Blog Archives

President Ronald Reagan: 20 January - 30 March 1981

3/26/2016

Source: H.W. Brands. Reagan: The Life (2015)

  20 January 1981, Inauguration Day: Outgoing President Jimmy Carter considered himself far more competent than the incoming President, Ronald Reagan. Carter still resented losing to Reagan in the Election of 1980; Carter's mood didn't improve in the least since the Iranian government refused to release the 52 American hostages as long as he was in office.
   For the first time, a President was inaugurated on the West side of the Capitol Building. Only a handful of people have spoken to a larger crowd than Reagan on his first Inaugural. It was unseasonably warm and cloudy; but when Reagan reached the podium, the sun started to shine.
   Reagan and his staff decided to cut taxes and get control of federal government spending. Reagan proposed to take the U.S. across the Rubicon with tax cuts ahead of spending cuts. Cutting taxes was the easy part, so Reagan and his staff decided to get those cuts through Congress first, saving the tougher battle on reducing government spending for later. David Stockman, the head of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) suggested significant spending cuts in every Cabinet department except one . . . Defense. The Defense Department, under SecDef Caspar Weinberger, was able to get most of what it wanted due to Reagan's philosophy of building up the military in order to better deal with the USSR.

Presidents have influence on domestic affairs, but they have actual power in foreign affairs. That being said, Reagan in his first term had more influence on domestic affairs compared to most other Presidents, in that he was a believer in Theodore Roosevelt's "Bully Pulpit". Reagan believed that the "Bully Pulpit" gave him an advantage over the Legislative branch. Reagan was the most compelling and effective communicator as President since Franklin Roosevelt, and he knew it. Reagan knew how to read a room, and he was able to reach a vast audience through television. Reagan's message was always the same: smaller government and lower taxes.
On 18 February 1981, Reagan formally proposed his budget in the House of Representatives. Reagan stated that unless Congress acted now, the economy would get worse; America was experiencing double-digit unemployment and inflation at the same time ("Stagflation"). Reagan wanted a four-part plan passed by Congress. First, Reagan called for $498B in federal government spending cuts. Reagan went on to say that these were cuts in projected increases; there still would be an absolute increase of $41B in government spending. To some, it already appeared that the new President was weakening his stance on cutting federal government spending.

Reagan further weakened his stance by announcing what areas of government would be exempted from spending cuts. Social safety nets such as Social Security and Medicare would be exempted. Reagan than announced that the Defense Department (pictured: President Reagan with his SecDef, Caspar Weinberger in 1981) would see increases in their budget; the President justified this decision by saying that the U.S. faced unprecedented challenges in terms of national security.
Federal aid for education would be cut, as would federal support for the arts. Concerning education, Reagan said that less federal money was a good thing, in that the cuts would lead to greater local control. Funding for the Energy Department's synthetic fuel research would be reduced, and the Import-Export Bank would lose 1/3 of their funding. Recipients of food stamps would be vigorously scrutinized in order to eliminate freeloaders. Medicaid payments to states would be capped, and the U.S. Postal Service would receive less federal money.

Part two of Reagan's proposed budget to Congress centered on tax cuts; specifically, Reagan wanted 10% across-the-board tax cuts. Every year for the next three years, taxes would be cut for all individual income taxpayers. Reagan disagreed that these tax cuts would increase inflation; like spending, these were cuts in projected tax increases. Reagan (pictured in February 1981; Reagan and David Stockman, Director of the OMB, to the right) argued that tax cuts would reduce inflation by increasing overall output, which then would lead to greater revenue for the federal government (that was basically what President Calvin Coolidge did in his administration).
Reagan predicted that the economy would not only recover under these tax cuts, but would be rolling along and expanding by 1985. Reagan also wanted to encourage investment in business by adjusting the complex-and-outdated tax brackets. But Reagan also stated that changing the tax brackets was a strategy that could be debated and implemented later.

   Part three dealt with deregulation; Reagan believed that government regulation equaled hidden taxes. Reagan made it clear that no regulations would be removed that were essential for health and safety. But Reagan was clear that many government regulations would have to go, and there would not be any new regulations created. Reagan announced that Vice-President George Bush would lead a committee that would focus on government regulations.
   Lastly was Monetary Policy; Reagan argued that to curb inflation, the growth of the money supply (MS) must be slowed. The Federal Reserve was not in the purview of the President, but Reagan wanted to clearly communicate that he wanted/expected cooperation by the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Paul Volcker (pictured with Reagan in July 1981, just weeks after the attempted assassination on the President on 30 March 1981).
   Not since the New Deal had a President presented such a sweeping economic program to Congress. It was Reagan's plan, but it required the assent of Congress; Reagan told Congress that the federal government must get out of the way of the American people in order to restore risk-taking, investment, consumer spending, and overall confidence in the economy.

Reagan enjoyed holding news conferences and dealing with reporters, at least in early years of his Presidency. Reagan took care to learn all of the names of the reporters that were assigned the White House as their primary beat. Reagan's mastery of details was much less than Carter, but his presence as President was far greater. The first press conference was one week after the Inauguration. Helen Thomas asked Reagan if he would punish or reconcile with Iran; Reagan answered that there would be no punishment, and no reconciliation.
Sam Donaldson of ABC News (the reporter that Reagan would come to detest the most) asked about his stance with the USSR; Reagan answered that the US would take a much harder line with the Soviets compared to recent Presidents. Walter Cronkite of CBS News (pictured at Reagan's left on 3 March 1981 - Cronkite was still "The Most Trusted Man in America") was just days away from retirement, and his last hurrah was interviewing Reagan on television. Cronkite asked if bashing the USSR would be productive, and Reagan responded that Leonid Brezhnev already wanted a US/USSR summit. Reagan further commented that he was in no hurry for a US/USSR summit, in that he needed to talk with America's allies in advance. Reagan went on to say that the summit could be canceled if the USSR misbehaved.

Despite a comfortable White House routine in terms of personal and Presidential activities (Reagan LOVED creating and keeping schedules), both the President and the First Lady, Nancy, felt confined, and very often went to Camp David on weekends to be outdoors. Fridays and Saturdays were movie nights at Camp David; the favorites of the President and First Lady were the classic "oldies" from their time in Hollywood . . . they watched more modern movies with much less enthusiasm.
The Reagans returned to the White House on Sunday afternoon, and they already missed Camp David. To the Reagans, Camp David was more soothing and comforting than Rancho del Cielo, their ranch in California. That being said, every few months, Air Force One would whisk the President and First Lady to their ranch in California . . . reporters and cameras were banned. By late-March 1981, President Ronald Reagan had developed a White House routine that he loved to follow, and he was able to
re-energize at Camp David on weekends (pictured: President Reagan and Vice-President George Bush on a trail at Camp David in 1981).
On 30 March 1981, Reagan addressed the leaders of the Building and Construction Trades Department of the AFL-CIO at the Washington Hilton, just up Connecticut Avenue from the White House . . . the President had no way to know that John Hinckley, Jr. was lying in wait to assassinate Reagan in order to impress the teen-aged actress Jodie Foster . . .

0 Comments

Turning the Tide of WW II: Defeating the "Tyranny of Distance"

3/23/2016

0 Comments

Source: Paul Kennedy. Engineers of Victory: The Problem Solvers Who
Turned the Tide in the Second World War (2013)

In World War II, Japan overreached, while the US overcame the vastness of the Pacific. Japan had never before been defeated in a war, but in WW II, their vast empire was brought to an end by external means, chiefly by beyond-impressive deployment of US resources. The US was better at exploiting distance, time, and opportunity; the maritime-oriented US held the advantage over Japan's fixation on land campaigns in Asia . . . America, not Japan was able to conquer the "Tyranny of Distance" in the Pacific Ocean.
It seemed to be all wine-and-roses for Japan until July 1941, when the US, Britain, and the Dutch froze all of Japan's commercial assets, essentially cutting off Japan's imports of oil (of which Japan imported 88%). The Empire of the Sun could either buckle or strike out to gain what it needed to supply their home islands and its war machine. The leaders of Japan believed that if they gave in to the US/British/Dutch, their nation would revert back to a medieval state. That scenario was totally unacceptable to that generation of Japan's military leaders, such as Nagumo, Tojo, and Yamamoto (all three served their nation in WW I).

  To Japan's leaders, their nation could only go forward and achieve its destiny, and in the process end Western influence in the Pacific. Therefore, it made perfect sense to take, by force, the oil tin, and rubber in Samatra and Malaya, and then to strike at Hong Kong, the Philippines, Borneo, Java, and Singapore. Japan's goal was to eliminate US/British/Dutch military forces/bases, and to create a strategic "Perimeter Rim" that swept from the Aleutian Islands to the Burma-India border.
   Japan's most decisive act WAS NOT their attacks on 7-8 December 1941 on Pearl Harbor, the Philippines, and Hong Kong, but their invasion of mainland China in 1937. Everything else that followed was of operational or diplomatic consequence, including closer ties with Nazi Germany, neutrality with the USSR, moving into Southeast Asia, going for oil in the Dutch East Indies, and taking Hong Kong and Singapore. As far as the attack on Pearl Harbor, Japan wanted to prevent any US advance in the Pacific, especially south . . . the main cause of all that occurred in the Pacific before and after 7/8 December 1941 was Japan's invasion of China in 1937.
  Japan had a strong army that was oriented toward conquest on the Asian continent, as well as dealing with Russia . . . the US/British were of much less interest to the Japanese military until the economic blockades. The Japanese army was large and disciplined, and very well-trained with modern weapons, but had little interest in fast armored warfare (e.g. tanks). The Japanese army had a tremendous focus on sea-to-land warfare, crossing rivers, warfare in jungles and mountains; taking distant islands in the Pacific was not yet a priority. Japan saw no point in creating an expensive long-range strategic bombing force, since there weren't any real strategic targets to bomb in Shanghai or Vladivostok.

Japan eventually advanced in the Pacific in an "Expanding Torrent"; their arc widened as they advanced. In the Pacific (and in Russia), that meant thousands of miles compared to Western Europe . . . the further Japan spread by force in SE Asia, China, and islands in the Pacific, their troop-density decreased. It was the same dilemma that Hitler forced on the Wehrmacht in Russia, Europe, and North Africa. But even in Russia, the distances weren't as great as in the Pacific / East Asia / SE Asia, and Germany possessed far-greater military and industrial resources compared to Japan.
Therefore, by June 1942, Imperial Japan had overstretched itself in the Pacific and Asia, and had even put most of their troops in the wrong places, but didn't realize their strategic blunders. Japan had achieved great territorial gains, the nation was safe, and the booty from its conquests were pouring in to the home islands, and there were no breakthrough counter-attacks by the US/Great Britain. So, to Imperial General Headquarters, the situation in June 1942 was not disastrous, or even serious. The loss of four aircraft carriers at Midway was "regrettable", and the loss of Guadalcanal seemed too distant to matter. By the end of 1942, alarm bells were not ringing at Imperial General HQ, and by the end of 1943, they only heard the alarm bells at a distance.

It was on the Allies to alter the landscape in the Pacific, since Japan didn't need to go much further. It would fall entirely on the shoulders of the US to take the offensive and force a Japanese surrender; that officially became the strategy in the Summer of 1942. But how, where, and with what means to win the War in the Pacific; it proved to be very difficult to transform from a largely defensive strategy in the Pacific to an offensive one, especially given the vastness of the Pacific. Turning the tide of WW II in the Pacific would be very different than in Europe.
There were four alternatives that were debated at the highest levels in the US Military as to the main strategy in the Pacific. One option was to base the Allied counter-offensive on mainland China. A second option was to focus on SE Asia, and a third was to focus in the SW Pacific from Australia north to the Philippines. The last option that was debated was "Island Hopping" in the Pacific, taking key Japanese island strongholds, shrinking their defense perimeter. In the end, only one option in the Pacific would work: Admiral Nimitz's thrust of the US Navy across the Pacific ("Island Hopping") in order to take islands close enough to be able to strategically bomb Japan into surrender. The other three options were ancillary or secondary to the US Navy and the Marines, much to General Douglas MacArthur's immense irritation in the SW Pacific.
By 1942, it was obvious that only the US could end Japan's domination of the Central, West, and South Pacific. American munitions factories were mostly located on the West Coast at about the same latitude as Japan, and there was no intervening land between San Francisco and Tokyo. It made sense to advance on a line that was somewhat south of the Tropic of Cancer, from Hawaii to the Gilbert and Marshall Islands, then to the Carolines, and then the prize, the Marianas, before turning north to Japan. Hawaii gave the US control of the Central Pacific, not only as a bulwark against Japanese expansion, but also as a launching point for a massive counter-offensive.

  The United States had the tools necessary to overcome "The Tyranny of Distance"; first, the Marines had the plans ready to take key Japanese-held islands one-by-one, and had also been able to develop weapons/tactics for amphibious warfare in the Pacific. Second was the evolution of the fast carrier groups; the US Navy had dependable carriers with decent planes, which gave them a chance against Japan's superior carriers/planes at the start of the war.
   The attack on Pearl Harbor opened the US Navy's eyes (as well as the US Gov't) to the amazing destructive reach of a carrier group . . . they were determined to use that strategy against Japan. Third was the development of the B-29 Superfortress, a bomber so advanced that not only could it carry and immense bomb load thousands of miles, but it could fly at an altitude of 30,000 feet, which meant it could not be attacked by enemy fighters or ant-aircraft shells. Once the Marianas were taken and secured from Japan, B-29 airbases provided an enormous advantage to end the war sooner.


During 1943-1945, only the US could have built the B-29; Hitler called the Superfortress a "Wonder Weapon". The wiring/aluminum for a B-29 equaled that of a squad of Messerschmitts. Fourth were the Seabees, the US Navy Construction Battalions; the Seabees were the engineers that created what was needed in the face of geographic challenges. And fifth, the US Submarine Service within the Navy . . . what was needed was command and organization to bring all the elements together in order to defeat Japan.

   The two greatest contributions in gaining supremacy in the air in the vast Pacific were the Essex-class aircraft carriers and the F6F Hellcat fighters designed to be used on those carriers.
Together, they tipped the balance in the Pacific in part because they came into full service in the middle of the crucial period of mid-1943 to early-1944, just when the US counter-attack was gaining momentum. Both complemented the other, with the Hellcat being a great defender of the carriers that launched them, as well as being an absolute terror to Japanese forces.
     There were many turning points in the Pacific, such as Guadalcanal and Midway; a turning point that to this day has been under the radar occurred 30 May 1943, when the USS Essex arrived at Pearl Harbor. The Essex was the first of the brand-new, tough, powerful and sophisticated aircraft carriers that would make a huge impact in the Pacific. The new Yorktown (named in honor of the original) arrived in late-July 1943 with some of the new light carriers. The Essex-class carriers proved to be superior to Japanese carriers; the weapons system was a miracle. The new US carriers had radar-controlled gunnery and detection, armored hangars, and were capable of speeds up to 30 knots, and have 90-100 planes.
   A total of 31 Essex-class carriers were on order in 24 gigantic shipyards. The new carriers were going to Admiral Chester Nimitz in the Central Pacific, not to MacArthur in the SW Pacific, in order to increase the odds of taking key islands. An added benefit: the US Navy would have time to plan how to use the new Essex-class carriers. It was decided to cluster the carrier groups in order to make the more effective; hundreds upon hundreds of aircraft would be able to descend on Japanese carriers/ships, plus the ability to defend the carrier groups was greatly increased.

Taking the Marianas would not have meant so much if it wasn't for the B-29 Superfortress. The B-29 was created with the traditional belief that the "bomber will always get through". In the Pacific, it would be true, since the B-29 could fly higher & faster than any Japanese plane.
The B-29 weighed twice that of a B-17 Flying Fortress; its pressurized cabin meant altitudes up to 30,000 feet, and its maximum airspeed was 350 mph. The B-29's over Japan unleashed brutal, unprecedented devastation in that part of the world. The most destructive runs of the B-29's were the low-flying firebombings of Tokyo in March 1945; 130,000 Japanese were killed - the Tokyo firebombing occurred at the same time as the firebombings in Western Europe (e.g. Dresden).
The B-29 was a very complicated weapon, which featured a great number of difficult development problems. The only runways for the 141 foot wingspan and the 120,000 pound weight existed in specifically-designed runways that were only in the Pacific. At Boeing, the Design-and Development teams had their abilities and imaginations stretched to the limit. Major problems included how to pressurize different cabins but not the bomb bays; designers created a pressurized "crawl tunnel" that linked the cabins. The biggest problem was with the engines; all the early engines were inadequate and unreliable. The B-29 project was almost scrapped due to the seemingly insurmountable obstacles, but General "Hap" Arnold kept the program going.
Even when the B-29 was completed, it was the devil to get a B-29 to successfully take-off; even the Enola Gay came close to running out of runway. But once the B-29 reached its desired altitude, it was untouchable . . . the only real threats were within the B-29 itself, with its complex mechanisms that needed to work flawlessly in concert with each other.

The B-29's took off from the Marianas to devastate Tokyo in the greatest firestorm of all of WW II in the Spring of 1945. After Tokyo, cities such as Nagoya, Osaka, and Kobe suffered the same fate. USAAF General Curtis LeMay ordered B-29 strategic bombing runs that not only destroyed Japanese industry, but also 2 million buildings with 13 million homeless. While the strategic bombing was achieving desired objectives, it was taking the lives of hundreds of thousands of Japanese civilians (as were the simultaneous firebombings in Europe), mainly women, children and seniors.
The US surge in the Pacific occurred later than that of the Allies in Western Europe, since the "tools of war" took longer to develop and produce in large numbers. But once assembled, the US counter-attack in the Pacific went remarkably fast. Even in the extreme early stages of the US counter-attack, in one day at Guadalcanal, 11,000 of 19,000 Marines landed without immediate opposition, quickly gaining the upper-hand.
The US Navy and Marines learned much in the months after the disastrous victory at Tarawa. The Marines had figured out their amphibious-warfare techniques, the Essex-class carriers and groups were in place, the F6F Hellcats were aloft, the Seabees were building, and the B-29's were bombing Japan. The single-most important amphibious operation in the Pacific occurred on 15 June 1944, when 127,000 US troops, mostly Marines, began to land on the Mariana Islands; it was far-more threatening to Japan than anything MacArthur's forces were accomplishing in the SW Pacific. The US had acquired the islands that were close enough in order to bomb Japan into submission and surrender.

0 Comments

Turning the Tide of WW II: Seizing an Enemy-Held Shore

3/23/2016

0 Comments

Source: Paul Kennedy. Engineers of Victory: The Problem Solvers Who
Turned the Tide in the Second World War (2013)

November 1942: Operation Torch was the largest Allied amphibious invasion of WW II to that point, much larger in scope than the Dieppe Raid. 75,000 Allied troops in the first stage, with many more to come; Torch was a joint Allied operation (US & Britain) featuring three armed services (land, sea, air).
British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President Franklin Roosevelt had been trying to bring about "jointness" since the Atlantic Charter. Overall command of Torch went to the American General Dwight Eisenhower, who was headquartered at Gibraltar. Also different from Dieppe was the distance and scope of Torch; so many different ships had to be in place at the right time, including landing craft for the soldiers to reach the beaches.

The Allies took naval bombardment and control of the air very seriously with Torch; four fleet carriers and five smaller carriers were deployed, which meant the Allies had control of the skies until the enemy airfields were taken. After the air bases were taken, then British Hurricane and Spitfire squadrons had an operational platform.
By 12 November 1942, the approaches to Casablanca in Morocco were secured, but the landings in Algiers and Oran were much more difficult due to increased enemy resistance. However, in three days, all three target areas in North Africa were secured, and the Allied ground forces started moving inland.
The Allies learned quite a few important lessons in terms of amphibious campaigns in North Africa: first, be sure to have control of the air, and if there were enemy air bases, take them. Second, be sure to have a command ship (a "Floating Headquarters"; the US didn't have a command ship during Torch). Third, it was sheer folly to attack an enemy in a fortified harbor, even if taking enemy-held beaches was very difficult. Complicating matters was that weather and geography was a potential additional enemy for the Allies when moving on an enemy shore. Lastly, the Allies didn't yet know how their strategies/tactics would work against entrenched German troops on a beach . . . Torch, despite the casualties, and been a relatively easy campaign for the Allies.

The deadly rehearsals in the Mediterranean were absolutely key for the planned Operation Overlord; also, there was a rushed timetable, in that even a somewhat-reluctant Churchill knew that Overlord had to occur at the latest in early-1944. However, the Allied amphibious campaigns logically went from North Africa to Sicily; the takeover of Sicily was a major blow to the Axis, in that it led to the overthrow of Mussolini and the eventual surrender of Italy. Another positive by-product of Sicily was that US forces gained valuable experience taking entrenched beaches.
However, Operation Overlord looked beyond-foreboding, in that the Allies experienced extreme resistance in Italy from German troops . . . the assumption was that German resistance would be far-greater in France. The Western Allies had no way of knowing that they would be able to take five separate beach-landings from the Germans, and start to pour inland like a breached dam, meeting resistance and swirling past obstacles. The ground forces would surge through gaps and places of least resistance, covered by air power, tanks (for the British), and mobile artillery. By the end of June 1944, Allied forces were twenty miles inland . . . by 25 August 1944 US and Free French troops were in Paris. So, why was Operation Overlord successful in the face of the feared German resistance . . . it started with Command-and-Control . . . without it, Operation Overlord would fail.

The "Mediterranean Gang" was brought to London to run the show for Operation Overlord, including General Eisenhower, and field commanders such as Bernard Montgomery (pictured with Eisenhower), Omar Bradley, and George Patton. Eisenhower decided to land on five beaches, not the original three; nothing was left out in terms of planning and details. The overall mastermind of Overlord was a modest British naval officer, Bertram Ramsay, who orchestrated the British withdrawal from Dunkirk in 1940. The strategic planners of Overlord (Ramsay, Eisenhower, et al) knew that certain things were required: command of the air and sea, as well as excellent deception and intelligence. To Ramsay and Eisenhower, take one of the three away, and Overlord's chances of success drastically diminished.
Air, sea, and deception/intelligence were factors that they could at least largely control; out of their control was the weather and the nature of German positioning and their response to the landings . . . the capacity of the Wehrmacht to strike fast (like at Anzio) had to be blunted. Also, German communications had to be crippled to-and-from the Atlantic / English Channel shores. Therefore, Eisenhower ordered the US Army Air Force (USAAF) and Ramsay the Royal Air Force (RAF) to strategically bomb bridges, roads, railroads, and known key communication centers in order to paralyze military transportation/communication networks for the Wehrmacht.

General Erwin Rommel had placed much in defense at Normandy, but the Germans didn't know where or when the Allied offensive would occur; Pas-de-Calais or Normandy? The Allied deceptions were very effective in clouding the picture for Rommel, and the weather was bad enough that Rommel actually went back home for his wife's birthday. The fickle weather gave the Allied forces a crucial window of opportunity, and a huge stroke of luck. On D-Day +10, one of the worst storms of the 20th Century hit Normandy, setting back the Allied timetable to Berlin. Had the monstrous storm occurred on D-Day +4 (10 June), the Allies would have been beached crabs, and open for counter-attack by German forces.
In the end, Hitler had made a series of decisions that benefited the Allies, in that he created a strategic situation that Germany would be weak everywhere, and strong nowhere, which was the exact opposite of Frederick the Great's military philosophy. Therefore, German defenses at Normandy were not strong enough on the shores, and not strong or mobile enough inland. So while the Allied invaders were very smart, well-orchestrated, and in command of the air and sea, they were also very, very lucky.

The only aspect left that wasn't guaranteed was what would happen on the beaches; and if the beaches were taken, then what would happen on the advance inland in France. Eisenhower worried about the beaches the most, and the Germans pinned all their hopes on the same. During the first three days of Operation Overlord, both sides were proven right, and Rommel was proven correct in that the first three days after the beach-landings would be the most decisive.
There were three amphibious landing forces in five beaches for D-Day, 6 June 1944. The westernmost of the beaches was Utah Beach; at the end of the day, US forces had moved five miles inland. Having reached that point, the US troops at Utah would not be easily dislodged; Utah was by far the smoothest amphibious attack in all of WW II - the 8th and 27th Infantry regiments lost a total of 12 men (pictured: General Patton in 1943 - to the right was General Theodore Roosevelt Jr., who would be the first high-ranking officer to set foot on Utah Beach).

The biggest part of Overlord were the British and Canadian beaches code-named Gold, Juno, and Sword. The British and Canadians were thorough, careful, fastidious, well-orchestrated, and not very bold. The British had deep respect for their old foe Germany, and the British could not afford another Dunkirk, Crete, Dakar, or Dieppe. In comparison to the US, British resources/manpower were overstretched; Overlord, no matter what, would be Britain's last great offensive of WW II.
Therefore, Britain was massively invested in deception, intelligence, Command-and-Control, signals, beachmasters (the US had none), mine clearance, as well as specially-designed tanks. Nicknamed "Hobart's Funnies", the British had a tank for almost any purpose, such as flail tanks, flamethrower tanks, and tanks that laid a layer of "carpet" so vehicles could get off the beach (pictured). With these specially-designed tanks on the beach, Germans fighting from concrete bunkers were not safe . . . at Gold, Juno, and Sword beaches, Rommel's "Outer Crust" strategy (keep the Allies on the beaches) quickly failed.

The third part of D-Day was Omaha Beach, which was an entirely different story than the other four beaches. The casualty numbers in comparison were dismal; most American soldiers came came ashore with only the weapons they carried, and had no choice but to move inland facing far-too-many deadly beach obstacles in the face of deadly crossfire from the Germans.
Only 5 of 32 tanks made it to the beach, and over 60% of the howitzers sunk.
American destroyers came within 1000 yards offshore to fire on the German bunkers, endangering the ships to minefields in the water near the shore. The initial landing at Omaha featured 34,000 men and 3300 vehicles with a similar number in reserve. Desperate shelling by the destroyers plus USAAF tactical bombing plus re-establishing order on the beaches finally cracked the German coastal defenses at Omaha. US troops got off the beaches, up the bluffs, and held a position only a mile inland. The German panzers could have easily pushed the Americans back to the beach, but Hitler refused to authorize any movement.
The 1st and 29th Infantry Divisions had taken Omaha Beach at bitter cost, and it was a close-call; Eisenhower was clearly disturbed the next day when he personally surveyed the situation. The 1st & 29th had 2400 killed, wounded, or captured; compared to large Civil War battles, or to such World War I disasters as the first day of the Somme, or Operation Bagration in the Eastern Front, those casualties pale in contrast . . . but Omaha Beach was by far the most deadly of the five beach landings on D-Day.

Omaha Beach had to be taken, otherwise a gap would have existed for the Germans to exploit, which would have made taking Cherbourg, a major port, very difficult if not impossible.
There was poor battlefield management at Omaha Beach, with too much self-confidence in play, which was never wise against the Wehrmacht. The naval bombardment beforehand was light, and cloud cover doomed the USAAF/RAF bombing runs. With the high waves/tides, it was sheer folly to order the tanks and howitzer craft in the sea 5000 yards away. The US had no flail or wire-cutting tanks, and General Bradley and his staff was unaware that the German 352nd had just moved behind Omaha beach in support.
The US troops at Omaha Beach achieved their objective without the luck, support, planning, and weapons that were present at the other four beaches. Depending on sources, between 132,000 and 175,000 Allies swarmed ashore at Normandy on 6 June 1944, taking approximately 5000 casualties, which was far-less than planning estimates. On 27 August 1944, Eisenhower was in Paris (which had been liberated two days prior); the Wehrmacht fought ferociously in defense with remarkable tactical efficiency, most notably in the Battle of the Bulge. For the rest of WW II in Europe, amphibious attacks were no longer needed; much of what was used at D-Day was sent to the Pacific.

0 Comments

Turning the Tide in WW II: Stopping the Nazi Blitzkrieg

3/23/2016

0 Comments

Source: Paul Kennedy. Engineers of Victory: The Problem Solvers Who
Turned the Tide in the Second World War (2013)

  1 September 1939: the Nazi Blitzkrieg of Poland. The formula: the Luftwaffe took control of the air, and destroyed Polish air bases, scattered Polish army columns, and then devastated Warsaw. At the same time, 14 mechanized divisions of the Wehrmacht swept past Polish army and cavalry, and raced to the important targets of Lodz, Krakow, and Lvov.
   During the Spring of 1940, the Nazis used the "Phony War" to improve their strategy and tactics. In early-1940, the Nazi Blitzkrieg was too much for Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway . . . and the Fall of France shocked the entire world. By June 1940, Great Britain stood alone against Nazi Germany.

  The geopolitical and military shape of WW II was transformed. Stalin was beyond-anxious, in that he knew the USSR was nowhere-near-ready for a major Nazi offensive. The U.S. was engaged in an incredibly divisive national debate in terms of Isolationism or Intervention, which paralyzed any meaningful assistance to Britain. Mussolini joined Hitler, and Japan recalculated their options in Asia and the Pacific. In just the first ten months of WW II, the world was turned upside-down by the Nazi Blitzkriegs.

It seemed that nothing could stop the Nazi Blitzkrieg, but that would change between
late-1941 and the Summer 1944. One reason was geography: for example, a decisive victory with a Blitzkrieg was unlikely in mountain ranges, as the Wehrmacht found out in Yugoslavia and Greece in 1941 . . . difficult geographical & physical circumstances favor the underdog.
Wide deserts with hundreds of miles of shifting sands restrict aggressive generals like Rommel in history, and give advantage to more conservative generals such as Montgomery. Also, great rivers slow down Blitzkriegs, and swift-and-decisive victories won't happen if the defensive forces are stronger, too entrenched and too numerous, regardless of the geography. And, the Blitzkrieg will falter if the attackers get too spread-out horizontally or vertically.
But the Nazis had a lot of the newest military weapons and technology, which made their Blitzkrieg seem revolutionary. The internal combustion engine and armored vehicles with railroads and aircraft were joined together to do something that seemed brand new . . . by the end of 1941, it did seem that the Nazi Blitzkrieg was invulnerable.

In order to defeat the Blitzkrieg, an opponent would need to deploy stronger, tougher, better-equipped forces to match, halt, and then counter-attack German forces. However, this could only be done by large and powerful nations, which during WW II meant Great Britain, the USSR, and the US . . . but none of those nations were ready for large-scale modern combat during the first-half of WW II.
All three nations, however, possessed the inherent resources of strength, technology, and innovation. All three nations enjoyed a decent geographic distance from Germany (for Britain, it was the English Channel), which allowed the three Allies to develop their capabilities and allow engineers, inventors, and manufacturing to reach capacity. Only superior numbers of "everything" could beat the Blitzkrieg; the tenacity and operational effectiveness of a seasoned Germany army division was hard to equal in WW II.
But superior numbers were not the entire picture; by late-1943 in North Africa, Britain introduced superior radar, decryption, and orchestration of tactical air power with ground forces. Also, Great Britain had Special Forces, while the Germans and Italians had ZERO. Also, the Allies would soon have more powerful and adaptable aircraft (e.g. the P-51 Mustang). Flail tanks (pictured above) and acoustic mine detectors arrived on the scene, as well as a better-integrated command-and-control system. By late-1943/early-1944, the Allies had figured out how to defeat the Nazi Blitzkrieg . . . superior numbers of troops in advantageous strategic locations with more advanced weapons and technology combined with great organization.

The Eastern Front was the worst of WW II; unprecedented ferocity, wholesale destruction, mass deportations, immense loss of life due to combat, starvation, exposure, disease, massacres . . . the Eastern Front was "Holocaust Central", in that nearly all Nazi concentration and extermination camps, death marches, ghettos, and most of the pogroms occurred in that theater of WW II. Of the 70+ million deaths from WW II, 30+ million died on the Eastern Front, including far-too many civilians (pictured below: Nazi concentration camps in Europe).
The Eastern Front was decisive in determining the outcome of WW II, serving as the main reason for not only the defeat of the Blitzkrieg, but of Nazi Germany as well . . . so how did the USSR defeat the all-powerful Nazi War Machine? The Eastern Front was unique in that mechanization was combined with Asiatic-horde-like warfare; the clash between Teutons and Slavs was now entwined with technological competition. Both Germany and the USSR reached deep into their own very advanced technological/productive resources to bring forth newer and more destructive weapons. Those new/improved weapons, combined with millions of troops, and the strategies/tactics in the vastness of Russia, led to the extended nightmare of the Eastern Front.

The first thing that slowed down the Blitzkrieg in Russia was the weather. During the first months of Operation Barbarossa, the weather was perfect for the Blitzkrieg, but by October and November 1941, it slowed down . . . there was nothing the Germans could do about Russian mud in the early-winter of 1941, which ironically was also the coldest since Napoleon's invasion of Russia.
By 1 November 1941, one major German army was out of fuel, artillery was frozen, and soldiers were crippled by frostbite. By the Spring of 1942, the ground conditions were even worse, due to Rasputitsa - "Quagmire Season". Surface snow had melted, but couldn't drain in that the soil was still frozen below; two feet of unfrozen soil turned into a muddy nightmare, and the Wehrmacht was literally stuck in the mud (pictured above). As the Germans discovered, Rasputitsas occurred in the Fall and Spring, but the mud was much, much worse during Spring.

It wasn't just the weather that slowed down the Blitzkrieg; the Red Army fought back enough to slow their advance, in part due to "Scorched Earth" tactics. For a German soldier, there was nothing scarier than to be lying, frozen & exhausted, in a defensive position only to see regiments of battle-hardened white-clad ghosts from the Red Army approach.
The Wehrmacht made immense gains (625 miles by December 1941), but were unable to break through to Moscow. German political and military leaders grossly underestimated the ability of the USSR to oppose the Blitzkrieg, and there was no consideration at all for the geography/climate. The Germans had no real useful intelligence of their opponent, in part because the Nazis believed that the USSR was relatively primitive across-the-board. This time for the Blitzkrieg, there would not be an equivalent of the Fall of France in Russia.
The numbers of Russian troops in opposition to the Blitzkrieg was breathtaking, and the story stayed the same through 1942 and 1943. The Wehrmacht constantly tried to encircle and destroy the growing USSR forces, but with no success. The Wehrmacht believed that the lines of the Red Army were thinly held and could be outflanked, but the reality was that defensive positions reached 1000+ miles across and 200+ miles deep. Also, the battlefront was littered with broken bridges, poisoned wells, booby traps, ruined crops, PLUS the climate of summer heat, autumn mud, hellish winters, and even worse mud in the spring, as well as the incredible endurance of the USSR. By early-1943, the Nazis were guilty of overreach: there was no way to provide what was necessary for German troops in far-away locations in the Eastern Front.

On 5 July 1943, the German Blitzkrieg struck Kursk, and immediately faced enormous strength-in-depth defenses . . . Stalin knew the Germans were coming. 12 July 1943 featured the greatest tank battle in world history; USSR losses were much greater, but the Wehrmacht had to abandon the field because the were unable to break through enemy lines. The Kursk campaign cost Germany 1600+ tanks; dozens of divisions were destroyed or rendered useless.
Two days before the climactic tank battle, the Allies landed in Sicily, and Hitler re-tasked some forces from the Eastern Front. Also on 12 July 1943, the Red Army attacked the Wehrmacht with Operation Kutozov . . . by the Summer of 1943, fatigue finally set in on the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front. The Red Army started to advance against the Wehrmacht from the North, Central, and South; the pattern was that the USSR attacked, the Wehrmacht resisted and pulled back, and the Red Army advanced. Most WW II historians regard Stalingrad as the turning point in the Eastern Front, but that isn't entirely accurate, in that it took more than Stalingrad to defeat the Wehrmacht.

In the Summer of 1943, the USSR defeated the Wehrmacht at Kursk; the USSR had the advantage of only fight on one (massive) front, while Germany was fully engaged on three fronts . . . Germany couldn't be strong everywhere.
The Nazi Blitzkrieg was stopped at Kursk not only by the greatest tank battle in history, but also with the greatest minefield (pictured: Red Army soldiers removing mines after Kursk). Nothing frustrated swift panzer attacks more than deeply sown minefields. The Red Army laid tens of thousands of mines across the entire Kursk Salient (the line of battle that projects closest to the enemy), and soon those mines were more-than-hidden by summer wheat. Anti-tank mines averaged 2400 per mile, and anti-personnel mines averaged 2700 per mile, and the minefields were 16 to 25 miles deep . . . there was no chance for a Panzer Blitzkrieg at Kursk.

The practical problems facing Germany in the Eastern Front included running out of ammunition/fuel, dealing with minefields, and Red Army anti-tank platoons. There were no longer any weak places that would allow a Blitzkrieg strike; panzer divisions kept trying to find weak spots in order to flank the Red Army, but they simply didn't exist. And there was also the positive impact of the Lend-Lease Act, especially with trucks and jeeps; American vehicles were brought over by the Royal Navy and drastically increased the mobility of the Red Army. The USSR was the only nation that had both tank and anti-tank forces that moved quickly.
Operation Bagration was launched on 22 June 1944 (3 years to the day after Operation Barbarossa), which was a massive assault on the German central line in the Eastern Front. The ground-based forces used by the Red Army in Operation Bagration were several-times larger than the combined totals of all forces involved in the Marianas and D-Day attacks . . . nothing was small-scale on the Eastern Front. The size of the USSR forces exceeded anything from before . . . Operation Bagration finally broke the back of the Wehrmacht.

The Red Army during Operation Bagration numbered 1.7 million combat/support troops, 24k artillery, 4000 tanks/assault guns, and 6334 aircraft. German strength was 800k troops, 95k artillery, 553 tanks/assault guns, and 839 aircraft (for comparison, General Rommel at El Alamein had 27k troops) . . . By the Summer of 1944, the USSR had finally reached its full military potential.
By now, the Soviet T-34 tank was virtually unstoppable, and it wasn't uncommon for the Red Army to outnumber soldiers in the Wehrmacht by a ratio of 10:1. Also, Stalin by 1944 had relinquished much of his inflexible command style to his major generals, while Hitler refused to do the same. German losses during Operation Bagration were astounding: 670k killed, wounded, or captured; although the USSR losses were greater, Russia had millions of men from which to draw for the singular purpose of defeating Nazi Germany in "The Great Patriotic War"
When Operation Bagration began, the Red Army was 750 miles from Berlin; at the same time, General Patton was 650 miles from Berlin . . . June 1944 represented the end for the Third Reich. By August 1944, the end of Operation Bagration was in sight, and Berlin became the focus for the Red Army. Somebody needed to march into Berlin and end the war, and the Red Army was the one to do so. Therefore, 85% of all Wehrmacht losses during WW II were against the USSR. By mid-to-late 1943, German U-Boats could not win the Battle of the Atlantic, nor could German Panzers win in Russia . . . Germany would fight on, ferociously, but moving forward with a Blitzkrieg was over.

0 Comments

Turning the Tide of WW II: Gaining Command of the Air

3/23/2016

0 Comments

Source: Paul Kennedy. Engineers of Victory: The Problem Solvers Who
Turned the Tide in the Second World War (2013)

By the Fall of 1943, the Luftwaffe was clearly winning the battle in the skies over Europe. On 30 March 1944, ten weeks before D-Day and fourteen months after Casablanca, 795 Royal Air Force (RAF) bombers were sent to attack Nuremberg in Germany: 95 bombers failed to return, a dozen were scrapped on their return, and 59 were very badly damaged. But those losses paled in comparison to the losses of trained crews . . . by early-1944, things were going backwards for the Allies in terms of strategic bombing in Nazi Germany.
It was amazing that the Allies didn't learn much from the Battle for Britain (overall plane/crew #'s pictured). The Germans "royally" failed in that not nearly enough bombers were sent to "get through" British defenses, the bombers didn't fly high enough, didn't have enough bombs, and had poor discipline in formation. The Allies felt when it was their turn to strategically bomb Germany, they would be much smarter with larger numbers of bombers flying at greater speeds and altitudes. Among other bombers, the Allies would fly B-24 Liberators and
B-17 Flying Fortresses at 24,000 feet (opposed to the Luftwaffe's 12,000 feet), which would minimize the loss of bombers. The Allies also assumed that the German people wouldn't be as tough as the British, which was the same conclusion reached by Hitler/Goering towards the enemy before the Battle for Britain. From late-1942 to early-1944, strategic bombing in Europe reached a level of stalemate much like trench warfare in World War I . . . no real attention was paid to the really important aspects of strategic bombing, such as distance, targeting, and detection.

Spring 1942: British and Nazi stupidity. The RAF inexplicably bombed Lubeck, Germany, an ancient wooden-framed city. Hitler became so enraged that he ordered bombing raids on British cathedral and university cities such as York, Norwich, and Exeter. Bombs and crews were wasted, and hatreds become more inflamed; the Luftwaffe didn't touch the Rolls Royce engine factories or the Spitfire and Lancaster assembly lines.
Hitler's "Retribution Bombing" served no strategic purpose for the Nazis, and it also took the focus off what should have been targeted in Britain. Hitler's "Retribution Bombing" desensitized Britain to the coming indiscriminate aerial bombings in Germany. A desire to payback German civilians for what the Luftwaffe did rose incredibly in Great Britain in 1942.

By the time the United States Army Air Force (USAAF) started bombing German targets, it was natural that their first raids would be tentative and would stick close to their bases. From August through September 1942, the USAAF was having a "dream season"; everything seemed to go right. But on 9 October 1942, 108 USAAF bombers raided the heavy industries at/near Lille in France (pinned in the map), Luftwaffe fighters rushed past 156 Allied fighter escorts, and focused their attack on the B-17s and B-24s. The Luftwaffe fighters shot down 4 bombers, seriously damaged 4 more, and damaged 42 other bombers . . . the bloodletting had begun.
More significant was that the Luftwaffe fighters caused a drastic drop-off in accuracy; only 9 of 588 high-explosive bombs fell within 1500 feet of any target. Many USAAF bombers aborted their runs entirely, and B-17 and B-24 gunners wildly inflated the number of Luftwaffe fighters they downed. These new crews were green-and-nervous, and after-action analysis was sub-standard. Of the 70+ claimed kills from the gunners on 9 October 1943, only ONE Luftwaffe fighter plane was actually shot down.

The raid on the Schweinfurt's 3 ball bearing factories occurred on 14 October 1943. 60 bombers were lost, and 138 damaged; that meant that only 14% of the 229 USAAF aircraft that actually attacked the targets returned unscathed. The Luftwaffe defenses had been greatly improved; the first wave of defense were single-engine fighters, followed by a second wave of two-engine fighters, all firing rockets and large-caliber machine guns. The single-engine and two-engine fighters refueled and re-engaged from all directions, and the fighters concentrated on one USAAF formation at a time (here the Luftwaffe targeted, which they didn't do in Britain).
Rocket attacks were used against the formation, while machine guns were used against the crippled aircraft. At Schweinfurt (pinned in the map), an entire combat wing of the 1st Bombardment Division was almost completely wiped out. While some targets on the ground were hit, the bomber attrition rate was unsustainable; Schweinfurt was the highest bomber attrition rate to that point of WW II. The USAAF strategic bombing offensive had to be shut down - only short range targets were approved.
The upcoming winter allowed USAAF to take inventory, reassess strategy, and to rebuild morale . . . the USAAF was forced to admit that they had lost air superiority over Germany. Long-range fighter escorts now became absolutely necessary, but their current range wasn't close to what was needed. Fortunately for the battered USAAF bomber crews, solutions were just around the corner.

In late-April 1942, Ronnie Harker, a RAF liaison test pilot for Rolls Royce engines was asked to test a problematic USAAF plane, Pursuit-Fighter 51 (P-51). The P-51 was a poor performing plane compared to the P-38 Lightning and the P-47 Thunderbolt . . . the P-51 seemed to be a round peg in a square hole. Harker first flew a P-51 on 30 April 1952; he was puzzled, in that it the plane turned easily and didn't stall, and functioned well in low-to-medium altitudes, and was aerodynamically superb (which meant low drag, less resistance in flight).
Harker wrote that if the P-51 had a Rolls Royce Merlin 61 engine, it would be 35 mph faster than a British Spitfire, and have the same power. As it turned out, the Merlin 61 engine was a perfect fit for the P-51; a Polish mathematician calculated that a P-51 with a Merlin 61 engine would outperform the Spitfire, reaching speeds of 432 mph and altitudes of 40,000 feet.
(pictured above: the P-51 Mustang and the British Spitfire)

Those calculations would prove to be correct. In the RAF, Wilfrid Freeman (Churchill's favorite in the RAF, pictured) was in charge of the types of planes to be used, and he immediately saw the potential of the P-51 and ordered Merlin 61 engines to be installed on 5 P-51's despite Bomber Command wanting more Merlin engines. Soon thereafter, Freeman ordered 500 P-51's with the Merlin 61 engine . . . by now, the fighter plane was named the P-51 Mustang. Freeman pressured Churchill to pressure FDR to have the P-51 Mustang mass-produced in the U.S.
At that point, good old U.S. government bureaucratic bungling and military competition for resources interfered. Devotees of other planes just didn't believe the P-51 Mustang was as good as advertised. The USAAF, therefore, kept making inferior aircraft that was doomed to fail against German and Japanese fighters. The powerful political backers for each inferior plane were formidable, and FDR was unwilling to stand up to them, at least at that point.

Eventually, the P-51 Mustang appeared in Europe in ever-increasing numbers, and became the most effective protectors of the USAAF daytime bombers. For unfathomable reasons, the P-51 Mustang was more efficient and more powerful than the Spitfire despite being heavier, which included the astounding fuel capacity of the aerodynamically-awesome plane. With maximum fuel tanks, the P-51 Mustang had a combat radius of 750 miles, twice that of a Spitfire.
Also developed were "drop tanks" (pictured: a P-51 Mustang with drop tanks) which contained extra fuel. The purpose of the drop tanks was to burn the extra fuel BEFORE entering combat. They were used for every fighter, whether RAF or USAAF; the demand for aluminum drop tanks was such that the RAF developed a stiffened paper drop tank (108 gallons), which worked wonderfully, and also denied the enemy of any aluminum tanks on the ground. With these drop tanks, ALL Allied fighters could provide 100% protection for the bombers.

All these developments led to the true breakthrough for the Allies in order to gain control of the skies in Europe: the destruction of the Luftwaffe fighter squadrons. The USAAF stuck to specific targets, such as oil refineries, which meant that, since there was less oil, the Luftwaffe fighters were unable to wait until USAAF escort fighters abandoned their bombers. Also, with so many P-51's in the USAAF, the order was given for many of the Mustangs to head-hunt Luftwaffe fighters while others protected the bombers.
In the early months of 1944, RAF & USAAF losses were still severe, but reinforcing squadrons kept on the pressure, and the Luftwaffe was unable to replace/reinforce what it lost. Hitler and Goering re-tasked planes from the Eastern Front, which gave the Red Army more advantage. P-51 Mustangs were flying in broad daylight over Berlin (pinned in the map) by mid-1944; Goering stated "We have lost the war". P-51 Mustangs were destroying three-to-five times more fighters than the P-47 Thunderbolts, and the P-47's were putting up devastating totals of their own. By the Spring of 1944, P-51 Mustangs with drop tanks could escort B-17's all the way to Western Russia, over 1000 miles from their base.
The Luftwaffe cracked in the Spring of 1944; there simply weren't enough planes, pilots, production, or communications. The Luftwaffe was hurt far more by aerial battles than the bombing of German factories. Then, in the late-Spring of 1944, Allied Supreme Commander General Dwight D. Eisenhower ordered the strategic bombing of key German railroad, road, and communications centers . . . it was time for Operation Overlord.

Eisenhower's strategy of bombing key transportation/communication targets drastically limited Germany's ability to respond in force during D-Day, and beyond. The issue now was not how to get control of the skies, but WHAT to attack by air to end the war as soon as possible. On 6 June 1944, the whole thing, sea, land, and air came together for the Western Allies; 11,590 Allied planes were in the air during D-Day . . . amazingly, the Allies had gained control of the skies only 90-or-so days before Operation Overlord. (Below: an overview of Operation Overlord, showing the Allied mastery of the skies)

0 Comments

Turning the Tide in WW II: The Battle of the Atlantic

3/23/2016

1 Comment

Source: Paul Kennedy. Engineers of Victory: The Problem Solvers Who
Turned the Tide in the Second World War (2013)

Winston Churchill stated in his memoirs that the Battle of the Atlantic was what he worried about most; if it was lost, Britain would have run out of everything, including fuel . . . and the will to fight. At the end of 1942, Admiral Karl Doenitz had 212 operational U-Boats; by the time Churchill met President Franklin Roosevelt at Casablanca (pictured), the Nazis were by far sinking more Allied ships than the Allied ships were sinking U-Boats.
In early-1943, Churchill's nightmare appeared to be coming true: 108 Allied ships were lost in March, with 2/3's of the total sunk in convoy on the single-most important route in the Atlantic. The Nazis came the closest to turning the tide in the Battle of the Atlantic in the first twenty days of March 1943 . . . the Allied strategy of using convoys was in doubt.

March 1943 started off badly for the Allies since Doenitz had four large wolf packs in the Atlantic; two of them in the Central Atlantic, with one each on the Northern and Southern flanks. Doenitz also held a significant advantage with intelligence and decryption; Germany even knew where Allied ships were going and when they were leaving their harbor. Bletchley Park was unable to do the same in assisting the convoy escorts in terms of locating German U-Boats . . . the wolves were preying on the shepherds.
On 5 March 1943, Convoy SC (Slow Convoy) 121 from New York City was slaughtered by U-Boats. 59 slow merchant ships were escorted by 5 ships without air cover facing 26 U-Boats. From 7 - 10 March, 13 ships were sunk without a single U-Boat being hit . . . it was the most one-sided encounter of the war, which explained Hitler's high-level of satisfaction after reading Doenitz's report. On 16-20 March 1943, Convoys HX (Fast Convoy) 229 and SC 122 went through the gauntlet of U-Boat wolf packs with a motley assembly of slow/ancient ships carrying crucial cargoes toward Britain. The convoys had become larger, with many more ships on the sea-lanes . . . while it was true that convoys with 60-90 ships had a greater chance of getting more cargo to Britain than 30 ships, the number of escort ships remained the same.

   Why did the Battle of the Atlantic go so poorly for the Allies in early-1943?
     First, there were just too few escort ships protecting the convoys, and far-too-few aircraft providing protection. Also, the Nazis held an advantage with intelligence with their code-breaking/communications network, B-Dienst. Doenitz (pictured) was able to direct four major U-Boat orchestras thousands of miles apart, especially since Allied intelligence was slow and late.
   The lack of air cover in the "Air Gap" was beyond-significant; U-Boats were able to operate virtually unopposed . . . Allied planes just didn't have the capacity to fly far enough from their bases to provide air cover in that stretch of North Atlantic. By April 1943, Doenitz had 240 operational U-Boats with 185 more being retro-fitted or in the process of training crews. Doenitz was capable of sending 40 U-Boats against any single convoy . . . finally, on the Allied side, reality set in. Allied strategists/planners figured out that the convoys would need to fight their way across the Atlantic rather than evade the enemy . . . that crucial decision gave the Allies a much more clearer focus on how to deal with the wolf packs lying in wait.

   What caused the change of fortunes in the North Atlantic?
  The greatest factor was aircraft; World War II was the war in which sea power was affected by air power. Doenitz lamented after WW II that Germany waged war without an "Air Arm" to complement and protect his U-Boats. Increased Allied air power took two forms: VLR (Very Long Range) shore-based aircraft, especially the B-24 Liberator, as well as B-17 Flying Fortresses and the PBY Catalina.
Secondly were escort carriers (pictured), which were modest in speed and striking power compared to the US full-sized fleet carriers in the Pacific, but were perfect for the North Atlantic. Aircraft from the escort carriers could patrol for miles around, and they had similar weapons systems as the VLR's to destroy U-Boats. These planes rearmed and refueled overnight on the escort carriers and were able to repeatedly engage U-Boats.
     Doenitz never could cope with the increased Allied aircraft, which not only held an obvious speed advantage, but also had more accurate-and-lethal weapons necessary to destroy U-Boats. By mid-1943, a VLR B-24 Liberator could assist a convoy 1200 miles from it s base; Doenitz realized as early as 1941 that without air power, control of the seas was basically impossible, even for his vaunted U-Boats.

For a nation dependent on long-range oceanic commerce, it was somewhat surprising that an "Air Gap" existed in the first place. But once diagnosed, closing the "Air Gap" didn't occur because some "great person" decreed so. For example, a team of mostly Canadian air engineers in early-1943 pulled one bomb bay from a Liberator and replaced it with extra fuel tanks, at last creating an aircraft that could reach the "Air Gap". There were scientists that developed more effective fuses for more predictable depth charges, as well as scientists and armaments experts that created the air-launched acoustic homing torpedo, nicknamed "Fido", which was specifically engineered to search-and-destroy submerged U-Boats.
There were improvements to radar, escort carriers, and training schools that cranked out air crews. During 1943 in all theaters of WW II, 199 U-Boats were sunk, 140 of them by Allied aircraft; that trend would continue for the rest of WW II. The key task for convoy escorts, whether surface or aerial, was to prevent U-Boats from launching their deadly torpedoes at Allied merchant ships.

The main Allied counter-weapon, the MK6 Depth Charge, wasn't very reliable in early-WW II. The theory was that the large explosion, magnified under water, would rip apart the U-Boat's joints, since it wasn't a contact explosive. A depth charge was an attractive weapon in that it could be mounted on even the rear decks of a corvette, and used by anti-sub air patrols.
However, the MK6 had significant disadvantages. A ship had to steam over where a U-Boat was detected, which would give the U-Boat time to dive deeper; the British Admiralty and the US Navy were slow to realize how quickly U-Boats were able to dive. Proximity fuses needed to be set at the last moment at the estimated depth of the U-Boat . . . on average hundreds of MK6 Depth Charges over days were needed to destroy a single U-Boat.

On the other hand, there was the Hedgehog (after the grenades were launched, what was left looked like the spine of a hedgehog), which was so simple one wonders why it wasn't created during WW I. A Hedgehog was a multi-headed grenade launcher that fired forward of the warship; usually, the four-inch gun was replaced with the Hedgehog. The Hedgehog had several advantages over depth charges, and its introduction in 1943 was widely welcomed by escort ships. The time it took to fire at U-Boats was reduced, and a fusilade of 24-30 grenades rained-down on the U-Boat, with delayed and/or contact explosions.
An added bonus was that the Hedgehog didn't distort sonar readings after the grenades were launched. By mid-1943, the British-invented Hedgehog was in wide use . . . by the end of WW II, the Hedgehog had destroyed about 50 U-Boats . . . and Allied weapons developers were in the process creating Hedgehogs that had projectiles that could search for submerged U-Boats.

Centimetric Radar was even more of a breakthrough, maybe the greatest of the new or improved technology used in the Battle of the Atlantic. It was a miniaturized version of the large-scale and effective British on-land radar used v. the Luftwaffe during the Battle for Britain. A device needed to be invented that could hold the power necessary to generate the microwave pulses to locate specific/small targets AND be small enough to be put on an escort vessel or in the nose of a VLR.
Slowly, Centimetric Radar was introduced in Allied reconnaissance aircraft as well as corvettes. This new radar could spot a U-Boat's conning tower miles away, day-or-night . . . in calm water, the Centimetric Radar could even spot a single periscope. And, none of the U-Boat technology systems could detect the radar.

    More-and-more Allied escort commanders were thinking "kill" and "attack" far more than "protect" when facing U-Boats. The creation of "support groups" in addition to escort ships was key, in that the support ships could pursue U-Boats while the escorts guided/protected merchant ships. With more warships, escort carrier planes would do the air equivalent of a "Creeping Attack", in that two planes would strafe a U-Boat, while a third plane would go for the kill with bombs and/or torpedoes.



While the number of U-Boats sunk by carriers was much less than land-based aircraft, their presence and effectiveness was invaluable. By June-August 1944, Allied control of the air and sea-lanes in the North Atlantic was complete. For example, only 5 Allied vessels were sunk during D-Day by German U-Boats. Doenitz was still receiving and dispatching new U-Boats as late as April 1945; the submarines of the Kriegsmarine fought to the end of the war. During WW II, the casualty rate among U-Boat crews was 63% (76% if captured crews were included) . . . no other service in any other nation's military suffered so great a casualty percentage. (Below: Episode #1 of "The War Against the U-Boats")

1 Comment

Turning the Tide in World War II: An Overview

3/23/2016

0 Comments

Source: Paul Kennedy. Engineers of Victory: The Problem Solvers Who
Turned the Tide in the Second World War (2013)

Traditional World War II history focuses on "Top-Down, Great-Man" narratives, such as Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, General Dwight Eisenhower, Adolph Hitler, etc. Rarely do historians inquire into the mechanics and dynamics of strategic success or failure. For example, the British victory over the Spanish Armada in 1588; Sir John Hawkins drastically redesigned the galleons ten years earlier, which gave the Royal Navy the necessary firepower and speed to defeat Spain. Another example: as the British Empire grew, it was financed by the merchants of Amsterdam and other European centers, as well as the creation and development of the Bank of England (pictured above: FDR, Stalin, and Churchill at the Teheran Conference, 1943).

At Casablanca in early-1943, FDR and Churchill proclaimed that nothing other than the unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers would be accepted . . . making the pronouncement was all well-and-good, but how to do so? At the time of the Casablanca Conference, the Allies were losing badly in all theaters . . . what needed to be done to win the war would have to be done at the "middle-level", involving thousands of people in various roles, both military and civilian.
First, the Allies needed to win control of the North Atlantic sea-lanes for their convoys. Second, the Allies needed to take control of the skies over West-Central Europe, so Britain would be more than just the launching pad for Operation Overlord, it would be the base of massive destruction from the air. Third, the Allies needed to find a way to get past Axis-held beaches and carry the fight to the heartland of Europe. Fourth, the Allies needed to find a way to counter the Nazi Blitzkrieg, and fifth, the Allies needed to find the best route and methods to take the war to Japan in the Pacific.
In a little more than a year after Casablanca (pictured above, L-R: French General Henri Giraud, FDR, Charles de Gaulle, and Churchill), all of the above was achieved with the exception of the unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers. No straight causal line connects Casablanca to the reality of achieving all five major obstacles to win the war; the Allies were in no position to do anything of substance to pursue Casablanca's goals in early-1942 (actually, WW II deteriorated for the Allies in the months immediately after Casablanca).
Much like Pearl Harbor erased memories of the most divisive period in U.S. History after the Civil War (1938 - 1941; Isolationists v. Internationalists), the ultimate victories in 1945 erased the truth that the Allies were losing World War II by late-1942 / early-1943 . . . the final victories of 1945 obscured how difficult the Allied position was in the middle years of World War II.

In the battle for control of the sea-lanes in the North Atlantic, losses among Allied merchant ships increased after Casablanca. During March 1943, German U-Boats sank 108 vessels, which stunned and demoralized the Western Allies. If the Allies couldn't reverse momentum, there would be no chance for Operation Overlord. Also, Allied strategic bombing in Europe after Casablanca went from bad-to-worse. the Royal Air Force (RAF) was running out of bombers due to the increased numbers and effectiveness of Luftwaffe night fighters.
From November 1943 to March 1944, there were 16 massive Allied attacks on Berlin. The Allies lost 1047 aircraft, while another 1682 planes were badly damaged . . . attrition was even greater during daytime raids. On 14 October 1943, the ball-bearing factory at Schweinfurt (pinned in the above map) was targeted; 60 of 291 B-17 Flying Fortresses were shot down, and a further 138 damaged. The Allies found out that their theory that "the bomber will always get through" was beyond-wrong. Allied command of the sea-lanes in the North Atlantic and of the air over Western/Central Europe was an illusion . . . both needed to be drastically reversed if there was to be any chance of victory.

It really didn't matter, in that the Allied Command had no idea how to achieve the incredibly difficult strategy/tactics of a major amphibious attack against an entrenched defensive force. Allied amphibious attacks had been relatively easy in North Africa, which was probably why FDR and Churchill were over-confident at Casablanca (Eisenhower was much less confident in terms of cracking Nazi defenses).
Dealing with the Germans on the Atlantic shore was a totally different proposition, as was discovered during the catastrophic Dieppe Raid in Aug 1942 (pinned in the above map) where the majority of Canadians were killed/wounded/captured. The conclusion by the Allies was that it was basically impossible to take a well-defended enemy harbor . . . the strategists started to think about a mass invasion on an open beach, which also seemed impossible. So then, how were the Allies supposed to take the war to Nazi Germany or Imperial Japan with ground troops . . . it definitely seemed like an impossibility by early-1943.

Also vexing the Allied Command was how to stop the Nazi Blitzkrieg. During 1940-1941, the British army had been tossed out of Norway, Belgium, Greece, Crete, and France very quickly and easily by the Nazis. True, there was some good news before Casablanca with El Alamein in North Africa and Stalingrad in the Eastern Front, but Nazi Germany reorganized after those two defeats, and were also able to increase their manufacturing capacity.
The German military had more-and-better aircraft, tanks, submarines, and on the Eastern Front, the Wehrmacht (the German unified military forces, but often the term refers to the German army) had stopped the Red Army's advance, and were assembling vast forces at Kursk. If Nazi Germany could keep up the momentum in the North Atlantic, blunt the effectiveness of Allied bombing in Europe, and deny the Western Allies any meaningful entry points in France, Stalin may have had no choice but to negotiate separate terms with Hitler, and for the second time in less than thirty years, Russia would have pulled out of a World War.

And then there was the War in the Pacific, which was an entirely American enterprise. The dilemma: how exactly would Marines land on a heavily defended/mined/booby-trapped coral atoll. November 1943: Imperial Japan didn't value Tarawa (pinned in the map), since they only had 3000 defenders, but the losses of Marines taking the atolls shocked the US public. The Japanese had 270,000 defending the Philippines . . . MacArthur boldly stated that "I Shall Return", but that was pure theatrics . . . the reality was that the US had no chance to force Japan off the Philippines in early-1943.
Systems networks were in play in a military sense, in that successes and failures elsewhere affected other regions/theaters, and the actions of others benefited/cursed others. For example, Stalin benefited tremendously from the Allied bombings in Germany, since Hitler needed to keep military forces in Germany instead of sending them to the Eastern Front. An advantage gained by the Allies in one theater could help campaigns elsewhere, and a serious defeat could damage chances of success in another theater(s).

All five separate-though-interconnected challenges facing the Allies were overcome in about 17 months, from February 1943 to the Summer of 1944, which was roughly between Casablanca and the quadruple successes of Normandy, the Fall of Rome, the Marianas Landings, and Operation Bagration in the Eastern Front.
There was still some work to be done: "Island-Hopping" in the Pacific and continued strategic bombing in Germany, and Japan as well as the advance of the Western Allies to Berlin. True, the Axis Powers overreached in their aggression, and the US especially was able to employ unmatched resources, but HOW did the Allies recover and fight their way to victory during those pivotal 17 months in 1943-1944 . . .

What if . . . the U-Boats had not been defeated in the Summer of 1943, or if the vaunted Luftwaffe wasn't crushed in early-1944 . . . or if the Red Army hadn't defeated the Nazi Panzers. What if . . . legendary "turn-around" weapons such as the P-51 Mustang or the B-29 Superfortress (pictured below) weren't developed . . . or if the miniaturized radar that arrived on the scene in 1943-1944 hadn't been developed in time, or at all. Maybe the Allies would have won World War II anyway, but it would have been at much greater cost in a much-longer time frame. For the United States, Great Britain, and the USSR, it would take not only their considerable resources, but also middle-level organizations to carry out the strategic goals and develop the technologies necessary to achieve total victory.

0 Comments

Ronald Reagan & the Republican National Convention of 1976

3/4/2016

0 Comments

Source: H.W. Brands. Reagan: The Life (2015)

For the 64 year-old Ronald Reagan, if there was to be a public role after serving as California's Governor for 8 years, it would be in the White House, which was an unrealistic goal until President Richard Nixon imploded during the Watergate Scandal. Nixon was no longer in a position to anoint a moderate successor; for Reagan, pursuing the Republican nomination for President was now a far more realistic proposition.
Reagan decided to make a run for the Republican nomination in 1976, but he didn't want to look too eager in trying to become the nominee. Reagan actually took a mini-gig on CBS Radio, where he had a daily five minute editorial (pictured: Reagan giving one of radio addresses). Those radio addresses kept Reagan in the public eye; Reagan preferred radio because he thought people would tire of him on television. The major reason was, perhaps, that Reagan thought TV would magnify is age.

By 1980, Reagan (pictured below at his ranch in 1976 with his favorite horse; his wife Nancy is to the left) was speaking via radio to at least 50 million Americans twice each day during commuting time; Reagan wrote every one of his 5 minute radio presentations. Reagan knew the radio was a very intimate medium; he purposely re-created his version of FDR's "Fireside Chats". Reagan wanted the audience to focus on his words and make their own images in their brain, rather than images he would have needed to provide if he was on television.
Reagan had no policy agenda beyond his basic conservative principles, which were anchored by his beliefs that the federal government was too large, taxes needed to be reduced, and that the US should stop "playing nice" with the USSR. Reagan expected events to provide opportunity and direction for a political comeback, and that occurred with the Fall of Saigon on 30 April 1975. Reagan blamed a lack of leadership in the federal government for South Vietnam falling to the North Vietnamese communists. Not long his radio addresses on Saigon, Reagan started to question the wisdom of detente with the USSR.

Reagan did not think the US/USSR monster grain deal, which lessened Soviet food shortages, was a good deal for US farmers. Mostly, Reagan admitted that there were some economic benefits for the US, but he questioned the morality of the grain deal with communist Russia.
Reagan was appointed to the Rockefeller Commission (Nelson Rockefeller was President Gerald Ford's Vice-President), which was investigating the Central Intelligence Agency's actions. However, Reagan attended less than half the committee's 26 meetings. At the end of the investigation, Reagan signed the committee's report, which was no more than a "slap on the wrist" to the CIA.
However, another investigation, the Church Committee, chaired by Democratic Senator Frank Church of Idaho (pictured to the left, with Republican Senator John Tower of Texas to the right), uncovered CIA shenanigans. The Church Committee outlined CIA activities in Iran in 1953 (the Shah of Iran was brought back to power), Guatemala in 1954, the Bay of Pigs disaster in 1961, and assorted attempted assassinations. Conservatives like Reagan didn't want any sunshine on the CIA, which in their view could only weaken a part of the government that needed to stay viable and effective against foreign threats.

Reagan didn't want to wait until President Ford stepped aside; he would challenge the President of the United States for the Republican nomination (pictured: Reagan and Ford at the Republican National Convention in Kansas City, MO). If Reagan had won the Election of 1976, only William Henry Harrison would have been older entering office. For Reagan, it was 1976 or never in terms of becoming President; the problem for Reagan was that it was a desperate decision, not an astute move, in pursuing the nomination at that point in time.
It was a long shot for Reagan to defeat Ford for the Republican nomination; as President, Ford had vast power within the party machinery compared to Reagan. Reagan also risked being blamed for splitting the Republican Party, and if Ford lost the General Election, Reagan would face even more blame. On 20 November 1975, Ronald Reagan formally declared himself as a candidate for President at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C.

In December 1975, a Gallup poll had Reagan ahead of President Ford 40% to 32% among Republicans. In February 1976, Ford defeated Reagan by 1% in the New Hampshire primary (pictured: Reagan campaigning in New Hampshire in January 1976). Reagan and his team made a tactical blunder, in that he left New Hampshire during the final two days before the primary vote to campaign in the Midwest. Ford's campaign took full advantage, claiming the mantle of victory in New Hampshire, and benefiting from the corresponding momentum.
Reagan and his campaign staff knew they had blown it in New Hampshire, and were unable to effectively compete in the next five primaries, losing to Ford in all of the contests. Each loss in a primary eroded Reagan's credibility in the Republican Party, and Reagan was pressured to drop out of the race, and support Ford as a loyal Republican. Reagan responded that he would battle all the way to the Republican National Convention in Kansas City.

   After Reagan was trounced in Florida, even his wife, Nancy, thought Reagan should drop out of the primaries (her main fear was that Reagan would not recover from what she viewed as repeated political embarrassments). But Reagan, with the help of Senator Jesse Helms
(R; NC) was able to arrange a 30 minute television broadcast, where Reagan espoused his conservative bona fides, and where he also was able to re-introduce himself to the American South.
   Reagan attacked President Ford for "giving away" the Panama Canal, something over which Ford had no influence or control, other than to continue what had started in the 1960s. But Reagan's attack struck a chord, and Reagan stunned Ford and the Republican leadership by winning North Carolina 52% to 46%. North Carolina had their delegates committed proportionately, so Reagan only garnered 28 delegates to Ford's 26. But the flow of campaign money increased, and Reagan was able to continue . . . Ford and his staff cast Reagan as a Republican Party "wrecker".
   Reagan captured more Southern primaries, as well as Indiana, California, and Nebraska. The Ford team had a modest lead over Reagan in terms of delegates heading into Kansas City, Missouri. But the decision was made to bring James Baker (pictured above) to the Ford campaign, an organizing genius with legendary political connections, to insure that the Republican National Convention would not descend into chaos, which would benefit Reagan.

Conventional wisdom had Ford needing about 40 more delegates for the nomination, with Reagan needing a little more than 100. Reagan gambled when he named his Vice-Presidential candidate early, selecting Senator Richard Schweiker (R; PA) in an effort to claim Pennsylvania's delegates. But Reagan and his team once again miscalculated, and he lost many of the Southern delegates that he had worked so hard to get in his fold during the primaries . . . and it turned out that Schweiker couldn't deliver on the expected Pennsylvania delegates.
Reagan's defeat was sealed as a result, with Ford capturing 1187 delegates to Reagan's 1070. Despite the totals, conservative Republicans stayed with Reagan. Ford didn't ask Reagan to be his Vice-President, and Reagan never offered to be Vice-President. According to James Baker (Reagan's future Chief-of-Staff and the Secretary of the Treasury), had Reagan been asked to be the VP, he would have done so out of a sense of party loyalty . . . but if that would have occurred, it would have been very unlikely that Reagan would have been elected President in 1980. (pictured above: Reagan shaking hands with President Ford on the stage in Kansas City, with V.P. Rockefeller in the background).

The Presidential Election of 1976: A Presidential Elector in Washington state, Mike Padden, was committed by tradition to vote for President Gerald Ford, who won the state over the Democratic candidate, Jimmy Carter. However, Padden used his Presidential Electoral Vote for Reagan instead of Ford (Padden didn't think Ford's stand against abortion was strong enough). Padden used his Vice-Presidential Electoral Vote for Ford's running mate, Senator Bob Dole (KS) . . . Dole received more Electoral Votes than than did President Ford, which was the first time a V.P. candidate received more votes in the Electoral College than the Presidential candidate from the same party.

0 Comments

Ronald Reagan: 1967 - 1975

3/4/2016

1 Comment

Source: H.W. Brands. Reagan: The Life (2015)

Governor Ronald Reagan took special pleasure in attacking the University of California at Berkeley whenever possible. Reagan vowed to "clean up" Berkeley, citing a need to change the leadership at the university's administration, which he believed was enabling a minority of malcontents to disrupt the education of the majority of students.
In February 1969, the Third World Liberation Front attempted to close down Berkeley's campus; Reagan responded by declaring an "extreme emergency", and sent state troopers to assist local authorities. Several weeks later, a property dispute arose at Berkeley, where a recently purchased lot remained empty; hippies and radicals squatted in the lot, proclaiming it to be the "People's Park" (pictured). Reagan had taken some criticism in California when he pursued the Republican nomination that he wasn't decisive-enough to be Governor . . . Reagan was itching to show that he was indeed decisive.

Reagan unilaterally ordered the area cleared, and then a fence erected to keep out the squatters. The fence was quickly erected, but a march to "take back" the People's Park started to move towards the area. Protesters threw rocks, concrete, and metal objects at the police, while police responded with tear gas and shotguns loaded with birdshot or buckshot (which was far worse, and its use was disputed by the police). Dozens of protesters were wounded, and one was killed; the California National Guard was called in, and remained under Reagan's orders.
Reagan officially blamed the "street gangs" and "campus radicals" for the violence; Reagan's words exacerbated the crisis, and shortly afterwards, National Guard helicopters sprayed tear gas on the protesters (pictured: a helicopter spraying tear gas on 20 May 1969). The Berkeley faculty denounced Reagan's "military occupation", and demanded an audience with the Governor. In a televised address at the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco, Reagan held firm. He cited many examples of lawbreaking in the last year at Berkeley, and he specifically identified the leaders of the riots as political agitators, with "lemmings" as followers. Reagan also called-out the Berkeley faculty, blaming them for creating the current polarized atmosphere on campus.

Reagan ran for re-election in 1970 while campus turmoil shifted to the University of California at Santa Barbara, where radicals were protesting the Military-Corporate Complex. Reagan once again declared a state of emergency, and again called in the National Guard. Reagan thought he knew the cause of the crisis: a small group of revolutionaries trying to rock the boat . . . Reagan was quoted as saying, "If it's to be a bloodbath, let it be now" (a comment which he obviously regretted).
California voters liked Reagan and his pragmatism, but they weren't as enthusiastic in 1970 as they were in 1966: in 1966, Reagan had .580 of the popular vote, compared to .530 in 1970. Although the margin of victory in 1970 was half that of 1966, Reagan viewed it as a "win-is-a-win", and accepted the outcome (pictured: campus unrest increased in 1970 when Nixon ordered the invasion of neutral Cambodia).

In 1964, Americans soundly rejected Barry Goldwater's ultra-conservatism, and in 1972, Americans soundly rejected George McGovern's ultra-liberalism; Nixon was right in the middle between the two extremes, which appealed to most Americans. Big government wasn't the enemy, and it wasn't a best friend . . . most Americans wanted a stable, calm status quo.
For Reagan, if there was a public role after serving two terms as Governor of California, it was in the White House, which was an unrealistic goal until Nixon's implosion during Watergate. Reagan (pictured with Nancy on 10 March 1974 returning to Los Angeles) turned 64 after his two terms, and Nixon was no longer in a political position to anoint a moderate successor . . . the road was wide open, and Reagan decided to make a run for the Republican nomination in 1976 (but not too eagerly . . .).

Reagan actually took a mini-gig on CBS Radio, five minutes twice a day during the commutes. Reagan was able to stay in the public eye, and avoid being on television; he believed that people would tire of seeing him on TV every day with Walter Cronkite (another reason was that Reagan thought the TV would magnify his age). By 1980, Reagan was speaking to at least 50 million people in the morning and afternoon.
Reagan wrote every one of his five minute radio broadcasts himself. Reagan remembered the intimate nature of FDR's "Fireside Chats", and re-created his version twice a day. Reagan wanted his words to be the focus, not images he would have needed to feature on TV. Reagan had no policy agenda beyond his basic conservative principles; he expected events to provide direction, and that occurred with the Fall of Saigon in 1975.

Reagan blamed a lack of leadership in the federal government for the nation of Vietnam becoming all-Communist. Soon, in his radio addresses, he started questioning the wisdom of "detente" with the USSR. Reagan had a big problem with the US/USSR monster grain deal which lessened food shortages in Russia; mostly, he questioned the morality of the grain deal (why should the US assist a communist nation in any way?) admitting that there were economic gains, especially by US farmers.
Reagan was appointed to the Rockefeller Commission, whose job it was to investigate the CIA. Reagan attended less than half of the 26 meetings (Reagan is pictured to the left of Vice-President Nelson Rockefeller); in the end, Reagan signed the Commission's findings, which were basically a "slap on the wrist" against the CIA.
But, the Church Committee (chaired by Senator Frank Church of Idaho) uncovered shenanigans by the CIA, including Iran in 1953, Guatemala in 1954, and the Bay of Pigs in 1961, as well as assassination attempts. Conservatives, like Reagan, didn't like any sunshine showing on the CIA; to Reagan, the CIA needed to stay viable and effective to guard against foreign threats . . . especially Communist foreign threats.

1 Comment

Archives

Categories