Source: Paul Kennedy. Engineers of Victory: The Problem Solvers Who
Turned the Tide in the Second World War (2013)
Turned the Tide in the Second World War (2013)
Traditional World War II history focuses on "Top-Down, Great-Man" narratives, such as Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, General Dwight Eisenhower, Adolph Hitler, etc. Rarely do historians inquire into the mechanics and dynamics of strategic success or failure. For example, the British victory over the Spanish Armada in 1588; Sir John Hawkins drastically redesigned the galleons ten years earlier, which gave the Royal Navy the necessary firepower and speed to defeat Spain. Another example: as the British Empire grew, it was financed by the merchants of Amsterdam and other European centers, as well as the creation and development of the Bank of England (pictured above: FDR, Stalin, and Churchill at the Teheran Conference, 1943).
At Casablanca in early-1943, FDR and Churchill proclaimed that nothing other than the unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers would be accepted . . . making the pronouncement was all well-and-good, but how to do so? At the time of the Casablanca Conference, the Allies were losing badly in all theaters . . . what needed to be done to win the war would have to be done at the "middle-level", involving thousands of people in various roles, both military and civilian.
First, the Allies needed to win control of the North Atlantic sea-lanes for their convoys. Second, the Allies needed to take control of the skies over West-Central Europe, so Britain would be more than just the launching pad for Operation Overlord, it would be the base of massive destruction from the air. Third, the Allies needed to find a way to get past Axis-held beaches and carry the fight to the heartland of Europe. Fourth, the Allies needed to find a way to counter the Nazi Blitzkrieg, and fifth, the Allies needed to find the best route and methods to take the war to Japan in the Pacific.
In a little more than a year after Casablanca (pictured above, L-R: French General Henri Giraud, FDR, Charles de Gaulle, and Churchill), all of the above was achieved with the exception of the unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers. No straight causal line connects Casablanca to the reality of achieving all five major obstacles to win the war; the Allies were in no position to do anything of substance to pursue Casablanca's goals in early-1942 (actually, WW II deteriorated for the Allies in the months immediately after Casablanca).
Much like Pearl Harbor erased memories of the most divisive period in U.S. History after the Civil War (1938 - 1941; Isolationists v. Internationalists), the ultimate victories in 1945 erased the truth that the Allies were losing World War II by late-1942 / early-1943 . . . the final victories of 1945 obscured how difficult the Allied position was in the middle years of World War II.
First, the Allies needed to win control of the North Atlantic sea-lanes for their convoys. Second, the Allies needed to take control of the skies over West-Central Europe, so Britain would be more than just the launching pad for Operation Overlord, it would be the base of massive destruction from the air. Third, the Allies needed to find a way to get past Axis-held beaches and carry the fight to the heartland of Europe. Fourth, the Allies needed to find a way to counter the Nazi Blitzkrieg, and fifth, the Allies needed to find the best route and methods to take the war to Japan in the Pacific.
In a little more than a year after Casablanca (pictured above, L-R: French General Henri Giraud, FDR, Charles de Gaulle, and Churchill), all of the above was achieved with the exception of the unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers. No straight causal line connects Casablanca to the reality of achieving all five major obstacles to win the war; the Allies were in no position to do anything of substance to pursue Casablanca's goals in early-1942 (actually, WW II deteriorated for the Allies in the months immediately after Casablanca).
Much like Pearl Harbor erased memories of the most divisive period in U.S. History after the Civil War (1938 - 1941; Isolationists v. Internationalists), the ultimate victories in 1945 erased the truth that the Allies were losing World War II by late-1942 / early-1943 . . . the final victories of 1945 obscured how difficult the Allied position was in the middle years of World War II.
In the battle for control of the sea-lanes in the North Atlantic, losses among Allied merchant ships increased after Casablanca. During March 1943, German U-Boats sank 108 vessels, which stunned and demoralized the Western Allies. If the Allies couldn't reverse momentum, there would be no chance for Operation Overlord. Also, Allied strategic bombing in Europe after Casablanca went from bad-to-worse. the Royal Air Force (RAF) was running out of bombers due to the increased numbers and effectiveness of Luftwaffe night fighters.
From November 1943 to March 1944, there were 16 massive Allied attacks on Berlin. The Allies lost 1047 aircraft, while another 1682 planes were badly damaged . . . attrition was even greater during daytime raids. On 14 October 1943, the ball-bearing factory at Schweinfurt (pinned in the above map) was targeted; 60 of 291 B-17 Flying Fortresses were shot down, and a further 138 damaged. The Allies found out that their theory that "the bomber will always get through" was beyond-wrong. Allied command of the sea-lanes in the North Atlantic and of the air over Western/Central Europe was an illusion . . . both needed to be drastically reversed if there was to be any chance of victory.
From November 1943 to March 1944, there were 16 massive Allied attacks on Berlin. The Allies lost 1047 aircraft, while another 1682 planes were badly damaged . . . attrition was even greater during daytime raids. On 14 October 1943, the ball-bearing factory at Schweinfurt (pinned in the above map) was targeted; 60 of 291 B-17 Flying Fortresses were shot down, and a further 138 damaged. The Allies found out that their theory that "the bomber will always get through" was beyond-wrong. Allied command of the sea-lanes in the North Atlantic and of the air over Western/Central Europe was an illusion . . . both needed to be drastically reversed if there was to be any chance of victory.
It really didn't matter, in that the Allied Command had no idea how to achieve the incredibly difficult strategy/tactics of a major amphibious attack against an entrenched defensive force. Allied amphibious attacks had been relatively easy in North Africa, which was probably why FDR and Churchill were over-confident at Casablanca (Eisenhower was much less confident in terms of cracking Nazi defenses).
Dealing with the Germans on the Atlantic shore was a totally different proposition, as was discovered during the catastrophic Dieppe Raid in Aug 1942 (pinned in the above map) where the majority of Canadians were killed/wounded/captured. The conclusion by the Allies was that it was basically impossible to take a well-defended enemy harbor . . . the strategists started to think about a mass invasion on an open beach, which also seemed impossible. So then, how were the Allies supposed to take the war to Nazi Germany or Imperial Japan with ground troops . . . it definitely seemed like an impossibility by early-1943.
Dealing with the Germans on the Atlantic shore was a totally different proposition, as was discovered during the catastrophic Dieppe Raid in Aug 1942 (pinned in the above map) where the majority of Canadians were killed/wounded/captured. The conclusion by the Allies was that it was basically impossible to take a well-defended enemy harbor . . . the strategists started to think about a mass invasion on an open beach, which also seemed impossible. So then, how were the Allies supposed to take the war to Nazi Germany or Imperial Japan with ground troops . . . it definitely seemed like an impossibility by early-1943.
Also vexing the Allied Command was how to stop the Nazi Blitzkrieg. During 1940-1941, the British army had been tossed out of Norway, Belgium, Greece, Crete, and France very quickly and easily by the Nazis. True, there was some good news before Casablanca with El Alamein in North Africa and Stalingrad in the Eastern Front, but Nazi Germany reorganized after those two defeats, and were also able to increase their manufacturing capacity.
The German military had more-and-better aircraft, tanks, submarines, and on the Eastern Front, the Wehrmacht (the German unified military forces, but often the term refers to the German army) had stopped the Red Army's advance, and were assembling vast forces at Kursk. If Nazi Germany could keep up the momentum in the North Atlantic, blunt the effectiveness of Allied bombing in Europe, and deny the Western Allies any meaningful entry points in France, Stalin may have had no choice but to negotiate separate terms with Hitler, and for the second time in less than thirty years, Russia would have pulled out of a World War.
The German military had more-and-better aircraft, tanks, submarines, and on the Eastern Front, the Wehrmacht (the German unified military forces, but often the term refers to the German army) had stopped the Red Army's advance, and were assembling vast forces at Kursk. If Nazi Germany could keep up the momentum in the North Atlantic, blunt the effectiveness of Allied bombing in Europe, and deny the Western Allies any meaningful entry points in France, Stalin may have had no choice but to negotiate separate terms with Hitler, and for the second time in less than thirty years, Russia would have pulled out of a World War.
And then there was the War in the Pacific, which was an entirely American enterprise. The dilemma: how exactly would Marines land on a heavily defended/mined/booby-trapped coral atoll. November 1943: Imperial Japan didn't value Tarawa (pinned in the map), since they only had 3000 defenders, but the losses of Marines taking the atolls shocked the US public. The Japanese had 270,000 defending the Philippines . . . MacArthur boldly stated that "I Shall Return", but that was pure theatrics . . . the reality was that the US had no chance to force Japan off the Philippines in early-1943.
Systems networks were in play in a military sense, in that successes and failures elsewhere affected other regions/theaters, and the actions of others benefited/cursed others. For example, Stalin benefited tremendously from the Allied bombings in Germany, since Hitler needed to keep military forces in Germany instead of sending them to the Eastern Front. An advantage gained by the Allies in one theater could help campaigns elsewhere, and a serious defeat could damage chances of success in another theater(s).
Systems networks were in play in a military sense, in that successes and failures elsewhere affected other regions/theaters, and the actions of others benefited/cursed others. For example, Stalin benefited tremendously from the Allied bombings in Germany, since Hitler needed to keep military forces in Germany instead of sending them to the Eastern Front. An advantage gained by the Allies in one theater could help campaigns elsewhere, and a serious defeat could damage chances of success in another theater(s).
All five separate-though-interconnected challenges facing the Allies were overcome in about 17 months, from February 1943 to the Summer of 1944, which was roughly between Casablanca and the quadruple successes of Normandy, the Fall of Rome, the Marianas Landings, and Operation Bagration in the Eastern Front.
There was still some work to be done: "Island-Hopping" in the Pacific and continued strategic bombing in Germany, and Japan as well as the advance of the Western Allies to Berlin. True, the Axis Powers overreached in their aggression, and the US especially was able to employ unmatched resources, but HOW did the Allies recover and fight their way to victory during those pivotal 17 months in 1943-1944 . . .
There was still some work to be done: "Island-Hopping" in the Pacific and continued strategic bombing in Germany, and Japan as well as the advance of the Western Allies to Berlin. True, the Axis Powers overreached in their aggression, and the US especially was able to employ unmatched resources, but HOW did the Allies recover and fight their way to victory during those pivotal 17 months in 1943-1944 . . .
What if . . . the U-Boats had not been defeated in the Summer of 1943, or if the vaunted Luftwaffe wasn't crushed in early-1944 . . . or if the Red Army hadn't defeated the Nazi Panzers. What if . . . legendary "turn-around" weapons such as the P-51 Mustang or the B-29 Superfortress (pictured below) weren't developed . . . or if the miniaturized radar that arrived on the scene in 1943-1944 hadn't been developed in time, or at all. Maybe the Allies would have won World War II anyway, but it would have been at much greater cost in a much-longer time frame. For the United States, Great Britain, and the USSR, it would take not only their considerable resources, but also middle-level organizations to carry out the strategic goals and develop the technologies necessary to achieve total victory.