Mr. Jensen's U.S. History Website
  • Home
  • College US
    • Coming Soon . . .
    • APHIST Video
    • NWU Dual Credit Info
  • US History 9
    • Coming Soon . . .
    • Online Reviews
    • US 9 Video
  • U.S. History Blog
    • U.S. History Blog (May 2020 - May 2021)
    • U.S. History Blog (May 2019 - May 2020)
    • U.S. History Blog (May 2018 - May 2019)
    • U.S. History Blog (May 2017 - May 2018)
    • U.S. History Blog (May 2016 - May 2017)
    • U.S. History Blog (May 2015 - May 2016)
    • U.S. History Blog (May, 2014 - May, 2015)
  • "Good News"
  • My WHS Google Site

James Knox Polk and the Wilmot Proviso

1/1/2016

0 Comments

 
        Source: Robert W. Merry. A Country of Vast Designs: James K. Polk, the
             Mexican War, and the Conquest of the American Continent (2009)
Picture
      President James Knox Polk was prepared to take a huge risk to try to end the Mexican War: he would sneak Santa Anna (in exile in Cuba) through the US blockade around Veracruz into Mexico, and in a pre-arranged deal, Santa Anna (pictured) would take the lead in negotiating an end to the war. In July 1846, Santa Anna was informally apprised of Polk's demands in exchange for his re-entry to Mexico: 1) The border would be the Rio Grande in Texas; 2) The U.S. would possess Upper California at least as far as San Francisco Bay; 3) The U.S. would pay quite a bit for Mexican lands with no indemnities for war damages. Santa Anna quibbled a bit about the Rio Grande border (Mexico had long insisted the border should be the Nueces River further north), but he accepted the terms. 
     On 3 August 1846, Polk received confirmation of Santa Anna's desire to return to Mexico; if current negotiations with the Mexican government failed, then Santa Anna was Polk's "Insurance Policy". From the very beginning of the war with Mexico, Polk pursued a negotiated peace while prosecuting an aggressive war. Polk, the Political Chess Master, was setting up his pieces on the board of statecraft . . . but 
by the Summer of 1846, Polk could no longer hide, or deny, his overall strategy of territorial expansion.

Picture
      President Polk's "Two Million Dollar Bill" was about to be introduced to Congress; he wanted Congress to authorize funding for the war, since there was no National Bank from which the government could secure loans. The overall design of the bill was to achieve an "honorable peace" with Mexico, but Polk did his best to keep the progress of the bill secret, using the Senate's Executive Committee. Polk (pictured) even sent a secret message to trusted Senators on the committee, trying to get the Senate to vote for the bill without any debate.
     But in the House of Representatives, Polk was unable to keep the progress of the $2m Bill secret, and he was forced to write an Open Message to Congress explaining the purpose of the bill. Almost immediately, House Whigs announced their opposition to the bill; in their view, Polk was trying to avoid responsibility for a war he started. Interestingly, one of Polk's goals with the Open Letter was to put the onus on the House if the $2m Bill failed. It was during the House debate on the $2m Bill that a first-term Representative, David Wilmot (D; PA), appeared on the historical stage. His motive for what became known as the Wilmot Proviso was most likely to make a name for himself in the House by intensifying the debate on the $2m Bill.

Picture
       David Wilmot (pictured) was somewhat similar to JFK in his approach to his legislative responsibilities: don't work too hard. But, when motivated, Wilmot took on all-comers, even going against his party. During a break during the debate, Wilmot overheard representatives from New York, the "Barnburners" (loyal to Martin Van Buren, and against the expansion of slavery . . . the "Barnburners" were the group of politicians that started the "Free Soil Party" in the late-1840s) brainstorm ideas about keeping slavery from expanding in any territory taken from Mexico. 
     Wilmot decided to introduce what he overheard from the "Barnburners" on the House floor in order to make the idea his own, for the record at least. Wilmot had never shown this kind of defiance against Democrats loyal to Polk, and it was rather surprising, in that Wilmot was not an opponent of the war, he wasn't an Abolitionist, he did not view African slavery as immoral, and he wasn't against slavery's expansion in the West. If Wilmot was passionate about anything, it was promoting the expansion of Free Labor.

Picture
       When Wilmot rose to speak, he declared the war with Mexico "necessary & proper", and not a war of conquest. Wilmot further clarified that if the war was about conquest, he would be in complete opposition. Wilmot continued to say that it would be desirable to obtain territory all the way to the Pacific, including San Francisco Bay, but only through negotiation. Then, he announced in dramatic fashion, that he would oppose, now and forever, the expansion of slavery in territories obtained from Mexico, and he would shortly officially propose an amendment to the $2m Bill to that effect (which he did on 8 August, 1846).
     Immediately, the war debate changed - the Mexican War and the expansion of slavery were now intertwined. It was immaterial if the potential territories did not have any interest in slavery . . . Senator Thomas Hart Benton (D; MO) commented that "never were two parties so completely at loggerheads over nothing". Polk was outraged, referring to Wilmot's Proviso as "a mischievous and foolish amendment"; to Polk, the war had zero connection with slavery.
​

Picture
     Now the debate centered on voting on the bill with or without the Wilmot Proviso. John Quincy Adams (pictured in a photograph from 1843) supported the Proviso as a statement of principle, even though he personally felt the amendment was unnecessary. Finally, the moment arrived when the House voted on whether or not to include the Wilmot Proviso in the $2m Bill; Wilmot's Proviso passed 83-64, and was attached to the $2m Bill . . . there would now be an intense national debate about the expansion of slavery in the West. 
     The Speaker of the House, John Wesley Davis (D; IN) who wanted to be absolutely sure the $2m Bill passed with the Wilmot Proviso attached, delayed and obstructed proceedings to the brink of midnight when the session was over, blocking any efforts of those in opposition to the Proviso to make an official motion. However, Davis forgot that the clock in the House ran 8 minutes faster than the clock in the Senate, and he foiled his own efforts at getting the bill with the Wilmot Proviso sent to the Upper Chamber in the last few minutes for a quick vote . . . whoops. 
The House ended its session with the Wilmot Proviso attached to the $2m Bill, and the Senate was not able to vote on the bill because the session of Congress had ended . . . for now, Polk's $2m Bill was dead, as was his leverage in Congress concerning the war with Mexico. 

Picture
     To Southern Democrats, it appeared that the Senate would have passed the bill if it had reached their chamber in time. If that would have happened, according to their perspective, then Polk would have had leverage to use against the Mexican government to end the war sooner. Polk believed that the failure of the $2m Bill denied him the ability to end the war with Mexico by October 1846.  
     Even with the defeat of the $2m Bill, Polk had been the most productive legislative President in US History to that point. He had finalized the annexation of Texas, was very close to ending the Oregon dispute with Great Britain, introduced much-needed tariff reform, and created an Independent Treasury, all in one legislative session. And, he started a war with Mexico, which to Polk's point-of-view, was absolutely necessary in order to expand America's border to the Pacific. Polk (pictured left) had done more in his first 18 months as President than even his mentor, Andrew Jackson (pictured right), had accomplished in 8 years.

0 Comments

The Election of 1844: James Knox Polk (D) v. Henry Clay (Whig)

12/24/2015

0 Comments

 
     Robert W. Merry. A Country of Vast Designs: James K. Polk, the  Mexican War,
                                  and the Conquest of the American Continent (2009)  
   
Picture
     On 27 April, 1844, independently of each other, Martin Van Buren (MVB, pictured) and Henry Clay announced their opposition to the immediate annexation of Texas. Clay stated that it was impossible to guarantee that war with Mexico wouldn't occur as a result, and that America's national character was at stake. Clay went so far to say that annexing Texas and war with Mexico would be the same thing. For MVB, there was no way to avoid a rupture in the Democratic Party over Texas, and to compound his problems after his announcement, Andrew Jackson was disappointed and crestfallen at MVB's stance on Texas. No matter their views and sentiments, MVB and Clay were out-of-touch with the vast majority of U.S. citizens who not only wanted Texas, but also rapid Western Expansion.

Picture
     On 1 May, 1844, Henry Clay was nominated as the candidate for the Whig Party at their national convention in Baltimore. On 10 May 1844, James Knox Polk was summoned to the Hermitage for an audience with his mentor, Andrew Jackson . . . Jackson wanted a pro-annexation man from the Southwest as the nominee for the Democrats, and he had identified Polk as the most able man available.
     MVB's right-hand man, Silas Wright, had also come to the same conclusion about Polk. Wright was even more assured when Polk let it be known that he would remain loyal to MVB as long as he remained a candidate for the nomination of the Democratic Party for President. But all was not well in the Democratic Party: Western and Southwestern delegates threatened to bolt the convention if MVB was a threat to Lewis Cass (Michigan, pictured), an avid expansionist. At the beginning of the Democratic National Convention, Southern delegations pushed for a 2/3's majority in order to determine a nominee . . . if that super-majority became a reality, MVB and his supporters knew they had no chance to win the nomination.

Picture
      Gideon J. Pillow (pictured, as a Confederate Brigadier General) was among the wealthiest men in Tennessee, and had been friends with Polk for many years; he was Polk's point man in the Democratic National Convention in Baltimore. Pillow told Polk that if MVB faded fast, he could survive his association with the former President among the delegates. The key, according to Pillow, was that Northern delegates had to start the "Polk Parade" towards nomination. So, at Baltimore, Pillow's overall goal was to guarantee Polk the Vice-Presidential slot, while doing his best to position him for the nomination as President.
     On 27 May 1844, the Democratic National Convention was called to order, and after a Chairman was selected, the motion for the 2/3's super-majority was made, and after extended debate was passed due to the unity of the Southern delegates. With that vote, MVB's chances at the nomination vanished; the results of the first ballot, with 177 being the 2/3's mark, were MVB 145, Cass 86, with three other candidates totaling 34 (including future President James Buchanan).

Picture
     After the 5th ballot, Cass had 107 delegates to MVB's 103; after the 6th ballot - Cass 166, MVB 101; 7th ballot - Cass 123, MVB 99 . . . by the 7th ballot, MVB's delegates were starting to commit to Cass, and MVB's supporters threatened to bolt the convention. During all this chaos, Pillow was approached by the Pennsylvania and Maryland delegations. Their idea was to nominate Polk as a compromise candidate to try and end the deadlock . . . PA & MD also had a hidden agenda, in that they were mostly concerned about denying Cass the nomination.
     For Polk's name to be put in play, Pillow needed Northern delegates to convince other Northern delegates to support Polk; Polk's chances were nil of he was nominated by Southerners. Before the 8th ballot, Pillow worked the floor during the debate, pushing Polk as the only candidate that could defeat Cass. After the 8th ballot, Cass and MVB held firm, but Polk had 44 delegates (New Hampshire started him off w/ their 6 delegates). Before the 9th ballot, many pro-Polk testimonials were given, and as a result of the 9th ballot, not only did Polk win the nomination, but he was unbelievably unanimously selected. 
Clay, when he heard Polk was the Democratic nominee, publicly stated that he would have an easy path to the Presidency; privately, he knew that Polk would be tougher to defeat in the South & the West than MVB or Cass.

Picture
       To Polk, the "Political Chess Master", there were four main obstacles in his way to winning the Presidency in 1844: a) The lingering tariff issue, especially in Pennsylvania; b) President John Tyler might run as a 3rd Party candidate, siphoning off votes from Polk; c) Senator Thomas Hart Benton's (MO) angry Northerners and John C. Calhoun's (SC) angry Southerners might derail Democratic unity; d) Texas - Polk wanted to separate annexation and slavery, if possible.
     Polk knew he would get backing from powerful Democrats if he promised to serve only one term: he needed Benton, Calhoun, Cass, Buchanan, and many others to support his candidacy. In June 1844, the Texas Treaty, which would have made Texas a state not from a territory, but from a sovereign nation, died on the Senate floor (35-14). And, to complicate matters even further, Benton's and Calhoun's forces went to war as a result, tearing the Democratic Party further apart. Polk even heard reports that a Southern Convention of Democrats would be held in Nashville; South Carolina was the impetus behind the convention, but not Calhoun. Once Calhoun (who was Tyler's 2nd SecState) was persuaded that Polk wasn't a tool of MVB, he not only supported Polk, but also put a stop to the proposed Nashville convention . . . Polk's single-term promise was a motivating factor for Calhoun as well. 

Picture
     By now, Henry Clay (pictured) realized that his stand on Texas was contrary to the national sentiment on expansion. Clay declared that as President, he would annex Texas if it involved no national dishonor or war with Mexico. Once again, Clay was seen by the "Average American" as cunning and duplicitous . . . Clay did not have Polk's political discipline in keeping silent when he needed to be silent. Clay still stuck to his American System past and his games of political intrigue; it didn't register to Clay that the U.S. had moved in a new direction, focusing on the future with Western expansion . . . stubbornness, ideology, ego, vanity, nostalgia . . . all were in play for Henry Clay, and they kept him from winning the Presidency he so coveted.
     In the Election of 1844, Polk had .495 of the Popular Vote, while Clay had .481, and in the Electoral College, it was Polk with 170 Electoral votes to Clay's 105; Polk won 15 states, while Clay carried 11. Clay just may have defeated Polk, except the Liberty Party candidate, James G. Birney (MI), may have kept Clay from winning New York, Michigan, and Ohio; if Clay had carried those three states, he, not Polk, would have been the 11th President of the United States.

0 Comments

The Election of 1800: The Real Story of the "Peaceful Revolution"

12/1/2015

0 Comments

 
     Source: Andrew Burstein & Nancy Isenberg. Madison and Jefferson (2013)
Picture
     The battle lines were set for the Election of 1800: to the Federalists, if Thomas Jefferson became President, it would be a government of "Experiment" instead of "Order". To Republicans, Federalist "Order" had slaughtered Liberty; political rancor was at a fever pitch. 
     As far as the Republicans were concerned, Jefferson was the only one that could defeat President John Adams, but to do so, Jefferson needed the New York Electors, especially since Pennsylvania's Electors had proven to be unpredictable in 1796. Jefferson and James Madison did the math: New York was the key to winning the Election of 1800, and Aaron Burr was the agent to deliver the state's Electors. Burr succeeded in outmaneuvering his rival, Alexander Hamilton, in New York City, making sure candidates loyal to him prevailed in the 13 NYC Assembly elections. Those men would select the state's 12 Electors, which would vote for Jefferson (Hamilton petitioned Governor Clinton to overturn the results of a fair election . . . he wasn't a very good loser).  
     Burr's efforts convinced Virginia's 21 Electors that he should be Jefferson's running mate. Virginia was one of the first states to adopt the "Winner-Take-All" strategy for their Electors (only Nebraska and Maine do not do so today), so therefore Jefferson and Burr secured all 42 of Virginia's Electoral Votes (each Elector cast two ballots for President until the 12th Amendment). In order to try and gain as many Electoral votes as possible in Northern states, the Republicans touted Jefferson as the primary author of the Declaration of Independence, which was not widely known until the end of the century. Federalists countered that Jefferson did indeed write the document, but he was not the author, only the "recorder" of the ideas of others in an effort to minimize any Republican advantage.

Picture
     By October 1800, Alexander Hamilton was less powerful than at any time before George     Washington was President. Hamilton tried to make his political comeback by attacking President John Adams in a 54 page pamphlet (he was embittered largely due to being thwarted by Adams in his pursuit of becoming the commander of the newly created Provisional Army). Hamilton attacked Adams in the pamphlet, and let it be known that he preferred and supported Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina as the Federalist candidate for President.
     There was not an Election Day for a popular vote in 1800 (the first such Presidential election that featured a meaningful popular vote occurred in 1824); the Electors voted on 3 December 1800 for President and Vice-President. The states that voted a "Straight Ticket" selected Jefferson with one Electoral vote, and Burr with the other vote. In the states that split their Electoral vote between the two parties, Jefferson and Burr received an equal number (again, each of an Elector's two votes was a vote for President in 1800).
     In South Carolina, Thomas Pinckney (Cotesworth Pinckney's cousin, not his famous brother), worked to hand the state's Electors to Jefferson and Burr. It was arranged during this wheeling-and-dealing that one Electoral vote was to be withheld from Burr in South Carolina, thereby avoiding an unnecessary (and embarrassing) tie. However, either the Elector chosen for the "honor" of doing so failed to properly cast his ballot, or the whole endeavor was inadequately organized and communicated. Republican unity proved greater than practical calculations in other states as well as South Carolina, and as a result, Jefferson and Burr each received 73 Electoral votes.

Picture
      Federalists had dominated Congress for the previous six years, but after the Election of 1800, 2/3's of the House of Representatives would be Republicans . . . but the 7th Congress wouldn't convene until 7 December 1801, nine months after Inauguration Day. It was in the Lame Duck Federalist-controlled House that the Election of 1800 would be decided, and the Federalists (especially the Hamiltonian "High Federalists") made every effort to sabotage the process of electing a new President. (Below: the Electoral College results for the Election of 1800 - notice how the Federalists were able to avoid a tie between Adams & Pinckney; an Elector from Rhode Island cast an Electoral vote for New York's John Jay)
     Many Federalists (especially the "High Federalists") were willing to reverse the intended order of the Republicans for President, and tried to elect Burr; these Federalists also entertained the idea of delaying the process until after Inauguration Day. Jefferson thought that a candid conversation with Adams would help resolve the impasse in the House, but Madison (Jefferson's de facto campaign manager in 1796 & 1800) advised him not to do so, in that a conversation with Adams could easily be misconstrued and backfire for the Republicans. 

Picture
     Contrary to popular history (which is often too accepting of historical hearsay as credible evidence), Jefferson and Madison held no hard feelings towards Burr at this time in terms of any illicit behavior towards them or the Republicans. The main factor why Burr was attractive to many Federalists was that he was a New Yorker, not a Virginian. Burr stayed away from the capital during the scurrilous hoo-haw, not wanting to get directly entangled in the political morass. 
     James Bayard, the lone representative from Delaware, could have ended the election in the House on the first ballot, since he was the lone representative from his state. If Bayard had voted for Jefferson on the first ballot, the election in the House would have been over, but Bayard deeply resented the Planter Class, and cast his ballot for Burr. The results of the first ballot in the House were as follows: Jefferson had 8 states, Burr 6, and there were 2 undecided delegations . . . with all 16 states voting, Jefferson needed 9 states in order to become President.

Picture
     Bayard announced, after well over two dozen ballots, that he would abstain from voting, since he was assured by a Virginia Republican he respected that Jefferson would continue Federalist fiscal policies if elected. The "High Federalists" freaked-out, since Bayard's abstention meant that Jefferson would become President with the 8 states he already had in his fold. Burr was the wildcard in the equation: Bayard was waiting to see if Burr would offer a better deal compared to Jefferson. A letter from Burr was received by Bayard, but the contents must have been less-than-satisfactory to Bayard and the other Federalists.
     On the 36th ballot, Bayard and members of the South Carolina delegation abstained, and with other movement among the Congressional delegations (Hamilton had convinced other Federalists that Jefferson was the "Lesser Evil" compared to Burr), Jefferson received 10 states to Burr's 4 (and with the two abstentions from DE & SC, all 16 states were on the record). Many of the Republicans believed that Burr was a schemer; to them in appeared that Burr made a play for President, and then failed to make a satisfactory deal with the Federalists (that may well have been true) . . . however, the true instigators of the "Nightmare in the House" were the outgoing Federalists.

Picture
     Epilogue: On 4 March 1801, James Madison was unable to attend Jefferson's Inauguration since his father had recently died. Albert Gallatin (pictured: the statue of Albert Gallatin in front of the Treasury Building in Washington, D.C.), who had been a thorn in the side of the Federalists in the House for nearly a decade, was confirmed as Secretary of the Treasury when the Senate convened in December. Gallatin became Jefferson's most influential adviser, convincing the 3rd President to reduce federal spending, with the most obvious cuts to the Navy (Gallatin would serve in the Cabinet for both Jefferson and Madison). 
     Madison was unanimously confirmed as Secretary of State, even though he had never left the shores of America; SecState in the early decades after the Constitution was considered the stepping-stone to the Presidency (Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, John Quincy Adams, and Martin Van Buren all served as SecState before going to the White House).
     Soon, John Marshall would be #1 on Jefferson's "Enemies List", replacing Patrick Henry (who died in 1799) and Alexander Hamilton (who was no longer a threat). Marshall was not only a Federalist, but also a popular Virginian, which presented two threats as far as Jefferson was concerned (Marshall and Jefferson were also second cousins). By the time Jefferson was sworn in as President, Marshall had made the transition from being John Adams' last Secretary of State to the 4th Chief Justice of the Supreme Court . . . Marshall would soon show that he was not afraid to flex his legal muscles in interpreting Executive and Legislative decisions in relation to the Constitution as Chief Justice (1801 - 1835), most famously in Marbury v. Madison in 1803.

0 Comments

Ida Tarbell and John D. Rockefeller, Part One

10/17/2015

1 Comment

 
      Source: Emily Arnold McCully. Ida M. Tarbell - The Woman That 
                       Challenged Big Business, And Won! (2014)
Picture
      Ida Tarbell and her employer, S.S. McClure (McClure's Magazine) shared a longing for the bygone era of an "Uncorrupted America". Both wanted to do their part to restore that ideal, and in the process, assist working-class Americans as well as incoming immigrants. Exposing the ills of America would mean a huge investment in terms of money, time, and energy, and McClure's would be open to potential lawsuits as well. Therefore, Tarbell and McClure knew that the any articles that attacked big business would need to be exceptionally well-written and credible. Tarbell, McClure, and the staff at McClure's believed that reform-minded articles should be targeted to more than just the middle class and the "Upper-10's" (upper-10% of the population in terms of wealth). 
     






      
     After weeks of discussion and debate, the McClure's staff became convinced that Trusts (not a big business, but a board that supervised the operation of the big business) would be their focus for exposure and potential reform . . . but which Trust? Steel was considered, in that J.P. Morgan was in the process of creating the behemoth U.S. Steel, which would be the first "Billion Dollar Trust" . . . . but everything associated with that possible story line seemed too complicated. Tarbell told her colleagues about growing up in Northwest Pennsylvania around the emerging and expanding oil industry; given her skill-set and experience, it was a no-brainer that Ida Tarbell would write about John D. Rockefeller and Standard Oil (she reluctantly agreed to pursue the project). Tarbell wondered if readers would really enjoy a feature about interlocking corporations and their balance sheets; she didn't sense any potential for danger, just a desire to discover truth.

Picture
      John D. Rockefeller had, in essence, created the first modern corporation by establishing the Standard Oil Trust (SOT) in 1882. Even before 1882, the Standard Oil Company controlled the production and distribution of oil, as well as determining its use by the consumer. The SOT was created in that Combinations (big consolidated businesses) couldn't do business across state lines; Rockefeller wanted to consolidate even more power and influence in the oil industry.
     Rockefeller purchased tank cars, pipelines, banks, real estate, and even bribed politicians. He invested in newspapers so he could be portrayed in the most positive light; he never responded to criticisms and investigations of his methods or his Trust. New oil reserves were discovered in Ohio in 1885, and Rockefeller believed that this huge reservoir was a "Gift from God" given directly to him (even though the oil in Ohio had a strong sulfur content, but Rockefeller made it work as marketable fuel nonetheless). Ohio became the main source of petroleum for the SOT; not only had the SOT dominated refining, but by the mid-1890s the SOT became the dominant producer of oil in the industry.

Picture
      Rockefeller continued to crush the independent oil producers by underselling them, and by using unsavory methods, such as industrial espionage. By the mid-1890s, the SOT was a financial colossus, no longer subject to the market fluctuations in the oil industry. As late as 1900, most Americans still burned kerosene in their homes instead of electricity, and the SOT produced 86% of that kerosene - it seemed that no independent producer could survive (one survivor was the Pure Oil Company, and its treasurer was Will Tarbell, Ida's brother). 
     Ida's father told her not to publish the first three parts of "The History of the Standard Oil Company", in that he feared that Rockefeller's retribution would be fierce (e.g. buying McClure's Magazine). Tarbell's search for documents was difficult, in that the SOT and the railroads (esp. NY Central, Erie, and PA) destroyed as many documents as possible relating to the South Improvement Company (SIC). But she persevered, and found that while most documents were destroyed, some remained in scattered locations. Tarbell proved that the SIC was Rockefeller's tool, using not only rebates, but "drawbacks" (a percentage of the freight rates that the independents paid the railroads went directly to the SIC). Rockefeller promised that he would ship all his refined oil with the NY Central, Erie, and Pennsylvania railroads in exchange for the rebates/drawbacks; it wasn't illegal, but it certainly wasn't ethical . . . and to Tarbell, it was grossly unfair, and more-than-worth investigating further.

Picture
      Then, through a connection with Mark Twain (Ida had known him for quite a few years), Tarbell was able to meet with the Vice President of the Standard Oil Trust, Henry Rogers
(pictured below: Mark Twain with Henry Rogers, in front). Rogers admitted that the SIC was a mistake, and he even offered to arrange a meeting with Rockefeller. Ida visited Rogers at the SOT headquarters (26 Broadway in NYC) often for the next two years; she spent so much time there that some independents refused to talk with her, fearing that she was in league w/ Rockefeller. (Interesting fact: Tarbell earned $4000 per article, $107k today; by comparison, Rogers' secretary earned $10,000 per year at the SOT - $269,000 today). While Rogers cooperated most of the time, Tarbell still suspected that chicanery was afoot; she couldn't yet prove the espionage and criminal acts that she knew occurred due to the actions of the SOT. 

     The "breakthrough evidence" came from an unexpected source: a Standard Oil office boy. His job was to burn selected documents every night, and while doing so, saw the name of his Sunday School teacher on some documents. His Sunday School teacher was a refiner, and the documents showed that the railroads were warning the SOT well in advance of the oil shipments from the independent producers. As a result, the SOT could ship its product first, undercutting the competition.
     The office boy took the documents to his Sunday School teacher, who had already read Tarbell's first three installments of "The History of the Standard Oil Company", and believed in Ida's integrity to the point where he gave her the documents. Those documents proved that the SOT was still engaged in unethical, and even illegal shenanigans, and in February 1904, McClure's published "Cutting to Kill" . . . Henry Rogers refused to meet with Ida Tarbell again.
Picture
1 Comment

Thomas Jefferson: Idealistic or Practical President?

10/11/2015

0 Comments

 
         Source: Jon Meacham. Thomas Jefferson: The Art of Power (2012)
Picture
     As President, Thomas Jefferson articulated ideals (theories), but largely acted pragmatically (practically) . . . especially helpful was his Secretary of State, James Madison. Jefferson used   Hamiltonian methods to achieve his goals; the 3rd President embraced power very subtly. In terms of military strategy, Jefferson preferred to focus on defense (e.g. reducing the Navy), except when it came to the Barbary Pirates. A shakeup in Congress helped Jefferson immensely as President. From 1801 - 1803, there were 17 Republicans and 15 Federalists in the Senate; in 1807 - 1809, there were 28 Republicans and 6 Federalists. Jefferson told his Cabinet that he needed to see all the information they had from their departments; Jefferson wanted and needed to know everything . . . he believed in "The Art of Power".

Picture
     Jefferson's favorite "political weapon" was hosting dinner parties, in that he used them as a tool for gathering political information and gossip. Many a Congressman's or Senator's vote was swayed by Jefferson during a dinner party. Jefferson's relationship with lawmakers kept information flowing between the Executive and Legislative branches. Jefferson was more a political chess player than a political warrior, hence the constant charges of "scheming" by his political opponents.
    Jefferson believed that sociability was essential to Republicanism, in that citizens would become more virtuous and act for the public good on a regular basis. However, Jefferson never invited Republicans AND Federalists to his dinner parties . . . he absolutely abhorred conflict in his presence. So, Jefferson used his dinner parties to create more personal and political attachment to himself; very often, he let his guests sit where they chose, except for his usual seat, of course. Jefferson encouraged free-flowing conversation (with plenty of wine) instead of guests "toasting" each other non-stop, which he saw as false bonhomie. Jefferson had the gift of making everyone at his dinner parties feel comfortable and respected, which led to the kind of conversations that Jefferson could at least potentially use politically. 

Picture
     President Jefferson authorized the rules of engagement with the Barbary Pirates; he controlled events while appearing to defer to Congress. That style was typical of Jefferson, in that he could achieve his goal without causing confrontation or a crisis with Congress. By the time Jefferson had to directly deal with the Barbary Pirates early in his first term, he had become a broad interpreter of the Constitution, which was a very Hamiltonian thing to do.
     On 31 October 1803, the U.S.S. Philadelphia was captured by Barbary Pirates based out of Tripoli. In February 1804, Stephen Decatur and a detachment of Marines torched the U.S.S. Philadelphia, which had been overrun and taken, denying the Barbary Pirates use of the frigate against the United States. After a successful "Black Ops" mission that was led by William Eaton (and authorized by Jefferson), a detachment of Marines, and a bevy of North Africans opposed to Tripoli, Jefferson announced to Congress that the enemy in the Mediterranean had, in essence, learned their lesson, and the U.S. would no longer have to pay "Tribute" . . . shortly thereafter, hostilities once again resumed.

Picture
     In the Spring of 1801, Spain ceded half of their North American empire to Napoleon in the third Treaty of San Ildefonso. France now had the Louisiana Territory, and a new U.S. political course was required. In a way, Jefferson was the perfect President at the perfect time for the   Louisiana Purchase; a less-courageous politician would have bungled, a too-idealistic politician would have been inflexible. 
     The Louisiana Purchase needed to be ratified by 30 October 1803; Jefferson called on Congress to meet on 17 October for "great and weighty matters". Jefferson's initial view on the purchase was that it required an amendment to the Constitution; his original intent was to formally ask both houses of Congress to propose the necessary amendment (Jefferson's initial thought was that purchasing the Louisiana Territory may have been in excess of his powers under the Constitution). In mid-August 1803, Jefferson received information that France was not as interested in the deal . . . that information changed the landscape dramatically, in that there was no time for an amendment, hence the "weighty matters" communication to Congress.

Picture
      The idealistic Jefferson wanted an amendment to justify the Louisiana Purchase, but the practical Jefferson wanted the land. In his mind, Jefferson saw a link in territorial expansion with increased Republicanism (virtue) and wealth. A Federalist U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, John Quincy Adams (who had known Jefferson since his childhood), suggested that Jefferson use the Executive's power of negotiation in Article 2 of the Constitution in order to justify the purchase. With the ratification in the Senate of the Louisiana Territory (24-7), the political tables had turned, in that the Federalists believed that Jefferson would become a "President-for-Life", in other words, a Monarch.
     After Vice-President Aaron Burr killed former Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton in a duel
on 11 July 1804, Jefferson kept silent, which was politically wise. Jefferson thought that Hamilton had possessed dangerous tendencies, yet he used Hamilton's institutions and methods to be the first President to drastically increase the power of the Executive branch. On 6 August 1804, Jefferson was informed that his Vice-President was interested in effecting a separation from the nation in Western states/territories. In the months that followed, Jefferson was re-elected in 1804 with an Electoral vote count of 162 to 14 for the Federalist candidate Thomas Cotesworth Pinckney.

Picture
     Jefferson knew that the now former Vice-President, Aaron Burr, was no longer a political threat, but he was convinced that Burr was a threat to potential disunion. Therefore, Jefferson was willing to go to extraordinary methods in order to deal with Burr and his activities in the West. On 22 January 1807, Jefferson publicly announced that Burr was guilty of treason "beyond reason"; it was the same approach that he used in 1778 as Governor of Virginia against Josiah Philips. 
     On March 1807, Burr was arrested for treason; Jefferson was deeply involved with the prosecution, but from a distance. During the trial, Jefferson was subpoenaed to testify against Burr . . . Jefferson refused to submit himself and the office of the President to the control of others. Jefferson did agree to submit "relevant documents", which were mostly copies of documents that the presiding judge, Chief Justice John Marshall, refused to allow into evidence. Burr's acquittal enraged Jefferson; to him, it was yet another in a line of incorrect decisions made by Federalists in the Supreme Court. Added to Marbury v Madison, and the     failed removal of Associate Justice Samuel Chase, Jefferson's distrust of the newly self-empowered Judicial branch increased.

Picture
     On 22 June 1807, the H.M.S. Leopard attacked the U.S.S. Chesapeake off the coast of Virginia. The Leopard fired 22 times before the Chesapeake could respond; 3 Americans were killed, and 17 more were wounded. Not long afterwards, another U.S. ship was fired upon; aboard that ship was Vice-President George Clinton (former Governor of New York). Jefferson had guessed that Congress would choose an embargo over war in response to the British attacks.
     Jefferson was willing to use force, but he knew in this situation he couldn't act unilaterally. Jefferson was also practical, in that the U.S. Navy was nowhere-near the strength of the Royal Navy. "War Fever" had subsided overall in America, and the only realistic alternative seemed to be the embargo . . . Jefferson reluctantly agreed that an embargo was the "least-bad" alternative.

Picture
     Jefferson's big gamble with the embargo was that he thought that time was on his side. By keeping ships in their ports, he thought that might lead to a faster conclusion of the war between Britain and France, and then "Freedom of the Seas" would return. On 22 December 1807, Jefferson signed the embargo into law: it was now the Embargo Act of 1807. The scope of the act surpassed even that of the Federalist Alien & Sedition Acts in 1798. Jefferson was given broad executive authority to enforce the embargo; U.S. exports decreased by at least 75% (some historians argue that the percentage was even greater). 
     In the early stages, Great Britain felt some of the effects of the embargo, and actively encouraged U.S. ships to try and sail to Europe despite the rigid enforcement. What Jefferson didn't know was that embargoes are impractical over the long-term, and Great Britain, while inconvenienced, was able to procure most of what they imported from the U.S. elsewhere. 
     The Embargo of 1807 turned U.S. politics on its head; now even loyal long-time Republicans believed that Jefferson had become a de facto Monarch, since he was now negatively affecting the lives of regular citizens (the embargo led to a severe economic downturn). Federalists (who were concentrated in New England) focused more-and-more on state's rights, and discussions to explore the possibility of secession intensified. Yet, as time would determine, any other decision but the embargo would have been madness or cowardice.

Picture
     In 1808, Jefferson was well-aware of his unpopularity with most Americans due to the Embargo of 1807, and as he had done before in the face of such political hostility and conflict (as Virginia's Governor during the Revolutionary War and as Secretary of State), he returned to his beloved Monticello. In effect, Jefferson was an "Absentee President" to close out his second term, and Secretary of State James Madison ran the Executive branch for the duration of Jefferson's second term, which was great training since he won the Election of 1808, and would serve two terms of his own as President.

0 Comments

John D. Rockefeller and the Great Railroad Strike of 1877

10/3/2015

0 Comments

 
        Source: Ron Chernow. Titan: The Life of John D. Rockefeller, Sr. (1998)
Picture
      In 1875, more oil fields were discovered near Oil Creek (NW Pennsylvania), and the market soon experienced another glut, from $4 a barrel in 1876 to .70 a barrel in 1878. Those that tried to deal directly with John D. Rockefeller (President of Standard Oil, pictured in 1872) during this crisis were frustrated, in that he only worked through trusted agents (one rival described trying to deal with Rockefeller as "boxing with a ghost"). 
     A large controversy erupted during this glut in the oil market in 1878. The major causes were, first, that Standard Oil (SO) wanted to retain its monopoly on it share of pipelines (SO controlled nearly half of the pipeline network). In order to continue to do so, SO connected new oil wells to their pipelines free-of-charge. Standard Oil constructed as much as 5 miles of new pipeline a day, PLUS built huge tank farms for surplus oil, which increased the storage capacity from 1 million to 4.5 million barrels. However, the oil producers had no discipline (or memory of past gluts), and produced far more oil than the system's capacity could hold. These very same "Over-Drillers", when their oil spewed on the ground since there was no place to transport or store it, blamed Rockefeller for their travails.

Picture
     While Rockefeller didn't create the crisis, he saw something in the hullabaloo in which to take advantage. Rockefeller stated that he would only accept oil for immediate shipment to refineries (his refineries, of course). Standard Oil quoted a price for crude oil that was 20% below the market price, then stalled on payments to the desperate oil producers. This was a terribly high-handed and insensitive way to respond to the problems of the producers, even though the producers were the main reason for the crisis. 
                            
​                       (Pictured: A Standard Oil Company Stock Certificate)

     The oil producers responded with a tsunami of rage; to them, the pipelines were behaving in the same conspiratorial manner as the railroads. To most Americans in the 1870s, the railroads were to be equally available for all to use, and the oil producers felt the same about the pipelines . . . interestingly, it's the same argument that Natives used in dealing with whites - no one truly owned the land, it should be available to all. Rockefeller saw the entire situation much differently, in that he was taming a wild and unpredictable industry. Soon, intimidating Ku Klux Klan-like protests by union hotheads occurred at night, threatening Standard Oil with all sorts of nasty and violent retribution.

Picture
     In October 1878, the Pennsylvania state government officially exonerated Standard Oil of any wrongdoing in the crisis. To most involved, that decision proved that shenanigans were afoot (e.g. the investigator was bribed, etc.). Rockefeller saw the oil producers as malcontents and ingrates; he couldn't fathom how the producers failed to make the simple connection that their oil was worthless without his pipelines. To Rockefeller, these oil producers were behaving like five-year-old children that didn't understand how markets worked (e.g. "How dare you not take all that we produce"; and "Why don't you just pay us in 1876 prices?"); he was convinced that the oil producers were unreasonably hostile.
     









   
     Rockefeller had the forward vision to position himself to profit from either surplus or scarcity in the oil market; but despite that foresight, he wasn't invulnerable. Tom Scott, the President of the Pennsylvania Railroad, entered the fray against Rockefeller again, this time using his refining and pipeline subsidiaries. Scott tried to win-over new refiners with bargain transportation rates, and he actually authorized construction of new pipelines from the new oil fields to seaboard refineries, which was a direct challenge to Standard Oil. Scott was trying to chop down Rockefeller despite the fact that 2/3's of all the oil the Pennsylvania Railroad carried was from Standard Oil. 

Picture
      Rockefeller interpreted Scott's actions as a declaration of war, and he decided to take on the most powerful corporation in America in the 1870s. Rockefeller threatened to ship his oil with other railroads (NY Central and Erie), but Scott didn't flinch, so he went on the attack. Rockefeller starved the Pennsylvania Railroad by idling the refineries he controlled in Pittsburgh while increasing production in those he controlled in Cleveland. Also, Standard Oil would undersell Scott's refineries in every market in which they competed.
     Rockefeller had the New York Central and Erie Railroads trim their transportation rates to pressure the Pennsylvania Railroad to lower their freight charges. Also, Standard Oil purchased 600 oil tank cars from William Vanderbilt (pictured); Rockefeller had covered all his bases during his frontal assault against Tom Scott. Rockefeller had quickly humbled the world's largest freight carrier, which everyone assumed was invincible, including Tom Scott. In order to compete with Standard Oil, the Pennsylvania Railroad actually paid oil producers to let them ship their product. 

Picture
     Tom Scott responded by slashing rates and firing hundreds of workers, while reducing wages by 20%. He doubled the length of trains without expanding crews, which led to workers in the Pennsylvania Railroad walking off the job in protest. The Baltimore & Ohio Railroad cut their wages as well, which created the critical mass that precipitated the Great Railroad Strike of 1877, which featured an incredible amount of violence. In Pittsburgh alone, 500 tank cars, 120 locomotives, and 27 buildings were destroyed by union vandals. It became so costly that Tom Scott needed emergency loans from Wall Street financiers . . . and the cost & violence worsened.
                 (Pictured: the main Pennsylvania Railroad yard in Pittsburgh in flames)
     President Rutherford B. Hayes 
sent federal troops to support state militias; American citizens watched in horror as the conflict intensified. After burning 2000+ freight cars, the strikers finally capitulated, but they had introduced America to a new era of labor strife. 
Rockefeller had come VERY close to Standard Oil's property in the affected areas being taken or destroyed . . . in that respect, he was powerless, and very fortunate. Reeling, the Pennsylvania Railroad skipped paying out their scheduled dividend to investors, which sent the price of its stock plummeting. Finally, Tom Scott communicated (via intermediaries) that he was ready to negotiate a settlement with Rockefeller to end the nightmarish scenario.

Picture
     The spoils of victory for Rockefeller were immense. Tom Scott was so desperate for cash that he offered to stop refining oil AND he offered the refining assets of the Pennsylvania Railroad at fire-sale prices (refineries, storage tanks, pipelines, steamships, tugboats, barges, loading docks) . . . even so, it was more than Standard Oil could pay. Scott refused to budge on two points, however: Standard Oil had to buy ALL the assets in which he offered, and he wanted $2.5 million of the $3.4 million purchase price to be paid by certified check in 24 hours. 
     That last demand taxed even Standard Oil's financial reserves, in that Rockefeller only had half of the $2.5m on hand. As a result, Rockefeller toured Cleveland's banks, telling each banker that he needed all the money they had, immediately. Yet, through all this, Rockefeller actually STRENGTHENED his alliance with Scott; his goal was always, if possible, to be conciliatory and to expand his influence.
     Standard Oil agreed to ship at least 2 million barrels of oil per year via the Pennsylvania Railroad, while SO received an additional 10% rebate. Standard Oil (once again) became the "Oil Umpire" for the railroads, deciding on the percentage of oil shipments for each (PA 47%; NY Central and Erie, 21% each; Baltimore & Ohio 11%). And, to top it off, Standard Oil demanded that the Pennsylvania Railroad pay Standard Oil .20 per shipped barrel, like the NY Central and Erie Railroads. In the end, Rockefeller insured that the railroads could never again challenge his power and influence in the oil industry . . . Rockefeller's next big move to consolidate even more power and profit in the oil industry would come in 1882, with the creation of the Standard Oil Trust.

0 Comments

John D. Rockefeller and the "Cleveland Massacre"

10/1/2015

0 Comments

 
  Source: Ron Chernow. Titan: The Life of John D. Rockefeller, Sr. (1998)
Picture
     Why were there severe economic depressions in the decades after the Civil War? First, inflationary booms swamped the nation with goods. Next, big gluts (surpluses) developed from overproduction, and it became impossible for businesses to recoup their investment. The expanded supply led to lower prices, and a cruel deflationary bust, which led to unemployment . . . and a brutal economic depression. In the decades after the Civil War, economic advances were always followed by severe economic downturns, as seen in the depressions that started with the Panics of 1873, 1893, and 1907, and of course the Great Depression.
     As a result, the incentive for many powerful men in business and industry was to try and crush competition by forming monopolies (aka Combinations). Oil was the most volatile of the major industries; being in the petroleum business was a nerve-wracking and unpredictable venture. Low kerosene prices were a boon to consumers, but they were a bane, especially to refiners, in terms of profit margin. 

      By 1870, refiners had a problem, in that total refining capacity was three-times the amount of oil that was pumped from the wells. Refiners and oil drillers were like farmers when the price went down, in that they produced too much crude / refined oil, trying to make money by sheer volume. In 1869, Rockefeller was in a panic; his fear was that his already immense wealth (he was only 29 years old) might disappear due to the volatile market, despite his under-the-table deal with rebates (discounts on shipping oil by rail) with the NY Central & Erie railroads. 
           (Pictured: A small part of Oil Creek in Northwest Pennsylvania in the 1860s)
Picture
     Rockefeller studied the entire market, and figured that a "systematic" solution would rescue the industry . . . and protect and increase his wealth. He thought in terms of "Cooperation" (his word for monopoly); to him that meant strategic alliances and long-term planning. Basically, Rockefeller wanted to reduce the number of refineries to better match oil production. He envisioned a giant oil cartel that would reduce overcapacity and stabilize prices, and of course he would be the one to accomplish that feat, as well as being the primary beneficiary. Ironically, the independent oil companies at Oil Creek (NW Pennsylvania, where the first oil well was erected in 1857), tried to enact the same strategy in terms of limiting the amount of oil that was extracted from the reserves . . . but that coalition fell apart due to a lack of leadership.
Picture
      In order to accomplish his goal, Rockefeller needed oceans of money . . . but how to supplement the company's existing capital and also keep control? His partner, Henry Flagler (pictured), found the solution via incorporation, which allowed them to sell shares to select outside investors. There was a problem with incorporation, however, in that a corporation couldn't own property outside of its state of incorporation ("Trusts" were created by Big Business to bypass this inconvenient law).
     On 10 January 1870, Standard Oil was created, with Rockefeller as President, and Henry Flagler as Secretary and Treasurer (a third partner, Samuel Andrews, was Vice-President). The name of the company referred to their "standard" uniform quality of kerosene which had no impurities of note compared to the competition. Standard Oil already controlled 10% of America's refining capacity, and also had a barrel-making factory, warehouses, shipping facilities, and a fleet of railroad tank cars. Rockefeller's goal was to simply refine ALL of America's oil.
     Rockefeller and Flagler refused a
 salary; their profit was to be solely from the appreciation of Standard Oil's shares and dividends (Rockefeller made sure that he was the largest single shareholder, holding about twice the shares of stock to Flagler and Andrews). Rich investors did not bang on Standard Oil's door, in that it was a very unstable time for new ventures, and the oil industry was too unpredictable for most that were looking to invest. In order to prove the naysayers wrong, Rockefeller paid out 105% on the company's dividends, which was absolutely unheard of in those days in an uncertain economic landscape.

Picture
     Rockefeller's first targets for "Cooperation" were the 26 refineries in-and-around Cleveland, Ohio. His strategy was to become the "Oil Blob" by taking over these refineries, one-by-one. This move would be his first, and most controversial, during his multi-decade career in the petroleum business. To Rockefeller's supporters in 1872, Standard Oil was the birth of a benevolent giant; to his detractors, the company was a monster (soon to be portrayed as an octopus). His rivals saw a brutal power grab; to Rockefeller, he believed that what he was doing would lead to the salvation of the oil industry.
    To "save" the industry from itself, Rockefeller covertly acquired New York's premier oil purchasing company in 1871 (it also had a refinery). This acquisition gave Rockefeller a sophisticated purchasing agency at the perfect time. Publicly, the firm looked like it stood in opposition to Standard Oil, but in reality, it was Rockefeller's pawn. On 1 January 1872, Standard Oil expanded it capital from $1m to $3.5m in just a couple of days. Among the new shareholders were the luminaries of Cleveland banking, with prominent railroad men as well. Also, on 1 January, Standard Oil's Executive Committee decided to purchase "certain refining properties" in Cleveland and elsewhere. It was the start of what historians call the “Cleveland Massacre”.

Picture
        The excluded refiners were from New York and Oil Creek (NW PA). Standard Oil was the driving force behind the SIC; Rockefeller held 900 of the 2000 total shares, and 100+ shares were owned by "Rockefeller Men", which meant that Rockefeller had the controlling interest. As a result, Cleveland refineries were more powerful within the SIC, as well as in the overall marketplace. 
     One might ask - how did the railroads benefit from the from this agreement with Rockefeller and the SIC? Rockefeller helped the railroads arbitrate their vicious rate disputes; Standard Oil also guaranteed that the three railroads had specific percentages of the SIC oil shipments (PA 45%; NY Central and Erie 27.5% each) . . . Rockefeller had become the railroads "Oil Umpire". The railroads were able to run lines of cars at full capacity while making far-fewer stops, which significantly increased their profit margins. Also, the railroads were fully aware that Rockefeller had accumulated MANY oil tank cars; in short, the three railroads badly needed John D. Rockefeller.
     Both refiners and railroads were struggling with excess capacity and suicidal price wars. Rockefeller figured out that he could fix the refiners' problems and those of the railroads in one fell swoop. Rockefeller knew exactly what he wanted, and he had a knack of knowing what the OTHER party wanted as well. Rockefeller saw the whole picture, and figured out how to save the railroads from themselves, and create greater wealth and power for himself.

Picture
      The mayhem began when Rockefeller entered a secret compact with the head of the Pennsylvania Railroad, Tom Scott (pictured). Rockefeller wanted to drive a wedge between the Pittsburgh and Philadelphia refiners and Scott. The result of their agreement was the creation of the South Improvement Company (SIC); the Pennsylvania, New York Central, and Erie Railroads and the refiners that joined the SIC agreed to keep their deal secret. 
     The three railroads (that controlled the rails from NYC to Cleveland) raised the freight rates by 50% for all refiners that weren't part of the SIC (to Rockefeller and the railroads, "Fair Warning" had been given to all refiners). Those in the SIC would receive 50% rebates off crude/refined oil shipments. Also, those in the SIC would receive "Drawbacks", which were further rebates given SIC members for every barrel shipped by non-member refiners (Rockefeller felt totally justified in receiving drawbacks, in that Standard Oil was the de facto warehouse for the oil that was to be shipped . . . he believed he should receive payment for services rendered).
     The railroads also gave members of the SIC inside information on oil shipments from the independent (non-member) refiners, which meant that the SIC could under-sell the independents. The drawbacks (and the other features of the SIC) were an instrument of competitive cruelty, which was unparalleled in US History up to that point; to many Americans, it was the grandest scheme of collusion and knavery they had ever seen.

Picture
     Not long after the SIC was created, the secret was out among the independent refineries in Oil Creek. On 26 February 1872, Pennsylvania newspapers reported the rate hikes for those that weren't in the SIC; it was the death warrant of the independent refiners, and the protests were large, intense, and sometimes ugly. The Petroleum Producer's Union (PPU) was created, and the group of independents only sold crude oil to Oil Creek refiners (the embargo didn't last long, in that their pockets weren't as deep as Rockefeller's; he was awash in cash reserves). The Oil City Derrick listed the names of those in the SIC on its front page, and Rockefeller's name was clearly visible. It was the first time that most Americans heard of John D. Rockefeller, and it was a negative debut.
     Ida Tarbell was 14 years old during this scurrilous hoo-haw, and the controversy was a negative frozen moment in her life (her father was one of the independent refiners). Eventually, she would write The History of the Standard Oil Company, which appeared in installments in McClure's Magazine from 1902 - 1904 (to Ida, Rockefeller didn't "play fair"). 
     Rockefeller always believed that his enemies were axiomatically wrong, and he was right; not just right, but Righteous. To Rockefeller, the furor over the SIC confirmed his view that the oil industry needed to be brought under control . . . his control. Rockefeller's silence during the uproar confirmed, to the public, that he was not only arrogant, but guilty. Rockefeller told the few that were close to him (e.g. Henry Flagler), "You can abuse me, you can strike me, so long as you let me have my way".

Picture
       As always, the greater the tumult, the more calm Rockefeller became, and the more firm he held his ground. The PPU was, in the short-run at least, well-organized and well-run; the PPU had 16 districts that blocked all oil sales to the SIC (there were even night patrols in each district to make sure there wasn't any clandestine night-time drilling). The PPU embargo / boycott took a toll on Standard Oil, in that Rockefeller temporarily laid-off 90% of his workforce.
     The fatal mistake that Rockefeller and the SIC made was omitting refiners in the state of New York; almost immediately the NY refiners joined their Oil Creek brethren in opposition to the SIC. On 25 March 1872, the three railroads, under severe pressure from the PPU and the general public, agreed to cancel their contract with the South Improvement Company. The SIC didn't violate any laws of the day, but it did violate a collective sense of what was considered "Fair Play". 
     On 8 April 1872, Rockefeller surrendered to the obvious, instructing those in the SIC that all contracts with the three railroads were null and void. Rockefeller tried to explain (through intermediaries, since he refused direct contact w/ most anyone) that there was no conspiracy against the refiners . . . the conspiracy was against the consumers. Rockefeller claimed that he wanted a "United Front of Refiners" in order to keep the consumer from negatively affecting the oil market . . . few believed the President of Standard Oil. However, Rockefeller owned 20 of the 26 Cleveland refineries, and already had enough control of at least the regional market to continue to negotiate secret rebate deals with railroads on his own . . .

0 Comments

"The Rise of the Octopus": John D. Rockefeller

9/17/2015

0 Comments

 
Source: Emily Arnold McCully. Ida Tarbell: The Woman Who Challenged 
                                     Big Business, And Won (2014).
Picture
     In Cleveland, Ohio, 1855, John Davidson Rockefeller earned $25/month ($626 today) as a grocery store bookkeeper. Rockefeller was the son of a con man, and he had startlingly opposite traits from his father, such as personal discipline, determination, religious conviction, and sky-high ambition. To Rockefeller, acquiring wealth meant that he had to gain strict and total control of himself, and the market (which would eventually mean a monopoly . . . in something). 
     The only characteristic passed on from his father was a willingness to take gigantic risks. Rockefeller felt superior in his virtue, and came to despise men that thought they were better than him. Once he got the upper-hand, sudden vengeance would belong to Rockefeller.
     Rockefeller arrived in "Oil Country" in 1860. "Oil Country" (in terms of drilling for oil) was Northwest Pennsylvania, and the center of region was Titusville, a city of 10,000+. Rockefeller almost immediately saw that refining oil to make money involved little expense and high potential profits compared to drilling for oil. 

Picture
     Soon, there were fifty refineries crowded around Cleveland, Ohio, including a refinery owned by John D. Rockefeller, and his partner Henry Flagler. Consistent with his belief of strict control over a market (to increase efficiency, production, and, of course, profits), Rockefeller started to absorb his rival refiners (in this "horizontal monopoly", Rockefeller gave his rivals a choice: sell for some level of profit, or be forced out of business). 
     The other key to controlling the refining market was transportation of the refined product (initially kerosene, a.k.a. coal oil), which meant dealing with the railroads. A transportation monopoly existed in the Oil Region, in that the Erie, Central, and Pennsylvania Railroads were in collusion with each other. In an effort to extract even more control over the oil industry, these three railroad behemoths created the South Improvement Company. (Pictured: oil derricks in close proximity in NW PA in the 1860s).
     Through this new company, this railroad Combination increased freight rates by 250%. However, the Combination let it be known that if an oil refiner joined the SIC, then that refiner would get a "rebate" (discount) on freight charges (they were pledged to secrecy, since it was against the law) . . . among the few refiners that joined the SIC was John D. Rockefeller (he also helped create the SIC). The 250% rate increase hit the refiners living in Titusville, Pennsylvania between the eyes, and these independent refiners made sure that the SIC was exposed to the daylight of public awareness. 

Picture
     The Oil City Derrick newspaper printed the names of the refiners that had joined the South Improvement Company, and Rockefeller's name was on the list. Franklin Tarbell (Ida Tarbell's father), a partner in one of the independent refining companies, became a changed man: he stopped whistling, no longer played his harmonica, and stopped making jokes. Franklin even joined vigilante groups that wrecked SIC railroad tank cars. More effective (for a short while) was the embargo against Rockefeller's Standard Oil, in which Franklin Tarbell enthusiastically participated. 
     Franklin personally turned down Rockefeller's offer to buy a full year's output from his refinery (which was a way to start the process of "absorbing" a rival refinery). Franklin simply dismissed Rockefeller's strategy/tactics as morally wrong; both Franklin Tarbell and John D. Rockefeller believed they were on the side of "right". Rockefeller believed that Standard Oil had rescued the oil industry, and had emerged as the "fittest" company ("Social-Darwinism" was in the nation's bloodstream by that time in history); the term that Rockefeller used to describe his intervention (and collusion with the railroads) was "Cooperation". Franklin Tarbell believed that the railroads were to serve the public (as did most Americans), not a select group, such as the Southern Improvement Company.
                  
                 
               
              (Pictured: an "Oil Town")

Picture
     To Ida Tarbell (Franklin's daughter), the dispute over the SIC hit home very hard, seeing how it had affected her father. In her mid-teens, Ida developed a hatred of the "Privileged Class", the unchecked wealthy and powerful that had negatively altered her life and that of her family. It became obvious to the independent refiners (and a young Ida Tarbell) that if the SIC controlled the transportation of oil, they were soon to be forced out of business. 
     On 25 March, 1872, the Railroad Combination (Erie, Central, PA) conceded defeat, and canceled the SIC contract. In their euphoria from (a perceived) victory, the independent refiners did their best to exclude and ostracize Rockefeller, since he was the alleged (and actual) leader of the SIC. Little did they know at the time that the fall of the SIC wasn't going to slow down Rockefeller in the least. He already controlled 22 of the 26 refineries in the Oil Region, which meant that Rockefeller (pictured above in 1875) was in a position to keep making secret deals with the railroads. To Ida Tarbell, her father represented the "Noble Underdog" who was overwhelmed by the "Evil Empire" . . . and Rockefeller was her Darth Vader. 
(When times were good for Franklin Tarbell, he moved his family to a better location. He purchased an abandoned hotel in a nearby oil ghost town for $600 ($10k today) and had it transported piece-by-piece to a plot of land he had just purchased . . . below, you see the new Tarbell home, which was completely reassembled in the early-1870s in Titusville, Pennsylvania)

Picture
Picture
     For the rest of her life, Ida Tarbell viewed many Combinations as malevolent, and John D. Rockefeller was at the top of her "list". By 1868, Rockefeller owned the largest oil refinery in the world, and by 1877, Rockefeller controlled 90% of the nation's oil production. In 1882, Rockefeller established the Standard Oil Trust (his Oil Combination was made "legal"), which was designed to determine (fix) prices in the industry. Those that succumbed to Rockefeller were offered stock in the Standard Oil Trust, or the cash equivalent (the smart ones chose the stock option); Franklin Tarbell refused to join Rockefeller's Oil Combination, and he struggled financially for the rest of his life (he died in 1905). Ida Tarbell (pictured) would expose the shenanigans of Rockefeller in her 19 part series titled The History of the Standard Oil Company (1902 - 1904).
(Below: a visual representation of Rockefeller's wealth since 
 the inception of the Standard Oil Trust in 1882)

Picture
0 Comments

The Battle of Little Bighorn, Part Two (25 June, 1876)

8/1/2015

0 Comments

 
         Source: James Donovan. A Terrible Glory: Custer and the Little Bighorn - 
                                                    The Last Great Battle of the American West (2009).
Addendum: Here is the other (largely forgotten) part of the Battle at Little Bighorn 
Picture
     Captain Frederick Benteen was a good soldier, and he followed Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer's orders . . . to a point. Benteen had become frustrated due to the seemingly neverending scouting / tending-to-the-pack-train mission. Benteen kept going over ridges to try and find Natives, and he didn't see any "hostiles". 
     To Benteen, this mission felt like a wild goose chase designed to keep him from sharing in any of the glory from the upcoming victory. He didn't send a messenger to Custer, since he was ordered only to do so if he saw Natives. Benteen ordered his men to take a longer-than-normal break for the horses (and the men) before moving on. Despite the order to hurry back after accomplishing his mission, Benteen sauntered on; the horses were capable of a faster gait, but Benteen would not hasten his pace.

Picture
        A messenger then appeared, sent by Custer (Private John Martin, an Italian whose English was substandard); Custer's written message was "Big Village, Come Quick, Bring Packs". After reading the message, Benteen (pictured to the right) chose to be confused . . . he asked those around him how could he be quick AND bring the pack trains at the same time . . . yet he moved towards Custer, but not at a brisk pace.
     Benteen wound up joining Major Marcus Reno (pictured left of Benteen), who was on a bluff after his disastrous retreat; Reno's men had their hands full dealing with attacks from warriors. Major Reno ordered Benteen to wait with him, and for the pack train; Benteen chose to follow the orders of an inferior officer instead of those of his superior, Custer. 
     Benteen spoke against sending troops towards the (loud) gunfire; he claimed that Custer and his men could handle what they were facing. In the absence of any orders from Custer, Reno made no effort to ride towards the sound of the fighting. Due to alcohol, shock, and a severe lack of command skills, Reno didn't even order reconnaissance to ascertain the situation that Custer and his men faced.

Picture
      Meanwhile, Custer had given up on Benteen, and was moving, surrounded on most flanks. Custer ordered Captain Myles Keogh to take three companies to hold the nearby high point; he would take the rest of the troops to try and kidnap Native civilians . . . to him it was the only chance for success (holding Native noncombatants hostage was a useful strategy to force warriors to stop their attack). If Custer would have given the orders to dig-in and/or retreat, he would have renounced any hope of victory, and any claims of glory thereafter. 
     Once on the move, Custer saw that he didn't have nearly enough men to corral a large number of Native civilians, and he was under fire from multiple angles. Custer moved half-way up a rise, and ordered a halt. His idea was to hold on for Benteen and Captain Myles Keogh (pictured, who was ordered to defend the high point above the rise) to provide support. It was at this point that Custer had surrendered the offensive to the Native warriors, and the three companies under Keogh's command at the high point were mostly surrounded, and suffering heavy casualties.

Picture
      Native warriors attacked from the East, West, and the South, converging on Custer and his men. Then suddenly many of the warriors moved to the remaining soldiers to the North at the high point - Captain Keogh's men. Keogh saw no other option than to try and join Custer's force, but before he could give the order, he was shot in the knee. Both Keogh and his horse (Comanche) went down, and the warriors descended on what was left of his men on the high point. 
     Crazy Horse and White Bull challenged each other to "make a run" (a "Courage Run"); they started the process of cutting off the rest of Keogh's men from joining Custer. Custer didn't have any warriors closer to him than 200 yards, too far to be under direct attack, but he saw that warriors were gathering and closing on his position from all sides. 
     Custer ordered his men to prepare a skirmish line, but they were still very vulnerable since there was little-or-no cover. Custer ordered all the horses shot, and placed in a semicircle to provide primitive breastworks . . . it was a stark declaration (and admission) of the seriousness of their situation (some historians argue that Custer didn't pace his horses properly, and by this point they were too fatigued to make a run to try and escape).

Picture
    Surrounded by more than 1000 warriors, Custer's men were running out of ammunition. They were fighting for their lives, hoping that Benteen and/or Keogh would come to their rescue. Custer was down to about 50 men (counting some of Keogh's men), but he was outnumbered at least 20 to 1. 
     No one, with the exception of Custer, could really hit what they aimed at (few in the Army or among the Natives could truly claim to be a sharpshooter), but the Natives had far more guns, and by volume alone, they were able to pick off Custer's men on the high ground (since the Natives had no real opportunities for practice, anything beyond point-blank range was guesswork).

            A segment from "Son of the Morning Star" (1991 TV Miniseries): 
  a) Reno's Retreat Across the Little Bighorn; b) Private John Martin & Benteen;
  c) Custer Makes His Final Push

Picture
     Custer was shot in the right breast, which knocked him back. He dropped his rifle, and drew his two English Bulldog pistols, and at that point, a bullet hit him in the right temple - that shot instantly killed Custer. The remaining survivors of the 7th Cavalry made a run for the nearby ravine, but most were killed before they could go 100 yards (those killed included two of Custer's brothers, Thomas and Boston, and a nephew, Autie). The rest made it halfway to the Little Bighorn before they were overcome by warriors. 
     Crazy Horse reached the area before the fighting was over, taking down one fleeing soldier. Very soon after the battle, noncombatants (especially Native women) had the job of mutilating the slain U.S. soldiers. They crushed skulls, tore out eyes, severed muscles/tendons, hacked off limbs and heads; the goal was to deny the defeated white soldiers any comfort at all in the afterlife.

         The end of the Battle of Little Bighorn ("Son of the Morning Star", 1991)
   a) The 1st Segment ends with Custer's death
   b) The 2nd Segment ends with inaccurate accounts of what was done to 
        Custer's body as well as the death of Crazy Horse . . .

Picture
0 Comments

The Battle of Little Bighorn, Part One (25 June, 1876)

8/1/2015

0 Comments

 
         Source: James Donovan. A Terrible Glory: Custer and Little Bighorn - 
                                                    The Last Great Battle of the American West (2009).
       The village on the Little Bighorn numbered over 1000 lodges, with over 8000 Natives, and around 2000 warriors. And, unlike the 3 columns of U.S. Cavalry that were heading their way in a 3-pronged advance, these 2000 warriors had extensive experience with guerilla warfare on the Plains.
Picture
Picture
     Members from all seven tribes of the Lakota were in the village (Hunkpapa, Sans Arc, Two Kettles, Oglala, Brule, Minneconjou, and Blackfoot), as well as some Dakota, Nakota, and Cheyenne. The list of war chiefs was the equivalent of the U.S. Men's Basketball Team from the Barcelona Olympics in 1992 - they were all superstars to the "nth" degree. 
     Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer (his superior officer was General Alfred Terry) only had about 660 men (he was part of a single column), including only 31 officers, 578 enlisted men, and 45 or so scouts/guides (most of them Natives). Each soldier had the single-shot breech-loading 1873 Springfield carbine, which had an Achilles Heel - the copper cartridges would heat and jam upon firing, and had to be pried loose, usually with a knife. Other than that, the Springfield was a relatively cheap and reliable carbine with stopping power (each soldier had 100 rounds of ammunition). Also, there was the Colt .45 sidearm (24 - 74 rounds issued), and the pack mules carried 26,000 more carbine rounds.

Picture
     Custer told his officers that he expected to deal with between 1000 and 1500 Native warriors. When the regiment of the 7th Cavalry under Custer's command started advancing in earnest, Captain Frederick Benteen was put in charge of the pack mules. Benteen's orders were to assist the movement of the pack train, and to provide rearguard protection (up to then, he had been in charge of the lead element of the regiment, the "Point of the Spear").
     Custer saw many diverging trails, but the Native scouts knew that they were actually CONVERGING trails, instead. Custer (and the other officers in the 3 columns) was too obsessed with the belief that the Natives were in the process of scattering, like cowards, in their view; there was a collective sense among the officers that if they took too long to engage, they would miss their chance at a decisive victory since the Natives would scatter and disappear. Custer calculated that he was only one day's march from much-desired and much-delayed glory . . . he ordered his regiment to follow the trail leading to the lower reaches of the Little Bighorn River.

Picture
      Custer divided his regiment into three wings (battalions); he would take command of the right wing (the horses of those soldiers were the most fatigued of the regiment). Custer assigned Major Marcus Reno and Captain Benteen three companies each; his plan was that his right wing would be the attacking force, driving fleeing Natives into the other wings. 
     
     






 




         










     Benteen was ordered to move toward the bluffs, deal with whatever he came across, and then rejoin Custer's right wing, all the while tending to the pack train. Custer expected Benteen to return fairly soon (as in an hour or two) if he didn't find any Native warriors. Benteen had gone from leading the regiment on the initial advance to being given a secondary mission; to him, it was the playground football equivalent of being told to go long, and the QB would fake a pass towards him. Benteen firmly believed that Custer was getting his long-delayed revenge against him for voicing concerns about Custer's decision-making at the Washita in 1868.

Picture
      Custer ordered Major Reno (pictured) to chase the escaping Natives that he believed were only two miles ahead. Custer also promised Reno that he would provide support if Reno engaged Native warriors. Reno had 175 men (140 troopers and 35 scouts), and after advancing three miles, he came in sight of the Little Bighorn River.
     Custer had about 220 men; he not only didn't have enough enlisted men, but he was short officers as well. Although the officers he did have at this point were inexperienced, they were accepted as members of the "Custer Family" (a.k.a. Custer's "Circle of Trust"; officers such as Reno and Benteen hated Custer). Custer knew Reno was under attack, and he changed his mind about directly supporting him; Custer decided to attack the Native warriors from the flank . . . the perceived benefit to Custer was that he could secure even more glory. 
     However, Custer never sent a messenger to let Reno know of his change in tactics. Back with Reno's wing, the major gave the order to attack, but his speech was slurred . . . he had been drinking whisky from his flask (Reno was an alcoholic). 

Picture
       The village that Custer suddenly saw had at least 1000 lodges; it was much larger than he had envisioned. Meanwhile, Major Reno should have kept charging into the village from the east/southeast to disrupt any organization from the Native warriors, but he ordered a halt in the open. The decision was a combination of no elan, no experience, and his "liquid courage" had dissipated. 
     Reno's 100+ men dismounted about half-a-mile from the nearest teepees; they were spread out across 250 yards, and Native warriors were advancing towards their skirmish line. When Custer saw Reno and his men retreat to the timbers and scrub by the Little Bighorn, he decided it was time to make his glorious attack.

Picture
     Crazy Horse finally entered the picture, leading up to 1000 warriors against Major Reno and his men in the timber/scrub by the river. Reno gave the order to retreat from that position, but since he didn't arrange for a bugler, most of his men didn't hear his order. The order was passed down verbally, and lost quite a bit in the translation - his men were under fire, and were panicked and confused. Reno in rapid succession ordered "Mount" and "Dismount"; it made sense to him, but it didn't to anyone else that was nearby.
     








 




    
     Reno then gave his "Come With Me" order, but didn't arrange for any rearguard action, which was standard military procedure, and more-than-warranted in this situation. To the pursuing Native warriors, it seemed like a '"Buffalo Chase"; Reno lost about half his men on the badly organized-and-led retreat to the bluffs across the Little Bighorn River.

Picture
       At about 4 pm on 25 June, 1876, Custer was informed of Reno's retreat, and that he was out-of-action. Custer had a dilemma, in that he needed to cut off the escaping Native civilians (he wanted them as potential hostages, leverage to use against the warriors), and he also needed to provide (delayed) support to Major Reno. 
     As Custer surveyed his situation, he saw a dust cloud in the distance; he believed that it was Captain Benteen's wing, and that he was no more than 30 miles away. Custer thought that victory was still possible with an attack, not so with a retreat. So Custer once again (for the third time overall) split his troops (this time, he divided his battalion) - his goal was to help Reno, and stay on the offensive . . . 

  A relevant segment from "Son of the Morning Star" (1991 TV Miniseries)
     a) Benteen's frustration at being "sent long"
     b) Reno's initial attack on the village . . . notice how there is a bugler . . . inaccurate!
     c) Reno stops his charge and forms a skirmish line; Custer goes for glory
     d) Reno orders a retreat to the timbers/scrub by the LBH
     e) Custer makes his flanking move on the village; the village gets more organized

0 Comments

Path to the Battle of Little Bighorn, Part Two (1860s - 1876)

7/17/2015

0 Comments

 
         Source: James Donovan. A Terrible Glory: Custer and the Little Bighorn - 
                                                   The Last Great Battle of the American West (2009).
Picture
     In June, 1866, a treaty was signed at Fort Laramie between the U.S. Government and Chief Spotted Tail, the Brule Sioux Chief. Chief Red Cloud (of the Oglala Sioux) and many other chiefs warned the U.S. Gov't what would happen if forts were built on the Bozeman Trail. In December, 1866, a large number of Sioux warriors descended on Fort Phil Kearny, and on 21 December, they lured Captain William J. Fetterman (with about 80 men, mostly raw recruits) out of the fort. 
     Fetterman had (supposedly) loudly boasted that he could defeat any number of Native warriors with only 80 men; he and all of his men were killed by the Lakota, Cheyenne, and Arapaho warriors (to the U.S. Government, it was known as the Fetterman Massacre). Crazy Horse (Oglala Lakota) was the war chief that led Fetterman into the lethal trap; Crazy Horse's reputation as a warrior was so secure, he would drop back and let other warriors count coup. 

      When news of the Fetterman Massacre reached the East, the clamor for retaliation reached a fever pitch. General William Tecumseh Sherman called for the extermination of Natives on the Great Plains, but President Andrew Johnson had other plans. Sherman was sent to negotiate another treaty at Fort Laramie in 1868 to find a solution to the violence. As a result of the treaty, many separate reservations were created; the idea of one big reservation (colony) was dead in the water. However, U.S. Government efforts to force Natives to assimilate (to become "white") intensified, in terms of education, agriculture, and culture. 
Picture
     In the treaty, the U.S. Government actually agreed to abandon all three forts on the Bozeman Trail, and to also concede the Powder River country to the Natives. Only when the three forts were destroyed, and the troops withdrawn, did Red Cloud sign the treaty . . . it was the only time Natives defeated the U.S. Government in a war.
Picture
      The Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868 created the Great Sioux Reservation west of the Missouri River in the Dakota Territory; even for the victorious Red Cloud, he and his people lived on a de facto reservation . . . the land that Red Cloud fought to defend would only be theirs temporarily. 
     The treaty stated that Natives could follow the buffalo if the animals were in such numbers to justify pursuit, but they couldn't occupy lands outside of the reservation area (General Sherman was advised that the buffalo wouldn't be in great numbers very much longer). The treaty even allowed the U.S. Government to build a railroad through the reservation to the Pacific Ocean. In only a few months after the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868 was signed, Sherman (largely on his own initiative) declared that any Natives that located outside of a reservation should be declared "hostile".

Picture
      In December, 1868, the Washita Massacre (the U.S. Gov't called it a battle) and the subsequent roundup of warring Cheyenne secured the Southern Plains for white expansion and settlement. Very soon after his inauguration as President, Ulysses S. Grant halted U.S. Gov't hostilities in the Northern Plains as the first step towards his "Peace Policy". While assimilation to whites continued, he favored locating Native reservations further away from heavily trafficked / settled areas. The true essence of Grant's "Peace Policy" towards Natives was that he would try to conquer them nicely, with more kindness and less brute force than his predecessors. 
     The War Department disagreed with the President; the "kind treatment" was mostly followed on reservations, but they viewed "hostiles" in an entirely different light. The War Dept. assumed that the strategies and tactics used in the Southern Plains would translate to success in the Northern Plains . . . it would not turn out to be the case.
     In 1871, a Congressional squabble led to legislation that actually forbid ratifying treaties with Natives. As a result, Grant used Executive Agreements as a substitute for negotiating treaties, and those Executive Agreements were then ratified by Congress. These agreements were treaties by another name (everyone involved understood), but ironically, the House of Representatives had more input with the actual negotiations under Grant's strategy.

Picture
       Congress immediately classified Natives as wards, not a foreign sovereign power in the U.S. as stated in the Constitution. The U.S. Government would use that distinction in justifying its actions during the next several years. In the early-1870s, the Transcontinental Railroad was completed (it wasn't fully transcontinental until a major rail link was build in Colorado), the already-lacking supplies in terms of annuities on reservations were cut back further . . . and worse yet, the buffalo had largely vanished on the Great Plains (the major reason was sky-high demand for quality leather in Europe). More Natives retreated to the Powder River country; it was their only realistic course of action other than surrendering and going to a reservation.
     The fuse to the Northern Plains powder keg was lit in the Black Hills region. Knowledge of gold in the Black Hills dated back to the early-1850s, but after the Panic of 1873 ushered in the worst economic depression in U.S. History (to that point), many men traveled to the region.  This search for gold by these desperate men in the Black Hills would be backed-up by the presence of U.S. soldiers.

Picture
       Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer, the nation's favorite and most famous "Indian Fighter", led the Black Hills Expedition of 1874. Custer made sure that detailed dispatches were sent back East, chronicling what he saw and what he accomplished. Custer led the East to believe that there was "Gold in Them Thar Black Hills", and it resulted in the biggest gold rush since California (Below: the Black Hills Expedition of 1874).
     In short order, over 10,000 gold mines were established in the Black Hills; there were too many rushing to the region for the Government to keep out illegal squatters; to the Lakota, all the whites in the Black Hills were illegal squatters. By tradition and treaty, the Black Hills belonged to the Lakota. Red Cloud and Spotted Tail made it clear that they (and other prominent chiefs) would not sell the region to the U.S. . . . Red Cloud and Spotted Tail were "summoned" to Washington, D.C. to negotiate terms for selling the land, but they adamantly refused to sign. 
     The U.S. Government then sent a commission to the Black Hills region to try and purchase the land, and over 5000 Lakotas met with them in Nebraska. The non-treaty faction of the Lakotas, led by Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse, stated that the Black Hills would be defended to the death. The commission barely escaped the area with their lives, and returned to Washington, D.C. in high dudgeon. 

Picture
     President Grant was in a dilemma, in that what was good for the nation was expansion, but that expansion was in conflict with his "Peace Policy" towards Natives. On 3 November, 1875, Grant met with General Phil Sheridan and General George Crook
(pictured). After the meeting, Grant decided (it's more likely that he was convinced) to claim that the Sioux abrogated (broke) the terms of the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868. 
     The U.S. Army had been waiting for any excuse to have all-out war in the Northern Plains against the "hostiles"; now the Army's hands had largely become untied . . . all that was needed was the requisite ultimatum. Generals Sherman and Sheridan ordered that any Natives that were not in a U.S. Government reservation by 31 January, 1876, would be officially classified as "hostile" to the U.S. Government. The timing and seasonal conditions made the deadline a practical impossibility to meet in any regard, and most (potentially "hostile") Lakotas (and other Natives) had no intention of going to a reservation anyway . . . so the deadline passed, and Natives outside of a reservation became classified as "hostile".

Picture
     On 1 February, 1876, General Sheridan once again (as in 1868) envisioned a major Winter Campaign against the ("hostile") Natives. It was to be a 3-pronged attack designed to encircle, capture, and if necessary kill "hostiles". By this time, only a relatively few Native tribes in the Northern Plains stood against the U.S. Government: Over 3000 Lakotas, Cheyennes, and Arapahos (among them 800 warriors) refused to comply.
     In opposition to these superb guerilla fighters, Sheridan could only muster 3000 soldiers in the Departments of the Dakota and the Platte. These soldiers were ill-equipped, poorly motivated, and most were malingerers, criminals, worthless "bounty jumpers" (those paid to join the army, and then ran away) . . . basically the scum of American society. To command this riff-raff, Sheridan called on a handful of Civil War officers that were vying for the few top-ranking positions in the shrunken post-Civil War Army. Among them were George Crook, Nelson Miles, John Pope, John Gibbon, Eugene Carr, Wesley Merritt, Ranald S. Mackenzie, and Sheridan's favorite attack dog, George Armstrong Custer (pictured, 1876).

0 Comments

Path to the Battle of Little Bighorn, Part One (1763 - 1860's)

7/17/2015

0 Comments

 
     Source: James Donovan. A Terrible Glory: Custer and the Little Bighorn - 
                                                The Last Great Battle of the American West (2009).
Picture
    For white Americans and the United States Government, it became known as "The Line"; it was the point from where Natives were forced to relocate West. One of the first "Lines" was the 
Proclamation of 1763, which was the last time that Native sovereignty (in the interior) was considered important to the causes of peace and trade; of course it was only considered, not respected, by Colonial whites (e.g. Washington).
     The demand for land by white Americans was enormous, and "The Line" kept moving West after such events as: The Battle of Fallen Timbers (1794) / Louisiana Purchase (1803) / 
Indian Removal Act (1830; where white expansion picked up serious momentum) / 
Indian Intercourse Act (1834; defined "Indian Territory") / The 1st Wagon Train to Reach the Platte River (1841; it was the origin of the 
Oregon Trail) . . . by the early-1840s, Native removal was largely accomplished in the view of white America.

Picture
        By 1845, 5000 immigrants were on various trails West, but by 1850, the number increased to 55,000, many of whom traveled through Lakota Territory. Of course disease spread through Native populations, and increased violence against whites was the logical result. 1845 was the same year that the phrase "Manifest Destiny" first appeared (in the 
Democratic Review); it provided political, social, economic, and even religious justification for whites to expand West.
     The Mexican War (1846 - 1848) finalized most of the U.S. Government's claims in what would become known as the contiguous states (the Gadsden Purchase of 1853 was the last land purchase from Mexico). The Gold Rush in California dramatically increased expansion, and it also proved that "The Line" was no longer an effective solution to the "Native Problem".
Picture
      As the 1850s progressed, the Reservation System from the East was applied in the Great Plains, and "Native Colonies" were established. There, in these "Colonies", Natives would be kept out of the white settlers' way, and taught to become "white". Thus began the U.S. Government strategy of negotiating (and forcing) treaties with Natives, taking what it wanted; the legality of most of the treaties were beyond-dubious.
     An example: A treaty was signed between the Cheyenne & Arapaho Nations and the U.S. Gov't in 1851 where it was agreed that the Cheyenne would relocate to a reservation south of the Arkansas River, giving up all their lands. But, only 6 of the 44 Cheyenne and Arapaho chiefs signed the treaty . . . therefore, most Cheyenne and Arapaho didn't feel that they were bound by the document. Also, "Annuity Payments" on reservations were designed to wean Natives from buffalo, but the system was steeped in corruption, since it was headed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Despite all the dishonesty and corruption with the treaties and on the reservations, major warfare had been avoided in the Midwest and the Great Plains.
Picture
      In August, 1862, a massacre occurred in SW Minnesota that resulted in Natives killing over 800 whites; it started over a dispute between Natives and a white farmer over access to the farmer's hens' eggs. The Great Sioux Uprising (a.k.a. Minnesota Massacre; Great Sioux War) of 1862 was the first sign of large-scale, organized Native resistance. 
     General John Pope, then in charge of the Missouri Division, vowed revenge; he ordered 
General Henry Sibley's troops into action, and they defeated a large number of Santee warriors at Wood Lake. Over 2000 were captured, and 38 were publicly hanged on 26 December, 1862; President Lincoln actually commuted over 300 Native executions. The Lakotas were stripped of their land in SW Minnesota by the Minnesota River, and moved to a reservation on the Missouri River. Sioux resistance (Lakota, Dakota, Nakota, and others) spread westward with the fleeing warriors, and violence on the Great Plains increased.
Picture
      The Sand Creek Massacre occurred on 29 November, 1864 under the command of Union Colonel John M. Chivington (pictured). Chivington attacked "Peace Chief" Black Kettle's sleeping Cheyenne village (about 100 lodges); even children were massacred under Chivington's orders. Over 200 Cheyenne were killed and mutilated by Chivington's men, and they proudly paraded through Denver (175 miles away), displaying Cheyenne body parts to cheering white Coloradans. 
     Enraged Cheyenne, Sioux, and Arapaho warriors raided towns, stage stations, ranches, wagon trains . . . they burned, looted, and killed wherever they could in retaliation for Sand Creek. During the Winter of 1864-1865, these warriors joined kinsmen in the Powder River country, which was the area between the Black Hills and the Bighorn Mountains, which the Lakota claimed as their homeland (although the Lakota had taken it from the Crow Nation a few decades earlier). 

Picture
     The Union Government initiated the Powder River Campaign in 1865; it became a fruitless endeavor to try and clear out marauding Natives in the region. Over 6000 soldiers in 3 columns stirred up the Lakota Nation for good, especially Chief Red Cloud (pictured; who had tallied over 80 coups by the age of 16, and coups were counted very carefully, much like confirmed kills for pilots in WW I and WW II) and the Oglala Nation. Red Cloud and his warriors reeked havoc over U.S. soldiers and whites foolish enough to enter the Powder River country, especially if they used the Bozeman Trail, which was the best route to the Montana gold mines.

0 Comments

Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse Before Little Bighorn

7/17/2015

1 Comment

 
         Source: James Donovan. A Terrible Glory: Custer and Little Bighorn - 
                                                   The Last Great Battle of the American West (2009).
Picture
     
     Before Sitting Bull became a warrior, he was a very deliberate boy, and his name before he entered adolescence was "Slow" (his first name was "Jumping Badger"). When he reached maturity, he was 5'10" with a heavy muscular frame, and possessed a deep bass voice with a deep, penetrating stare . . . even as a young man he was a commanding presence. 
     By 1855 (at the age of 25), Sitting Bull was a leader of a Hunkpapa elite military society, the "Strong Hearts". This group (like others) was a combination of warrior and military police; their mission was to not only protect the Hunkpapa tribe, but also its culture and social order. Collectively, these groups were called an akicita; Sitting Bull had joined a type of military fraternity.

Picture
      
     Soon, it became clear that Sitting Bull was more than just a warrior; he possessed other traits in addition to bravery, including generosity, fortitude, and wisdom (which was especially hard to acquire). In Sitting Bull, each of these traits had been developed to an incredible degree. By his late-20s, Sitting Bull was made a war chief of the Hunkpapa tribe (within the Lakota Nation). 
     Sitting Bull earned the reputation as a Wichasha Wakan (Holy Man) before he was 30 years old. By the Summer of 1857, six of the seven Lakota tribes gathered at Bear Butte in the Black Hills for a council. Present among the tribes were the Hunkpapa, Minneconjou,
Two Kettles, Blackfeet, Sans Arc, and the Oglala (the Brule tribe was busy in the South, making war on the Pawnee along the Platte River).

Picture
     
     At least 5000 attended the council at Bear Butte, and Lakota leaders pledged resistance to white expansion on their lands . . . as long as whites stayed out of what they considered their land, all would be well. After the Great Sioux Uprising in Minnesota in December, 1862, the fleeing Dakotas traveled West to join their Lakota brethren. U.S. Army columns were in pursuit, and Lakota and Dakota warriors united to fight the U.S. force. 
     Gradually, Lakota warriors perfected the hit-and-run guerilla tactics would would become so successful in the Great Plains. By the end of 1864, there were running battles in the Badlands and the Upper Missouri area; Sitting Bull and the other Lakota war chiefs attacked whites to forestall the invasion from the East.

     Sitting Bull refused to participate and sign the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868. Soon after Laramie, an unprecedented decision was made among the Lakota; a Supreme Chief would be selected (instead of the independent chiefs from independent tribes). Sitting Bull was named Supreme Chief for the entire Lakota Nation with much ceremony. 
     Almost all non-treaty Lakotas (what General Sherman termed "hostiles") gathered around him, at least in spirit. While most Lakota were already on reservations, Sitting Bull led the "Free-Roamers" against the U.S. Government. He refused all efforts by the Government to have him negotiate and sign a treaty; Sitting Bull didn't change his stance for 17 years, until his people were starving.
Picture
Picture
     In 1865, Crazy Horse (Oglala) was named a "Shirt-Wearer", which was the highest honor a Lakota warrior could receive. Not only was Crazy Horse an elite warrior, but being a "Shirt-Wearer" also meant that he had governing responsibilities as well; he was expected to put the tribe's interests ahead of his own. However, in 1870, Crazy Horse was with a woman that wasn't his wife, and the enraged husband shot him in the face just below the left nostril. Crazy Horse survived with a broken jaw and a scar on his left cheek (the husband, as well as most everyone else in the tribe, believed that Crazy Horse had died). 
     As a consequence of his actions, Crazy Horse lost his status as a "Shirt-Wearer", but he 
looked far more intimidating as a warrior. Crazy Horse first met Sitting Bull in 1871, and by then, Sitting Bull's Hunkpapa tribe had moved to the Powder River country, and waged a defensive war against the U.S. Government and white settlers.

Picture
     In August, 1872, several thousand Lakota gathered for their traditional Sun Dance in Southeast Montana, which was a combination social and religious celebration. Then, on 14 August, 1872, Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse took part in an attack on a railroad survey crew that was protected by U.S. troops. Crazy Horse led an attack in the open against the troops, while Sitting Bull, inspired by Crazy Horse's charge, just sat down, well within rifle range of U.S. Cavalry, calmly smoking his pipe while bullets were hitting the ground all around him. 
     Crazy Horse, inspired by the actions of Sitting Bull, made one more charge against U.S. troops, and his horse was shot out from under him. Both men had covered themselves in glory in their respective tribes, and within the Lakota Nation, on that mid-Summer day in August, 1872.

Picture
     In the late Summer of 1873, an even larger railroad / government survey expedition (2000 men) headed out to the Powder River country (the Yellowstone is one of the major rivers in the region). In charge of the troops was Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer; he and his men were based out of Fort Abraham Lincoln (pictured: the restored blockhouse) on the Missouri River near Bismarck, North Dakota. The Northern Pacific Railroad had just reached Bismarck, and the next stretch of track was heading to Montana . . . Powder River country. 
     A very desirable trek existed for the tracks, in that all the Northern Pacific had to do was follow the Yellowstone River to the Rockies, and then find a navigable pass through the mountains. On 4 August, 1873, Custer experienced his first contact with Natives in Montana; he was by himself (most likely either hunting or target shooting), and had a close call with Native warriors. Thus began a series of encounters where the Lakota dictated the rules of engagement (guerilla tactics). Custer used cannon to disperse Lakota warriors; Custer equated cowardice with the withdrawal of the warriors.

Picture
       The Northern Pacific's plan to go west of Bismarck was canceled due to the Panic of 1873 (which led to the worst economic depression in US History at that point). It seemed that the Lakota (and other Natives) in the Powder River country would get a reprieve from the white "Invasion From the East", but another trespass would begin the final chapter in the Great Plains (gold), and it would involve Custer, and the Black Hills region.
     To the Lakota, it didn't matter that they had taken the Black Hills from the Cheyenne, and the Cheyenne had taken it from the Comanches/Kiowas, and that they had taken the area from the Crows over a century ago. To the Lakota, the Black Hills represented their "Food Pack", which they could access when needed (the region also had religious significance). Other than protecting railroad surveys, the U.S. Cavalry hadn't really dealt with Natives in the Powder River country in any significant manner.
(Pictured: President Grant trying to help America, depicted as a woman in distress as a commentary on the severity of the Panic of 1873)

Picture
     U.S. troops attacked a peaceful sleeping village of mostly Cheyenne, with some Oglala and Minneconjou as well. This attack started a chain of events that caused the groups led by Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse to band together. That large gathering of Cheyenne, Oglala, and Hunkpapa Natives moved northwest in April/May, 1875. "Free-Roamers", made up of Sans Arc, Blackfeet Lakota, and more Minneconjou, joined the entourage.
     In early-June, 1875, this gathering of Natives had 500 lodges, 1000 warriors, and thousands of Natives were leaving reservations to join this growing number of Natives. The U.S. Government, military, and the general public had no idea what Sitting Bull, Crazy Horse, and the Dakota Chief Inkpaduta (pictured, who had been resisting white incursions far longer that the other two) meant to their people in terms of inspiration and direction. All three shared an unyielding desire to defend, to the death, their homelands, people, and their way of life.

            Addendum: The Deaths of Crazy Horse and Sitting Bull . . .
1 Comment

George Armstrong Custer After the Civil War (1866 - 1868)

7/17/2015

0 Comments

 
     Source: James Donovan. A Terrible Glory: Custer and Little Bighorn - 
                              the Last Great Battle of the American West (2009)
Picture
      In July 1866, Congress expanded the mounted cavalry with four more regiments (a rare expansion in the climate of Post-Civil War military downsizing), and they all headed West. George Armstrong Custer was a Lieutenant Colonel in the 7th Cavalry; he was once again in command, even if not the overall commander. In the next decade, Custer would only command in one battle (Washita, 1868), with the rest classified as skirmishes . . . until Little Bighorn in June, 1876.
     The fawning press still loved him, and Custer was always accommodating to the media. By 1872, his letters were regularly published in newspapers and magazines under his own name. Custer enjoyed his celebrity enormously . . . much to the chagrin & irritation of some. 


(Pictured: Lt. Colonel Custer shortly before the Battle at Little Bighorn)

Picture
      In October, 1866, Custer (and his wife Libbie) went to Fort Riley (KS) to organize and train his new regiment within the 7th Cavalry. Under Custer's command was 
Captain Frederick Benteen (31, 5 yrs older than Custer), a cantankerous Virginian that served with distinction in the Civil War. Benteen took an instant dislike to Custer when he first met him in January, 1867; many historians have argued that this may have been due to similarities in their personalities. Benteen viewed Custer as a blustering, bragging, press-created peacock . . . he was jealous, upset that he wasn't in command. Benteen's bitterness would infect the 7th Cavalry all the way to Little Bighorn on 25 June, 1876.
     The 7th Cavalry was ordered to protect settlers and railroad crews pushing West. In the Spring of 1867, Custer joined up with General Winfield Scott Hancock's 1400 soldiers, cavalry, and artillery, but the joint mission was an abject failure, in that hostilities actually increased in the Great Plains.

Picture
      On the Great Plains, Custer was introduced to guerilla tactics for the first time, and he became very frustrated with the lack of success. He was also experiencing supply problems, inferior rations, desertions, excessive heat, deceitful Native guides/scouts, but most of all, he missed Libbie. As a result, Custer the "Tyrant" resurfaced, alienating many of his men, and then he went back to see Libbie in Fort Riley (pictured: the front of the Custer home in the fort) without permission . . . Custer went AWOL (he missed her, but he was also concerned that she was cheating on him with a captain stationed at the fort).
     Custer was court-martialed two months later, and he basically dug his own grave. The Court of Inquiry gave Custer multiple chances to help himself, but Custer remained imperious. After a month of deliberation, Custer was found guilty on all but three charges, and was suspended from rank and command without pay for a year. It was actually a very mild verdict, and at the time, being convicted in a court-martial was not the career-ending humiliation that it would become in the 20th Century. Custer blamed many others in the 7th Cavalry for his situation, never once reflecting on his own decision-making . . . it widened a rift that would never heal in the regiment.

Picture
       On the surface at least, the Custers treated the year as an extended vacation. Custer's suspension would only last ten months, because General Philip Sheridan (pictured, now in overall command of the departments on the Plains) requested that his sentence be reduced. The War on the Plains was going poorly, and Sheridan (still a huge Custer supporter) gave Custer a virtual "blank check" in terms of what he could do on the Plains. 
     When Custer returned, he was energetic, purposeful, and itching to find Natives. Custer was allowed to retain his regiment, and Sheridan made sure that the regiment was properly supplied. Custer was still the disciplinarian: officers late to meetings actually had their tents put on fire.  One month after his return, the 7th set out to find Natives . . . during the winter. Sheridan calculated that it would be easier to find Natives along their winter camps by rivers and creeks.

Picture
     The 7th Cavalry headed towards the Washita River on 23 November, 1868. Custer followed a trail of over 100 Cheyenne warriors from Kansas to a winter camp. He didn't know if the Native camp was hostile, but the trail of the Cheyenne warriors led straight there; Custer assumed that the 100 warriors were in the village's 51 tepees.
     Custer led the charge from the north (with the rising sun at his back) into the village, but he had ordered multiple simultaneous charges from different directions. The engagement lasted a mere ten minutes, but there were two alarming developments. First was Major Elliott and his sixteen missing men, and Custer had reports that some warriors were heading his way. The village Custer attacked was actually one of several that had over 1000 warriors (very poor reconnaissance), and they were advancing in mass. Custer decided to burn the village, kill 900+ ponies, and abandon Major Elliott and his men on the field (Elliott and his men were eventually found, dead and frozen, riddled with arrows and badly mutilated).

Picture
     Instead of retreating as the 1000 warriors advanced, Custer (pictured in 1868) gave the order to move TOWARD the warriors, and the Cheyenne retreated (Native warriors preferred to chase down their enemies; they often retreated when advanced upon, preferring guerilla tactics). The Washita was heralded as a major triumph by the U.S. Government, military, media, and Westerners. Some denounced the Washita as a massacre on defenseless and peaceable Natives. 
   Of the 40-50 Natives killed, over half were noncombatants; Osage scouts, not troopers, were the main reason for the deaths (to the Osage, it was a chance to gain revenge against the Cheyenne from past events). The Washita was harsh, but it wasn't a wholesale massacre; Custer actually halted some of the killing. Custer's superiors were pleased with the result, in that it was the first piece of good news to come from the Plains after the Civil War. While it was a morale-booster for the government, it demoralized Southern Plains Natives . . . no longer could Natives feel safe during the winter in their camps by rivers.

Picture
      The 7th Cavalry continued rounding up hostile Natives in the Southern Plains during that winter (1868-1869). Captain Benteen took Major Elliott's death very hard, and blamed Custer; he even wrote a scathing letter that was published in Eastern newspapers. Custer just couldn't believe or understand why one of his officers could be so disloyal (when Benteen freely admitted in an officer's meeting that he wrote the letter, Custer, disbelievingly, walked out of the tent). 
     From that point on, there was a Custer "Clan", and Benteen's "Anti-Custer Clan"; however, most officers remained neutral, wanting nothing more than to do their duty (and when off duty . . . drink). Benteen would continue to rail against Custer, loudly, for the next seven years . . . 


0 Comments

George Armstrong Custer: Before/During the Civil War

7/17/2015

0 Comments

 
   Source: James Donovan. A Terrible Glory: Custer and the Little Bighorn -
                    the Last Great Battle of the American West (2009)
Picture
     George Armstrong Custer had the ability to process a lot of information and make a considered decision in short order. Time and again during the Civil War, Custer made split-second decisions that turned out to be correct. By the end of the Civil War, Custer's skeptics among the Union officers were the older and less successful. The Custer of the Civil War inspired loyalty and shared the danger with his men, and they followed him where he went.
     Few would have predicted that level of success for Custer at West Point, where he had the highest number of demerits in his class. He was very popular, despite graduating at the bottom of his class in June, 1861 (Ironically, his worst grades were in cavalry tactics). His class's graduation was accelerated by over a year (the last year was condensed to one month) due to the onset of the Civil War.

Picture
     2nd Lieutenant Custer's first assignment was with the 2nd Cavalry, which was in General 
Irvin McDowell's division. Custer was at the 1st Battle of Bull Run, but was only an observer from a distance, not a participant. He was cited for bravery, however, for directing aspects of the Union rearguard action on the retreat. For over a year, Custer served as 2nd Lt. as an aid to various officers in the Union Army. 
     Custer often volunteered for combat assignments, and as a result, impressed the General of the Army of the Potomac, George B. McClellan . . . McClellan promoted Custer to Brevet Captain (during the Civil War, there weren't many medals issued, but promotions that were in effect during the war, "brevets", were very common . . . with no increase in pay, of course).
     Above: the earliest photograph taken of 2nd Lt. Custer during the Civil War in 1862)

     Custer made himself indispensable to McClellan; Custer worshipped the General from afar.
When Lincoln removed McClellan in the Fall of 1862, the 22 year-old Custer was without a position of significance. Custer's rank reverted to 2nd Lt. when he was reassigned to the Army of the Potomac in the Spring of 1863. 
     General Joseph "Fighting Joe" Hooker acted on good advice, and finally created a unified cavalry corps in the Army of the Potomac. Once again, Custer made himself indispensable, this time to the cavalry commander, Brigadier General Alfred Pleasonton . . . Custer was fearless, had an inclination and desire for battle, and proved to be a natural leader in combat
      (Pictured below: Custer and General Alfred Pleasonton after the Battle of Gettysburg)
Picture
Picture
       On 28 June, 1863, Custer was promoted to Brevet Brigadier General (Pleasonton was also promoted to a higher-rank). Unlike his previous two promotions, this one was based solely on merit, no political connections were needed. Custer had learned much about command in terms of organization, strategies, and tactics . . . he had also learned to "toot his own horn" rather effectively (probably from McClellan).
     Few Brigadier generals led their men into battle; most preferred to stay back. But Custer led his men, believing that if he shared the danger, his men would fight harder. At this point, Custer had started to craft his own uniform, featuring multiple colors (e.g. a red scarf). Custer claimed that he wanted his men to know where he was at all times in battle 
            (Pictured: Brevet Brigadier General Custer)

Picture
      The Battle of Gettysburg occurred just a few days after his promotion, and his first charge was a disaster. Custer knew he received rash advice from a reckless junior officer, but he authorized and led the charge (depicted in the painting) on the principle that he wanted to prove himself in his new rank. Custer was almost killed (his horse was KIA), and he was rescued by one of his privates; although the charge was disastrous, he did prove his mettle to his men.
     On the climactic day of Gettysburg ("Day 3"), Custer charged into Jeb Stuart's much larger and more vaunted cavalry TWICE. Custer was outnumbered at least 8 to 1, but ordered and led the second charge anyway, halting Stuart's flanking efforts. It was the first time in the Civil War that a Union cavalry won AND held the field against a Southern force. After Gettysburg, it was mostly triumph-after-triumph for Custer and his Michigan brigade - they proved to be the best of the Union cavalry corps. Custer's reputation and fame grew, and his likeness became common in newspapers and magazines.

Picture
     On 9 February, 1864, Custer married Libbie Bacon. Libble was able to stay near her husband during the Civil War in that General Sheridan had ordered a special dispensation for Custer's wife (Custer was apparently back in Sheridan's good graces). By now, Sheridan was in command of the entire Union cavalry, which meant when General Grant ordered that Jubal Early's forces be crushed (he was a constant menace to Washington, D.C.), it was Sheridan's responsibility to do so. Sheridan ordered his Union cavalry to engage in "total war" in the Shenandoah Valley (west of DC), denying Early any easy chances to forage for supplies.
     In September, 1864, Custer was given command of the 3rd Cavalry, and the soldiers of the 3rd were thrilled. General Jubal Early's surprise attack led to great disarray and a Union retreat for all the cavalry corps except Custer's 3rd, which had an orderly and effective rearguard action. When Sheridan arrived after his famous 11 mile ride to the front, the situation had markedly improved due to Custer taking active command. After Early was crushed, Custer was promoted to Brevet Major General in the Union cavalry.

Picture
      Later in 1864, Custer was taken by surprise by a Confederate advance (after pulling in his pickets too early), and was almost captured at an inn (similar to 
General Charles Lee during the Revolution). In what was a common practice with high-ranking officers during the Civil War, Custer twisted and altered facts in his reports to avoid taking responsibility (which he would continue to do after the war);  even General Phil Sheridan was on Custer's case after the near-debacle. 
     At Appomattox, Custer talked to Confederate officers, some of whom he knew from West Point. General Sheridan purchased Wilmer McLean's table on which Lee surrendered to Grant for $20 ($300 today), and gave it to Libbie with a very complimentary note about her husband.

Picture
     At the close of the Civil War, only General Ulysses S. Grant, General William Tecumseh Sherman, and General "Li'l Phil" Sheridan were more popular than Custer. However, his popularity with his men would soon plummet; he would be viewed as a tyrant during "Reconstruction Duty". After the Civil War, Custer was posted in Louisiana and Texas, and his men lacked provisions and motivation. Nevertheless, Custer demanded that his men follow his orders and rules to the letter, which led to the "tyrant" label. 
   Sheridan supported Custer wholeheartedly, but his new reputation as a tyrant would shadow him to his death at Little Bighorn on 25 June, 1876. Custer's commission in the Union Army expired in January, 1866, and he was mustered out of the Army at age 26. Custer was now only a cavalry captain in the regular (peacetime) army . . . what would he do with the rest of his life . . . 

(Pictured above: General Custer during the Civil War with one of his dogs; he absolutely loved dogs. After the Civil War, it was common for him to claim to have between 20 and 40 dogs in his "entourage")

0 Comments

Temperance: "The Women's War" (featuring Carry Nation)

7/1/2015

0 Comments

 
      Source: Edward Behr. Prohibition: 13 Years That Changed America (2013)
Picture
     
     Women's Temperance was the first mass-movement involving women in U.S. History. It also featured the world's first large-scale non-violent protest movement (like Gandhi' efforts decades later). These "Women Crusaders" used arrests and insults in the early-1870s as a way to gain guilt-ridden converts to their cause. The behind-the-scenes mentors were men, and the logistics came from Protestant churches. There was some success in the Midwest in terms of non-stop picketing and protesting, but while awareness was raised, only a relatively small percentage of saloons actually closed their doors.

Picture
       While this specific "Women's Crusade" was a a media success, it had a short shelf-life. When the interest from the media waned, the Crusaders went back home, and the affected saloons reopened. As a result, the Women's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) was formed in 1874. Frances Willard (pictured) was eventually elected as WCTU President; she was not only an ex-Crusader, but also a university professor. 
      The WCTU believed that moderation was a "shoddy lifebelt", which promised safety, but only tempted danger. Willard was one of the first to work for nationwide Prohibition; she organized a petition effort to lobby Congress in 1875. The WCTU made every effort to educate kids on the evils of alcohol, featuring such Sunday School publications as "Counting Fingers". 

Picture
     At the turn-of-the-century, Carry Nation would steal the WCTU's formidable thunder. Nominally a member of the WCTU, Carry Nation was determined to protest in her own way. Born into an eccentric (insane?) and rebellious family, Carry Moore (pictured) was very likely a mentally unbalanced person. Carry spent a lot of time with African slaves, looking for human connections, since her mother didn't want much to do with her at all. 
     She married Charles Gloyd in 1867, who was a heavy drinker, and her life took a major turn as a result. Gloyd's two main vices were drinking and smoking, which were the very vices that Nation attacked in the future. She married again, this time to a man named David Nation, partly so she could legitimately call herself Carry Nation. David was not a strong man, and failed at most everything, including preaching. During unsuccessful sermons, Carry would embarrass him by saying such things out loud as "That will be all for today, David".

Picture
     Carry Nation soon started busting up saloons in St. Louis, Cincinnati, Philadelphia, and New York City, and as a result, she became a "Media Star". By 1901, Nation was so far removed from reality that she publicly celebrated the Assassination of President William McKinley; it was at that point that she started her sharp decline. Soon, the WCTU stopped funding her, and the media stopped covering her "Hatchetations". 
    Nation resorted to reenacting her "Hatchetations" on stage, but there were no crowds of note. She even tried stage performances in Britain, and tried to break up pubs, but was arrested and heavily fined. Nation was totally unaware that she had become a complete caricature, a figure of ridicule. Soon after her unsuccessful "tour" in Britain, Nation had a mental breakdown, and died at the age of 65 in a mental institution.

Picture
     One day, Nation entered a Kansas saloon with another WCTU woman, and a sledgehammer; she smashed a keg of whiskey, and hurled invectives in a rage . . . no one dared trifle with her. After busting up a few saloons in Kiowa, she bought a large hatchet, which was to become her signature. Her raids on saloons were sudden, fierce, and violent: few dared face her directly as she destroyed bars and furniture. 
     Law enforcement was in a dilemma as to what to do with Carry Nation, since Kansas was officially a "Dry" state. Nation was destroying property, but those properties were violating state law. Nation rarely stayed in jail more than one night; very often, she used her short periods of incarceration for media exposure.
   (Below: if the embedded video doesn't play, click on "Women of Prohibition Carry Nation")

0 Comments

The Origin of the Temperance Movement

7/1/2015

0 Comments

 
Source: Edward Behr. Prohibition: 13 Years That Changed America (2013)
     In 18th Century America, alcohol in one-form-or-another was so plentiful and so cheap that most Americans went through life in a semi-perpetual alcoholic haze. An American tradition was not only plentiful alcohol, but plenty of time-off (as in hours/days) for consumption. This was a tradition carried over from Europe, especially Britain; in 1720s England there was a "Gin Craze" that was similar to the Crack Cocaine epidemic that ravaged 1980s America. In Colonial America, it was rum, not gin, that was king, and hard liquor (and even beer) was consumed far more than wine.
      (Below: American Colonists enjoying a concoction commonly known as "Rum Punch")
Picture
     In contrast to Europe, Colonial America, despite its factionalism, didn't have nearly the same level of strife, which allowed Temperance (and then Prohibition) to slowly take root. Also, there was a link between liquor and politics in Colonial America, especially in taverns. 
     Colonial tavern owners were economically and politically powerful; they not only delivered votes by providing (often free) liquor, but their taverns were the epicenter of politics for the area. Politicians, to be taken seriously, basically had to be an engaging presence in a tavern(s) in order to be elected/re-elected. The tavern keeper would buy votes and politicians that matched his ideology with liquor. 

                (Below: an "election" involving alcohol in Colonial America)

Picture
     Tavern keepers (and the clergy) were the key opinion-makers long before the development of modern media . . . however, the status of the tavern keeper would sharply decrease after the Civil War, in that the percentage of tavern keepers that were foreign-born would rise significantly.
  (Below: a depiction of an apple press - the first step in making hard apple cider)
Picture
Picture
       Hard apple cider was the staple alcoholic beverage since the early-1700s for most Colonists, and then whiskey made its debut in the 1760s. As the 19th Century progressed, rum and gin became working-class staples, while for those with greater socio-economic status, madeira, port, or malaga were consumed (Beer wasn't heavily consumed until German immigrants came to America in significant numbers starting in the 1830s).
    By 1810, the population of the U.S. was 7 million, and among those millions, alcohol consumption was rampant. One estimation, based on the somewhat measurable data of the day, was that the average per capita consumption of alcohol was 10-12 gallons of distilled spirits a year (a more realistic estimate would be in the 3 to 4 gallon range: by 1830, citizens over the age of 15 consumed 7 gallons of alcohol per year). Here is another way to measure the alcohol consumption from our early history: In Washington's first four months as President, 25% of his budget was spent on various varieties of liquor.
     From early Colonial times, some Puritans, such as Increase and Cotton Mather, favored Temperance (limiting, or tempering, the consumption of alcohol). By the 1740s, the small percentage of people that classified themselves as Temperance leaders had, in their minds, linked drinking alcohol with spiritual neglect. To these Temperance leaders, excessive drinking was the source of the lack of adherence to religion and social order.

Picture
      Dr. Benjamin Rush (pictured) was the first to clinically analyze the negative effects of liquor. Rush's study was an early-1800s equivalent to the Surgeon General's warning with cigarettes in the 1960s. The crux of Rush's argument was that people needed to switch from hard liquor to wine or beer (and drink less). As a result of its publication, Temperance societies started to sprout up in the U.S. (the diminutive President James Madison still drank a pint of whiskey before breakfast every morning). 
     The first Temperance publication in Boston was The Philanthropist in 1826; by 1829, there were at least a thousand Temperance Societies throughout America. There were so many Temperance Societies that the clergy were forced to take notice. By 1836, Dr. Rush's study had become "lost in translation", in that with the clergy running point, Temperance Societies were on the warpath against all liquor for religious reasons - in parts of the U.S., there was already open support for Prohibition.


Picture
      From the 1830s-on, Temperance focused on the moral cost of drinking - it was a "Mortal Sin". More clergy were comparing drinking with eternal damnation and sobriety with salvation. In America, drinking alcohol became a religious problem, not a political or social problem. 
      To Temperance leaders like Reverend Justin Edwards (pictured), the alcohol industry represented a vast Godless conspiracy to undermine traditional society . . . Americans, then as now, were susceptible to conspiracy theories. As the Temperance Movement began to grow, the rate of alcohol consumption actually decreased; by 1850, per capita consumption of alcohol was down to a little less than two gallons per year.

Picture
     On 2 June, 1851, the Maine legislature made the sale of liquor illegal throughout the state; decades later, it would become the basis for the 18th Amendment. The leader of the Prohibition movement in Maine was the "Napoleon of Temperance", Colonel Neal Dow (pictured). He was among the first to believe that a legislative solution was the best method to drastically reduce alcohol consumption, and improve society.
    In opposition were the "Wets", which were mostly staunch conservatives backed by brewers, distillers, and saloon keepers. Not only did "Wets" oppose Temperance / Prohibition, they also opposed the emancipation of African Slaves. To these social conservatives, Temperance and Abolitionism came from the same brood of trouble-makers: they believed that their status and influence were under attack.

     The Maine Prohibition law was easily circumvented: it didn't actually prohibit drinking, it just outlawed saloons. Alcohol could be imported and consumed - a common way around the law was to sell a five-cent soda cracker, but the rum was "free". Also, code phrases such as "do you want to see a Blind Pig" meant "do you want a glass of rum"; it was the beginning of what would become known during Prohibition as a "Speakeasy".
     In the 1850s, the momentum of the Temperance Movement ground to a halt due to the increasing likelihood of Civil War. During the Civil War, taxes on liquor and beer were deemed essential in order to help fund the war effort, especially in the Union. However, the Civil War would prove to be a very useful springboard for what would eventually become the first powerful Prohibition lobbying group, the Anti-Saloon League (ASL) . . . 
               (Below: A Temperance poster called "The Drunkard's Progress" from 1846)
Picture
0 Comments

President Washington & the 3 Branches of Gov't (1789 - 1791)

6/13/2015

0 Comments

 
               Source: Ron Chernow. Washington: A Life (2010)
Picture
    President George Washington, as a Virginia Planter, found it hard to adjust to a sedentary job in an urban setting; it very may well have weakened his  overall health (pictured: a list of GW's serious health problems). In June, 1789, a fast-growing tumor appeared on his left thigh, accompanied by a high fever. It became excruciating for GW to even sit down - as it turned out, GW was in mortal danger of dying. He most likely had a carbuncle, which was a cluster of boils connected to each other under the skin. 
    On 17 June, 1789, Dr. Samuel Bard operated on GW's left thigh. The tumor was very large, and Bard had to excise the infected tissue and pus. It was an enormously painful procedure, but GW remained unfailingly courteous. GW was bedridden for weeks, and many wondered if he would ever regain the strength necessary to lead the nation as its first President. By early September, GW told Dr. Bard that the inflammation was almost gone.

Picture
     In June, 1789, Congress tried to pass a law that required GW to get the permission of the Senate if he wanted to remove a member from his Cabinet. The Senate vote was a tie, and Vice-President John Adams voted against the bill. The significance of VP Adams' vote was that it prevented the emergence of a Parliamentary-style Democracy in the U.S. 
    President Washington appeared in the Senate twice. The first was to personally ask why one of his appointments was being blocked. The second (and last) time was to inquire (with his Secretary of War, Henry Knox) the status in terms of ratification of a negotiated treaty with the Creek Nation. The Senate obfuscated by referring the proposed treaty to a committee for further study; GW responded by saying "that defeats the whole purpose of my coming here" - Washington never again returned to the U.S. Senate.
   From that point on, President Washington sent missives to Congress, notifying them of his decisions. These actions did more to define the Presidency and the conduct of foreign policy than an entire shelf of Supreme Court decisions on the separation of power among the three branches.
       (Below: From the 15:12 - 18:57 mark, watch GW in the Senate w/ the Creek Treaty)

Picture
       President Washington made the Executive the principle actor in the federal government, negotiating treaties and nominating people for confirmation. GW knew that one man could make and take decisive action, as opposed to a legislative body. Among his decisive actions, and an enduring mystery of GW's Presidency: why did he relegate Vice-President John Adams (pictured) to a minor role in his administration   . . . Adams was clearly excluded from Washington's inner circle of advisors. 
     Adams was probably a casualty of being identified, by Washington, as the nominal head of the Senate. GW also had a long memory of those that criticized him during the Revolution, and Adams was one of the names at the top of Washington's list. GW believed that criticism was a lack of loyalty, and many people paid a price for what they said about Commander-in-Chief Washington when he was President. Meanwhile, Adams was secretly exasperated by GW's success and prestige as President; John Adams' greatest fear was that Washington and Franklin would dwarf him in American History.

Picture
      What hurt Adams was that Washington preferred to tap the talents of younger men, such as Hamilton, Madison, and Jefferson. What hurt Washington's focus in his early months as President was that he was absolutely besieged with office seekers, since he had to fill over 1000 posts in the new federal government. GW tried to be as impartial as possible with his selections because he wanted to strengthen the legitimacy of the new government. 
     Washington set up five departments that were designed to provide advice: Treasury, War, State, Attorney General, and Postmaster General. With the Constitution mum about Presidential advisors, GW created the first Cabinet (not pictured; the Postmaster General, Samuel Osgood); by doing so, he created a major shift from Legislative to Executive (in effect, he found another way to bypass Congress). Jefferson viewed the first Cabinet as a wheel, with Washington as the hub, and the others as the spokes . . . but those spokes featured an incredible array of talented young (relative to GW) men.

Picture
       SecWar Henry Knox was Washington's closest friend (kind of his "Work-Wife") and ally, which he desperately needed, since he wasn't really close to anyone else but his wife Martha. Typically, GW wasn't an original thinker or policy-maker, but he was very comfortable helping Knox supervise the War Department. For the Treasury, GW first approached Robert Morris, but he felt he was too busy (and also didn't want to mess w/ his prosperity), so he recommended Alexander Hamilton (pictured left below with Jefferson). GW knew Hamilton's faults, but he had worked with him twice before during the Revolution and the Constitutional Convention. It's hard to believe, but Hamilton, the great Secretary of the Treasury, wasn't Washington's first choice for the position.
     For the crucial position of Secretary of State, GW offered the post first to John Jay, but Jay had his eye on being the first Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. GW then "settled" for someone he knew from his days in the Virginia Assembly: Thomas Jefferson. Jefferson took months to decide whether-or-not to accept the position; he took so long that both GW and James Madison had to pressure him hasten his decision (to accept!). 
     Hamilton practically burst through the doors of the Treasury Department with sky-high enthusiasm and a desire to do his best to make the new federal government a long-term success. Jefferson, on the other hand, was not very enthusiastic in carrying out his duties as the first SecState. A possible reason for his delay for accepting the post, and his lack of energy in heading State was that he wasn't very comfortable with the federal government as envisioned, written, and ratified.

Picture
     A main source for the problems and friction between Hamilton and Jefferson was that GW wanted his Cabinet to advise him on all fronts. For example, GW would often ask Hamilton for input on foreign affairs, which obviously rankled Jefferson. It also meant that Cabinent members often tread on each other's turf, and rivalries and resentment were the consequence. 
   The Attorney General was Edmund Randolph (pictured; he was only 36), and he was frustrated in that he really didn't have a department to run like the others . . . it was basically GW and him. Randolph had so little to do that he actually took private clients as a lawyer. 
     There was high turnover in the early years of the Supreme Court under the Constitution; "Riding the Circuit" was the main reason. Supreme Court justices spent a long time away from the comforts of home, and also had to endure miserable working conditions and substandard lodging. The lack of prestige alone lead to resignations and a low-level of interest in serving on the Court. GW would appoint 11 justices to the Supreme Court (in the early decades, there were only 6 justices) . . . the Supreme Court was an institution searching for a mission.

Picture
     For Washington, the good news about being President was, unlike being Commander-in-Chief during the Revolutionary War, he was able to take his time in making most every decision. Washington, therefore, made far-fewer mistakes as the Chief Executive. GW worried more about committing an error than making a brilliant decision that would lead to a cacophony of "Huzzahs".  
     For example, Washington deliberated quite a while on the pros and cons of the proposed 
Bill of Rights; he then actually changed his previous stance in opposition to adding amendments to the Constitution. GW's open support of the Bill of Rights broke the logjam in Congress in terms of their proposal for ratification.

0 Comments

George Washington and the Constitutional Convention

6/8/2015

0 Comments

 
                    Source: Ron Chernow. Washington: A Life (2010)
Picture
     Due to incompetence and the extreme selfishness of the states, the U.S. was unable to repay its Revolutionary War debts under the Articles of Confederation. Also, there was no realistic way to create a decent army or navy without at least a modicum of federal power. George Washington and Alexander Hamilton saw a strong federal government as the best way to repay the debts, establish a national army and navy, and deter monarchy. 
     James Madison, over the last several years, had been a key figure in shaping GW's political views; he joined with James Monroe and Edmund Randolph in pressing GW to re-enter politics, since the Constitutional Convention scheduled in Philadelphia in May, 1787.
     Shays' Rebellion (1786-1787) was perhaps the most useful crisis in U.S. History. The rebellion horrified GW, and his letters show much more political agitation than what he showed on the surface. Shays' Rebellion also crystallized GW's belief that the Articles of Confederation had to be replaced with a stronger national government . . . his days as a Virginia Planter at Mount Vernon were yet again numbered.

Picture
      In late-1786, Madison notified GW that he was chosen to head the seven man Virginia delegation in Philadelphia. Although GW was leaning on going to Philadelphia, with the intent of "revising" the Articles of Confederation, he hadn't formally committed to the delegation. 
     Henry Knox (GW's artillery officer during the Revolution) made GW's decision for him: in a personal letter, Knox argued that if GW didn't go to Philadelphia and the convention failed, it would forever harm GW's reputation in history. But, if GW presided over the convention, and a strong federal government was the result, then GW would become even greater in the present, and more-so in history.






      In other words, Knox appealed to GW's extreme vanity; GW was always extremely conscious of what others thought of him, both in terms of appearance and reputation (which explained why GW would not go to Philadelphia until he was "summoned from retirement" by the public). GW and Madison were primed for decisive action at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, ready to create a new national government.
Picture
      Once in Philadelphia, the first person that GW visited was an (ailing) Ben Franklin, who he hadn't seen since 1776 (and who was his only realistic rival to being named President of the Constitutional Convention). The Constitutional Convention started on 14 May, 1787, and the only state delegations in in attendance were from Virginia and Pennsylvania. GW hated tardiness, and was profoundly irritated that the convention wasn't able to start because there wasn't a quorum of seven states present (pictured: Franklin addressing GW during the Constitutional Convention).
     The Virginia delegation became a cohesive group, meeting for 2 to 3 hours a day until the convention was able to officially begin. On 25 May, 1787, the convention finally had seven state delegations, and GW was unanimously elected President of the convention. 
      The role of President was ideal for GW, in that the position was officially nonpartisan and nonspeaking while in session (He would have plenty to say when the convention was out of session). GW was not an "Originator", but a keen judge of the points-of-view and arguments from others; it also greatly benefited GW that others framed the debate during the convention. GW's mere presence guaranteed that the Constitutional Convention was at least perceived as striving for the public good. 

Picture
     GW had to leave the chair during the debate on the Virginia Plan, but other than that instance, he held his tongue while presiding over the convention . . . but he was "all-in" for a strong federal government. GW's influence was by far the main reason why the Constitution featured a strong executive (Pictured: GW addressing the convention).
     For the most part, the delegates at the convention were motivated and governed by their hopes rather than their fears, which was largely attributed to the presence of GW. Also, GW was the reason why each member of the House of Representatives was based on 30,000 citizens.  Despite not getting all he wanted in the final draft, he was a strong supporter of the proposed Constitution; he put his trust in the amendment process to refine any imperfections contained in the document.

      GW saw that The Federalist Essays were way-past regular journalism; it was classical political philosophy from Madison and Hamilton (with a dash of John Jay). Behind the scenes, GW made sure the Federalist essays were published in Virginia, which became especially important after New York narrowly ratified the Constitution (the VA state convention became the 10th state to ratify with an 89-79 vote; RI and NC were the last two holdouts). 
     As the newly "elected" President, GW didn't see himself finishing the first term; he figured in two years, he would be back at Mount Vernon . . . he never envisioned eight long years as President. Had GW known his commitment would have been that long, he never would have agreed to be the nation's first Chief Executive. 
(Below: the results of the "Election" of 1789 - side note: John Adams was appalled that he didn't even receive anything close to half the Electoral Votes, such was his view of his level of importance at this time in U.S. History)
Picture
Picture
     The first Inauguration was set for 4 March, 1789, in New York City, but bad roads due to a lingering winter delayed GW's first Inauguration until April. GW was in severe financial straits as he entered the Presidency; bad harvests (weather/insects), deadbeat renters, inflation, and his lavish spending contributed to his financial stress. GW actually had to borrow money to pay his taxes, and then he had to borrow more to PAY FOR HIS TRIP TO NYC TO BE INAUGURATED as the nation's first President.





0 Comments

    Archives

    May 2016
    April 2016
    March 2016
    February 2016
    January 2016
    December 2015
    November 2015
    October 2015
    September 2015
    August 2015
    July 2015
    June 2015
    May 2015

    Categories

    All
    18th Century
    19th Century
    20th Century
    Biography
    History

Powered by Create your own unique website with customizable templates.