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Ronald Reagan, the McCarthy Era, and Television (1948 - 1954)

1/23/2016

Source: H.W. Brands. Reagan: The Life (2015)

Republican conservatives absolutely hated the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, mostly for fiscal reasons; to them, the New Deal had gone international, and Big Government was growing bigger at the expense of the American citizens. The Election of 1948 looked bleak for President Harry Truman, since many Americans were clamoring for a change-of-party after 16 years of Democrats in the White House. But Truman barely eaked-out a victory; Ronald Reagan, out of habit, remained loyal to the Democrats, endorsing Truman and raising campaign funds for the President.
Truman celebrated his narrow electoral victory by having the US join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which was a huge affront to Republican conservatives. NATO was America's first peace-time alliance, which committed the US in advance to defend Britain, France, Italy, and 8 other nations from any external attack. Truman and most of the Democrats saw NATO as the "Capstone of Containment", while conservatives thought war-making powers were taken from Congress and handed to the Executive.
Republicans overall were in a quandary, in that they hated Big Government, but they also hated Communism. In the end, Republicans (especially conservatives) believed that the threat to US liberty was greater from international communism than from domestic liberals. Therefore, there was just enough Republican support in Congress to approve NATO, as well as Truman's Cold War agenda.

In 1948, the Supreme Court ruled that the major studios couldn't also control theater distribution (U.S. v. Paramount); for the first time, the studios had to compete to place their movies in American theaters. The big movie stars had nothing to worry about, but marginal actors, such as Ronald Reagan, found less-and-less work.
Another factor that changed the landscape for the big studios in Hollywood was television. By 1955, 30 million homes had a TV, which was about half the residences in America (by 1960, there would be 60 million residences with TV). As the President of the Screen Actor's Guild (SAG), Reagan had to decide if TV actors would be represented by SAG. To Reagan and SAG, TV actors seemed more like stage actors, so the decision was delayed. The radio industry tried to create an all-encompassing union for actors & performers, but Reagan still resisted, believing that movie actors represented the elite aspects of the industry. Plus, most of the members of SAG lived in Hollywood, where most other performers lived in New York City.

Reagan also saw a political problem, believing the Television Authority (TVA) might be a haven for subversives (Reagan characterized the TVA as "catnip to a kitten where the little Red brothers are concerned"). In other words, Reagan believed that "One Big Union" played into the hands of communist subversives; ultimately, SAG stood pat, and TV actors joined the radio performers in the American Federation of TV & Radio Artists.
Theodore Roosevelt was the first celebrity President, using the newspapers as his medium to do so. Franklin Roosevelt was the first President to really use the radio, and Reagan, as President, would use TV to great effect, but . . . it was Senator Joseph McCarthy (R; WI) that was the first major politician to use television. The political atmosphere in America was perfect for an ambitious politician like McCarthy; in 1949, the USSR announced they had the atomic bomb, Klaus Fuchs and Julius & Ethel Rosenberg were arrested, and China became a communist nation. The political atmosphere was perfect for McCarthy's rise to prominence when he gave his "Communist Infiltration" televised press conference; to most Americans, there was a real battle between Democracy and Communism, not only globally, but also in the U.S.

   Not long after McCarthy's televised press conference, North Korea invaded South Korea. McCarthy's "discovery" of communists in the State Department gave Republicans a powerful weapon, which they used against President Truman and the Democrats. Stunned by Truman's victory in 1948, the Republicans abandoned all respect for the President, and declared war on all-things-Truman. To the Republican leadership, McCarthy was just the bashi-bazouk ("undisciplined bandit") to lead their charge.








  McCarthy's attacks on Truman made the President un-electable in 1952; Truman didn't even pursue the Democratic nomination. Dwight Eisenhower delivered the White House to the Republicans for the first time since Herbert Hoover in 1928. McCarthy soon attacked Ike, claiming that he wasn't nearly as vigilant as he needed to be as President in dealing with the USSR, as well as subversives in the U.S. The Republican Leadership in the Senate gave McCarthy the chair on the Committee of Government Operations, and he used that chairmanship as a platform for his holy war against subversives, using live television to cover his committee hearings.

The Army-McCarthy Hearings aired on live television in 1954, with ABC showing all of the hearings, while CBS and NBC had partial coverage. President Eisenhower and the Army were still seething at McCarthy's attacks on SecState George Marshall, and Ike and the Army set a trap for McCarthy.
A McCarthy aide wanted favorable treatment for an assistant that had been drafted, which allowed the Army leadership to publicly denounce McCarthy . . . in essence, the Army "triple-dog-dared" McCarthy to hold televised hearings, and McCarthy obliged. The hearings aired for 36 days with 20 million viewers; McCarthy lacked the requisite "TV Persona", and as a result his approval plummeted. McCarthy's defeat proved the power of television to shape political perceptions; among many others, John F. Kennedy and Ronald Reagan were watching, learning, and waiting. (Below: the moment caught on television that was the beginning-of-the-end for Senator Joseph McCarthy . . . "Have you no sense of
decency, sir . . .")

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Ronald Reagan, Hollywood, and HUAC (1947)

1/16/2016

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Source: H.W. Brands. Reagan: The Life (2015)

Historically, there have been two main reasons for Congressional investigations. The first was to gather information for quality legislation, and the second was put/keep elected officials in the public eye . . . these Representatives / Senators would be the "Guardians of the Commonweal".
Investigations on suspected subversion have numbered a close second to war inquiries. But challenging the conduct of a war meant challenging the President (that's why most investigations have occurred after wars); challenging subversion, however was politically safe. Subversives, if they actually existed, were on the margin of society, and had few defenders. Members of Congress could foam-at-the-mouth with little worry of negative political consequences if they launched an investigation on suspected subversives.
During World War I, Congress investigated German subversion in the US. When Germany was defeated, the focus immediately shifted to Bolshevik subversion, which was the "1st Red Scare". The House Committee on Un-American Activities was created in 1937 (it was originally called the "Dies Committee" since it was under the leadership of Chairman Martin Dies, Jr.
D; TX, pictured above), and launched its first investigation in 1938 . . . Dies tried to prove that communists were linked to the New Deal. In 1946, the committee started using the acronym HUAC (House Un-American Activities Committee).

After the death of Franklin Roosevelt (12 April 1945) and the end of World War II, the Dies (pronounced Deez) Committee focused on FDR's pro-USSR propaganda films, which depicted Russia and Stalin as worthy allies against the Nazis. In 1945, the Dies Committee issued a confidential report that Hollywood was infested with communists. The report stated that if nothing was done with the 500+ communists, they would take over the film industry. Charges of communist subversion in the US was an effective ploy to use against Democrats in the Off-Year Election in 1946; Republicans took control of both houses, and swung into action against Hollywood (as well as President Harry Truman).
In the spring of 1947, HUAC (pictured; HUAC committee member, California Representative Richard Nixon) launched a new investigation and sent members to assess the situation in Hollywood; studio executives were questioned about FDR's influence in making WW II propaganda films in support of the USSR . . . but the investigation that spring was nothing compared to the all-out investigation in the fall.

HUAC summoned dozens of Hollywood producers, directors, writers, and actors to Washington, D.C. HUAC's official reason was to "spotlight" communists, to determine the extent of communist subversion in the film industry . . . then the public could do what it wanted at that point. The hearings were a big deal to the American public, in that witnesses were often famous Hollywood personalities.
During the fall hearings, studio executives named people, including Dalton Trumbo (pictured; screenwriter) by Jack Warner; Director Sam Wood ("Kings Row", in which Reagan was a star) also listed names, and Louis B. Mayer was cooperative. But Mayer told HUAC that the industry did a great job of keeping communists at bay; these executives walked a thin line, in that they didn't want Congress to censor movies, but the executives also didn't want to be seen as obstructing a high-profile Congressional investigation . . . especially by movie-goers.

The entire film industry was based on restraint-of-trade, and the studio executives didn't want to upset Congress, who then just might step in and break up the Hollywood Oligarchy of studios. After the executives, actors testified; Robert Taylor said he had often detected communist influences. After a few other actors, Ronald Reagan testified (pictured); his service in WW II greatly impressed the members of HUAC.
Reagan echoed what was stated before, being more specific without identifying people. He stated under oath that he believed that there was a communist influence in Hollywood, based on the votes of the Screen Actors Guild (SAG; of which he was their President) on certain issues. Reagan went on to say that Hollywood could police itself, claiming that 90% of SAG was communist-free. Reagan, again on the record, stated that unless the American Communist Party was directly influenced by the USSR, the party should not be banned, telling HUAC to let "Democracy do it's thing".

Reagan really enjoyed being on the national political stage (he later entered politics mostly due to craving an audience and praise), plus he was very good at it, using his quick brain to respond in a variety of ways, including the use of humor. Reagan struck just the right chord of cooperation with HUAC in defending Hollywood, and he came out of the hearings with his reputation and image enhanced.
The same could not be said about the ten writers/directors, called "The Hollywood 10", who were cited for Contempt of Congress by a vote of 346 - 17. The most famous of the "10" was the first to testify, John Howard Lawson of the Screen Writer's Guild (Dalton Tumbo was part of the "10" as well). "The Hollywood 10" became heroes to the Liberals and Leftists, and pariahs to Conservatives all at the same time.
Studio Executives, once it became clear that public opinion was solidly behind HUAC, studio execs started to deny jobs to those in "The Hollywood 10", saying that their actions reflected poorly on the film industry. Those executives stated they would not employ any of the "10" until they were acquitted and declared under oath that they were not a communist. The executives also said the policy wasn't just for the "10"; they knew there was a risk, in that innocent people could be hurt, and that creativity suffered when fear was in the atmosphere in Hollywood.

The HUAC hearings changed Reagan; he was exposed to the allure of the political stage, and he was also at an ideological abyss (he was still a self-proclaimed "New Deal Democrat" in 1947), over which he jumped when he joined the studio executives on the issue of communists in Hollywood. Fortunately for Reagan, "The Hollywood 10" weren't actors, so his job as SAG President was unaffected. Keeping actors working while keeping SAG "communist-free" coincided with the interests/goals of the executives.
Reagan asked the executives what would happen if HUAC charged an actor with being a communist; the executives responded that if the actor refused to answer whether-or-not they were a communist under oath, the actor would be terminated. Reagan didn't object, since politics were the heart of the matter, far more so than economics. Reagan didn't yet know it, but this was this issue, fighting communism, on which he would build his political career.

F.B.I. Director J. Edgar Hoover also wanted to talk to Reagan; FBI agents first interviewed Reagan in 1943, during a stagehand's strike. FBI agents told Reagan that communists in Hollywood hated him very much; Reagan was told of meetings where the question was asked what were they going to do with "that sonofabitching bastard Reagan". Reagan decided to cooperate after that eye-opening FBI interview, and in the spring of 1947, in another FBI interview, Reagan started to provide names, including the famous actress Anne Revere (pictured from "Gentleman's Agreement" with Gregory Peck in 1947; she won an Oscar for Best-Supporting Actress in "National Velvet" in 1944).
In effect, Reagan became an informant for the FBI in Hollywood; Reagan's code-name was "T-10"; Reagan was among at least 18 Hollywood informants, and he never publicized his FBI connections. Reagan didn't think he was doing anything wrong; he judged that he would be far more effective as an informant if he remained anonymous, and the suspected subversives didn't know that he was an informant that ruined their careers . . . as would become clear when he was President, Reagan wanted the atmosphere that surrounded him professionally and personally to be as structured and pleasant as possible . . .

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James Knox Polk & the Mexican War (August - December 1846)

1/1/2016

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Source: Robert W. Merry. A Country of Vast Designs: James K. Polk, the
Mexican War, and the Conquest of the American Continent (2009)

By August 1846, President James Knox Polk reached the conclusion that he would need to be BOLD in his prosecution of the war with Mexico. On 29 August 1846, Polk presented his new war plan to his Cabinet (pictured; James Buchanan was absent, he was the "loose-cannon" in the Cabinet, with Presidential ambitions): a sea-to-land invasion at Veracruz. Santa Anna was already in Mexico, and Polk was expecting his gamble of secreting Santa Anna into Mexico to pay off in terms of meaningful negotiations to end the war. Polk was also worried about General Zachary Taylor in Northern Mexico, who followed orders but did not exhibit initiative in the field.
On 19 September 1846, the Mexican government rejected Polk's terms on negotiations . . . to Polk, captured land from the Mexican War would now be "captured booty". Mexico's strategy was centered on scoring a significant victory, THEN negotiate with the U.S. from a position of strength. Americans started to realize that the Mexican War would be a protracted conflict, especially when newspapers reported that Santa Anna had boasted that he would drive Taylor back to the Sabine River (the border between Texas and Louisiana). Santa Anna had fooled and deceived Polk, and in Mexico, Santa Anna was free to pursue what he treasured most: ultimate glory and national acclaim.

In May 1846, Taylor, "Old Rough and Ready" (pictured), had crossed the Rio Grande, which was the first U.S. invasion of another nation since General Andrew Jackson invaded Spanish Florida in 1818. On 2 October 1846, Polk received a message from Taylor, who was approaching Monterrey in Northern Mexico; Taylor stated that he expected heavy resistance as he approached. On the same day, Polk received a message from Colonel Stephen Kearny, who informed the President that he had taken New Mexico and was heading towards California.
Taylor showed valor and tactical abilities, but many in the government and military questioned his strategic thinking. Taylor had defeated the larger Mexican force, and was in the process of house-to-house fighting, removing the Mexican army from Monterrey. Near the moment of victory, Taylor let the Mexican general off the hook by agreeing to let his army leave the area. It's possible that Taylor could have ended the war outright by defeating and capturing the largest Mexican army . . . Polk and his Cabinet were furious. But Polk didn't know that Taylor's men were a bedraggled and demoralized lot by the time they reached Monterrey. Taylor was ordered by Polk to ignore his agreement with the Mexican general, and move deeper into Mexico in pursuit.

Polk was generally unhappy with the state of the war with Mexico, but then he received intelligence that showed how Veracruz could be overtaken. Polk ordered Taylor to stay near Monterrey and keep the 7000k Mexican force occupied (which outnumbered Taylor by as much as 5:1); there was no way Taylor would be able to reach Mexico City.
And then, disaster: due to numerous newspaper accounts, Polk's deal returning Santa Anna to Mexico became public, and the results of the Off-Year Elections of 1846 (30th Congress) would have 115 Whigs to 108 Democrats in the House of Representatives. Henry Clay's Whig party had picked up 31 seats, while the Democrats lost 28, a swing of 59 seats. In the Senate, the Democrats only had a +4 advantage over the Whigs, but the Democrats were not a unified party . . . the Mexican War and the debate on the expansion of slavery (Wilmot Proviso) was the catalyst for the opposition to Polk.
Polk offered the position of Lieutenant General (overall commander of the Army, based in Washington, D.C.) to Senator Thomas Hart Benton (D; MO), who accepted, pending confirmation in Congress. To win the war, Polk now needed to quickly take Veracruz and Mexico City, while at the same time getting a less-than-cooperative Congress to fund all that was required to win the war. Polk authorized the invasion of Mexico at Veracruz, but delayed any decision regarding Mexico City. Polk's Cabinet reluctantly agreed that the vainglorious General Winfield Scott (pictured above; "Old Fuss & Feathers"), was the only choice to command at Veracruz.

Polk saw himself as "above politics", but he was starting to have a desire to respond to the political attacks against him by the Whigs and an increasing number of Democrats. In his Second Annual Message to Congress on 8 December 1846, Polk claimed that those in opposition to the Mexican War were giving the enemy "aid and comfort"; in effect, he called those in opposition (especially Whigs), de facto traitors. Those in opposition accused Polk of "Moral Treason", engaging the U.S. in an illegal and unnecessary war.
Representative Stephen Douglas (pictured, D; Ill), a rising political star, supported Polk, as well as Commander Stockton's and General Kearny's actions in California (However, Stockton and Kearny had granted U.S. citizenship, which only Congress could legally do). The U.S. had never acted like this before with another nation; everything about the Mexican War was new and debatable (e.g. Polk's "Right of Conquest" reference in his 2nd Annual Message was not mentioned anywhere in the Constitution). The "intensifier" of the debate on the war was Polk's "aid and comfort" phrase, which had appeared in most American newspapers.

The Whigs focused their attack against President Polk with three specific accusations: 1) Taylor crossing the Rio Grande was an act of war; 2) Polk's "War of Conquest" was a usurpation of power according to the Constitution; 3) Polk had illegally annexed New Mexico and California. In short, the Whigs accused Polk of distorting the facts and misrepresenting the truth concerning the Mexican War.
On 21 December 1846, Polk met with Benton (pictured), informing him that his support in Congress was nowhere-near sufficient for Benton to be confirmed in the newly-created position of Lieutenant General. Benton wanted Polk to press on in his behalf, and Polk wrote out a draft supporting Benton, mostly to keep the powerful Democratic Senator amenable towards his administration. By the end of 1846, most Americans supported expansion West, as well as the Mexican War, but opposition to the war was growing, and becoming more vocal and organized. The Whigs sensed political opportunity in the upcoming Presidential Election of 1848 (already, Zachary Taylor was targeted by many Whigs for their party's nomination), and the creation of the "Free Soil Party" would further intensify the debate on the expansion of slavery in any territories taken from Mexico.

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James Knox Polk and the Wilmot Proviso

1/1/2016

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Source: Robert W. Merry. A Country of Vast Designs: James K. Polk, the
Mexican War, and the Conquest of the American Continent (2009)

President James Knox Polk was prepared to take a huge risk to try to end the Mexican War: he would sneak Santa Anna (in exile in Cuba) through the US blockade around Veracruz into Mexico, and in a pre-arranged deal, Santa Anna (pictured) would take the lead in negotiating an end to the war. In July 1846, Santa Anna was informally apprised of Polk's demands in exchange for his re-entry to Mexico: 1) The border would be the Rio Grande in Texas; 2) The U.S. would possess Upper California at least as far as San Francisco Bay; 3) The U.S. would pay quite a bit for Mexican lands with no indemnities for war damages. Santa Anna quibbled a bit about the Rio Grande border (Mexico had long insisted the border should be the Nueces River further north), but he accepted the terms.
On 3 August 1846, Polk received confirmation of Santa Anna's desire to return to Mexico; if current negotiations with the Mexican government failed, then Santa Anna was Polk's "Insurance Policy". From the very beginning of the war with Mexico, Polk pursued a negotiated peace while prosecuting an aggressive war. Polk, the Political Chess Master, was setting up his pieces on the board of statecraft . . . but by the Summer of 1846, Polk could no longer hide, or deny, his overall strategy of territorial expansion.

President Polk's "Two Million Dollar Bill" was about to be introduced to Congress; he wanted Congress to authorize funding for the war, since there was no National Bank from which the government could secure loans. The overall design of the bill was to achieve an "honorable peace" with Mexico, but Polk did his best to keep the progress of the bill secret, using the Senate's Executive Committee. Polk (pictured) even sent a secret message to trusted Senators on the committee, trying to get the Senate to vote for the bill without any debate.
But in the House of Representatives, Polk was unable to keep the progress of the $2m Bill secret, and he was forced to write an Open Message to Congress explaining the purpose of the bill. Almost immediately, House Whigs announced their opposition to the bill; in their view, Polk was trying to avoid responsibility for a war he started. Interestingly, one of Polk's goals with the Open Letter was to put the onus on the House if the $2m Bill failed. It was during the House debate on the $2m Bill that a first-term Representative, David Wilmot (D; PA), appeared on the historical stage. His motive for what became known as the Wilmot Proviso was most likely to make a name for himself in the House by intensifying the debate on the $2m Bill.

David Wilmot (pictured) was somewhat similar to JFK in his approach to his legislative responsibilities: don't work too hard. But, when motivated, Wilmot took on all-comers, even going against his party. During a break during the debate, Wilmot overheard representatives from New York, the "Barnburners" (loyal to Martin Van Buren, and against the expansion of slavery . . . the "Barnburners" were the group of politicians that started the "Free Soil Party" in the late-1840s) brainstorm ideas about keeping slavery from expanding in any territory taken from Mexico.
Wilmot decided to introduce what he overheard from the "Barnburners" on the House floor in order to make the idea his own, for the record at least. Wilmot had never shown this kind of defiance against Democrats loyal to Polk, and it was rather surprising, in that Wilmot was not an opponent of the war, he wasn't an Abolitionist, he did not view African slavery as immoral, and he wasn't against slavery's expansion in the West. If Wilmot was passionate about anything, it was promoting the expansion of Free Labor.

When Wilmot rose to speak, he declared the war with Mexico "necessary & proper", and not a war of conquest. Wilmot further clarified that if the war was about conquest, he would be in complete opposition. Wilmot continued to say that it would be desirable to obtain territory all the way to the Pacific, including San Francisco Bay, but only through negotiation. Then, he announced in dramatic fashion, that he would oppose, now and forever, the expansion of slavery in territories obtained from Mexico, and he would shortly officially propose an amendment to the $2m Bill to that effect (which he did on 8 August, 1846).
Immediately, the war debate changed - the Mexican War and the expansion of slavery were now intertwined. It was immaterial if the potential territories did not have any interest in slavery . . . Senator Thomas Hart Benton (D; MO) commented that "never were two parties so completely at loggerheads over nothing". Polk was outraged, referring to Wilmot's Proviso as "a mischievous and foolish amendment"; to Polk, the war had zero connection with slavery.

Now the debate centered on voting on the bill with or without the Wilmot Proviso. John Quincy Adams (pictured in a photograph from 1843) supported the Proviso as a statement of principle, even though he personally felt the amendment was unnecessary. Finally, the moment arrived when the House voted on whether or not to include the Wilmot Proviso in the $2m Bill; Wilmot's Proviso passed 83-64, and was attached to the $2m Bill . . . there would now be an intense national debate about the expansion of slavery in the West.
The Speaker of the House, John Wesley Davis (D; IN) who wanted to be absolutely sure the $2m Bill passed with the Wilmot Proviso attached, delayed and obstructed proceedings to the brink of midnight when the session was over, blocking any efforts of those in opposition to the Proviso to make an official motion. However, Davis forgot that the clock in the House ran 8 minutes faster than the clock in the Senate, and he foiled his own efforts at getting the bill with the Wilmot Proviso sent to the Upper Chamber in the last few minutes for a quick vote . . . whoops. The House ended its session with the Wilmot Proviso attached to the $2m Bill, and the Senate was not able to vote on the bill because the session of Congress had ended . . . for now, Polk's $2m Bill was dead, as was his leverage in Congress concerning the war with Mexico.

To Southern Democrats, it appeared that the Senate would have passed the bill if it had reached their chamber in time. If that would have happened, according to their perspective, then Polk would have had leverage to use against the Mexican government to end the war sooner. Polk believed that the failure of the $2m Bill denied him the ability to end the war with Mexico by October 1846.
Even with the defeat of the $2m Bill, Polk had been the most productive legislative President in US History to that point. He had finalized the annexation of Texas, was very close to ending the Oregon dispute with Great Britain, introduced much-needed tariff reform, and created an Independent Treasury, all in one legislative session. And, he started a war with Mexico, which to Polk's point-of-view, was absolutely necessary in order to expand America's border to the Pacific. Polk (pictured left) had done more in his first 18 months as President than even his mentor, Andrew Jackson (pictured right), had accomplished in 8 years.

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Ronald Reagan, the McCarthy Era, and Television (1948 - 1954)

Ronald Reagan, Hollywood, and HUAC (1947)

James Knox Polk & the Mexican War (August - December 1846)

James Knox Polk and the Wilmot Proviso

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