Mr. Jensen's U.S. History Website
  • Home
  • College US
    • Coming Soon . . .
    • APHIST Video
    • NWU Dual Credit Info
  • US History 9
    • Coming Soon . . .
    • Online Reviews
    • US 9 Video
  • U.S. History Blog
    • U.S. History Blog (May 2020 - May 2021)
    • U.S. History Blog (May 2019 - May 2020)
    • U.S. History Blog (May 2018 - May 2019)
    • U.S. History Blog (May 2017 - May 2018)
    • U.S. History Blog (May 2016 - May 2017)
    • U.S. History Blog (May 2015 - May 2016)
    • U.S. History Blog (May, 2014 - May, 2015)
  • "Good News"
  • My WHS Google Site

The Election of 1844: James Knox Polk (D) v. Henry Clay (Whig)

12/24/2015

0 Comments

 
     Robert W. Merry. A Country of Vast Designs: James K. Polk, the  Mexican War,
                                  and the Conquest of the American Continent (2009)  
   
Picture
     On 27 April, 1844, independently of each other, Martin Van Buren (MVB, pictured) and Henry Clay announced their opposition to the immediate annexation of Texas. Clay stated that it was impossible to guarantee that war with Mexico wouldn't occur as a result, and that America's national character was at stake. Clay went so far to say that annexing Texas and war with Mexico would be the same thing. For MVB, there was no way to avoid a rupture in the Democratic Party over Texas, and to compound his problems after his announcement, Andrew Jackson was disappointed and crestfallen at MVB's stance on Texas. No matter their views and sentiments, MVB and Clay were out-of-touch with the vast majority of U.S. citizens who not only wanted Texas, but also rapid Western Expansion.

Picture
     On 1 May, 1844, Henry Clay was nominated as the candidate for the Whig Party at their national convention in Baltimore. On 10 May 1844, James Knox Polk was summoned to the Hermitage for an audience with his mentor, Andrew Jackson . . . Jackson wanted a pro-annexation man from the Southwest as the nominee for the Democrats, and he had identified Polk as the most able man available.
     MVB's right-hand man, Silas Wright, had also come to the same conclusion about Polk. Wright was even more assured when Polk let it be known that he would remain loyal to MVB as long as he remained a candidate for the nomination of the Democratic Party for President. But all was not well in the Democratic Party: Western and Southwestern delegates threatened to bolt the convention if MVB was a threat to Lewis Cass (Michigan, pictured), an avid expansionist. At the beginning of the Democratic National Convention, Southern delegations pushed for a 2/3's majority in order to determine a nominee . . . if that super-majority became a reality, MVB and his supporters knew they had no chance to win the nomination.

Picture
      Gideon J. Pillow (pictured, as a Confederate Brigadier General) was among the wealthiest men in Tennessee, and had been friends with Polk for many years; he was Polk's point man in the Democratic National Convention in Baltimore. Pillow told Polk that if MVB faded fast, he could survive his association with the former President among the delegates. The key, according to Pillow, was that Northern delegates had to start the "Polk Parade" towards nomination. So, at Baltimore, Pillow's overall goal was to guarantee Polk the Vice-Presidential slot, while doing his best to position him for the nomination as President.
     On 27 May 1844, the Democratic National Convention was called to order, and after a Chairman was selected, the motion for the 2/3's super-majority was made, and after extended debate was passed due to the unity of the Southern delegates. With that vote, MVB's chances at the nomination vanished; the results of the first ballot, with 177 being the 2/3's mark, were MVB 145, Cass 86, with three other candidates totaling 34 (including future President James Buchanan).

Picture
     After the 5th ballot, Cass had 107 delegates to MVB's 103; after the 6th ballot - Cass 166, MVB 101; 7th ballot - Cass 123, MVB 99 . . . by the 7th ballot, MVB's delegates were starting to commit to Cass, and MVB's supporters threatened to bolt the convention. During all this chaos, Pillow was approached by the Pennsylvania and Maryland delegations. Their idea was to nominate Polk as a compromise candidate to try and end the deadlock . . . PA & MD also had a hidden agenda, in that they were mostly concerned about denying Cass the nomination.
     For Polk's name to be put in play, Pillow needed Northern delegates to convince other Northern delegates to support Polk; Polk's chances were nil of he was nominated by Southerners. Before the 8th ballot, Pillow worked the floor during the debate, pushing Polk as the only candidate that could defeat Cass. After the 8th ballot, Cass and MVB held firm, but Polk had 44 delegates (New Hampshire started him off w/ their 6 delegates). Before the 9th ballot, many pro-Polk testimonials were given, and as a result of the 9th ballot, not only did Polk win the nomination, but he was unbelievably unanimously selected. 
Clay, when he heard Polk was the Democratic nominee, publicly stated that he would have an easy path to the Presidency; privately, he knew that Polk would be tougher to defeat in the South & the West than MVB or Cass.

Picture
       To Polk, the "Political Chess Master", there were four main obstacles in his way to winning the Presidency in 1844: a) The lingering tariff issue, especially in Pennsylvania; b) President John Tyler might run as a 3rd Party candidate, siphoning off votes from Polk; c) Senator Thomas Hart Benton's (MO) angry Northerners and John C. Calhoun's (SC) angry Southerners might derail Democratic unity; d) Texas - Polk wanted to separate annexation and slavery, if possible.
     Polk knew he would get backing from powerful Democrats if he promised to serve only one term: he needed Benton, Calhoun, Cass, Buchanan, and many others to support his candidacy. In June 1844, the Texas Treaty, which would have made Texas a state not from a territory, but from a sovereign nation, died on the Senate floor (35-14). And, to complicate matters even further, Benton's and Calhoun's forces went to war as a result, tearing the Democratic Party further apart. Polk even heard reports that a Southern Convention of Democrats would be held in Nashville; South Carolina was the impetus behind the convention, but not Calhoun. Once Calhoun (who was Tyler's 2nd SecState) was persuaded that Polk wasn't a tool of MVB, he not only supported Polk, but also put a stop to the proposed Nashville convention . . . Polk's single-term promise was a motivating factor for Calhoun as well. 

Picture
     By now, Henry Clay (pictured) realized that his stand on Texas was contrary to the national sentiment on expansion. Clay declared that as President, he would annex Texas if it involved no national dishonor or war with Mexico. Once again, Clay was seen by the "Average American" as cunning and duplicitous . . . Clay did not have Polk's political discipline in keeping silent when he needed to be silent. Clay still stuck to his American System past and his games of political intrigue; it didn't register to Clay that the U.S. had moved in a new direction, focusing on the future with Western expansion . . . stubbornness, ideology, ego, vanity, nostalgia . . . all were in play for Henry Clay, and they kept him from winning the Presidency he so coveted.
     In the Election of 1844, Polk had .495 of the Popular Vote, while Clay had .481, and in the Electoral College, it was Polk with 170 Electoral votes to Clay's 105; Polk won 15 states, while Clay carried 11. Clay just may have defeated Polk, except the Liberty Party candidate, James G. Birney (MI), may have kept Clay from winning New York, Michigan, and Ohio; if Clay had carried those three states, he, not Polk, would have been the 11th President of the United States.

0 Comments

The Election of 1800: The Real Story of the "Peaceful Revolution"

12/1/2015

0 Comments

 
     Source: Andrew Burstein & Nancy Isenberg. Madison and Jefferson (2013)
Picture
     The battle lines were set for the Election of 1800: to the Federalists, if Thomas Jefferson became President, it would be a government of "Experiment" instead of "Order". To Republicans, Federalist "Order" had slaughtered Liberty; political rancor was at a fever pitch. 
     As far as the Republicans were concerned, Jefferson was the only one that could defeat President John Adams, but to do so, Jefferson needed the New York Electors, especially since Pennsylvania's Electors had proven to be unpredictable in 1796. Jefferson and James Madison did the math: New York was the key to winning the Election of 1800, and Aaron Burr was the agent to deliver the state's Electors. Burr succeeded in outmaneuvering his rival, Alexander Hamilton, in New York City, making sure candidates loyal to him prevailed in the 13 NYC Assembly elections. Those men would select the state's 12 Electors, which would vote for Jefferson (Hamilton petitioned Governor Clinton to overturn the results of a fair election . . . he wasn't a very good loser).  
     Burr's efforts convinced Virginia's 21 Electors that he should be Jefferson's running mate. Virginia was one of the first states to adopt the "Winner-Take-All" strategy for their Electors (only Nebraska and Maine do not do so today), so therefore Jefferson and Burr secured all 42 of Virginia's Electoral Votes (each Elector cast two ballots for President until the 12th Amendment). In order to try and gain as many Electoral votes as possible in Northern states, the Republicans touted Jefferson as the primary author of the Declaration of Independence, which was not widely known until the end of the century. Federalists countered that Jefferson did indeed write the document, but he was not the author, only the "recorder" of the ideas of others in an effort to minimize any Republican advantage.

Picture
     By October 1800, Alexander Hamilton was less powerful than at any time before George     Washington was President. Hamilton tried to make his political comeback by attacking President John Adams in a 54 page pamphlet (he was embittered largely due to being thwarted by Adams in his pursuit of becoming the commander of the newly created Provisional Army). Hamilton attacked Adams in the pamphlet, and let it be known that he preferred and supported Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina as the Federalist candidate for President.
     There was not an Election Day for a popular vote in 1800 (the first such Presidential election that featured a meaningful popular vote occurred in 1824); the Electors voted on 3 December 1800 for President and Vice-President. The states that voted a "Straight Ticket" selected Jefferson with one Electoral vote, and Burr with the other vote. In the states that split their Electoral vote between the two parties, Jefferson and Burr received an equal number (again, each of an Elector's two votes was a vote for President in 1800).
     In South Carolina, Thomas Pinckney (Cotesworth Pinckney's cousin, not his famous brother), worked to hand the state's Electors to Jefferson and Burr. It was arranged during this wheeling-and-dealing that one Electoral vote was to be withheld from Burr in South Carolina, thereby avoiding an unnecessary (and embarrassing) tie. However, either the Elector chosen for the "honor" of doing so failed to properly cast his ballot, or the whole endeavor was inadequately organized and communicated. Republican unity proved greater than practical calculations in other states as well as South Carolina, and as a result, Jefferson and Burr each received 73 Electoral votes.

Picture
      Federalists had dominated Congress for the previous six years, but after the Election of 1800, 2/3's of the House of Representatives would be Republicans . . . but the 7th Congress wouldn't convene until 7 December 1801, nine months after Inauguration Day. It was in the Lame Duck Federalist-controlled House that the Election of 1800 would be decided, and the Federalists (especially the Hamiltonian "High Federalists") made every effort to sabotage the process of electing a new President. (Below: the Electoral College results for the Election of 1800 - notice how the Federalists were able to avoid a tie between Adams & Pinckney; an Elector from Rhode Island cast an Electoral vote for New York's John Jay)
     Many Federalists (especially the "High Federalists") were willing to reverse the intended order of the Republicans for President, and tried to elect Burr; these Federalists also entertained the idea of delaying the process until after Inauguration Day. Jefferson thought that a candid conversation with Adams would help resolve the impasse in the House, but Madison (Jefferson's de facto campaign manager in 1796 & 1800) advised him not to do so, in that a conversation with Adams could easily be misconstrued and backfire for the Republicans. 

Picture
     Contrary to popular history (which is often too accepting of historical hearsay as credible evidence), Jefferson and Madison held no hard feelings towards Burr at this time in terms of any illicit behavior towards them or the Republicans. The main factor why Burr was attractive to many Federalists was that he was a New Yorker, not a Virginian. Burr stayed away from the capital during the scurrilous hoo-haw, not wanting to get directly entangled in the political morass. 
     James Bayard, the lone representative from Delaware, could have ended the election in the House on the first ballot, since he was the lone representative from his state. If Bayard had voted for Jefferson on the first ballot, the election in the House would have been over, but Bayard deeply resented the Planter Class, and cast his ballot for Burr. The results of the first ballot in the House were as follows: Jefferson had 8 states, Burr 6, and there were 2 undecided delegations . . . with all 16 states voting, Jefferson needed 9 states in order to become President.

Picture
     Bayard announced, after well over two dozen ballots, that he would abstain from voting, since he was assured by a Virginia Republican he respected that Jefferson would continue Federalist fiscal policies if elected. The "High Federalists" freaked-out, since Bayard's abstention meant that Jefferson would become President with the 8 states he already had in his fold. Burr was the wildcard in the equation: Bayard was waiting to see if Burr would offer a better deal compared to Jefferson. A letter from Burr was received by Bayard, but the contents must have been less-than-satisfactory to Bayard and the other Federalists.
     On the 36th ballot, Bayard and members of the South Carolina delegation abstained, and with other movement among the Congressional delegations (Hamilton had convinced other Federalists that Jefferson was the "Lesser Evil" compared to Burr), Jefferson received 10 states to Burr's 4 (and with the two abstentions from DE & SC, all 16 states were on the record). Many of the Republicans believed that Burr was a schemer; to them in appeared that Burr made a play for President, and then failed to make a satisfactory deal with the Federalists (that may well have been true) . . . however, the true instigators of the "Nightmare in the House" were the outgoing Federalists.

Picture
     Epilogue: On 4 March 1801, James Madison was unable to attend Jefferson's Inauguration since his father had recently died. Albert Gallatin (pictured: the statue of Albert Gallatin in front of the Treasury Building in Washington, D.C.), who had been a thorn in the side of the Federalists in the House for nearly a decade, was confirmed as Secretary of the Treasury when the Senate convened in December. Gallatin became Jefferson's most influential adviser, convincing the 3rd President to reduce federal spending, with the most obvious cuts to the Navy (Gallatin would serve in the Cabinet for both Jefferson and Madison). 
     Madison was unanimously confirmed as Secretary of State, even though he had never left the shores of America; SecState in the early decades after the Constitution was considered the stepping-stone to the Presidency (Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, John Quincy Adams, and Martin Van Buren all served as SecState before going to the White House).
     Soon, John Marshall would be #1 on Jefferson's "Enemies List", replacing Patrick Henry (who died in 1799) and Alexander Hamilton (who was no longer a threat). Marshall was not only a Federalist, but also a popular Virginian, which presented two threats as far as Jefferson was concerned (Marshall and Jefferson were also second cousins). By the time Jefferson was sworn in as President, Marshall had made the transition from being John Adams' last Secretary of State to the 4th Chief Justice of the Supreme Court . . . Marshall would soon show that he was not afraid to flex his legal muscles in interpreting Executive and Legislative decisions in relation to the Constitution as Chief Justice (1801 - 1835), most famously in Marbury v. Madison in 1803.

0 Comments

    Archives

    May 2016
    April 2016
    March 2016
    February 2016
    January 2016
    December 2015
    November 2015
    October 2015
    September 2015
    August 2015
    July 2015
    June 2015
    May 2015

    Categories

    All
    18th Century
    19th Century
    20th Century
    Biography
    History

Powered by Create your own unique website with customizable templates.