAF inexplicably bombed Lubeck, Germany, an ancient wooden-framed city. Hitler became so enraged that he ordered bombing raids on British cathedral and university cities such as York, Norwich, and Exeter. Bombs and crews were wasted, and hatreds become more inflamed; the Luftwaffe didn't touch the Rolls Royce engine factories or the Spitfire and Lancaster assembly lines.
     Hitler's "Retribution Bombing" served no strategic purpose for the Nazis, and it also took the focus off what should have been targeted in Britain. Hitler's "Retribution Bombing" desensitized Britain to the coming indiscriminate aerial bombings in Germany. A desire to payback German civilians for what the Luftwaffe did rose incredibly in Great Britain in 1942.

Picture
       By the time the United States Army Air Force (USAAF) started bombing German targets, it was natural that their first raids would be tentative and would stick close to their bases. From August through September 1942, the USAAF was having a "dream season"; everything seemed to go right. But on 9 October 1942, 108 USAAF bombers raided the heavy industries at/near Lille in France (pinned in the map), Luftwaffe fighters rushed past 156 Allied fighter escorts, and focused their attack on the B-17s and B-24s. The Luftwaffe fighters shot down 4 bombers, seriously damaged 4 more, and damaged 42 other bombers . . . the bloodletting had begun.
     More significant was that the Luftwaffe fighters caused a drastic drop-off in accuracy; only 9 of 588 high-explosive bombs fell within 1500 feet of any target. Many USAAF bombers aborted their runs entirely, and B-17 and B-24 gunners wildly inflated the number of Luftwaffe fighters they downed. These new crews were green-and-nervous, and after-action analysis was sub-standard. Of the 70+ claimed kills from the gunners on 9 October 1943, only ONE Luftwaffe fighter plane was actually shot down.

Picture
      The raid on the Schweinfurt's 3 ball bearing factories occurred on 14 October 1943. 60 bombers were lost, and 138 damaged; that meant that only 14% of the 229 USAAF aircraft that actually attacked the targets returned unscathed. The Luftwaffe defenses had been greatly improved; the first wave of defense were single-engine fighters, followed by a second wave of two-engine fighters, all firing rockets and large-caliber machine guns. The single-engine and two-engine fighters refueled and re-engaged from all directions, and the fighters concentrated on one USAAF formation at a time (here the Luftwaffe targeted, which they didn't do in Britain). 
     Rocket attacks were used against the formation, while machine guns were used against the crippled aircraft. At Schweinfurt (pinned in the map), an entire combat wing of the 1st Bombardment Division was almost completely wiped out. While some targets on the ground were hit, the bomber attrition rate was unsustainable; Schweinfurt was the highest bomber attrition rate to that point of WW II. The USAAF strategic bombing offensive had to be shut down - only short range targets were approved. 
     The upcoming winter allowed USAAF to take inventory, reassess strategy, and to rebuild morale . . . the USAAF was forced to admit that they had lost air superiority over Germany. Long-range fighter escorts now became absolutely necessary, but their current range wasn't close to what was needed. Fortunately for the battered USAAF bomber crews, solutions were just around the corner.

Picture
      In late-April 1942, Ronnie Harker, a RAF liaison test pilot for Rolls Royce engines was asked to test a problematic USAAF plane, Pursuit-Fighter 51 (P-51). The P-51 was a poor performing plane compared to the P-38 Lightning and the P-47 Thunderbolt . . . the P-51 seemed to be a round peg in a square hole. Harker first flew a P-51 on 30 April 1952; he was puzzled, in that it the plane turned easily and didn't stall, and functioned well in low-to-medium altitudes, and was aerodynamically superb (which meant low drag, less resistance in flight). 
     Harker wrote that if the P-51 had a Rolls Royce Merlin 61 engine, it would be 35 mph faster than a British Spitfire, and have the same power. As it turned out, the Merlin 61 engine was a perfect fit for the P-51; a Polish mathematician calculated that a P-51 with a Merlin 61 engine would outperform the Spitfire, reaching speeds of 432 mph and altitudes of 40,000 feet.
(pictured above: the P-51 Mustang and the British Spitfire)

Picture
      Those calculations would prove to be correct. In the RAF, Wilfrid Freeman (Churchill's favorite in the RAF, pictured) was in charge of the types of planes to be used, and he immediately saw the potential of the P-51 and ordered Merlin 61 engines to be installed on 5 P-51's despite Bomber Command wanting more Merlin engines. Soon thereafter, Freeman ordered 500 P-51's with the Merlin 61 engine . . . by now, the fighter plane was named the P-51 Mustang. Freeman pressured Churchill to pressure FDR to have the P-51 Mustang mass-produced in the U.S. 
     At that point, good old U.S. government bureaucratic bungling and military competition for resources interfered. Devotees of other planes just didn't believe the P-51 Mustang was as good as advertised. The USAAF, therefore, kept making inferior aircraft that was doomed to fail against German and Japanese fighters. The powerful political backers for each inferior plane were formidable, and FDR was unwilling to stand up to them, at least at that point.

Picture
     Eventually, the P-51 Mustang appeared in Europe in ever-increasing numbers, and became the most effective protectors of the USAAF daytime bombers. For unfathomable reasons, the P-51 Mustang was more efficient and more powerful than the Spitfire despite being heavier, which included the astounding fuel capacity of the aerodynamically-awesome plane. With maximum fuel tanks, the P-51 Mustang had a combat radius of 750 miles, twice that of a Spitfire.
     Also developed were "drop tanks" (pictured: a P-51 Mustang with drop tanks) which contained extra fuel. The purpose of the drop tanks was to burn the extra fuel BEFORE entering combat. They were used for every fighter, whether RAF or USAAF; the demand for aluminum drop tanks was such that the RAF developed a stiffened paper drop tank (108 gallons), which worked wonderfully, and also denied the enemy of any aluminum tanks on the ground. With these drop tanks, ALL Allied fighters could provide 100% protection for the bombers.

Picture
      All these developments led to the true breakthrough for the Allies in order to gain control of the skies in Europe: the destruction of the Luftwaffe fighter squadrons. The USAAF stuck to specific targets, such as oil refineries, which meant that, since there was less oil, the Luftwaffe fighters were unable to wait until USAAF escort fighters abandoned their bombers. Also, with so many P-51's in the USAAF, the order was given for many of the Mustangs to head-hunt Luftwaffe fighters while others protected the bombers.
     In the early months of 1944, RAF & USAAF losses were still severe, but reinforcing squadrons kept on the pressure, and the Luftwaffe was unable to replace/reinforce what it lost. Hitler and Goering re-tasked planes from the Eastern Front, which gave the Red Army more advantage. P-51 Mustangs were flying in broad daylight over Berlin (pinned in the map) by mid-1944; Goering stated "We have lost the war". P-51 Mustangs were destroying three-to-five times more fighters than the P-47 Thunderbolts, and the P-47's were putting up devastating totals of their own. 
By the Spring of 1944, P-51 Mustangs with drop tanks could escort B-17's all the way to Western Russia, over 1000 miles from their base.
     The Luftwaffe cracked in the Spring of 1944; there simply weren't enough planes, pilots, production, or communications. The Luftwaffe was hurt far more by aerial battles than the bombing of German factories. Then, in the late-Spring of 1944, Allied Supreme Commander General Dwight D. Eisenhower ordered the strategic bombing of key German railroad, road, and communications centers . . . it was time for Operation Overlord.

      Eisenhower's strategy of bombing key transportation/communication targets drastically limited Germany's ability to respond in force during D-Day, and beyond. The issue now was not how to get control of the skies, but WHAT to attack by air to end the war as soon as possible. On 6 June 1944, the whole thing, sea, land, and air came together for the Western Allies; 11,590 Allied planes were in the air during D-Day . . . amazingly, the Allies had gained control of the skies only 90-or-so days before Operation Overlord. (Below: an overview of Operation Overlord, showing the Allied mastery of the skies)
Picture
0 Comments

Turning the Tide in WW II: The Battle of the Atlantic

3/23/2016

0 Comments

 
        Source: Paul Kennedy. Engineers of Victory: The Problem Solvers Who      
                                            Turned the Tide in the Second World War (2013)
Picture
      Winston Churchill stated in his memoirs that the Battle of the Atlantic was what he worried about most; if it was lost, Britain would have run out of everything, including fuel . . . and the will to fight. At the end of 1942, Admiral Karl Doenitz had 212 operational U-Boats; by the time Churchill met President Franklin Roosevelt at Casablanca (pictured), the Nazis were by far sinking more Allied ships than the Allied ships were sinking U-Boats.
     In early-1943, Churchill's nightmare appeared to be coming true: 108 Allied ships were lost in March, with 2/3's of the total sunk in convoy on the single-most important route in the Atlantic. The Nazis came the closest to turning the tide in the Battle of the Atlantic in the first twenty days of March 1943 . . . the Allied strategy of using convoys was in doubt.

Picture
     March 1943 started off badly for the Allies since Doenitz had four large wolf packs in the Atlantic; two of them in the Central Atlantic, with one each on the Northern and Southern flanks. Doenitz also held a significant advantage with intelligence and decryption; Germany even knew where Allied ships were going and when they were leaving their harbor. Bletchley Park was unable to do the same in assisting the convoy escorts in terms of locating German U-Boats . . . the wolves were preying on the shepherds.
     On 5 March 1943, Convoy SC (Slow Convoy) 121 from New York City was slaughtered by U-Boats. 59 slow merchant ships were escorted by 5 ships without air cover facing 26 U-Boats. From 7 - 10 March, 13 ships were sunk without a single U-Boat being hit . . . it was the most one-sided encounter of the war, which explained Hitler's high-level of satisfaction after reading Doenitz's report. On 16-20 March 1943, Convoys HX (Fast Convoy) 229 and SC 122 went through the gauntlet of U-Boat wolf packs with a motley assembly of slow/ancient ships carrying crucial cargoes toward Britain. The convoys had become larger, with many more ships on the sea-lanes . . . while it was true that convoys with 60-90 ships had a greater chance of getting more cargo to Britain than 30 ships, the number of escort ships remained the same.

Picture
      Why did the Battle of the Atlantic go so poorly for the Allies in early-1943? 
     First, there were just too few escort ships protecting the convoys, and far-too-few aircraft providing protection. Also, the Nazis held an advantage with intelligence with their code-breaking/communications network, B-Dienst. Doenitz
(pictured) was able to direct four major U-Boat orchestras thousands of miles apart, especially since Allied intelligence was slow and late. 
     The lack of air cover in the "Air Gap" was beyond-significant; U-Boats were able to operate virtually unopposed . . . Allied planes just didn't have the capacity to fly far enough from their bases to provide air cover in that stretch of North Atlantic. By April 1943, Doenitz had 240 operational U-Boats with 185 more being retro-fitted or in the process of training crews. Doenitz was capable of sending 40 U-Boats against any single convoy . . . finally, on the Allied side, reality set in. Allied strategists/planners figured out that the convoys would need to fight their way across the Atlantic rather than evade the enemy . . . that crucial decision gave the Allies a much more clearer focus on how to deal with the wolf packs lying in wait. 

Picture
     What caused the change of fortunes in the North Atlantic? 
​     The greatest factor was aircraft; World War II was the war in which sea power was affected by air power. Doenitz lamented after WW II that Germany waged war without an "Air Arm" to complement and protect his U-Boats. Increased Allied air power took two forms: VLR (Very Long Range) shore-based aircraft, especially the B-24 Liberator, as well as B-17 Flying Fortresses and the PBY Catalina.       

​    Secondly were escort carriers (pictured), which were modest in speed and striking power compared to the US full-sized fleet carriers in the Pacific, but were perfect for the North Atlantic. Aircraft from the escort carriers could patrol for miles around, and they had similar weapons systems as the VLR's to destroy U-Boats. These planes rearmed and refueled overnight on the escort carriers and were able to repeatedly engage U-Boats.
     Doenitz never could cope with the increased Allied aircraft, which not only held an obvious speed advantage, but also had more accurate-and-lethal weapons necessary to destroy U-Boats. By mid-1943, a VLR B-24 Liberator could assist a convoy 1200 miles from it s base; Doenitz realized as early as 1941 that without air power, control of the seas was basically impossible, even for his vaunted U-Boats.

Picture
     For a nation dependent on long-range oceanic commerce, it was somewhat surprising that an "Air Gap" existed in the first place. But once diagnosed, closing the "Air Gap" didn't occur because some "great person" decreed so. For example, a team of mostly Canadian air engineers in early-1943 pulled one bomb bay from a Liberator and replaced it with extra fuel tanks, at last creating an aircraft that could reach the "Air Gap". There were scientists that developed more effective fuses for more predictable depth charges, as well as scientists and armaments experts that created the air-launched acoustic homing torpedo, nicknamed "Fido", which was specifically engineered to search-and-destroy submerged U-Boats.
     There were improvements to radar, escort carriers, and training schools that cranked out air crews. During 1943 in all theaters of WW II, 199 U-Boats were sunk, 140 of them by Allied aircraft; that trend would continue for the rest of WW II. The key task for convoy escorts, whether surface or aerial, was to prevent U-Boats from launching their deadly torpedoes at Allied merchant ships. 

Picture
      The main Allied counter-weapon, the MK6 Depth Charge, wasn't very reliable in early-WW II. The theory was that the large explosion, magnified under water, would rip apart the U-Boat's joints, since it wasn't a contact explosive. A depth charge was an attractive weapon in that it could be mounted on even the rear decks of a corvette, and used by anti-sub air patrols.
     However, the MK6 had significant disadvantages. A ship had to steam over where a U-Boat was detected, which would give the U-Boat time to dive deeper; the British Admiralty and the US Navy were slow to realize how quickly U-Boats were able to dive. Proximity fuses needed to be set at the last moment at the estimated depth of the U-Boat . . . on average hundreds of MK6 Depth Charges over days were needed to destroy a single U-Boat.

Picture
     On the other hand, there was the Hedgehog (after the grenades were launched, what was left looked like the spine of a hedgehog), which was so simple one wonders why it wasn't created during WW I. A Hedgehog was a multi-headed grenade launcher that fired forward of the warship; usually, the four-inch gun was replaced with the Hedgehog. The Hedgehog had several advantages over depth charges, and its introduction in 1943 was widely welcomed by escort ships. The time it took to fire at U-Boats was reduced, and a fusilade of 24-30 grenades rained-down on the U-Boat, with delayed and/or contact explosions.
     An added bonus was that the Hedgehog didn't distort sonar readings after the grenades were launched. By mid-1943, the British-invented Hedgehog was in wide use . . . by the end of WW II, the Hedgehog had destroyed about 50 U-Boats . . . and Allied weapons developers were in the process creating Hedgehogs that had projectiles that could search for submerged U-Boats.

Picture
     Centimetric Radar was even more of a breakthrough, maybe the greatest of the new or improved technology used in the Battle of the Atlantic. It was a miniaturized version of the large-scale and effective British on-land radar used v. the Luftwaffe during the Battle for Britain. A device needed to be invented that could hold the power necessary to generate the microwave pulses to locate specific/small targets AND be small enough to be put on an escort vessel or in the nose of a VLR. 
    Slowly, Centimetric Radar was introduced in Allied reconnaissance aircraft as well as corvettes. This new radar could spot a U-Boat's conning tower miles away, day-or-night . . . in calm water, the Centimetric Radar could even spot a single periscope. And, none of the U-Boat technology systems could detect the radar.

Picture
       More-and-more Allied escort commanders were thinking "kill" and "attack" far more than "protect" when facing U-Boats. The creation of "support groups" in addition to escort ships was key, in that the support ships could pursue U-Boats while the escorts guided/protected merchant ships. With more warships, escort carrier planes would do the air equivalent of a "Creeping Attack", in that two planes would strafe a U-Boat, while a third plane would go for the kill with bombs and/or torpedoes. 
     






 
 


    
    
         While the number of U-Boats sunk by carriers was much less than land-based aircraft, their presence and effectiveness was invaluable. By June-August 1944, Allied control of the air and sea-lanes in the North Atlantic was complete. For example, only 5 Allied vessels were sunk during D-Day by German U-Boats. Doenitz was still receiving and dispatching new U-Boats as late as April 1945; the submarines of the Kriegsmarine fought to the end of the war. During WW II, the casualty rate among U-Boat crews was 63% (76% if captured crews were included) . . . no other service in any other nation's military suffered so great a casualty percentage. (Below: Episode #1 of "The War Against the U-Boats")

0 Comments

Turning the Tide in World War II: An Overview

3/23/2016

0 Comments

 
       Source: Paul Kennedy. Engineers of Victory: The Problem Solvers Who      
                                           Turned the Tide in the Second World War (2013)
Picture
      Traditional World War II history focuses on "Top-Down, Great-Man" narratives, such as Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, General Dwight Eisenhower, Adolph Hitler, etc. Rarely do historians inquire into the mechanics and dynamics of strategic success or failure. For example, the British victory over the Spanish Armada in 1588; Sir John Hawkins drastically redesigned the galleons ten years earlier, which gave the Royal Navy the necessary firepower and speed to defeat Spain. Another example: as the British Empire grew, it was financed by the merchants of Amsterdam and other European centers, as well as the creation and development of the Bank of England (pictured above: FDR, Stalin, and Churchill at the Teheran Conference, 1943).

Picture
      At Casablanca in early-1943, FDR and Churchill proclaimed that nothing other than the unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers would be accepted . . . making the pronouncement was all well-and-good, but how to do so? At the time of the Casablanca Conference, the Allies were losing badly in all theaters . . . what needed to be done to win the war would have to be done at the "middle-level", involving thousands of people in various roles, both military and civilian. 
     First, the Allies needed to win control of the North Atlantic sea-lanes for their convoys. Second, the Allies needed to take control of the skies over West-Central Europe, so Britain would be more than just the launching pad for Operation Overlord, it would be the base of massive destruction from the air. Third, the Allies needed to find a way to get past Axis-held beaches and carry the fight to the heartland of Europe. Fourth, the Allies needed to find a way to counter the Nazi Blitzkrieg, and fifth, the Allies needed to find the best route and methods to take the war to Japan in the Pacific.
     In a little more than a year after Casablanca (pictured above, L-R: French General Henri Giraud, FDR, Charles de Gaulle, and Churchill), all of the above was achieved with the exception of the unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers. No straight causal line connects Casablanca to the reality of achieving all five major obstacles to win the war; the Allies were in no position to do anything of substance to pursue Casablanca's goals in early-1942 (actually, WW II deteriorated for the Allies in the months immediately after Casablanca). 
     Much like Pearl Harbor erased memories of the most divisive period in U.S. History after the Civil War (1938 - 1941; Isolationists v. Internationalists), the ultimate victories in 1945 erased the truth that the Allies were losing World War II by late-1942 / early-1943 . . . the final victories of 1945 obscured how difficult the Allied position was in the middle years of World War II.

Picture
     In the battle for control of the sea-lanes in the North Atlantic, losses among Allied merchant ships increased after Casablanca. During March 1943, German U-Boats sank 108 vessels, which stunned and demoralized the Western Allies. If the Allies couldn't reverse momentum, there would be no chance for Operation Overlord. Also, Allied strategic bombing in Europe after Casablanca went from bad-to-worse. the Royal Air Force (RAF) was running out of bombers due to the increased numbers and effectiveness of Luftwaffe night fighters.
     From November 1943 to March 1944, there were 16 massive Allied attacks on Berlin. The Allies lost 1047 aircraft, while another 1682 planes were badly damaged . . . attrition was even greater during daytime raids. On 14 October 1943, the ball-bearing factory at Schweinfurt (pinned in the above map) was targeted; 60 of 291 B-17 Flying Fortresses were shot down, and a further 138 damaged. The Allies found out that their theory that "the bomber will always get through" was beyond-wrong. Allied command of the sea-lanes in the North Atlantic and of the air over Western/Central Europe was an illusion . . . both needed to be drastically reversed if there was to be any chance of victory.

Picture
     It really didn't matter, in that the Allied Command had no idea how to achieve the incredibly difficult strategy/tactics of a major amphibious attack against an entrenched defensive force. Allied amphibious attacks had been relatively easy in North Africa, which was probably why FDR and Churchill were over-confident at Casablanca (Eisenhower was much less confident in terms of cracking Nazi defenses). 
     Dealing with the Germans on the Atlantic shore was a totally different proposition, as was discovered during the catastrophic 
Dieppe Raid in Aug 1942 (pinned in the above map) where the majority of Canadians were killed/wounded/captured. The conclusion by the Allies was that it was basically impossible to take a well-defended enemy harbor . . . the strategists started to think about a mass invasion on an open beach, which also seemed impossible. So then, how were the Allies supposed to take the war to Nazi Germany or Imperial Japan with ground troops . . . it definitely seemed like an impossibility by early-1943.

Picture
     Also vexing the Allied Command was how to stop the Nazi Blitzkrieg. During 1940-1941, the British army had been tossed out of Norway, Belgium, Greece, Crete, and France very quickly and easily by the Nazis. True, there was some good news before Casablanca with El Alamein in North Africa and Stalingrad in the Eastern Front, but Nazi Germany reorganized after those two defeats, and were also able to increase their manufacturing capacity.
    The German military had more-and-better aircraft, tanks, submarines, and on the Eastern Front, the Wehrmacht (the German unified military forces, but often the term refers to the German army) had stopped the Red Army's advance, and were assembling vast forces at Kursk. If Nazi Germany could keep up the momentum in the North Atlantic, blunt the effectiveness of Allied bombing in Europe, and deny the Western Allies any meaningful entry points in France, Stalin may have had no choice but to negotiate separate terms with Hitler, and for the second time in less than thirty years, Russia would have pulled out of a World War.

Picture
     And then there was the War in the Pacific, which was an entirely American enterprise. The dilemma: how exactly would Marines land on a heavily defended/mined/booby-trapped coral atoll. November 1943: Imperial Japan didn't value Tarawa (pinned in the map), since they only had 3000 defenders, but the losses of Marines taking the atolls shocked the US public. The Japanese had 270,000 defending the Philippines . . . MacArthur boldly stated that "I Shall Return", but that was pure theatrics . . . the reality was that the US had no chance to force Japan off the Philippines in early-1943.
    Systems networks were in play in a military sense, in that successes and failures elsewhere affected other regions/theaters, and the actions of others benefited/cursed others. For example, Stalin benefited tremendously from the Allied bombings in Germany, since Hitler needed to keep military forces in Germany instead of sending them to the Eastern Front. An advantage gained by the Allies in one theater could help campaigns elsewhere, and a serious defeat could damage chances of success in another theater(s).

Picture
      All five separate-though-interconnected challenges facing the Allies were overcome in about 17 months, from February 1943 to the Summer of 1944, which was roughly between Casablanca and the quadruple successes of Normandy, the Fall of Rome, the Marianas Landings, and Operation Bagration in the Eastern Front. 
     There was still some work to be done: "Island-Hopping" in the Pacific and continued strategic bombing in Germany, and Japan as well as the advance of the Western Allies to Berlin. True, the Axis Powers overreached in their aggression, and the US especially was able to employ unmatched resources, but HOW did the Allies recover and fight their way to victory during those pivotal 17 months in 1943-1944 . . . 

Picture
     What if . . . the U-Boats had not been defeated in the Summer of 1943, or if the vaunted Luftwaffe wasn't crushed in early-1944 . . . or if the Red Army hadn't defeated the Nazi Panzers. What if . . . legendary "turn-around" weapons such as the P-51 Mustang or the B-29 Superfortress (pictured below) weren't developed . . . or if the miniaturized radar that arrived on the scene in 1943-1944 hadn't been developed in time, or at all. Maybe the Allies would have won World War II anyway, but it would have been at much greater cost in a much-longer time frame. For the United States, Great Britain, and the USSR, it would take not only their considerable resources, but also middle-level organizations to carry out the strategic goals and develop the technologies necessary to achieve total victory.

0 Comments

Ronald Reagan & the Republican National Convention of 1976

3/4/2016

0 Comments

 
                   Source: H.W. Brands. Reagan: The Life (2015)
Picture
      For the 64 year-old Ronald Reagan, if there was to be a public role after serving as California's Governor for 8 years, it would be in the White House, which was an unrealistic goal until President Richard Nixon imploded during the Watergate Scandal. Nixon was no longer in a position to anoint a moderate successor; for Reagan, pursuing the Republican nomination for President was now a far more realistic proposition.
     Reagan decided to make a run for the Republican nomination in 1976, but he didn't want to look too eager in trying to become the nominee. Reagan actually took a mini-gig on CBS Radio, where he had a daily five minute editorial (pictured: Reagan giving one of radio addresses). Those radio addresses kept Reagan in the public eye; Reagan preferred radio because he thought people would tire of him on television. The major reason was, perhaps, that Reagan thought TV would magnify is age.

Picture
       By 1980, Reagan (pictured below at his ranch  in 1976 with his favorite horse; his wife Nancy is to the left) was speaking via radio to at least 50 million Americans twice each day during commuting time; Reagan wrote every one of his 5 minute radio presentations. Reagan knew the radio was a very intimate medium; he purposely re-created his version of FDR's "Fireside Chats". Reagan wanted the audience to focus on his words and make their own images in their brain, rather than images he would have needed to provide if he was on television. 
     Reagan had no policy agenda beyond his basic conservative principles, which were anchored by his beliefs that the federal government was too large, taxes needed to be reduced, and that the US should stop "playing nice" with the USSR. Reagan expected events to provide opportunity and direction for a political comeback, and that occurred with the Fall of Saigon on 30 April 1975. Reagan blamed a lack of leadership in the federal government for South Vietnam falling to the North Vietnamese communists. Not long his radio addresses on Saigon, Reagan started to question the wisdom of detente with the USSR.

Picture
     Reagan did not think the US/USSR monster grain deal, which lessened Soviet food shortages, was a good deal for US farmers. Mostly, Reagan admitted that there were some economic benefits for the US, but he questioned the morality of the grain deal with communist Russia. 
     Reagan was appointed to the Rockefeller Commission (Nelson Rockefeller was President Gerald Ford's Vice-President), which was investigating the Central Intelligence Agency's actions. However, Reagan attended less than half the committee's 26 meetings. At the end of the investigation, Reagan signed the committee's report, which was no more than a "slap on the wrist" to the CIA.
      However, another investigation, the Church Committee, chaired by Democratic Senator Frank Church of Idaho (pictured to the left, with Republican Senator John Tower of Texas to the right), uncovered CIA shenanigans. The Church Committee outlined CIA activities in Iran in 1953 (the Shah of Iran was brought back to power), Guatemala in 1954, the Bay of Pigs disaster in 1961, and assorted attempted assassinations. Conservatives like Reagan didn't want any sunshine on the CIA, which in their view could only weaken a part of the government that needed to stay viable and effective against foreign threats.

Picture
      Reagan didn't want to wait until President Ford stepped aside; he would challenge the President of the United States for the Republican nomination (pictured: Reagan and Ford at the Republican National Convention in Kansas City, MO). If Reagan had won the Election of 1976, only William Henry Harrison would have been older entering office. For Reagan, it was 1976 or never in terms of becoming President; the problem for Reagan was that it was a desperate decision, not an astute move, in pursuing the nomination at that point in time.
     It was a long shot for Reagan to defeat Ford for the Republican nomination; as President, Ford had vast power within the party machinery compared to Reagan. Reagan also risked being blamed for splitting the Republican Party, and if Ford lost the General Election, Reagan would face even more blame. On 20 November 1975, Ronald Reagan formally declared himself as a candidate for President at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C.

Picture
      In December 1975, a Gallup poll had Reagan ahead of President Ford 40% to 32% among Republicans. In February 1976, Ford defeated Reagan by 1% in the New Hampshire primary (pictured: Reagan campaigning in New Hampshire in January 1976). Reagan and his team made a tactical blunder, in that he left New Hampshire during the final two days before the primary vote to campaign in the Midwest. Ford's campaign took full advantage, claiming the mantle of victory in New Hampshire, and benefiting from the corresponding momentum. 
     Reagan and his campaign staff knew they had blown it in New Hampshire, and were unable to effectively compete in the next five primaries, losing to Ford in all of the contests. Each loss in a primary eroded Reagan's credibility in the Republican Party, and Reagan was pressured to drop out of the race, and support Ford as a loyal Republican. Reagan responded that he would battle all the way to the Republican National Convention in Kansas City.

Picture
     After Reagan was trounced in Florida, even his wife, Nancy, thought Reagan should drop out of the primaries (her main fear was that Reagan would not recover from what she viewed as repeated political embarrassments). But Reagan, with the help of Senator Jesse Helms
​
(R; NC) was able to arrange a 30 minute television broadcast, where Reagan espoused his conservative bona fides, and where he also was able to re-introduce himself to the American South.
     Reagan attacked President Ford for "giving away" the Panama Canal, something over which Ford had no influence or control, other than to continue what had started in the 1960s. But Reagan's attack struck a chord, and Reagan stunned Ford and the Republican leadership by winning North Carolina 52% to 46%. North Carolina had their delegates committed proportionately, so Reagan only garnered 28 delegates to Ford's 26. But the flow of campaign money increased, and Reagan was able to continue . . . Ford and his staff cast Reagan as a Republican Party "wrecker". 
     Reagan captured more Southern primaries, as well as Indiana, California, and Nebraska. The Ford team had a modest lead over Reagan in terms of delegates heading into Kansas City, Missouri. But the decision was made to bring James Baker (pictured above) to the Ford campaign, an organizing genius with legendary political connections, to insure that the Republican National Convention would not descend into chaos, which would benefit Reagan.

Picture
      Conventional wisdom had Ford needing about 40 more delegates for the nomination, with Reagan needing a little more than 100. Reagan gambled when he named his Vice-Presidential candidate early, selecting Senator Richard Schweiker (R; PA) in an effort to claim Pennsylvania's delegates. But Reagan and his team once again miscalculated, and he lost many of the Southern delegates that he had worked so hard to get in his fold during the primaries . . . and it turned out that Schweiker couldn't deliver on the expected Pennsylvania delegates.
     Reagan's defeat was sealed as a result, with Ford capturing 1187 delegates to Reagan's 1070. Despite the totals, conservative Republicans stayed with Reagan. Ford didn't ask Reagan to be his Vice-President, and Reagan never offered to be Vice-President. According to James Baker (Reagan's future Chief-of-Staff and the Secretary of the Treasury), had Reagan been asked to be the VP, he would have done so out of a sense of party loyalty . . . but if that would have occurred, it would have been very unlikely that Reagan would have been elected President in 1980. (pictured above: Reagan shaking hands with President Ford on the stage in Kansas City, with V.P. Rockefeller in the background).

Picture
     The Presidential Election of 1976: A Presidential Elector in Washington state, Mike Padden, was committed by tradition to vote for President Gerald Ford, who won the state over the Democratic candidate, Jimmy Carter. However, Padden used his Presidential Electoral Vote for Reagan instead of Ford (Padden didn't think Ford's stand against abortion was strong enough). Padden used his Vice-Presidential Electoral Vote for Ford's running mate, Senator Bob Dole (KS) . . . Dole received more Electoral Votes than than did President Ford, which was the first time a V.P. candidate received more votes in the Electoral College than the Presidential candidate from the same party.

0 Comments

Ronald Reagan: 1967 - 1975

3/4/2016

0 Comments

 
                   Source: H.W. Brands. Reagan: The Life (2015)
Picture
      Governor Ronald Reagan took special pleasure in attacking the University of California at Berkeley whenever possible. Reagan vowed to "clean up" Berkeley, citing a need to change the leadership at the university's administration, which he believed was enabling a minority of malcontents to disrupt the education of the majority of students. 
     In February 1969, the Third World Liberation Front attempted to close down Berkeley's campus; Reagan responded by declaring an "extreme emergency", and sent state troopers to assist local authorities. Several weeks later, a property dispute arose at Berkeley, where a recently purchased lot remained empty; hippies and radicals squatted in the lot, proclaiming it to be the "People's Park" (pictured). Reagan had taken some criticism in California when he pursued the Republican nomination that he wasn't decisive-enough to be Governor . . . Reagan was itching to show that he was indeed decisive.

Picture
     Reagan unilaterally ordered the area cleared, and then a fence erected to keep out the squatters. The fence was quickly erected, but a march to "take back" the People's Park started to move towards the area. Protesters threw rocks, concrete, and metal objects at the police, while police responded with tear gas and shotguns loaded with birdshot or buckshot (which was far worse, and its use was disputed by the police). Dozens of protesters were wounded, and one was killed; the California National Guard was called in, and remained under Reagan's orders.
    Reagan officially blamed the "street gangs" and "campus radicals" for the violence; Reagan's words exacerbated the crisis, and shortly afterwards, National Guard helicopters sprayed tear gas on the protesters (pictured: a helicopter spraying tear gas on 20 May 1969). The Berkeley faculty denounced Reagan's "military occupation", and demanded an audience with the Governor. In a televised address at the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco, Reagan held firm. He cited many examples of lawbreaking in the last year at Berkeley, and he specifically identified the leaders of the riots as political agitators, with "lemmings" as followers. Reagan also called-out the Berkeley faculty, blaming them for creating the current polarized atmosphere on campus.

Picture
      Reagan ran for re-election in 1970 while campus turmoil shifted to the University of California at Santa Barbara, where radicals were protesting the Military-Corporate Complex. Reagan once again declared a state of emergency, and again called in the National Guard. Reagan thought he knew the cause of the crisis: a small group of revolutionaries trying to rock the boat . . . Reagan was quoted as saying, "If it's to be a bloodbath, let it be now" (a comment which he obviously regretted). 
     California voters liked Reagan and his pragmatism, but they weren't as enthusiastic in 1970 as they were in 1966: in 1966, Reagan had .580 of the popular vote, compared to .530 in 1970. Although the margin of victory in 1970 was half that of 1966, Reagan viewed it as a "win-is-a-win", and accepted the outcome (pictured: campus unrest increased in 1970 when Nixon ordered the invasion of neutral Cambodia).

Picture
      In 1964, Americans soundly rejected Barry Goldwater's ultra-conservatism, and in 1972, Americans soundly rejected George McGovern's ultra-liberalism; Nixon was right in the middle between the two extremes, which appealed to most Americans. Big government wasn't the enemy, and it wasn't a best friend . . . most Americans wanted a stable, calm status quo.
     For Reagan, if there was a public role after serving two terms as Governor of California, it was in the White House, which was an unrealistic goal until Nixon's implosion during Watergate. Reagan (pictured with Nancy on 10 March 1974 returning to Los Angeles) turned 64 after his two terms, and Nixon was no longer in a political position to anoint a moderate successor . . . the road was wide open, and Reagan decided to make a run for the Republican nomination in 1976 (but not too eagerly . . .).

Picture
      Reagan actually took a mini-gig on CBS Radio, five minutes twice a day during the commutes. Reagan was able to stay in the public eye, and avoid being on television; he believed that people would tire of seeing him on TV every day with Walter Cronkite (another reason was that Reagan thought the TV would magnify his age). By 1980, Reagan was speaking to at least 50 million people in the morning and afternoon.
     Reagan wrote every one of his five minute radio broadcasts himself. Reagan remembered the intimate nature of FDR's "Fireside Chats", and re-created his version twice a day. Reagan wanted his words to be the focus, not images he would have needed to feature on TV. Reagan had no policy agenda beyond his basic conservative principles; he expected events to provide direction, and that occurred with the Fall of Saigon in 1975.

Picture
     Reagan blamed a lack of leadership in the federal government for the nation of Vietnam becoming all-Communist. Soon, in his radio addresses, he started questioning the wisdom of "detente" with the USSR. Reagan had a big problem with the US/USSR monster grain deal which lessened food shortages in Russia; mostly, he questioned the morality of the grain deal (why should the US assist a communist nation in any way?) admitting that there were economic gains, especially by US farmers.
     Reagan was appointed to the Rockefeller Commission, whose job it was to investigate the CIA. Reagan attended less than half of the 26 meetings (Reagan is pictured to the left of Vice-President Nelson Rockefeller); in the end, Reagan signed the Commission's findings, which were basically a "slap on the wrist" against the CIA. 
     But, the Church Committee (chaired by Senator Frank Church of Idaho) uncovered shenanigans by the CIA, including Iran in 1953, Guatemala in 1954, and the Bay of Pigs in 1961, as well as assassination attempts. Conservatives, like Reagan, didn't like any sunshine showing on the CIA; to Reagan, the CIA needed to stay viable and effective to guard against foreign threats . . . especially Communist foreign threats.

0 Comments

Governor Ronald Reagan and Campus Turmoil in California

2/21/2016

0 Comments

 
                Source: H.W. Brands. Reagan: The Life (2015)
Picture
      Governor Reagan took special pleasure in attacking UC-Berkeley whenever possible (even when he was campaigning for Governor in 1966). Reagan vowed to "clean up" the campus at the University of California at Berkeley, citing a need to change the university's administration, which in his view was enabling a minority of beatniks and malcontents to disrupt the education of the majority of students.
     In February 1969, the "3rd World Liberation Front" attempted to close down Berkeley's campus. Reagan responded by declaring the situation an "extreme emergency", and he sent state troopers to assist local law enforcement. In the spring of 1969, a property dispute erupted, where a recently purchased lot by the university sat idle, and hippies and radicals squatted in the area proclaiming the lot to be the "People's Park"
(pictured: squatters working to create the "People's Park" in the idle lot). Reagan had taken some criticism in California that he wasn't a decisive governor, and Reagan was itching to show his decisiveness to the entire nation.

     Governor Reagan unilaterally ordered the area cleared, and then a fence erected to the out the protesters. The fence was quickly constructed, but a march to "take back" the People's Park started to move towards the area. Protesters threw rocks, concrete, and metal at the police, while police used tear gas and and in some situations, used shotguns with birdshot (or buckshot, which was worse). Dozens of protesters were wounded, and one was killed. Reagan called in the California National Guard, and they remained until the crisis ended. Reagan officially blamed the "street gangs" and campus radicals for the violence. (Below: a short video segment that summarizes Reagan's response in Berkeley in May 1969)
      Reagan's rhetoric exacerbated the crisis at Berkeley; helicopters were called in to spray more tear gas to disperse the protesters. The Berkeley faculty demanded an audience, and denounced Reagan’s “military occupation” on the campus. Reagan held firm as he addressed the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco, which was carried on live television. 
     Reagan cited many examples of lawbreaking in the past year at Berkeley, and he specifically identified the leaders of the riots as political agitators; Reagan also blamed those that followed the riot's leaders. Reagan also called out the faculty for creating the current polarized atmosphere on campus.

Picture
      In the gubernatorial  election in California in 1970, Reagan ran for re-election. Campus turmoil continued, this time at UC-Santa Barbara, where radicals were protesting against the Military-Corporate Complex. Reagan once again declared a state of emergency, and once again called in the National Guard.
     Reagan thought he knew the cause of the riots in Berkeley and Santa Barbara: a small group of revolutionaries that enjoyed creating a crisis. Reagan was quoted as saying, on 7 April 1970, "If it's to be a bloodbath, let it be now" . . . Reagan regretted saying those words, especially since they were publicly reported. But a majority of voters liked Reagan and his pragmatism, but they weren't as enthusiastic in 1970 as in 1966. In 1970, Reagan garnered 53% of the popular vote, while in 1966 it was 58%. Reagan's margin of victory was about half of what it was in 1966, but Reagan accepted the results, saying a "win is a win". 

Picture
      University and college campuses erupted in protest nationwide when President Nixon ordered the invasion of Cambodia; Governor Reagan continued to take a hard line against campus protests, regardless of the motivations. In 1964, American voters soundly rejected Barry Goldwater's ultra-conservatism; in 1972, American voters resoundingly rejected George McGovern's ultra-liberalism. Richard Nixon was right in the middle between the two political extremes, and he often appealed to both sides. To Nixon, big government was not the enemy, but it wasn't a best friend, either . . . most Americans wanted a predictable and stable status quo by the early-1970s. In the Election of 1972, Nixon won 49 states; only Massachusetts (and Washington, D.C.) the most liberal state in the nation at that time, voted for McGovern.

0 Comments

Ronald Reagan: 1964 to July 1968

2/14/2016

0 Comments

 
                     Source: H.W. Brands. Reagan: The Life (2015)
Picture
      In 1964 Ronald Reagan needed work, and he was hired as the host of "Death Valley Days", a television show that had its roots in radio. Reagan was able to travel much as he did when he was the host of "General Electric Theater", but this time in service of his own political brand: "Reagan the Conservative". 
     Opinion polls had Reagan far ahead of any other challenger for the Election of 1966 for Governor of California, and the national media had started to notice. Reagan's main problem at this point was that he needed to keep the conservative wing of the Republican Party happy without scaring the devil out of everyone else in California, which was what Barry Goldwater was unable to do in 1964. Even though Reagan had previously attacked Republican moderates, he toned down his rhetoric in early-1966 concerning that wing of the party.

Picture
     On 4 January 1966, Reagan felt it was time to formally announce his candidacy for Governor of California. Reagan did so with a 30m TV special that was broadcast to 16 stations around California. In the California Republican primary, Reagan won by a 2:1 margin; conservatives now had real hope for Reagan winning the gubernatorial election. 
     Reagan had a winning personality to go with his conservative credentials. Governor Pat Brown, by comparison, looked stodgy and slow. In a June 1966 poll, Reagan held an eleven point lead over Brown, and the Governor was never able to close the gap. On 8 November 1966, Reagan crushed Brown by tallying one million more votes; Republicans swept the statewide offices as well. Nationally, seven other Republicans were elected governor, and Republicans won three Senate seats, and forty-seven seats in the House of Representatives.

Picture
      Reagan started his term as Governor on 2 January 1967, with his public Inauguration occurring a few days later (pictured). The details of governing would rarely interest Reagan; he was a man of ideas and principles . . . the details he left to others. The typical person that worked for Reagan did whatever he/she could to make life easier for Reagan, even though he never asked them to do so. Such was Reagan's personality - niceness, integrity, vision, etc.; people worked hard for him. Reagan's vision and philosophy was his strength, while an over-reliance on many others to carry out the necessary details of government was a weakness . . . both his strengths and weaknesses became apparent as he tried to balance California's budget.

Picture
     Although California law prohibited the state from running a deficit, accounting gimmicks from Governor Brown's administration meant that Reagan inherited a budget that was wildly out-of-balance. Reagan proposed a 10% overall slash in the budget; that proposal antagonized anyone that looked to state programs for assistance . . . Reagan's budget proposal created far more losers than winners. (pictured: Governor Reagan and President-Elect Richard Nixon at the 1969 Rose Bowl)
     The Governor of California was expected to socialize, but Reagan was more of a loner by nature. Reagan went home every night, while state legislators, who were away from home in Sacramento, would "howl and the night". Reagan made some efforts at socializing, for example inviting legislators over for dinner, but his efforts didn't close the "social gap" between the branches of state government.
     California Democrats in the legislature attacked Reagan's budget proposal; it turned out that the Democrats paid far more attention to details than the new Governor. Democrats pointed out that Reagan's proposed 10% cuts across-the-board wouldn't eliminate the state budget deficit, and therefore a tax increase was needed. Reagan was forced to compromise with the legislature; a $1 billion tax increase was featured, which went against Reagan's fiscal philosophy (two of his basic principles were smaller government and less taxes), but he had to take what he could get with the state legislature so soon after taking office.

Picture
     As the Republican National Convention (RNC) in Miami approached in the summer of 1968, Richard Nixon (pictured, in "Campaign Mode"), a moderate Republican, had positioned himself nicely for the nomination. Reagan looked around for the party's #1 conservative, and discovered that he was that man. Reagan allowed the California delegation to the RNC to nominate him as a "Favorite Son" candidate. With 86 delegates from California, Reagan hoped to develop momentum before the RNC.
     Reagan, like Nixon, went on a multi-state speaking tour before the convention. Reagan campaigned like a candidate for President, even though he was technically non-committal. When Robert Kennedy was assassinated in June 1968, Nixon, the moderate, politically benefited far more than Reagan. Moderate Republicans evoked less emotional passions in the extremely polarized social and political landscape of 1968 compared to the conservative Reagan, who to many was still a very scary proposition, even among Republicans.

Picture
      Nixon had enough delegates from the primaries to win the nomination as the Presidential candidate for the Republican Party on the first ballot. As the Republican National Convention convened in August 1968 in Miami, Nelson Rockefeller and Ronald Reagan both tried to sap Nixon's strength; Reagan's people tried to get a speaking appearance for Reagan in front of the entire convention before any balloting took place. 
    But Nixon was a savvy politician, and he was able to keep Reagan off the stage before the balloting while courting Southern delegates by promising that he wouldn't nominate a liberal Republican for the Vice-Presidential slot (Nixon selected Spiro Agnew as his running mate). As predicted, Nixon won the nomination on the first ballot with 692 delegates, while Reagan finished third with 182 (Nelson Rockefeller finished second with 277); only then did Nixon allow Reagan on the stage to address the convention, for the sole purpose of recommending that Nixon's nomination be unanimous (the final ballot, after "switching", was Nixon with 1238 delegates, Rockefeller with 93, and Reagan with 2; pictured above - NBC anchorman John Chancellor interviewing Reagan on the floor of the convention).

0 Comments

Ronald Reagan: 1961 - 1965

2/3/2016

0 Comments

 
                     Source: H.W. Brands. Reagan: The Life (2015)
Picture
      Some enter politics seeking power, but Ronald Reagan entered politics wanting attention. Unlike Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon, who were about power and making their marks on history, Reagan merely wanted a large audience, notice, and applause . . . he craved the political stage.
     In the early-1960s, the ratings for General Electric Theater were slipping; the format was outdated compared to most other programs. In 1961, the Justice Department launched a probe into price-fixing, and GE was the prime target; JFK's election as President had shifted the political landscape towards Liberalism and Big Government. Reagan was bucking the political tide with his conservative speeches, and GE didn't want their profile to be any greater than what it already was with the government. GE offered to let Reagan do GE commercials if he would stop talking conservative politics when he was representing the company. In 1962, Reagan formally refused GE's offer, and GE canceled their TV show, completely severing ties with Reagan.

Picture
      Reagan was unemployed during the most dire moment of the Cold War: the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962. The Cold War was in Europe, Asia, Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America, especially with Fidel Castro in Cuba. Soviet missiles in Cuba gave U.S. leaders a sobering taste of the elixir that the USSR was drinking in terms of the proximity of enemy nuclear missiles. 
     In the midst of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the growing US involvement in Vietnam, and JFK's Assassination, Reagan had the opportunity to publicize his conversion to Republican Conservatism (he had long been a "New Deal Democrat"). Republicans were split, some believing that the moderate President Eisenhower was too accommodating, not only to liberals, but also to the USSR. These conservatives pointed to the expanded role of the federal government, the main reason being Social Security. These conservative Republicans were concerned that the Grand Old Party was actually losing its political soul. (Pictured: an ad promoting a conservative speech by Reagan while he was still employed with General Electric)

Picture
      Senator Barry Goldwater (AZ) was the best of the conservative Republicans to promote for high office. While he rode Eisenhower's coattails to the Senate, Goldwater called Ike's policies "A Dime Store New Deal". Easily re-elected to the Senate in 1958, Goldwater appealed to millions of American conservatives; he lamented the growth of Big Government, but supported a large military in order to meet the threat of international communism, especially from the USSR.
     Goldwater favored equality, but he opposed Civil Rights on the political belief that the states should have the authority with legislation on that issue, not the federal government. Goldwater was contested in the Republican primaries by Nelson Rockefeller (pictured: Goldwater is to the right), the Governor of New York. Goldwater edged Rockefeller in the California primary, which gave Goldwater a decided advantage in the Republican National Convention in the Cow Palace in San Francisco.

Picture
      The Republican National Convention of 1964 was perhaps the ugliest in the 108 year history of the party. Western conservatives howled and heckled the moderate Rockefeller, and then used his divorce and remarriage as an issue to sidetrack his nomination; conservatives were not about to let a divorced man be their party's nominee for President.
     Moderates tried every trick they knew to keep Goldwater from becoming their party's candidate, even during the "11th Hour", but Goldwater and his supporters had a lock on the nomination. Goldwater became the nominee with 883 delegates, William Scranton (Governor of PA) finished second with 214, and Rockefeller finished a very distant third with 114 delegates.
     During his acceptance speech, Goldwater stated "extremism in the defense of liberty . . . is no vice . . . and moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue"; conservative Republicans were elated. But conservatives soon discovered that they had nominated an unelectable candidate for the Election of 1964: President Lyndon Johnson received the highest percentage of the popular vote in history, .611, to Goldwater's .385.

Picture
      Goldwater's main motivation for asking Reagan to give the "Time For Choosing" TV/radio address (27 October 1964) so close to the election was to try and woo as many Southern Democrats to vote for Goldwater as possible. The speech was a huge success for Reagan; no speech in US History did more to launch a political career. True, William Jennings Bryan's "Cross of Gold" Speech in 1896, and Abraham Lincoln's "Cooper Union Address" in 1860 were significant, but both were already in politics . . . Reagan had never held any elected office . . . he had never even run for an elected office.
     Reagan had only been a Republican for two years, and with one speech, he was viewed as the #1 conservative Republican after Goldwater's disastrous showing in the Election of 1964. Almost immediately, Reagan was being mentioned as a Republican candidate for the Governor of California. Democratic Governor Pat Brown's second term expired in 1966, and many California Republicans viewed Reagan as their chance to win the state's highest political office.

Picture
      Reagan (pictured riding a horse at his ranch in 1965) and the Republicans in California faced obstacles, especially because the state had overwhelmingly voted for LBJ in 1964. Also, Reagan didn't have political experience, and he had been a Democrat for most of his 53 years . . . and many still viewed him as too conservative. Added to the hurdles in place was that Reagan hated flying, and preferred to travel by train, which drastically reduced the number of campaign appearances he could make.
     But Reagan was a Southern Californian, and that's where most of the votes were located, and his apparent Republican opponent for the nomination was a Northern Californian. Reagan had the advantage of coming through great on television, and when Reagan spoke, it was on broad principles instead of political details. Reagan did attack moderate Republicans, stating that the moderates were the main reason for Goldwater's defeat. Despite his popularity in California, Reagan remained noncommittal about running for governor.

Picture
      For conservatives in the 1960s, the decade was the worst of times; tradition and stability were challenged as had rarely occurred before. But at the peak of Liberalism, when LBJ signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 into law, he commented to journalist Bill Moyers that he thought that he just delivered the South to the Republicans for a very long time. 
     But, ironically, the 1960s were the best of times for conservatives as well, in that there was a sense of lawlessness and disorder that galvanized conservatives into action across the nation. Race riots occurred in Harlem, Philadelphia, Rochester (NY), and Jersey City in 1964, and then the Watts Riot (headline pictured to the left) started just days after LBJ signed the Voting Rights Act of 1965 into law. (the only African-Americans that were safe during the riot were those that shouted "Burn Baby Burn"). Until 1965, the main complaint of conservatives was that the federal government was too large, but with the race riots, conservatives actually started to think that the federal government might be too small to secure law and order.

Picture
      Conservatives blamed "Bleeding-Heart Liberals" for the lack of law and order in America. Conservatives didn't see poverty and inequality as the main causes of lawlessness and disorder; to conservatives, Liberalism corroded the US character, and the race riots were confirming evidence. 
     And then, there were the Baby Boomers; they represented the first huge wave of students that hit colleges / universities in the 1960s. These Baby Boomer students demanded autonomy and protested such issues as freedom of speech. The University of California at Berkeley was the first flashpoint; a combination of anti-Establishment and anti-Vietnam activists protested the restrictions of freedom of speech on campus. Conservatives were especially irked by the anti-Vietnam War protesters, whose war model was World War II; many conservatives branded resistance to the draft as sedition, or even treason.
     Conservatives, such as Reagan, wondered who was more responsible for what was wrong with America: the over-sized liberal government under LBJ, or the "Long Hair" protesters on college campuses. The question that was most-often asked by conservatives was this: why didn't the federal government do something about the disorder in America? Due to this frustration and anxiety, the stage was set for a conservative backlash to Liberalism, and with the right candidate, Conservatism could rise again . . . the stage was set for Ronald Reagan's entry into politics in the California Gubernatorial Election of 1966.

0 Comments

Ronald Reagan, the McCarthy Era, and Television (1948 - 1954)

1/23/2016

0 Comments

 
                Source: H.W. Brands. Reagan: The Life (2015)
Picture
      Republican conservatives absolutely hated the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, mostly for fiscal reasons; to them, the New Deal had gone international, and Big Government was growing bigger at the expense of the American citizens. The Election of 1948 looked bleak for President Harry Truman, since many Americans were clamoring for a change-of-party after 16 years of Democrats in the White House. But Truman barely eaked-out a victory; Ronald Reagan, out of habit, remained loyal to the Democrats, endorsing Truman and raising campaign funds for the President.
    Truman celebrated his narrow electoral victory by having the US join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which was a huge affront to Republican conservatives. NATO was America's first peace-time alliance, which committed the US in advance to defend Britain, France, Italy, and 8 other nations from any external attack. Truman and most of the Democrats saw NATO as the "Capstone of Containment", while conservatives thought war-making powers were taken from Congress and handed to the Executive.
     Republicans overall were in a quandary, in that they hated Big Government, but they also hated Communism. In the end, Republicans (especially conservatives) believed that the threat to US liberty was greater from international communism than from domestic liberals. Therefore, there was just enough Republican support in Congress to approve NATO, as well as Truman's Cold War agenda.

Picture
      In 1948, the Supreme Court ruled that the major studios couldn't also control theater distribution (U.S. v. Paramount); for the first time, the studios had to compete to place their movies in American theaters. The big movie stars had nothing to worry about, but marginal actors, such as Ronald Reagan, found less-and-less work.
     Another factor that changed the landscape for the big studios in Hollywood was television. By 1955, 30 million homes had a TV, which was about half the residences in America (by 1960, there would be 60 million residences with TV). As the President of the Screen Actor's Guild (SAG), Reagan had to decide if TV actors would be represented by SAG. To Reagan and SAG, TV actors seemed more like stage actors, so the decision was delayed. The radio industry tried to create an all-encompassing union for actors & performers, but Reagan still resisted, believing that movie actors represented the elite aspects of the industry. Plus, most of the members of SAG lived in Hollywood, where most other performers lived in New York City.

Picture
      Reagan also saw a political problem, believing the Television Authority (TVA) might be a haven for subversives (Reagan characterized the TVA as "catnip to a kitten where the little Red brothers are concerned"). In other words, Reagan believed that "One Big Union" played into the hands of communist subversives; ultimately, SAG stood pat, and TV actors joined the radio performers in the American Federation of TV & Radio Artists.
     Theodore Roosevelt was the first celebrity President, using the newspapers as his medium to do so. Franklin Roosevelt was the first President to really use the radio, and Reagan, as President, would use TV to great effect, but . . . it was Senator Joseph McCarthy (R; WI) that was the first major politician to use television. The political atmosphere in America was perfect for an ambitious politician like McCarthy; in 1949, the USSR announced they had the atomic bomb, Klaus Fuchs and Julius & Ethel Rosenberg were arrested, and China became a communist nation. The political atmosphere was perfect for McCarthy's rise to prominence when he gave his "Communist Infiltration" televised press conference; to most Americans, there was a real battle between Democracy and Communism, not only globally, but also in the U.S.

Picture
     Not long after McCarthy's televised press conference, North Korea invaded South Korea. McCarthy's "discovery" of communists in the State Department gave Republicans a powerful weapon, which they used against President Truman and the Democrats. Stunned by Truman's victory in 1948, the Republicans abandoned all respect for the President, and declared war on all-things-Truman. To the Republican leadership, McCarthy was just the bashi-bazouk ("undisciplined bandit") to lead their charge. 
    



     


   







                     
​      

​     McCarthy's attacks on Truman made the President un-electable in 1952; Truman didn't even pursue the Democratic nomination. Dwight Eisenhower delivered the White House to the Republicans for the first time since Herbert Hoover in 1928. McCarthy soon attacked Ike, claiming that he wasn't nearly as vigilant as he needed to be as President in dealing with the USSR, as well as subversives in the U.S. The Republican Leadership in the Senate gave McCarthy the chair on the Committee of Government Operations, and he used that chairmanship as a platform for his holy war against subversives, using live television to cover his committee hearings.

Picture
     The Army-McCarthy Hearings aired on live television in 1954, with ABC showing all of the hearings, while CBS and NBC had partial coverage. President Eisenhower and the Army were still seething at McCarthy's attacks on SecState George Marshall, and Ike and the Army set a trap for McCarthy.
     A McCarthy aide wanted favorable treatment for an assistant that had been drafted, which allowed the Army leadership to publicly denounce McCarthy . . . in essence, the Army "triple-dog-dared" McCarthy to hold televised hearings, and McCarthy obliged. The hearings aired for 36 days with 20 million viewers; McCarthy lacked the requisite "TV Persona", and as a result his approval plummeted. McCarthy's defeat proved the power of television to shape political perceptions; among many others, John F. Kennedy and Ronald Reagan were watching, learning, and waiting. (Below: the moment caught on television that was the beginning-of-the-end for Senator Joseph McCarthy . . . "Have you no sense of
decency, sir . . .")

0 Comments

Ronald Reagan, Hollywood, and HUAC (1947)

1/16/2016

0 Comments

 
                   Source:  H.W. Brands. Reagan: The Life (2015)
Picture
     Historically, there have been two main reasons for Congressional investigations. The first was to gather information for quality legislation, and the second was put/keep elected officials in the public eye . . . these Representatives / Senators would be the "Guardians of the Commonweal". 
     Investigations on suspected subversion have numbered a close second to war inquiries. But challenging the conduct of a war meant challenging the President (that's why most investigations have occurred after wars); challenging subversion, however was politically safe. Subversives, if they actually existed, were on the margin of society, and had few defenders. Members of Congress could foam-at-the-mouth with little worry of negative political consequences if they launched an investigation on suspected subversives.
    During World War I, Congress investigated German subversion in the US. When Germany was defeated, the focus immediately shifted to Bolshevik subversion, which was the "1st Red Scare". The House Committee on Un-American Activities was created in 1937 (it was originally called the "Dies Committee" since it was under the leadership of Chairman Martin Dies, Jr. 
​D; TX, pictured above)
, and launched its first investigation in 1938 . . . Dies tried to prove that communists were linked to the New Deal. In 1946, the committee started using the acronym HUAC (House Un-American Activities Committee).

Picture
       After the death of Franklin Roosevelt (12 April 1945) and the end of World War II, the Dies (pronounced Deez) Committee focused on FDR's pro-USSR propaganda films, which depicted Russia and Stalin as worthy allies against the Nazis. In 1945, the Dies Committee issued a confidential report that Hollywood was infested with communists. The report stated that if nothing was done with the 500+ communists, they would take over the film industry. Charges of communist subversion in the US was an effective ploy to use against Democrats in the Off-Year Election in 1946; Republicans took control of both houses, and swung into action against Hollywood (as well as President Harry Truman).
     In the spring of 1947, HUAC (pictured; HUAC committee member, California Representative Richard Nixon) launched a new investigation and sent members to assess the situation in Hollywood; studio executives were questioned about FDR's influence in making WW II propaganda films in support of the USSR . . . but the investigation that spring was nothing compared to the all-out investigation in the fall.

Picture
        HUAC summoned dozens of Hollywood producers, directors, writers, and actors to Washington, D.C. HUAC's official reason was to "spotlight" communists, to determine the extent of communist subversion in the film industry . . . then the public could do what it wanted at that point. The hearings were a big deal to the American public, in that witnesses were often famous Hollywood personalities.
      During the fall hearings, studio executives named people, including Dalton Trumbo (pictured; screenwriter) by Jack Warner; Director Sam Wood ("Kings Row", in which Reagan was a star) also listed names, and Louis B. Mayer was cooperative. But Mayer told HUAC that the industry did a great job of keeping communists at bay; these executives walked a thin line, in that they didn't want Congress to censor movies, but the executives also didn't want to be seen as obstructing a high-profile Congressional investigation . . . especially by movie-goers.

Picture
      The entire film industry was based on restraint-of-trade, and the studio executives didn't want to upset Congress, who then just might step in and break up the Hollywood Oligarchy of studios. After the executives, actors testified; Robert Taylor said he had often detected communist influences. After a few other actors, Ronald Reagan testified (pictured); his service in WW II greatly impressed the members of HUAC. 
     Reagan echoed what was stated before, being more specific without identifying people. He stated under oath that he believed that there was a communist influence in Hollywood, based on the votes of the Screen Actors Guild (SAG; of which he was their President) on certain issues. Reagan went on to say that Hollywood could police itself, claiming that 90% of SAG was communist-free. Reagan, again on the record, stated that unless the American Communist Party was directly influenced by the USSR, the party should not be banned, telling HUAC to let "Democracy do it's thing".

Picture
      Reagan really enjoyed being on the national political stage (he later entered politics mostly due to craving an audience and praise), plus he was very good at it, using his quick brain to respond in a variety of ways, including the use of humor. Reagan struck just the right chord of cooperation with HUAC in defending Hollywood, and he came out of the hearings with his reputation and image enhanced. 
     The same could not be said about the ten writers/directors, called "The Hollywood 10", who were cited for Contempt of Congress by a vote of 346 - 17. The most famous of the "10" was the first to testify, 
John Howard Lawson of the Screen Writer's Guild (Dalton Tumbo was part of the "10" as well). "The Hollywood 10" became heroes to the Liberals and Leftists, and pariahs to Conservatives all at the same time.            
     Studio Executives, once it became clear that public opinion was solidly behind HUAC, studio execs started to deny jobs to those in "The Hollywood 10", saying that their actions reflected poorly on the film industry. Those executives stated they would not employ any of the "10" until they were acquitted and declared under oath that they were not a communist. The executives also said the policy wasn't just for the "10"; they knew there was a risk, in that innocent people could be hurt, and that creativity suffered when fear was in the atmosphere in Hollywood.

Picture
      The HUAC hearings changed Reagan; he was exposed to the allure of the political stage, and he was also at an ideological abyss (he was still a self-proclaimed "New Deal Democrat" in 1947), over which he jumped when he joined the studio executives on the issue of communists in Hollywood. Fortunately for Reagan, "The Hollywood 10" weren't actors, so his job as SAG President was unaffected. Keeping actors working while keeping SAG "communist-free" coincided with the interests/goals of the executives.
     Reagan asked the executives what would happen if HUAC charged an actor with being a communist; the executives responded that if the actor refused to answer whether-or-not they were a communist under oath, the actor would be terminated. Reagan didn't object, since politics were the heart of the matter, far more so than economics. Reagan didn't yet know it, but this was this issue, fighting communism, on which he would build his political career.

Picture
     F.B.I. Director J. Edgar Hoover also wanted to talk to Reagan; FBI agents first interviewed Reagan in 1943, during a stagehand's strike. FBI agents told Reagan that communists in Hollywood hated him very much; Reagan was told of meetings where the question was asked what were they going to do with "that sonofabitching bastard Reagan". Reagan decided to cooperate after that eye-opening FBI interview, and in the spring of 1947, in another FBI interview, Reagan started to provide names, including the famous actress Anne Revere (pictured from "Gentleman's Agreement" with Gregory Peck in 1947; she won an Oscar for Best-Supporting Actress in "National Velvet" in 1944).
     In effect, Reagan became an informant for the FBI in Hollywood; Reagan's code-name was "T-10"; Reagan was among at least 18 Hollywood informants, and he never publicized his FBI connections. Reagan didn't think he was doing anything wrong; he judged that he would be far more effective as an informant if he remained anonymous, and the suspected subversives didn't know that he was an informant that ruined their careers . . . as would become clear when he was President, Reagan wanted the atmosphere that surrounded him professionally and personally to be as structured and pleasant as possible . . .

0 Comments

Ida Tarbell and John D. Rockefeller, Part Two

10/17/2015

0 Comments

 
         Source: Emily Arnold McCully. Ida M. Tarbell: The Woman Who
                        Challenged Big Business - And Won! (2014)
Picture
      In November 1902, the first installment of "The History of the Standard Oil Company" (HSOC) appeared in McClure's Magazine, written by Ida Tarbell. Even though the HSOC series had started, Tarbell's research was very difficult and complicated in that Rockefeller insisted on anonymity and was mostly invisible in the relevant Standard Oil documents; Rockefeller ruled his empire with winks, nods, hints, and handshakes . . . all designed to derail any investigation.
     Tarbell portrayed the independent oil producers as "Innocents" who risked everything in their ventures, and then a malevolent "Big Hand" (Rockefeller) came down and swatted them. Ida also wrote a separate article about the labor violence in the coal industry (Tarbell had little sympathy for labor union leaders), while Lincoln Steffens (pictured) wrote an article on the corruption in city governments for McClure's. All three articles were designed to show that the "American Contempt for the Law" negatively affected the public good.

Picture
        In effect, these three articles were the real birth of "Muckraking", which used the following formula: first, quality investigation exposes a major problem, then citizens read the article, then the citizens mobilize, and demand change. One of Tarbell's leading researchers discovered proof that Standard Oil had started manipulating prices in 1876; he found a memo from Henry Flagler (Rockefeller's major partner) which stated that an increase of a quarter-cent per barrel would net Standard Oil millions of dollars. Tarbell's goal in exposing the document was to show that Standard Oil's goal was to always artificially increase prices for the consumer, for the benefit of Rockefeller and Standard Oil.
     




  
    Tarbell contended that the independents welcomed competition (that basically wasn't true; Tarbell didn't have a great grasp on the mechanics and motivations within markets), and Rockefeller wanted to crush competition (that was absolutely true). Tarbell described a takeover by Standard Oil of an independent pipeline that used espionage, sabotage of a Buffalo refinery, and rigging an Ohio U.S. Senate election. 
     Even though Tarbell extolled the virtues of the independents, in private she became disillusioned about her heroes; her wrath with them was as great as with Rockefeller. Ida thought that the independents always seemed to make the wrong decisions and flunk-out at every critical juncture, but she kept her official written focus on the Standard Oil Trust (SOT) and Rockefeller . . . she kept going after "The Octopus". 

Picture
      Rockefeller's extreme elusiveness was in part due to the fact that he had lost all of his hair; that elusiveness cost him in that it worsened his reputation with the American public. Henry Demarest Lloyd, the first journalist to expose Rockefeller's decisions and practices with Standard Oil, finally agreed to meet with Tarbell. Lloyd documented that the railroad rebates were still occurring and benefiting Standard Oil, and the records of the rebates were continually destroyed. Ida borrowed documents from Lloyd's files, and used what she discovered in her HSOC series. 
     By 1904, Ida and her researchers still hadn't found a recent photograph of Rockefeller, and to Tarbell, the HSOC wasn't complete without one. Ida and her main assistant decided to attend Rockefeller's Baptist church incognito, using other parishioners as "cover". Also, a sketch artist would be with them in the church as well, and his sketch from the "secret mission" is pictured above.

Picture
     Men like Rockefeller were accustomed to living and operating with no regard for public opinion. But privately, Rockefeller referred to Ida as "Miss Tarbarrel" during the run of the HSOC in McClure's Magazine (1902-1904). Rockefeller and his family fell ill with one ailment or another during the run of the HSOC; "Junior" suffered the most, suffering from a mental breakdown. After "The History of the Standard Oil Company" finished its run, Tarbell followed with a "Character Sketch" of Rockefeller, focusing on a key point in time: Rockefeller's decision to pursue the South Improvement Company (SIC) - to Tarbell, that was the point-in-time where Rockefeller chose evil instead of good (Ida used searing language in her "sketch").
     Tarbell stated that a man of Rockefeller's power and influence should not be able to "Live in the Dark"; he was the victim of "Money Passion", which blinded him to the good in life (according to Mark Hanna, Rockefeller was "Money Mad . . . sane in every other way . . . but "Money Mad"). Tarbell's only praises for Rockefeller were that he was a good husband and father, and lived far more economically than other tycoons (tycoon is based on a Japanese word that meant "Great Lord").
     In the second installment of her "Character Sketch" on Rockefeller, Ida found a formal photograph, and based the installment on her observations of Rockefeller's face, asking readers to do the same. To Ida, the photograph of Rockefeller (pictured on the cover of McClure's, above) combined with the "Church Sketch" showed concentration, cruelty, craftiness . . . a repulsive "Living Mummy", who was far too stealthy and secretive for the public good (Ida even proved that Rockefeller's father, a known scoundrel, had been indicted for horse theft and rape). After her "Character Sketch" on Rockefeller, Ida Tarbell became the most famous woman in America (in part that was also due to the decline in popularity of Jane Addams in the early-1900's).

Picture
     All the while, Rockefeller never personally disputed Tarbell's findings or assertions in public. He probably believed such public responses were "beneath him", but he also didn't want to open any door to other investigations. Rockefeller could have ruined McClure's Magazine (and 
S.S. McClure's publishing empire) by influencing and intimidating advertisers, but he was confident that his secret business methods would remain secret . . . he felt safe from further exposure.
     Ida Tarbell (pictured at her desk at McClure's in 1905) condemned the practices of the Standard Oil Trust, but not the practice of Capitalism in general - Tarbell didn't have any problem with Combinations that used ethical means to earn profits. To Tarbell, Rockefeller's potential for greatness was ruined because he didn't played fair . . . in 1906, the Attorney General (Charles J. Bonaparte) agreed, in that he prosecuted Rockefeller and the Standard Oil Trust for unfair business practices under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act (1890). 

0 Comments

Ida Tarbell and John D. Rockefeller, Part One

10/17/2015

1 Comment

 
      Source: Emily Arnold McCully. Ida M. Tarbell - The Woman That 
                       Challenged Big Business, And Won! (2014)
Picture
      Ida Tarbell and her employer, S.S. McClure (McClure's Magazine) shared a longing for the bygone era of an "Uncorrupted America". Both wanted to do their part to restore that ideal, and in the process, assist working-class Americans as well as incoming immigrants. Exposing the ills of America would mean a huge investment in terms of money, time, and energy, and McClure's would be open to potential lawsuits as well. Therefore, Tarbell and McClure knew that the any articles that attacked big business would need to be exceptionally well-written and credible. Tarbell, McClure, and the staff at McClure's believed that reform-minded articles should be targeted to more than just the middle class and the "Upper-10's" (upper-10% of the population in terms of wealth). 
     






      
     After weeks of discussion and debate, the McClure's staff became convinced that Trusts (not a big business, but a board that supervised the operation of the big business) would be their focus for exposure and potential reform . . . but which Trust? Steel was considered, in that J.P. Morgan was in the process of creating the behemoth U.S. Steel, which would be the first "Billion Dollar Trust" . . . . but everything associated with that possible story line seemed too complicated. Tarbell told her colleagues about growing up in Northwest Pennsylvania around the emerging and expanding oil industry; given her skill-set and experience, it was a no-brainer that Ida Tarbell would write about John D. Rockefeller and Standard Oil (she reluctantly agreed to pursue the project). Tarbell wondered if readers would really enjoy a feature about interlocking corporations and their balance sheets; she didn't sense any potential for danger, just a desire to discover truth.

Picture
      John D. Rockefeller had, in essence, created the first modern corporation by establishing the Standard Oil Trust (SOT) in 1882. Even before 1882, the Standard Oil Company controlled the production and distribution of oil, as well as determining its use by the consumer. The SOT was created in that Combinations (big consolidated businesses) couldn't do business across state lines; Rockefeller wanted to consolidate even more power and influence in the oil industry.
     Rockefeller purchased tank cars, pipelines, banks, real estate, and even bribed politicians. He invested in newspapers so he could be portrayed in the most positive light; he never responded to criticisms and investigations of his methods or his Trust. New oil reserves were discovered in Ohio in 1885, and Rockefeller believed that this huge reservoir was a "Gift from God" given directly to him (even though the oil in Ohio had a strong sulfur content, but Rockefeller made it work as marketable fuel nonetheless). Ohio became the main source of petroleum for the SOT; not only had the SOT dominated refining, but by the mid-1890s the SOT became the dominant producer of oil in the industry.

Picture
      Rockefeller continued to crush the independent oil producers by underselling them, and by using unsavory methods, such as industrial espionage. By the mid-1890s, the SOT was a financial colossus, no longer subject to the market fluctuations in the oil industry. As late as 1900, most Americans still burned kerosene in their homes instead of electricity, and the SOT produced 86% of that kerosene - it seemed that no independent producer could survive (one survivor was the Pure Oil Company, and its treasurer was Will Tarbell, Ida's brother). 
     Ida's father told her not to publish the first three parts of "The History of the Standard Oil Company", in that he feared that Rockefeller's retribution would be fierce (e.g. buying McClure's Magazine). Tarbell's search for documents was difficult, in that the SOT and the railroads (esp. NY Central, Erie, and PA) destroyed as many documents as possible relating to the South Improvement Company (SIC). But she persevered, and found that while most documents were destroyed, some remained in scattered locations. Tarbell proved that the SIC was Rockefeller's tool, using not only rebates, but "drawbacks" (a percentage of the freight rates that the independents paid the railroads went directly to the SIC). Rockefeller promised that he would ship all his refined oil with the NY Central, Erie, and Pennsylvania railroads in exchange for the rebates/drawbacks; it wasn't illegal, but it certainly wasn't ethical . . . and to Tarbell, it was grossly unfair, and more-than-worth investigating further.

Picture
      Then, through a connection with Mark Twain (Ida had known him for quite a few years), Tarbell was able to meet with the Vice President of the Standard Oil Trust, Henry Rogers
(pictured below: Mark Twain with Henry Rogers, in front). Rogers admitted that the SIC was a mistake, and he even offered to arrange a meeting with Rockefeller. Ida visited Rogers at the SOT headquarters (26 Broadway in NYC) often for the next two years; she spent so much time there that some independents refused to talk with her, fearing that she was in league w/ Rockefeller. (Interesting fact: Tarbell earned $4000 per article, $107k today; by comparison, Rogers' secretary earned $10,000 per year at the SOT - $269,000 today). While Rogers cooperated most of the time, Tarbell still suspected that chicanery was afoot; she couldn't yet prove the espionage and criminal acts that she knew occurred due to the actions of the SOT. 

     The "breakthrough evidence" came from an unexpected source: a Standard Oil office boy. His job was to burn selected documents every night, and while doing so, saw the name of his Sunday School teacher on some documents. His Sunday School teacher was a refiner, and the documents showed that the railroads were warning the SOT well in advance of the oil shipments from the independent producers. As a result, the SOT could ship its product first, undercutting the competition.
     The office boy took the documents to his Sunday School teacher, who had already read Tarbell's first three installments of "The History of the Standard Oil Company", and believed in Ida's integrity to the point where he gave her the documents. Those documents proved that the SOT was still engaged in unethical, and even illegal shenanigans, and in February 1904, McClure's published "Cutting to Kill" . . . Henry Rogers refused to meet with Ida Tarbell again.
Picture
1 Comment

The U.S.S. Indianapolis, Part Two

8/16/2015

0 Comments

 
Source: Doug Stanton. In Harm's Way: The Sinking of the U.S.S. Indianapolis and 
                                       the Extraordinary Story of Its Survivors (2003)
               Also, here is a full television movie, "Mission of the Shark" (1991)
Picture
     While the Indianapolis was sinking, an emergency SOS message HAD reached Naval Command at Leyte in The Philippines from a makeshift get-up from Radio Room #2. Commodore Jacob Jacobsen was awakened and apprised of the SOS, but no effort was made beyond that point. The SOS had reached another Leyte naval outpost, and the Officer of the Day dispatched two fast Navy tugboats to the site . . . but Commodore Norman Gillette recalled the tugs, since they sent without his authority. That SOS reached a THIRD Leyte outpost (a landing craft in the harbor); that craft signaled Leyte's Naval Operating Base, but did not receive any instructions . . . in the end, there were no immediate responses to the SOS.
     
     The U.S. Navy's protocol was to treat messages that couldn't be confirmed as pranks, and it was a pro forma procedure by late-July, 1945; The Japanese often tried to confuse and expose the Navy in many locations. It was estimated that about 300 men died on the Indianapolis, and a little over 900 men entered the Pacific with Captain McVay. McVay had been sucked down with the ship, but a large air bubble brought him back to the surface. From the moment the first torpedo hit the ship to when the Indianapolis sank, only twelve minutes had elapsed . . . and the ship sank in one of the deepest ocean trenches on Earth.

Picture
Day One: Monday, 30 July, 1945
     About half of the 900 in the water had a life vest or an inflatable life belt, but those belts were useless, since the fuel oil in the ocean had weakened the seams. For awhile, Captain McVay was by himself; he was in absolute hell, in that he assumed that he was the only survivor. Other than fuel oil on his face (and some in his eyes), he was in good physical shape.
(Pictured: a screen capture from the 1991 made-for-television movie "Mission of the Shark")
     Once clear of the oil slicks, bobbing around in the Pacific was like being in a mildly acidic bath. Also, since most were getting constantly splashed in the face, the survivors were unwillingly ingesting seawater, their red blood cells were breaking down (leading to dehydration), and their lungs were slowly filling with water. One of the very few positives was that some survivors (including McVay) discovered that the fuel oil made an excellent sun screen.
     By dusk on Monday, the sharks arrived, most likely attracted by the blood trail. There were hundreds of sharks, including tigers, makos, white-tips, and blues . . . the survivors thought that the bumps they were feeling were from their fellow crew mates.

      (Below: a segment from "Mission of the Shark"; Captain McVay finds another survivor)

Picture
Day Two: Tuesday, 31 July, 1945
     The sharks attacked around dawn, prowling in frenzied schools. There were two reasons why there was a high probability that many sharks had shadowed the Indianapolis for awhile. First, the ship's low-grade electrical current was an attraction, and secondly, there was a constant stream of refuse thrown overboard . . . the sharks were most likely a presence even before the Indianapolis was sunk. (pictured: a screen capture from "Mission of the Shark"; Captain McVay is in the center).
     So far, the sharks had fed on the dead, but that was soon going to change. The sharks started to hone in on those that were partially clothed (white in blue water was also an attraction). To these sharks, the sailors most likely seemed to be similar to wounded fish. As the shark attacks increased, so did the frenzy and ferocity, since there was blood in the water.
     Then, all of a sudden, the sharks stopped attacking, and returned to the lower levels of the Pacific; sharks prefer to attack (and feed) during dusk and dawn. Between attacks, more-and-more survivors were thinking about drinking seawater.

Picture
     Although the water was 85 degrees, slow hypothermia still occurred, in that there was a ten-degree differential between the water and air temperature. Shivering quadrupled the rate of oxygen consumption, which caused the rate of hypothermia to occur faster. The body starts to slowly shut down under those circumstances (e.g. kidney failure), and in combination with ingesting seawater, many survivors would make fatal future judgments.
     At Leyte, the Indianapolis was marked as "Arrived"; it was always assumed so if there was no information to the contrary. The current Navy policy was that the "arrival of combatant ships shall not be reported." So, there was no help for the survivors in the offing from Leyte, or anywhere else. (pictured: Capt. McVay and one of his crew on a life raft in "Mission of the Shark").
     The survivors had reached the 40 hour mark since the Indianapolis sank, and there were probably only 600 or so still alive. "Will I Live" or "Will I Quit" were the questions among the survivors, and for those that gave up, suicide was common. By nightfall, many dehydrated survivors started to drink seawater, gorging themselves. In most cases, in only two hours, each survivor that did so died, since the body was overloaded with saline. Those that were most likely to resist drinking seawater . . . those that had families. 

Picture
Day Three: Wednesday, 1 August, 1945
     That morning, some survivors started killing other survivors . . . for them, there was no more hope left. In their hallucinations, they saw "Japs" everywhere, and they used their knives to attack and defend. In just one ten-minute span, fifty were killed - it was like a flash-fire. For the past three days, survivors had been dying on an average of one every ten minutes. McVay's survivors were relatively untouched by the madness that gripped the other groups (the survivors were scattered over miles of ocean). The overriding concerns of McVay's group was exhaustion . . . and sharks (pictured: screen capture from "Mission of the Shark").

Picture
Days Four & Five: Thursday/Friday, 2 - 3 August, 1945
     A small bomber plane was on patrol, looking for Japanese submarines, and its crew was struggling with its long-range radio antennae/sensor that extended behind the plane. It was weighted with a "sock", but that "sock" kept falling off, and they were in the midst of trying to solve the problem. 
     It was during this struggle for a "Plan B" that one of the crew members saw something that looked like an oil slick in the water as they flew by . . . to them, that meant there was probably a Japanese submarine in the area. The plane turned around, and prepared for a bombing run; they even had their depth charges ready to drop. On their first pass, they saw bodies in the water . . . it didn't matter whether they were friend or foe, the plane's crew had to think and act fast. (pictured: another screen capture from "Mission of the Shark").
     The bombing run was aborted, and they readied for another pass. The pilot had to calculate their position by "dead-reckoning", since they had a loose antennae. At 11:25 am, the plane radioed-in their approximate position, making it clear that survivors were sighted . . . it was the first report of the Indianapolis disaster. 
     The survivors had drifted incredible distances, some over 100 miles in just four days. Using a piece of rubber hose, the plane's crew weighted down their loose antennae, and calculated an accurate fix on their position. A second, far-more-accurate position message was sent, and US forces at Peleliu (SW of their position) were mobilized for rescue. Radio traffic was heavy, and news spread to US Naval Command in Guam. 

     As a result of the first radio message, floating planes (PBY Catalinas) were sent to the area. One was to relieve the spotter plane, and the others were to land in the water for immediate assistance. But, since a Catalina was unable to get immediately airborne, a Ventura bomber was the first plane that was dispatched. Also, there were orders from Guam (NE of their position) to send two destroyers to rescue the survivors. 
     A separate amphibious plane spotted the survivors, and dropped all their gear in the ocean. They radioed for permission to put-down in order to assist the survivors . . . and permission to do so was actually denied. At least at this point Naval Command in The Philippines (CINCPAC) ordered all ships to break radio silence in order to report their position.
Picture
     One of the Catalinas (pictured) decided to land in the ocean against orders; it was very risky; planes in that class were rarely successful in putting down in the ocean, as opposed to an enclosed bay or harbor. The crew landed despite almost tearing their plane apart, and they were taking on water due to torn rivets. Once in the water, the crew's goal was to collect as many survivors as possible before dark.
     B-17's dropped much more equipment in the water, including larger rafts and wooden lifeboats. The Catalina in the water brought 56 survivors on board, many strapped down on the wings. The destroyer Cecil J. Doyle arrived at 11:45 pm, and started with rescuing the 50+ men on the Catalina. At 12:52 am (3 August) the high-speed transport ship Bassett arrived, and then the destroyers Ralph Talbot and Madison were on the scene, with the destroyer escort Dufilho soon to arrive as well. During the pre-dawn hours, the Bassett picked up 152 survivors, and then under orders returned to Leyte.
Picture
Day Five and After: 3 August, 1945 . . .
    Top Navy brass (including Admiral Chester Nimitz) feared a "controversy" over the Indianapolis would mar the Navy's "Finest Hour" . . . they didn't want the Indianapolis disaster to take anything away from Hiroshima and Nagasaki. As soon as 3 August, the aftershocks of the Indianapolis disaster were rippling through Navy command. New rules were issued: no ships were allowed in the Pacific without escort, and every ship that was five-hours-or-more overdue were to report to the port from which they started . . . this was all far-too-late for the men of the Indianapolis.
     By early morning on 3 August, Captain McVay had still not been found by rescuers. At 10 am, a ship (the high-speed transport Ringness) arrived, and by a stroke of good luck, their radar pinged on an ammunition can that McVay had tried to use as a beacon. Now that he was rescued, McVay’s thoughts drifted towards his imminent court-martial.

     The last of the survivors pulled from the Pacific had been in the ocean for 112 hours, or more than four days. They had no food, water, or shelter from the sun, and they had drifted 124 miles from where the Indianapolis had sunk. Of the 1196 crew members, only 321 survived; 67 of the 81 officers and 808 enlisted men. 
     Four survivors would soon die in navy hospitals, reducing the number of survivors to 317; while there was no way to be certain, estimates were that as many as 200 survivors were killed by sharks. There was also the strong possibility that there were some survivors that were never rescued, despite the relentless and tireless efforts of plane-and-ship rescue crews during the following days and nights. 
        (Below: an actual photograph of some of the survivors of the Indianapolis on Guam)
Picture
      Here is the full television movie, "Mission of the Shark" (1991);
                 Stacy Keach portrays Captain Charles McVay III
0 Comments

The U.S.S. Indianapolis, Part One

8/16/2015

0 Comments

 
Source: Doug Stanton. In Harm's Way: The Sinking of the U.S.S. Indianapolis and 
                                        the Extraordinary Story of Its Survivors (2003)
Picture
      Captain Charles McVay III (pictured) was the only captain in the US Navy to have been court-martialed whose ship was sunk by an act of war (there were nearly 400 captains whose ships went down under attack in WW II). In the early-1990s, declassified intelligence reports surfaced, and they showed Captain McVay's innocence. The U.S. Navy still refused to reconsider its decision; McVay still stands convicted to this day . . . and he is also listed as a convicted felon.
     Of the original 317 men who survived, 38 are still alive (as of the last reunion in 2014). These survivors of the U.S.S. Indianapolis have met every two years to revisit the sinking, and to remember Captain McVay. To a man, they insist that McVay wasn't responsible for the Japanese submarine torpedo attack and the subsequent nightmare of sharks killing hundreds of survivors in the Pacific. 

    The USS Indianapolis was a wounded ship; repairs were necessary after the 31 March, 1945, near-fatal kamikaze attack off Okinawa (the southern-most Japanese island, northeast of Taiwan). The Indianapolis limped 6000 miles back to San Francisco with damage to propellor shafts, a fuel tank, and the water distillation system. Those on board had grumbled that the Indianapolis would never be the same, that she had "turned poor" . . . many thought that the Indianapolis had become an unlucky ship.
Picture
Picture
     The Indianapolis was commissioned in 1932, and FDR made it his "Ship of State", basically an Air Force 1 on water (pictured: FDR on the Indianapolis in 1933). Technically, the Indianapolis was a heavy cruiser; it wasn't quite in the battleship class, although it certainly looked and acted like one. The top speed of the Indianapolis was 32.75 knots; few ships in her class could keep up with her. However, the downside with that speed was a lack of armor; battleships had 13 inches of steel amidships, while the Indianapolis only had 4 inches.
     The Indianapolis was FDR's favorite ship (remember, he was a former Ass't SecNav), but by 1945 she was considered past her prime; the newer heavy cruisers were bigger, faster, and better-armored. The Indianapolis was a replacement ship for a top-priority, top-secret mission in the Pacific. The USS Pensacola was the initial choice for the mission, but she failed her trial run (the engines failed in rough seas), and the Indianapolis, in for repairs in San Francisco, became the ship tasked with the secret run in the Pacific.

Picture
    Very shortly after the Trinity Test 
(pictured: the first atomic bomb that was tested at Alamogordo, NM on 16 July, 1945) McVay received orders that originated from President Truman (had the Trinity Test failed, the Indianapolis would have stayed in port to fully complete repairs). Truman ordered the Indianapolis to deliver its cargo at any cost. The secret cargo was in a crate, secured on deck . . . it was the atomic bomb that would be dropped on Hiroshima ("Little Boy"). 
     Secured elsewhere in the ship was a big black canister that contained U-235. That uranium represented half of America's supply, and it had a "street value" that would be $4B adjusted for inflation. Once the Indianapolis delivered the cargo to Tinian Island, the first atomic bomb would be dropped on Hiroshima inside of three weeks . . . McVay was ordered to head to Leyte Gulf in The Philippines.

      On 28 July, 1945, Captain McVay stopped his zig-zagging route due to rough seas, which his orders allowed him to do, between 7:30 and 8 pm (Zig-Zagging was the authorized, and not very effective, method to try and avoid enemy submarines). Also, McVay's intelligence report indicated the he was alone in his area of the Pacific (his superiors failed to provide McVay the information he needed to keep his ship and men as safe as possible . . . his superiors knew there were Japanese submarines on patrol, McVay did not know ).
            (Pictured below: The USS Indianapolis, officially classified as a heavy cruiser, 
                      departing San Francisco on its mission to the Tinian Islands)
Picture
      At 10 pm, it was 95 degrees, and many crewmen chose to sleep on deck. Due to the heat, and the lack of any threat due to the latest intelligence report, the Indianapolis was in a "Yoke-Modified" state which meant that many of the interior doors/spaces were open to let in as much air as possible. If the Indianapolis had been in a state of "Zed", all the interior doors and spaces would have been closed . . . in short, the Indianapolis would sink fast if it was hit hard by a Japanese submarine. 
Picture
       The I-58 was only one of six Japanese submarines that were still operating in the Pacific. It was 356 feet long, had a seaplane and a machine gun, and it also had the latest in torpedo technology. Her sausage shape was coated in a rubber girdle, which confused US Navy sonar listeners. The I-58 had 19 magnetic torpedoes, and six kaiten (manned kamikaze torpedoes). 
The I-58 hadn't sunk a US ship yet in the war, and the captain and his crew were beyond-anxious to do so.
Picture
     The I-58, spotted the Indianapolis six miles away, after 11 pm. It was a very complex business working up a firing solution for a torpedo, in that distance, speed, and direction needed to be carefully and quickly calculated . . . every moment that passed meant advantage to the Indianapolis. At 11:39 pm, six torpedoes were ready to fire; it was also at that moment that Captain Hashimoto (pictured) discovered that the ship he had targeted was all alone. 
     The Indianapolis was three miles away, and Captain Hashimoto wanted to know the identity of the US warship that he was going to sink. He had a classified reference book of silhouettes of US ships; he wanted to know the ID of the ship in order to know its capabilities, but the reference book was little help. At last, he was able to see the signature battleship class outline of the Indianapolis (again, the ship was a heavy cruiser that looked like a battleship) - he lined up to fire on the broadside of the US warship (he had forgotten about his kaitens). At 12:04 am on 29 July, 1945, Captain Hashimoto gave the order to fire a regular torpedo.

Picture
       The torpedo traveled at 48 knots, 13 feet below the water, with 1210 pounds of explosives; it was enough firepower to take out an entire city block . . . and Hashimoto fired five more identical torpedoes. It took less than a minute for two torpedoes to hit the Indianapolis. The first torpedo hit the ship's forward starboard bow, and it was obliterated. The Indianapolis was still traveling at 17 knots, and it was scooping up massive amounts of water. The second torpedo hit midship, and that explosion was even more horrific. With only 4 inches of armor amidships, the Indianapolis had no chance to remain afloat.
     The ocean itself seemed to be burning, due to a ruptured fuel tank near the bow. In just one minute after the second torpedo hit, the Indianapolis was effectively cut in half. Captain McVay had little time to asses the situation, because the massive warship was going to quickly sink. The ship was listing at 15 degrees, and still moving forward at 14 knots.

Picture
       At 12:13 am, Captain McVay gave the order to abandon ship, eight minutes after the second torpedo exploded. There was no time to abandon the ship in an orderly fashion; naval protocol was not followed in the least, as one would expect under the conditions. Of the 35 life rafts, only 12 made it to the sea, and on those rafts there were few provisions. But, there was a surplus of life vests . . . however far too many crew members went in the Pacific without one. 
     
     Complicating the nightmare was that no emergency radio messages had been sent (it was common practice for the Navy to order radio silence for its ships in WW II, especially in the Pacific . . . no one in the Navy from San Francisco to The Philippines knew the location of the Indianapolis). Before both radio rooms became inoperable, short, cryptic messages were sent; McVay knew it was crucial to transmit their location to Naval Command in Leyte in The Philippines. 
     For those that entered the ocean on the starboard side, lifesaving equipment existed . . . but for those on the port, there was no such luck. And all those that entered the Pacific had to deal with the massive amount of black oil that surrounded the ship, much of which was on 
fire . . . 
Below: First, an incredible account from one of the 300+ survivors of the Indianapolis.
          After that is famous scene from "Jaws" where Quint recounts his experience after the
          USS Indianapolis was hit by the two torpedoes from the Japanese submarine. 

0 Comments

The Repeal of Prohibition

7/1/2015

0 Comments

 
     Source: Edward Behr. Prohibition: 13 Years That Changed America (2013)
Picture
     In 1927, perhaps 50,000 Americans died from drinking "Moonshine" liquor during Prohibition. Hundreds of thousands of other Americans suffered from blindness, paralysis, and other very serious conditions; much of the alcohol that was consumed was just flat-out dangerous. The main poisons were wood alcohol and, "denatured" (and tax-exempt) alcohol. Usually, the denaturing substance was methanol (sometimes kerosene); three glasses could kill a person. 
     Wayne Wheeler (President of the Anti-Saloon League), so powerful and influential for so long, was finally on the defensive. He had supported the use of methanol for "denaturing" alcohol, and he had actively and aggressively lobbied against mandatory poison labels (pictured: a local warning label from a pharmacy). Wheeler actually denied responsibility in any way over the deaths from "denatured" alcohol; he stated that those that died from drinking that type of alcohol deserved it, since they were breaking the law . . . at long last, Wheeler's enemies 
(the "Wets") sensed that his "Prohibition Power" was starting to ebb away.

Picture
      
     As the Anti-Saloon League was losing it influence with Congress, Wheeler's health was slipping. He had made many enemies in America, but also in the Anti-Saloon League. But Wheeler's downfall actually started in 1925 when President Coolidge replaced the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury with someone that wasn't loyal or beholden to Wheeler. This new Ass't SecTreas made sure that the Commissioner in the Prohibition Bureau was no longer a lackey for Wheeler (pictured). At the first sign of weakness, some members of Congress pounced on Wheeler, and long-dormant anti-Prohibition groups started to regain political traction.

Picture
     There were many groups that continually voiced their opposition to Prohibition. Two of note were the American Bar Association (which challenged the legality of the Volstead Act) and the American Federation of Labor. What worried Wheeler the most was the strong possibility of a new "Women's Crusade", and he had reason to worry - the effort to form the crusade was led by the most famous female Republican in the U.S. . . . Pauline Morton Sabin
(pictured).
     On 23 April, 1927, Wheeler (who was very ill with heart and kidney problems) debated Clarence Darrow, one of the most famous and influential "Drys", at Carnegie Hall. Wheeler didn't acquit himself well, in part because of his health, but also because Darrow was a far superior opponent. After the debate, Coolidge kept replacing more top-level administration officials that were anti-Wheeler, and in essence the "wheels came off" for Wheeler, in that no one in the federal government was afraid of him any longer. Wheeler died only five months after his debate with Darrow, in September, 1927; he had been in the process of making plans to try and influence the outcomes of
 both political conventions.

     When the Great Depression started, the consumption of liquor didn't decrease by much at all, but there was a great awareness of the lost tax revenues that existed before Prohibition from liquor sales. Due to the Depression, some of the most staunch "Drys" were at the forefront of trying to repeal Prohibition; to these conservatives, the federal government was facing a fiscal, not a moral, issue. 
     The Great Depression didn't initiate the repeal for Prohibition, but it did markedly accelerate the ratification of the 21st Amendment. Many wealthy "Drys" wanted liquor to be once again legal so it could be taxed, hoping that the resulting revenues would lower their income tax. Many "Dry" farmers also changed their tune so they could sell more grain at a better price.
Picture
Picture
     Al Smith ("The Happy Warrior", pictured) won the 
Democratic nomination for President in 1928, after Wheeler thwarted his bid four years earlier . . . the "Wets" finally had some momentum. However, Prohibition and his Catholicism dogged Smith during the General Campaign against the Republican candidate Herbert Hoover. In the Election of 1928, the "Drys" won their last victory, electing Hoover to the White House in a landslide (pictured below), while also sending the highest percentage of "Drys" to Congress during Prohibition. 
     President Hoover stated that he opposed any effort to repeal the 18th Amendment, but the political mood would drastically change in the next four years, due to the Great Depression. Also, the new leader of the Anti-Saloon League, Bishop James Cannon, proved to be brazenly bigoted and hypocritical. The "Wet" media confirmed that he was a black-marketer during the Great War, and was guilty of multiple counts of "moral turpitude". 

Picture
      On 5 December, 1933, hard liquor was again legal to drink, but there was a problem, in that hardly any speakeasy / bar had a liquor license to legally dispense alcohol. Ironically, few wanted to tangle with any legalities after Prohibition was repealed. In New Jersey, the governor extended Prohibition a few more days so those that wanted to celebrate could do so "legally". 
     On 6 December, 1932, the 21st Amendment to repeal Prohibition was officially proposed in Congress. In December, 1933, Utah became the 36th state to ratify the 21st Amendment (the Nebraska Unicameral took "no action" with the proposed amendment), officially ending Prohibition in America. The implementation of the repeal of Prohibition occurred in two steps: first, "real" beer once again became legal, and after that process was started, then hard liquor became legal. 
Picture
      The Significance of Prohibition: Most Americans wanted to forget the 13+ years of Prohibition . . . not only that, but Prohibition remains the least-studied area for historians. It's almost impossible to stamp out "Tolerated Vices", and if an attempt is made, organized (and even unorganized) crime will thrive as a result. 
     The least-learned lesson of Prohibition is that legislation alone is no cure for our nation's problems. America's social conservatives were proven wrong in at least their politics and predictions concerning Prohibition. Repression is like morphine, in that it masks the pain, but it doesn't cure the sickness . . . and Prohibition was a dose of national morphine that lasted 13 years, 5 months, and 9 days, and left an indelible mark, both positive and negative, on America.
Picture
0 Comments

Prohibition: The Volstead Act,  Ratification of the 18th                                              Amendment, and the Immediate Aftermath

7/1/2015

1 Comment

 
     Source: Edward Behr. Prohibition: 13 Years That Changed America (2013)
Picture
     The many weaknesses and omissions of the Volstead Act and the 18th Amendment were due to the powerful influence of Wayne Wheeler (pictured), the leader of the Anti-Saloon League. Congressman Andrew J. Volstead (R; MN), was merely the facilitator of the law that bore his name. On 27 May, 1919, the bill was introduced to the House of Representatives, and after a three month debate, was passed 255 - 166. Shortly thereafter, the Senate also passed the Volstead Bill, and then President Woodrow Wilson vetoed it on Constitutional and ethical grounds. On the same day, Congress overrode Wilson's veto; at that point, the Volstead Act replaced all previous "Dry" laws in the states.

Picture
Picture
      The Volstead Act (pictured: Representative Andrew J. Volstead) had many exceptions with alcohol, such as brewers could stay in business with "Near Beer" (.05 % alcohol). There was no liquor advertising, and the implements to manufacture liquor were illegal as well, but it was legal to drink in a private home. 
     The Volstead Act was a hopeless piece of legislation, in that it didn't take into account the willingness and ingenuity of regular citizens and lawbreakers to get around the feeble enforcement provisions. The "Drys" naively assumed that the "Wets" would actually honor the law.

Picture
Picture
    It was a forgone conclusion that 3/4's of the states would ratify the proposed 18th Amendment, making Prohibition part of the Constitution (Nebraska would be the 36th state to ratify the 18th Amendment). One year after ratification, the 18th Amendment was officially enacted on 17 January, 1920 (immediately, the Bahamas became a "Bootleggers Paradise").
     On the night of 16 January, 1920, the level of drinking by the nation's "Wets" was somewhat muted. On 17 January, the celebration of the "Drys" was off-the-charts; it was vitriolic and self-congratulatory hyperbole . . . to the "Drys", they had totally defeated the "Wets"; those that consumed alcohol had become a "conquered people". 

Picture
Picture
      During that "Grace Period" between ratification and implementation of the 18th Amendment, the government had to prepare for the enforcement of Prohibition. But Congress only allocated a measly $3 million, and there were only 1500 agents in the newly-created Prohibition Bureau (pictured: agents from the Prohibition Bureau in action).
     Adding to the future futility of enforcing Prohibition was Wayne Wheeler's idea to put the agents in the Prohibition Bureau under the authority of the Treasury Department, not under Justice (Wheeler had lobbied Ohio Senator Warren Harding very hard for that decision). Very early, that proved to be a disastrous decision, in that since the agents were civil servants, they were poorly paid and equipped . . . the conditions were ripe for corruption at the enforcement level in the federal government during Prohibition.

Picture
     Immediately after Prohibition was enacted in January 1920, sprouting up like daisies, were speakeasies, bootleggers, and hijackers. The "Drys" were, of course, surprised, but these shenanigans had been going on at the state level for a long time. "Medicinal" liquor was legal under the 18th Amendment, and in Chicago alone, 15,000 doctors and 57,000 druggist were prescribing liquor to "treat" various ailments. 
     The ingenuity of clandestine liquor manufacturers / brewers was impressive; it was worth their while to supply that product, in that demand for illegal alcohol was sky-high. Defying Prohibition became the "thing to do" with college students, "Flappers", and much of America's middle class (also, the cocktail was invented during Prohibition, in order to disguise the taste of bad liquor). 
        Below: America's most famous columnist, H.L Mencken of the Baltimore Sun,   
                   openly and enthusiastically violating Prohibition in a speakeasy.

Picture
     Prohibition meant that the U.S. was all set for a wild drinking spree that would last 13 years, 5 months, and 9 days. Prohibition would transform the nation's morals, and alter attitudes towards all those in authority; it would also usher in a new "Era of Cynicism". Political immorality flourished at the federal, state, and local levels during Prohibition, which allowed lawbreakers, bootleggers, speakeasies, hijackers, and a new breed of gangster to flourish.
                           (Below: A segment from Ken Burns' "Prohibition", 
                      tracing the last few years before the 18th Amendment)
1 Comment

Temperance: "The Women's War" (featuring Carry Nation)

7/1/2015

0 Comments

 
      Source: Edward Behr. Prohibition: 13 Years That Changed America (2013)
Picture
     
     Women's Temperance was the first mass-movement involving women in U.S. History. It also featured the world's first large-scale non-violent protest movement (like Gandhi' efforts decades later). These "Women Crusaders" used arrests and insults in the early-1870s as a way to gain guilt-ridden converts to their cause. The behind-the-scenes mentors were men, and the logistics came from Protestant churches. There was some success in the Midwest in terms of non-stop picketing and protesting, but while awareness was raised, only a relatively small percentage of saloons actually closed their doors.

Picture
       While this specific "Women's Crusade" was a a media success, it had a short shelf-life. When the interest from the media waned, the Crusaders went back home, and the affected saloons reopened. As a result, the Women's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) was formed in 1874. Frances Willard (pictured) was eventually elected as WCTU President; she was not only an ex-Crusader, but also a university professor. 
      The WCTU believed that moderation was a "shoddy lifebelt", which promised safety, but only tempted danger. Willard was one of the first to work for nationwide Prohibition; she organized a petition effort to lobby Congress in 1875. The WCTU made every effort to educate kids on the evils of alcohol, featuring such Sunday School publications as "Counting Fingers". 

Picture
     At the turn-of-the-century, Carry Nation would steal the WCTU's formidable thunder. Nominally a member of the WCTU, Carry Nation was determined to protest in her own way. Born into an eccentric (insane?) and rebellious family, Carry Moore (pictured) was very likely a mentally unbalanced person. Carry spent a lot of time with African slaves, looking for human connections, since her mother didn't want much to do with her at all. 
     She married Charles Gloyd in 1867, who was a heavy drinker, and her life took a major turn as a result. Gloyd's two main vices were drinking and smoking, which were the very vices that Nation attacked in the future. She married again, this time to a man named David Nation, partly so she could legitimately call herself Carry Nation. David was not a strong man, and failed at most everything, including preaching. During unsuccessful sermons, Carry would embarrass him by saying such things out loud as "That will be all for today, David".

Picture
     Carry Nation soon started busting up saloons in St. Louis, Cincinnati, Philadelphia, and New York City, and as a result, she became a "Media Star". By 1901, Nation was so far removed from reality that she publicly celebrated the Assassination of President William McKinley; it was at that point that she started her sharp decline. Soon, the WCTU stopped funding her, and the media stopped covering her "Hatchetations". 
    Nation resorted to reenacting her "Hatchetations" on stage, but there were no crowds of note. She even tried stage performances in Britain, and tried to break up pubs, but was arrested and heavily fined. Nation was totally unaware that she had become a complete caricature, a figure of ridicule. Soon after her unsuccessful "tour" in Britain, Nation had a mental breakdown, and died at the age of 65 in a mental institution.

Picture
     One day, Nation entered a Kansas saloon with another WCTU woman, and a sledgehammer; she smashed a keg of whiskey, and hurled invectives in a rage . . . no one dared trifle with her. After busting up a few saloons in Kiowa, she bought a large hatchet, which was to become her signature. Her raids on saloons were sudden, fierce, and violent: few dared face her directly as she destroyed bars and furniture. 
     Law enforcement was in a dilemma as to what to do with Carry Nation, since Kansas was officially a "Dry" state. Nation was destroying property, but those properties were violating state law. Nation rarely stayed in jail more than one night; very often, she used her short periods of incarceration for media exposure.
   (Below: if the embedded video doesn't play, click on "Women of Prohibition Carry Nation")

0 Comments

The (Nasty) Election of 1940: FDR v. Wendell Willkie

5/22/2015

0 Comments

 
         Source: Lynne Olson. Those Angry Days: Roosevelt, Lindbergh, and
                  America's Fight Over World War II, 1939 - 1941 (2013)
Picture
      The Election of 1940 turned out to be, predictably, a very nasty affair, given the political landscape in America of Isolationists ("Fortress America") v. Internationalists (direct military assistance to Britain). No major policy differences existed between Franklin Roosevelt and the Republican candidate, Wendell Willkie (he actually supported FDR on most issues). 
     Willkie and his handlers took five weeks off after the Republican convention to plot their strategy. As a result, what was hot became cold; the cost of the decision was that Willkie was out of public view, and he lost ground to FDR. Once his campaign began, it was a very disorganized fountain of anarchy and confusion; that was due largely to Willkie's refusal to have anything to do with the traditional Republican Party strategists.
     Willkie's problem: how to get voters to favor a political neophyte over FDR, a long time veteran of the hustings (campaigning). Willkie tried to attack FDR on the still-stagnant economy, and the failure to quickly organize the now much-larger army since the Selective Service Act of 1940. Willkie also accused FDR of being a dictator, which to him was easily shown by FDR running for a third term.

Picture
      From the beginning of the general campaign, circumstances worked against Willkie. The economy was improving, despite unemployment remaining stubbornly high. Mobilizing the new larger-and-improved Army was turning into a giant mess, but a lot of federal money had been spent on the military. And, there was actually little concern over FDR running for a third term in the face of the severe international crisis that was the War in Europe. 
     Willkie became even more annoyed and frustrated during the general campaign when it became clear that FDR wasn't even going to acknowledge him as a viable opponent. From September through much of October, FDR stayed "above the fray", emphasizing his role as Commander-in-Chief. While FDR toured defense locations, the leaders of the Democratic Party went after Willkie hard on the President's behalf. 
     The Democratic strategists focused on exploiting the split in the Republican Party, associating Willkie (incorrectly) with the Isolationist faction. The idea spread that Willkie was just a tool for the Republican ultra-conservative Isolationists. There was even the rumor (spread by these Democrat strategists) that a Willkie victory would lead to a Fascist coup d'etat in Washington, D.C. by Republicans. FDR's VP candidate Henry Wallace came very close to publicly stating that a vote for Willkie would be a vote for Hitler.

Picture
      The Democrats went on to accuse Willkie of really being German, claiming that his "original" name was spelled Wulkje. The Democrats then went after Willkie's efforts to lure African-American voters by pointing out Indiana's (Willkie's home state) history of blatant racism. The attacks on Willkie were also physical - he became the target of violence wherever he campaigned. In working-class sections in big cities, he was pelted with rocks, rotten eggs, fruit, vegetables, even light bulbs. Despite FDR's attempts to stop these physical attacks, they continued, "egged on" by the Democratic party bosses.
     Willkie was also beginning to slip in the polls (by early-October, FDR was ahead by ten points), and he began to re-think his promise to keep his campaign civil. Republican leaders begged Willkie to attack FDR where he was weakest: the War in Europe. These party bosses demanded that Willkie renounce all he had done before, and state that a vote for FDR was a vote for America entering the War in Europe, and sending American soldiers to once again die on European battlefields. 
     Willkie agreed: he had reached a point where his anger and resentment trumped his principles and conscience. Suddenly, Willkie was the Apostle for Isolationism; he accused FDR of causing America to "drift towards war" in Europe. Willkie even went so far to state that FDR had made a secret agreement with Great Britain that the U.S. would soon enter the war as their ally.

Picture
      Willkie's metamorphosis outraged his supporters, including prominent journalists. Henry Luce (Time, Life, & Fortune magazines) lamented that Willkie should have stayed true to his political beliefs and lost with dignity. And yet, given the divisive American political landscape concerning the War in Europe, FDR's comfortable margin in the polls evaporated in mid-October. 
     Willkie was ahead of FDR in the Midwest, and was surging in the Northeast. Now it was the Democrats turn to panic; FDR actually had to start campaigning for re-election. A potential complication for the Democrats arose when a series of letters written by VP candidate Henry Wallace came to be in the possession of a powerful Chicago Republican newspaper publisher . . . that powerful enemy of FDR wanted to publish the letters, showing that Wallace's mental stability was in question. 
     But FDR had in his possession proof of Willkie's extramarital affair with the New York Herald-Tribune's book editor, Irita Van Doren (pictured in a portrait taken in 1947). FDR told the Chicago publisher if the Wallace letters were published,then Willkie would be "outed". During this nasty campaign, in this instance, both sides actually agreed to keep what they had secret.

Picture
     With only six weeks to go before Election Day, FDR entered the fray, and he went at Willkie, hard. He obliquely made references linking Willkie to evil foreign and domestic influences (often referred to as "Fifth Columnists"). With Willkie still gaining in the polls, a desperate FDR stated that the U.S. would not enter a foreign war; to many, this seemed to be a mistake - FDR had apparently "caved" to the Isolationists. 
     But Dorothy Thompson (pictured), the most famous female journalist in America (and the biggest "Lindbergh Hater" in the media), wasn't fooled by the rhetoric. She switched from being 100% behind Willkie to 100% behind FDR; FDR's last campaign speech was largely taken from a draft that Thompson had written on his behalf. Thompson's main focus was to stop Hitler (she had seen firsthand the excesses of the Nazi Party in Germany), and she believed that Willkie had become an "Isolationist Shill". 

      On Election Day, FDR was uncharacteristically nervous and agitated, which was unlike his normal demeanor. He wasn't nervous for long; the returns were showing that he would coast to an easy victory. It was the largest election turnout in history to that point, and FDR won by five million votes (27.3m to 22.3m), but it was also the closest election since 1916 in terms of the percentage of the popular vote. 
     Willkie had received more votes that any other Republican candidate in U.S. History by 1940; had it not been for the War in Europe, the Republicans would have regained the White House. In the end, FDR's known faults were preferred to Willkie's unknown virtues.
Picture
Picture
     On the night after the election, the doorbell rang at Russell Davenport's apartment in New York City (Davenport was Willkie's campaign manager). His wife Marcia answered the door, and to her shock, it was Harry Hopkins, FDR's #1 Man; Hopkins and Davenport met for hours. 
     One week later, on a national radio address, Willkie once again put partisan politics aside. He proclaimed his support for FDR, stating that all Americans owed him the respect that the Presidency deserved. Little did anyone know that in the upcoming crucial years, Willkie would be one of FDR's most trustworthy and reliable soldiers, becoming in essence America's "Ambassador at Large" in Europe and Asia during most of WW II.
      (Below: Lowell Thomas narrates a short film documenting Willkie's political life)

0 Comments

    Archives

    May 2016
    April 2016
    March 2016
    February 2016
    January 2016
    December 2015
    November 2015
    October 2015
    September 2015
    August 2015
    July 2015
    June 2015
    May 2015

    Categories

    All
    18th Century
    19th Century
    20th Century
    Biography
    History

Powered by Create your own unique website with customizable templates.