Robert W. Merry. A Country of Vast Designs: James K. Polk, the Mexican War,
and the Conquest of the American Continent (2009)
and the Conquest of the American Continent (2009)
On 27 April, 1844, independently of each other, Martin Van Buren (MVB, pictured) and Henry Clay announced their opposition to the immediate annexation of Texas. Clay stated that it was impossible to guarantee that war with Mexico wouldn't occur as a result, and that America's national character was at stake. Clay went so far to say that annexing Texas and war with Mexico would be the same thing. For MVB, there was no way to avoid a rupture in the Democratic Party over Texas, and to compound his problems after his announcement, Andrew Jackson was disappointed and crestfallen at MVB's stance on Texas. No matter their views and sentiments, MVB and Clay were out-of-touch with the vast majority of U.S. citizens who not only wanted Texas, but also rapid Western Expansion.
On 1 May, 1844, Henry Clay was nominated as the candidate for the Whig Party at their national convention in Baltimore. On 10 May 1844, James Knox Polk was summoned to the Hermitage for an audience with his mentor, Andrew Jackson . . . Jackson wanted a pro-annexation man from the Southwest as the nominee for the Democrats, and he had identified Polk as the most able man available.
MVB's right-hand man, Silas Wright, had also come to the same conclusion about Polk. Wright was even more assured when Polk let it be known that he would remain loyal to MVB as long as he remained a candidate for the nomination of the Democratic Party for President. But all was not well in the Democratic Party: Western and Southwestern delegates threatened to bolt the convention if MVB was a threat to Lewis Cass (Michigan, pictured), an avid expansionist. At the beginning of the Democratic National Convention, Southern delegations pushed for a 2/3's majority in order to determine a nominee . . . if that super-majority became a reality, MVB and his supporters knew they had no chance to win the nomination.
MVB's right-hand man, Silas Wright, had also come to the same conclusion about Polk. Wright was even more assured when Polk let it be known that he would remain loyal to MVB as long as he remained a candidate for the nomination of the Democratic Party for President. But all was not well in the Democratic Party: Western and Southwestern delegates threatened to bolt the convention if MVB was a threat to Lewis Cass (Michigan, pictured), an avid expansionist. At the beginning of the Democratic National Convention, Southern delegations pushed for a 2/3's majority in order to determine a nominee . . . if that super-majority became a reality, MVB and his supporters knew they had no chance to win the nomination.
Gideon J. Pillow (pictured, as a Confederate Brigadier General) was among the wealthiest men in Tennessee, and had been friends with Polk for many years; he was Polk's point man in the Democratic National Convention in Baltimore. Pillow told Polk that if MVB faded fast, he could survive his association with the former President among the delegates. The key, according to Pillow, was that Northern delegates had to start the "Polk Parade" towards nomination. So, at Baltimore, Pillow's overall goal was to guarantee Polk the Vice-Presidential slot, while doing his best to position him for the nomination as President.
On 27 May 1844, the Democratic National Convention was called to order, and after a Chairman was selected, the motion for the 2/3's super-majority was made, and after extended debate was passed due to the unity of the Southern delegates. With that vote, MVB's chances at the nomination vanished; the results of the first ballot, with 177 being the 2/3's mark, were MVB 145, Cass 86, with three other candidates totaling 34 (including future President James Buchanan).
On 27 May 1844, the Democratic National Convention was called to order, and after a Chairman was selected, the motion for the 2/3's super-majority was made, and after extended debate was passed due to the unity of the Southern delegates. With that vote, MVB's chances at the nomination vanished; the results of the first ballot, with 177 being the 2/3's mark, were MVB 145, Cass 86, with three other candidates totaling 34 (including future President James Buchanan).
After the 5th ballot, Cass had 107 delegates to MVB's 103; after the 6th ballot - Cass 166, MVB 101; 7th ballot - Cass 123, MVB 99 . . . by the 7th ballot, MVB's delegates were starting to commit to Cass, and MVB's supporters threatened to bolt the convention. During all this chaos, Pillow was approached by the Pennsylvania and Maryland delegations. Their idea was to nominate Polk as a compromise candidate to try and end the deadlock . . . PA & MD also had a hidden agenda, in that they were mostly concerned about denying Cass the nomination.
For Polk's name to be put in play, Pillow needed Northern delegates to convince other Northern delegates to support Polk; Polk's chances were nil of he was nominated by Southerners. Before the 8th ballot, Pillow worked the floor during the debate, pushing Polk as the only candidate that could defeat Cass. After the 8th ballot, Cass and MVB held firm, but Polk had 44 delegates (New Hampshire started him off w/ their 6 delegates). Before the 9th ballot, many pro-Polk testimonials were given, and as a result of the 9th ballot, not only did Polk win the nomination, but he was unbelievably unanimously selected. Clay, when he heard Polk was the Democratic nominee, publicly stated that he would have an easy path to the Presidency; privately, he knew that Polk would be tougher to defeat in the South & the West than MVB or Cass.
For Polk's name to be put in play, Pillow needed Northern delegates to convince other Northern delegates to support Polk; Polk's chances were nil of he was nominated by Southerners. Before the 8th ballot, Pillow worked the floor during the debate, pushing Polk as the only candidate that could defeat Cass. After the 8th ballot, Cass and MVB held firm, but Polk had 44 delegates (New Hampshire started him off w/ their 6 delegates). Before the 9th ballot, many pro-Polk testimonials were given, and as a result of the 9th ballot, not only did Polk win the nomination, but he was unbelievably unanimously selected. Clay, when he heard Polk was the Democratic nominee, publicly stated that he would have an easy path to the Presidency; privately, he knew that Polk would be tougher to defeat in the South & the West than MVB or Cass.
To Polk, the "Political Chess Master", there were four main obstacles in his way to winning the Presidency in 1844: a) The lingering tariff issue, especially in Pennsylvania; b) President John Tyler might run as a 3rd Party candidate, siphoning off votes from Polk; c) Senator Thomas Hart Benton's (MO) angry Northerners and John C. Calhoun's (SC) angry Southerners might derail Democratic unity; d) Texas - Polk wanted to separate annexation and slavery, if possible.
Polk knew he would get backing from powerful Democrats if he promised to serve only one term: he needed Benton, Calhoun, Cass, Buchanan, and many others to support his candidacy. In June 1844, the Texas Treaty, which would have made Texas a state not from a territory, but from a sovereign nation, died on the Senate floor (35-14). And, to complicate matters even further, Benton's and Calhoun's forces went to war as a result, tearing the Democratic Party further apart. Polk even heard reports that a Southern Convention of Democrats would be held in Nashville; South Carolina was the impetus behind the convention, but not Calhoun. Once Calhoun (who was Tyler's 2nd SecState) was persuaded that Polk wasn't a tool of MVB, he not only supported Polk, but also put a stop to the proposed Nashville convention . . . Polk's single-term promise was a motivating factor for Calhoun as well.
Polk knew he would get backing from powerful Democrats if he promised to serve only one term: he needed Benton, Calhoun, Cass, Buchanan, and many others to support his candidacy. In June 1844, the Texas Treaty, which would have made Texas a state not from a territory, but from a sovereign nation, died on the Senate floor (35-14). And, to complicate matters even further, Benton's and Calhoun's forces went to war as a result, tearing the Democratic Party further apart. Polk even heard reports that a Southern Convention of Democrats would be held in Nashville; South Carolina was the impetus behind the convention, but not Calhoun. Once Calhoun (who was Tyler's 2nd SecState) was persuaded that Polk wasn't a tool of MVB, he not only supported Polk, but also put a stop to the proposed Nashville convention . . . Polk's single-term promise was a motivating factor for Calhoun as well.
By now, Henry Clay (pictured) realized that his stand on Texas was contrary to the national sentiment on expansion. Clay declared that as President, he would annex Texas if it involved no national dishonor or war with Mexico. Once again, Clay was seen by the "Average American" as cunning and duplicitous . . . Clay did not have Polk's political discipline in keeping silent when he needed to be silent. Clay still stuck to his American System past and his games of political intrigue; it didn't register to Clay that the U.S. had moved in a new direction, focusing on the future with Western expansion . . . stubbornness, ideology, ego, vanity, nostalgia . . . all were in play for Henry Clay, and they kept him from winning the Presidency he so coveted.
In the Election of 1844, Polk had .495 of the Popular Vote, while Clay had .481, and in the Electoral College, it was Polk with 170 Electoral votes to Clay's 105; Polk won 15 states, while Clay carried 11. Clay just may have defeated Polk, except the Liberty Party candidate, James G. Birney (MI), may have kept Clay from winning New York, Michigan, and Ohio; if Clay had carried those three states, he, not Polk, would have been the 11th President of the United States.
In the Election of 1844, Polk had .495 of the Popular Vote, while Clay had .481, and in the Electoral College, it was Polk with 170 Electoral votes to Clay's 105; Polk won 15 states, while Clay carried 11. Clay just may have defeated Polk, except the Liberty Party candidate, James G. Birney (MI), may have kept Clay from winning New York, Michigan, and Ohio; if Clay had carried those three states, he, not Polk, would have been the 11th President of the United States.
