Source: Joseph J. Ellis. Founding Brothers - The Revolutionary Generation (2000)
There was a constitutional crisis in terms of ratifying the Jay Treaty in 1795. Washington had the secret minutes of the Constitutional Convention in his possession by agreement of all those that participated. According to Washington, those minutes stipulated that treaties were negotiated by the President, and ratified by 2/3’s of the Senate. James Madison had his own notes of the convention, and he went to Monticello to consult with Jefferson. They discovered that Washington was correct, and also that Madison had been one of the staunchest supporters of a strong Executive.
Nonetheless, Jefferson concluded that the House was an equal partner in the proceedings concerning the Jay Treaty; if Jefferson had his way, there would have been the kind of gridlock/inaction that he had decried from afar while in France. Hearings on the House took place in the Fall/Winter of 1795 under Madison’s direction as well as his more narrow interpretation of the Constitution. Madison argued that the House was involved in the ratification of the Jay Treaty in terms of funding. Madison was able to block the treaty while avoiding a frontal assault on the Executive branch. As 1796 dawned, Madison’s bloc of opposition to the Jay Treaty in the House looked to be beyond-solid, but James Madison soon discovered that anyone that went head to head with Washington was bound to lose.
Nonetheless, Jefferson concluded that the House was an equal partner in the proceedings concerning the Jay Treaty; if Jefferson had his way, there would have been the kind of gridlock/inaction that he had decried from afar while in France. Hearings on the House took place in the Fall/Winter of 1795 under Madison’s direction as well as his more narrow interpretation of the Constitution. Madison argued that the House was involved in the ratification of the Jay Treaty in terms of funding. Madison was able to block the treaty while avoiding a frontal assault on the Executive branch. As 1796 dawned, Madison’s bloc of opposition to the Jay Treaty in the House looked to be beyond-solid, but James Madison soon discovered that anyone that went head to head with Washington was bound to lose.
Madison’s majority in the House started to melt during March 1796, and he lost the vote in the next month. James Madison blamed the banking interests and the Anglophiles. Jefferson concluded that the Jay Treaty passed in the House due to the immense prestige and influence of President Washington. What was strong Executive leadership that took into account the national interest in the long run looked to Jefferson and Madison as the arbitrary decisions of a king, and the betrayal of the principles of the Revolutionary War. To Jefferson, his vision of the world would only be achieved when the last king was strangled with the entrails of the last priest.
As early as 1790, Jefferson believed that the Revolution as he understood it had been hijacked by hostile forces from within, and the chief enemy was the Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton. Initially, Jefferson didn’t see Washington as being anything other than a Colonel Blake (MASH) that wondered what was happening around him, and Jefferson also knew that Washington was untouchable in terms of criticism. But all that changed with the Whiskey Rebellion (1794), where a federal law was enforced for the first time. Jefferson believed that Hamilton had taken over the Executive and that Washington had become senile.
As early as 1790, Jefferson believed that the Revolution as he understood it had been hijacked by hostile forces from within, and the chief enemy was the Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton. Initially, Jefferson didn’t see Washington as being anything other than a Colonel Blake (MASH) that wondered what was happening around him, and Jefferson also knew that Washington was untouchable in terms of criticism. But all that changed with the Whiskey Rebellion (1794), where a federal law was enforced for the first time. Jefferson believed that Hamilton had taken over the Executive and that Washington had become senile.
Still, Jefferson wasn’t directly accusing Washington of anything, and he did not say or write any criticisms about the President publicly. But his private letters to those that were in his Circle of Trust show that the Jay Treaty was the breaking point for former Secretary of State. Jefferson saw the French Revolution as a continuation of the American Revolution as well as a continuing chapter in the global revolution. Where Washington did not see the war between Britain and France as a threat to the nation’s vital interests (other than trade), Jefferson saw the war in Europe as vital to the future of America. Jefferson consistently either ignored or glossed over the horrors of the French Revolution, seeing France as a Revolutionary hero and Britain as the counterrevolutionary villain.
To Jefferson, Britain was an inherently corrupt society, the bastion of monarchical power. Jefferson’s Anglophobia and other-worldly support of the French Revolution was virulent because it was based on philosophy/theory. Jefferson simply believed that the Jay Treaty put the US on the wrong side of history. For Washington, part of why he left the Presidency after two terms was that he was done with the shenanigans and machinations of fellow Elites such as Jefferson. Washington wanted to harness the energies of the US after the Revolution to nation-building, while Jefferson saw that effort/focus as a betrayal of the Revolution.
Washington wanted to accomplish three things with his Farewell Address. First, he wanted to demonstrate that he was still very much in charge and nowhere near senile. Second, he wanted to chart a middle course in order to push his critics to the fringes of the ongoing debate over what the Revolution meant. Third, Washington, the master of grand exits, wanted to explain what the Revolution really meant, especially coming together as an increasingly unified nation (much like how the Continental Army hung in there during the Revolutionary War).
Washington wanted to accomplish three things with his Farewell Address. First, he wanted to demonstrate that he was still very much in charge and nowhere near senile. Second, he wanted to chart a middle course in order to push his critics to the fringes of the ongoing debate over what the Revolution meant. Third, Washington, the master of grand exits, wanted to explain what the Revolution really meant, especially coming together as an increasingly unified nation (much like how the Continental Army hung in there during the Revolutionary War).
Washington planted his standard squarely in the field of political combat, inviting citizens to rally behind him even though he was retiring to Mount Vernon. The words of the Farewell Address may have mostly been Madison’s (from 1792 when Washington seriously considered going home) and Hamilton’s, but the ideas were all Washington’s (Hamilton gave nearly perfect wording, phrasing, and tone to Washington’s ideas). Washington strongly hinted that in his absence the federal government would need to become more powerful.
Reactions to his Farewell Address in public was overwhelmingly positive, with much tearful exuberance, missing the man but embracing his message. Republican newspapers that were a mouthpiece for Jefferson dismissed it as the “loathings of a sick mind”. Washington’s last years at Mount Vernon were spent knowing he was right, but he was also apprehensive that his wisdom would be ignored. Part of Washington’s problem was that his beloved Mount Vernon was located in Virginia, which was the headquarters for Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, and the Republicans . . . in effect, Mount Vernon was an enclave in enemy territory.
Reactions to his Farewell Address in public was overwhelmingly positive, with much tearful exuberance, missing the man but embracing his message. Republican newspapers that were a mouthpiece for Jefferson dismissed it as the “loathings of a sick mind”. Washington’s last years at Mount Vernon were spent knowing he was right, but he was also apprehensive that his wisdom would be ignored. Part of Washington’s problem was that his beloved Mount Vernon was located in Virginia, which was the headquarters for Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, and the Republicans . . . in effect, Mount Vernon was an enclave in enemy territory.