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Thomas Jefferson's Last Year as Secretary of State: 1793

11/25/2015

Source: Andrew Burstein & Nancy Isenberg. Madison and Jefferson (2013)

In January of 1793, King Louis XVI of France was guillotined (pictured), and the Jacobins took control, ending the initial relatively-liberal phase of the French Revolution. In February 1793, Great Britain was officially added to France's list of belligerent nations. Also by that point in France, aristocracy had become a crime, and civil rights were ignored . . . it was the beginning of the "Reign of Terror". Even after the execution and subsequent "Reign of Terror", many Americans had high-hopes for the
French Revolution.
Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson was a supporter of the Jacobins, and really didn't believe the reports he received of the nightmarish violence in France. Jefferson, in a letter to James Madison, wrote that he would rather have "half the Earth desolated" than see the French Revolution fail. Even before 1793, Jefferson had linked the success of the French Revolution (what he thought was going on, anyway) with the success or failure of of his vision of America (Jefferson envisioned an Agrarian nation, with virtuous farmers as the backbone of America under a relatively weak central government).

In a precursor to the Monroe Doctrine, President Washington, Secretary of State Jefferson, Secretary of the Treasury Hamilton, and the Leader of the House of Representatives, James Madison, all agreed to provide military and financial assistance to whites in St. Domingue (Haiti). A massive African slave uprising on the island presented a problem, in that most of America's coffee and sugar came from St. Domingue, but more importantly, Washington, et. al. wanted Great Britain to stay out of that part of the Caribbean, for reasons of hemispheric security.
While Jefferson and Madison were united w/ Washington and Hamilton concerning St. Domingue, they differed on France. Washington's decision to remain neutral in regards to the French Revolution signified to Jefferson that Hamilton had entered the sphere of foreign policy. In April 1793, Charles-Edmond Genet arrived in South Carolina; in quick order, this "Undiplomatic Diplomat" alienated and angered Jefferson, in that Genet proposed that U.S. ports be used for the needs of the French navy. Jefferson viewed Genet as all imagination with no judgment, as well as disrespectful (especially to Washington) and dictatorial.

Jefferson tired of the hostile environment in the Cabinet; he abhorred conflict in his presence. Jefferson told Washington that he intended to resign as SecState on 30 September, 1793; when Jefferson wrote Madison about his intention to resign, Madison, in essence, told him to "suck it up". Jefferson responded that he felt that he had more than paid his debt in terms of public service . . . Jefferson was playing the part of a wounded, wronged victim.
One reason why Jefferson had reached his limit serving in Washington's Cabinet is that Alexander Hamilton meddled in the affairs of every department without apology. To Jefferson (and many others that worked with/around him), Hamilton was not a team player; in Hamilton's mind, he always knew best, and did what he wanted, most likely totally unaware of how his behavior was viewed by others.

President Washington was in a tough spot, in that he never would have agreed to a second term in office if he had known that Jefferson (and then Hamilton) would resign their posts early; it would be nearly-impossible to find replacements with the requisite skills and brainpower. Jefferson wanted to end his time as SecState not only because of Hamilton, but also due to perceived slights from a fellow Virginian, Attorney General Edmund Randolph.
According to Jefferson, Randolph didn't back him during his face-to-face tirade (a very rare display of temper) in a Cabinet meeting that was directed at Hamilton. To Jefferson, Randolph was a chameleon that changed his colors depending on the people who were around him. Actually, Jefferson was upset that Randolph didn't agree with him 100% of the time. This unrealistic expectation/perspective was mostly likely due to Jefferson's belief that Randolph was somehow interfering with his political war against Hamilton.
Added to Jefferson's travails was that Genet was still on the loose, doing everything he could to circumvent SecState Jefferson to pressure Washington to directly aid France. So dangerous did Genet become to Washington and his Cabinet that a memorandum was sent to Paris demanding that the government (what there was of it) recall Genet. When Robespierre came to power in France, Genet was recalled; Genet then asked Washington for asylum (Robespierre's directive was to send Genet back "in chains"). Washington graciously granted Genet's request, and Genet went to New York, married a member of the Clinton family (he was Governor), and lived the rest of his life in peaceful obscurity, never returning to France.

   During August/September in 1793, a Yellow Fever epidemic hit the 30,000 inhabitants of Philadelphia. Philadelphia hadn't experienced a Yellow Fever attack in 30 years, and the scale of this epidemic was unprecedented; nearly half of the city's population fled to the country-side, including President Washington. Several thousand died, including John Todd; his widow was Dolley, who would be in short order would be marry James Madison.
   Approximately half of those that contracted Yellow Fever died, yet Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson refused to leave the city. Jefferson caught news that Hamilton had the fever, and he wrote Madison about what the SecTreas was going through with undisguised glee. In the same letter, Jefferson also speculated that Hamilton may be healthy, and using the epidemic as a ruse to build up sympathy and support for himself and his policies.
   Hamilton, in fact, had contracted Yellow Fever, had barely survived, and was on the road to recovery when Jefferson had written his letter to Madison. Jefferson, after having "made his point" by being the only member of the Executive branch that chose to stay in Philadelphia and remained healthy during the scourge, left for Montpelier (Madison's home) in mid-September 1793. There, Jefferson, Madison, and James Monroe met to discuss their strategy in regards to Hamilton and the Federalists.

In 1793, Democratic-Republican (D-R) Societies started to form and spread throughout the nation; they were akin to the Committees of Correspondence before the American Revolution.
While not directed by Jefferson or Madison, the D-R Societies were all critical of Hamilton and his goals/policies (Also in 1793, New York became the most populous city with 33,000, surpassing Philadelphia).
Jefferson's & Madison's Republican Party and Hamilton's Federalist Party (they actually hadn't started to use that name for their party yet . . . anti-Republican was often used) both claimed legitimacy while labeling the other as a "Faction". The Federalists (and even Washington) went so far as to blame the D-R Societies for causing the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794 (pictured above). In the last quarter of 1793, Jefferson submitted his resignation as Secretary of State to President Washington, which would take effect on 31 December 1793; Washington reluctantly accepted Jefferson's resignation on 1 January 1794. Thomas Jefferson
retreated to Monticello, and waited for "The Call" from his party to return to the fray when the political landscape was more favorable.

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James Madison & the Constitutional Convention (May-Sept, 1787)

11/13/2015

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Source: Andrew Burstein & Nancy Isenberg. Madison and Jefferson (2013)

James Madison and the Virginia delegation were ready for the Constitutional Convention to begin in early-May, 1787, but there was a problem: there weren't enough state delegations in Philadelphia to start the convention. Finally, on 25 May 1787, seven state delegations were present, which was enough to organize the convention. George Washington (a member of the VA delegation) was unanimously selected the President of the Convention "una voca" (by a voice vote).
Shays' Rebellion (pictured above is a depiction of the fire-fight at the Springfield Arsenal in early-1787) was still not only a fresh memory, but it had hit a nerve on the 50+ delegates, in that it raised the specter of class warfare in America (e.g. all the Massachusetts politicians that supported the tax increases and military response to the rebellion were voted out of office). To
James Madison, Shays' Rebellion was a major symptom of what was wrong with the Articles of Confederation (A of C). And, to Madison's absolute horror, some of the rebels even won elected office in Massachusetts.
The delegates at the Constitutional Convention hated paper money, and most, if not all, saw massive government debt as a catalyst that could cause social upheaval. For the delegates, a new government was needed to protect property, raise desperately needed revenue, and most of all to Madison, discipline rogue state legislatures.

If Roger Sherman (Connecticut, pictured) was the true maestro of the Constitutional Convention, then James Madison was the frustrated rival composer; as brilliant as Madison was, Sherman constantly bested him in terms of strategy and parliamentary procedure. To start, Sherman was able to pass a motion in which all 12 delegations (Rhode Island boycotted the convention) were given equal weight, as in all previous conventions, and in the A of C . . . Madison reluctantly agreed, in that he didn't want to immediately alienate smaller states.
The most difficult aspect of the convention to enforce was preserving the secrecy of the proceedings. It was decided that nothing could be published or discussed with non-delegates; even correspondence (letters) were included. On 29 May 1787, Edmund Randolph (Governor of VA, and the "Voice" of the VA delegation) was the first speaker. Randolph focused on the need for greater national security against a foreign invasion. Then, after presenting a mild persona, he introduced the Virginia Plan to the Constitutional Convention.

The VA Plan featured a bicameral legislature, with both houses based on representation (or wealth). Those in the House of Representatives would be elected directly by eligible voters, and then the House would elect the members of the Senate (from nominations from state legislatures). To Madison (pictured from a drawing completed during the Constitutional Convention), the most important aspect of his VA Plan was the "Absolute Negative", where the Senate could negate any nefarious actions of what he considered "rogue" state legislatures. But Madison was not only frustrated by Sherman, but also by his fellow VA delegates George Mason and Edmund Randolph, in that they succeeded in noticeably reducing Madison's "Absolute Negative".
The VA Plan also had members of the Executive and Judicial branches chosen by Congress; the Chief Executive would serve a single term. Madison also insisted that Ratification of the future Constitution be conducted by specially-called state conventions, rather than state legislatures. One of Madison's main goals of the convention was to limit the influence of state legislatures on national policy.

Under the Virginia Plan, states could only submit nominations to the House for Senators; Madison counted on a coalition of Southern states and large Northern states for passage . . . then delegates from Delaware, Connecticut, and New Jersey started to whittle away at the VA Plan. Delaware threatened to leave the convention; only the cajoling of fellow small-state delegations kept them in Philadelphia. Sherman introduced a plan in which the state legislatures would select members of the Senate (that proposal would eventually become part of the Constitution, which was eventually canceled by the 17th Amendment, which provided for the direct election of Senators).
The VA Plan's major weakness was that it only addressed the "shenanigans" of the state legislatures to the proposed national government; there was no reciprocal protection for the states against the national government. Also, under the VA Plan, Delaware would have a 1/90th share of representation, while Virginia and Pennsylvania combined would have 1/3.
Madison's main problem at this point in the convention was his lack of sympathy for the small states. He viewed states such as Rhode Island as holding the interests of the nation, and especially those of Virginia, hostage in the A of C. But what was really eroding Madison's influence in the convention was his insistence on his "Absolute Negative" (which would make the Senate the ultimate authority under the Constitution, able to discipline state legislatures); despite, or perhaps in spite of, his constant insistence, the "Absolute Negative" proposal was defeated 7 to 3.

On 19 June 1787, the New Jersey Plan (which basically wanted the A of C to continue) was voted down, but the significant end result of the vote was that Madison's VA Plan coalition was destroyed. On 29 June 1787, Oliver Ellsworth (CT, pictured) proposed that the House of Representatives be based on population, but that the Senate would be based on equal representation. Also, in what would become the Connecticut (or Great) Compromise, 3/5's of the African slave population in the South would be counted for representation in the House (that was not a new idea; it was originally proposed in 1783).
What was new was a proposal that the Southern states pay taxes on 3/5's of their African slave population for representation, which was mostly posturing since no one at the convention really anticipated any meaningful revenue from the new tax. On 16 July 1787, the Connecticut Compromise was adopted; the VA Plan coalition met, but it was clear that all their momentum was lost.
After all his preparation for the convention, Madison had seen most of his ideas rejected in only six weeks. To Madison, the worst development was that Senators would be the pawns of the state legislatures. Some delegates left the Constitutional Convention after the Connecticut Compromise, but not Madison, who regrouped and refocused his efforts. For the remainder of the convention, Madison did his best to reduce the power of the Senate. Madison looked to the House, and the Executive & Judicial branches to diffuse the power of the proposed Senate.

Discussion then drifted toward electing the President, and again, Electors were brought up in the debate. General agreement existed among Southern delegates that a direct election would favor Northern states. In September 1787, it was decided that the President would serve a four-year term, and would be eligible for re-elections. Also, it was decided that Electors in each state would be determined by the state legislature, and that each would cast two votes. And, if there was no majority reached in the Electoral Vote, the Senate would decide the election among the top 5 that received votes.
To Madison, that meant that too much power rested in the Senate; ironically, it was Sherman's revision that suggested that the House of Representatives decide the Presidential Election if the Electors could not, with each state's Congressional delegation counting as one vote . . . Sherman's revision passed by a vote of 10 to 1 (pictured: a dramatization of the Signing of the Constitution).
Madison now focused his attention and energies on vesting as much power as possible in the Executive, based on what had been decided in the convention. To Madison, the Presidential veto represented at least partial success for his defeated "Absolute Negative". However, Madison failed in his attempt to require a 3/4's majority in both houses of Congress to override a veto . . . he had to be satisfied with a 2/3's majority. But Madison was pleased that the President had more "latitude and discretion" than the other two branches.

Rufus King (MA) ignited the discussion of the Slave Trade; he was adamant that the convention end the practice. The Slave Trade Compromise was mostly crafted by a "Committee of Eleven", which included Madison. The committee's recommendation was that Congress should be prohibited from interfering with the Slave Trade until 1800 (but a duty on imported slaves was authorized; revenue was desired). The Lower South (NC, SC, & GA) held out until the year was extended to 1808 (keep in mind, African slavery was slowly ebbing away, due to the colossal expense, and no one at the convention could predict the impact of the Cotton Gin that was patented in 1793). Pictured: another depiction of the Signing of the Constitution
George Mason and Edmund Randolph were so dispirited that they refused to sign the Constitution. Randolph wanted the state conventions empowered to add amendments, while Mason loudly called for a 2nd Constitutional Convention (Elbridge Gerry was the third delegate that was present on 17 September, 1787, that didn't sign). For those that did sign the Constitution, their experience was far more wearisome than glorious. Madison saw the President as the only vehicle in the Constitution that could be in line with Virginia's interests; Madison wanted to make sure that Virginia would remain the most preeminent state in the U.S.

The President of the Constitutional Convention, George Washington, didn't speak out until the end, when he asked for permission to address the convention. His reason for doing so was to officially favor the proposal that each representative in the House be based on 40,000 people, rather than 30,000. It was his way to tell the delegates that he supported the Constitution, and he expected them to fall in line with his stance.
Madison succeeded in having the A of C send copies of the proposed Constitution to each state without a direct endorsement, or offering any proposed amendments. Madison also stood firm that state conventions should ratify the Constitution, not the state legislatures. Madison wrote Jefferson (who was still in Paris), expressing anger and frustration with the convention; he thought that the new government was far-too weak . . . soon, Jefferson, and even Madison, would view the new federal government under the Constitution to be too powerful at the expense of the states, especially towards their beloved Virginia.

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Thomas Jefferson - "The Virginia Reformer" (Fall, 1776)

11/1/2015

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Source: Andrew Burstein & Nancy Isenberg. Madison and Jefferson (2013)

Thomas Jefferson felt like he was being held hostage in Philadelphia as a delegate to the 2nd Continental Congress in the spring and summer of 1776, in that he wanted to be in Virginia taking part in the creation of its constitution (he had no way of knowing the lasting impact of the Declaration of Independence at that point in time). On 3 September 1776, Jefferson was finally able to leave Philadelphia, and six days later he arrived at Monticello.
Jefferson immediately assumed his seat in the newly-created House of Delegates under the Virginia Constitution (James Madison arrived in Williamsburg a week later). On 12 October, Jefferson introduced a motion to revise the laws of Virginia, focusing especially on criminal, religious, education, and property rights.
Jefferson was trying to empower the "Rising Generation" in Virginia, which to him meant the non-Tidewater Virginians, who held most of the property and power (The Tidewater region of Virginia dominated the state, and Williamsburg was the state capital; eventually, Jefferson would relocate the state capital to Richmond, in his Piedmont region of Virginia). On 26 October, Jefferson's bill passed, and was sent to a special committee, which included, among others, George Mason). Jefferson's big idea was to transform Virginia's laws, making the state an "Enlightened Republic".

Jefferson's conceit was that he wanted the other twelve (and future) states to pattern themselves after his vision of Virginia. TJ saw himself as a social engineer, and his laboratory was Virginia; his first priority in the Fall of 1776 was to disable laws that denied people their liberty, whether they were rich or poor.
In order to accomplish that goal, TJ wanted to spread (diffuse) knowledge among the white population in Virginia: all Virginians should be able to acquire land, civilize the wilderness, to experience and benefit from self-government. TJ wanted to create an Agrarian Society that would nurture Anglo-Saxon virtues for a Republic. TJ's definition of a republic meant that a majority of freeholders (whites) would have a real stake in society and a voice in government.

Reform #1: More Equitable Distribution of Lands
TJ's first reform came under the heading of property law; he was trying to end the de facto system of feudalism in Virginia, which was labeled "Primogeniture" and "Entail". TJ believed that if so much land was in so few hands (especially the Tidewater Elite), African slavery would increase. Land reform was a very radical effort by TJ to socially and literally change the landscape of Virginia; to him land ownership was, at least in part, a "Zero Sum Game", in that if power was taken from the Tidewater region, more power should flow to his beloved Piedmont region of Virginia.
By the Revolutionary War, most of Virginia's land was "entailed", which meant that lands were inherited generation after generation (10% of Virginia's population owned, through "entailing" the land, the vast majority of the state). TJ wanted that land freed up for redistribution, which of course led to fierce resistance by the powerful Tidewater Elite.

Reform #2: The Gradual Abolition of African Slavery
This reform would be no easier for Jefferson to achieve. TJ saw African slavery as a deterrent to good manners, morals, and laws. Weakening the slaveholding oligarchy "entailed" more than land redistribution; it would require radical social engineering taking into account that no one in Virginia advocated mass emancipation . . . there was zero support for freeing African slaves OR allowing them to acquire citizenship rights.
TJ's goal was to reduce the African slave population, which he hoped would lead to its future extinction. Ending the African Slave Trade to Virginia seemed to be the best way to start his attempted reform, and TJ wanted to grant freedom to African slaves after five years of labor. TJ also supported the voluntary manumission (formal emancipation) of African slaves; his goal in the end was to "Whiten" the population of Virginia. TJ believed that racial homogeneity was essential for a society to prosper and flourish.
Jefferson had enough of the "Dead Hands" of Virginia's long deceased gentry influencing life in Virginia. He also saw that the practice of "Primogeniture" and "Entail" affected African slaves as well, in that their future was set in a negative, oppressive fashion. To TJ, Virginia in 1776 was a corrupt and disfigured state, with various factions at war with each other. TJ viewed African slavery as a social contagion, but abolition of slavery would be an unreliable solution. Rather, exiling Free Blacks from Virginia would establish a racial quarantine, making Virginia safe for future (white) generations.

Reform #3: Universal Public Education + Reform of the Courts
In Jefferson's view, education would suture the wounds created by the Tidewater aristocracy and African slavery. Education would transform the Virginia master class into an Enlightened Class with liberal, republican principles. TJ introduced Bill #79, which wanted primary schools for all free children, grammar schools for the more capable children, and college for the most gifted (those with genius and virtue).

TJ wanted the state to help subsidize the cost of his educational reforms, mostly the odds would increase that education wouldn't remain in the province of Virginia's Elite (this attitude would resurface in the 1790s and early 1800s with his battles with the Federalist Party . . . to TJ, the Federalists were unfit to rule since they were "corrupt"). Also, TJ wanted to weed out the poor lawyers in Virginia's county courts; he labeled them "insects" . . . in short, TJ wanted to create an Enlightened All-Male White Intellectual Guardian Class in his beloved state of Virginia.

Reform #4: Limit the Power of the Anglican Church (The Church of England)
In the Fall of 1776, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison were both on the Committee of Religion, which had a total of 17 members. They were only socially connected with each other at that point; they both knew an incredible array of prominent and powerful Virginians . . . it would take more interactions and time until they would discover that they were "Political Soul Mates".
TJ wanted to end what he termed "Spiritual Tyranny"; even with James Madison in support of creating an atmosphere of religious freedom (by reducing the power of the Anglican Church) in Virginia, powerful members of the Tidewater region blocked the bill in committee . . . the separation of Church and State would be delayed.

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Thomas Jefferson's Last Year as Secretary of State: 1793

James Madison & the Constitutional Convention (May-Sept, 1787)

Thomas Jefferson - "The Virginia Reformer" (Fall, 1776)

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