Source: Joseph J. Ellis. Founding Brothers - The Revolutionary Generation (2000)
On 11 February 1790, two Quaker delegations (from MA and NY) presented petitions to the House to immediately abolish the African Slave Trade. Most members of Congress considered the petition an embarrassing interruption to their debates on assumption and residency. The Constitution specifically prohibited Congress from passing any law restricting/abolishing the slave trade until 1808. Although protected by the Constitution, Southern representatives were apoplectic and made many speeches against the petitions, accusing the Quakers of trying to force the nation towards emancipation.
James Madison (the leader of the House) again was the voice of reason, saying that those freaking out, while impassioned and sincere, were actually stirring up the pot for no reason. Madison suggested that the petitions be forwarded to the proper committee and dealt with like any other petition, believing that the scurrilous hoo-haw would evaporate. Madison counseled those that were up in arms that they were actually playing into the hands of the Quakers, in that the issue of slavery would be openly debated for the first time. On 12 February 1790, another petition arrived in Congress from the Pennsylvania Abolition Society, and just as some Southern representatives had predicted the previous day, the slave trade was linked to the abolition of slavery.
James Madison (the leader of the House) again was the voice of reason, saying that those freaking out, while impassioned and sincere, were actually stirring up the pot for no reason. Madison suggested that the petitions be forwarded to the proper committee and dealt with like any other petition, believing that the scurrilous hoo-haw would evaporate. Madison counseled those that were up in arms that they were actually playing into the hands of the Quakers, in that the issue of slavery would be openly debated for the first time. On 12 February 1790, another petition arrived in Congress from the Pennsylvania Abolition Society, and just as some Southern representatives had predicted the previous day, the slave trade was linked to the abolition of slavery.
The Pennsylvania petition argued that slavery ran counter to the principles of the Revolutionary War, and also stated that the “general welfare” and the “necessary and proper” clauses of the Constitution allowed Congress to restrict/abolish slavery before 1808. And to top it off, the petition was signed by Benjamin Franklin, which meant that Madison’s strategy of ignoring the petitions was not going to work. Already, Southern members in Congress accused the petitioners of blowing the trumpets of sedition, and even civil war.
As far as those Southern representatives were concerned, the Constitution meant that the petitions were not even supposed to be read aloud on the floor and entered into the public record, which was an argument they were destined to lose. Representative Thomas Scott (PA) spoke on behalf of the petitioners, and admitted that the Constitution kept Congress from abolishing the slave trade until 1808. but not slavery itself. Representative James Jackson (GA), the most outspoken of the Southerners in the House, countered that slavery was God’s will and that the Southern economy couldn’t function without slavery. Jackson went on to argue that every white person in the South automatically understood those two basic points, and that no white Southerner would do the worst of the work that African slaves did (e.g. draining swamps).
As far as those Southern representatives were concerned, the Constitution meant that the petitions were not even supposed to be read aloud on the floor and entered into the public record, which was an argument they were destined to lose. Representative Thomas Scott (PA) spoke on behalf of the petitioners, and admitted that the Constitution kept Congress from abolishing the slave trade until 1808. but not slavery itself. Representative James Jackson (GA), the most outspoken of the Southerners in the House, countered that slavery was God’s will and that the Southern economy couldn’t function without slavery. Jackson went on to argue that every white person in the South automatically understood those two basic points, and that no white Southerner would do the worst of the work that African slaves did (e.g. draining swamps).
Representative William Loughton (SC) stated that the delegates at the
Constitutional Convention had come to an understanding in that the Northern delegates agreed to not interfere with the property rights of the South. Loughton went on to say that all of the Southern states ratified the Constitution with the knowledge that the new federal government couldn’t touch slavery, at least until 1808. The sum argument of the Southern representatives was that the Bible and the Constitution sanctioned slavery; interestingly, the position of the Virginia delegation in the House was equivocal.
Despite the sharp sectional debate, the vote to send the petitions to committee was
43 - 11, with 7 of the negative votes from Georgia and South Carolina, and no member from those states was willing to serve on the committee that would deal with those petitions. The differing perspectives on slavery were largely rooted on which founding moment the person focused, the Declaration of Independence (1776), or the Constitutional Convention and Ratification (1787-88), as well as geography.
In 1782, Virginia passed a law that gave planters the ability to free their slaves, and by 1790 there were 12.000 Free Blacks in Virginia. In the only book that Jefferson had published,
Notes on the State of Virginia (1784), he outlined a plan that slaves would eventually be freed if they were born after 1800. So then, to many Americans in 1790, it appeared that slavery was on its descendancy, given its tremendous cost and expense, and it was a question of when, not if, slavery would come to an end.
Constitutional Convention had come to an understanding in that the Northern delegates agreed to not interfere with the property rights of the South. Loughton went on to say that all of the Southern states ratified the Constitution with the knowledge that the new federal government couldn’t touch slavery, at least until 1808. The sum argument of the Southern representatives was that the Bible and the Constitution sanctioned slavery; interestingly, the position of the Virginia delegation in the House was equivocal.
Despite the sharp sectional debate, the vote to send the petitions to committee was
43 - 11, with 7 of the negative votes from Georgia and South Carolina, and no member from those states was willing to serve on the committee that would deal with those petitions. The differing perspectives on slavery were largely rooted on which founding moment the person focused, the Declaration of Independence (1776), or the Constitutional Convention and Ratification (1787-88), as well as geography.
In 1782, Virginia passed a law that gave planters the ability to free their slaves, and by 1790 there were 12.000 Free Blacks in Virginia. In the only book that Jefferson had published,
Notes on the State of Virginia (1784), he outlined a plan that slaves would eventually be freed if they were born after 1800. So then, to many Americans in 1790, it appeared that slavery was on its descendancy, given its tremendous cost and expense, and it was a question of when, not if, slavery would come to an end.
By 1790, the African Slave Trade was seen by most as a criminal enterprise, slavery was dead/dying in northern states, and the expansion of slavery to the West seemed uncertain. In addition, Virginia looked to be the forerunner of the rising anti-slavery impulses in the South. Therefore, looking back, it seemed to be the right time to match the ideals of the Revolutionary War with the post-war realities.
All that being said, slavery in fact was too intertwined on too many levels, including in the North, at least indirectly (e.g. textile mills). The false optimism of the inevitable decline of slavery led to inaction. Also, the major Revolutionary War problems were political, not economic like slavery, which to many Northerners was also seen as a property rights issue.
With the passage of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 (under the Articles of Confederation), slavery was prohibited north of the Ohio River, which was interpreted by the South as an endorsement of the spread of slavery below the Ohio in the future. The NW Ordinance of 1787 was probably the main reason why the Northern and Southern delegates at the Constitutional Convention felt that they didn’t have to directly deal with slavery.
The “Great Compromise” (a.k.a. the “Sectional Compromise”) during the Constitutional Convention in 1787 basically came down to this agreement: New England agreed to back an extension of the African Slave Trade for 20 years in return for the Deep South (the Carolinas and Georgia) agreeing to make the federal regulation of commerce a simple majority vote instead of a super-majority (2/3’s). Both sides claimed victory, and then moved on to other items on the agenda. Although Virginia was relatively moderate on its stand on slavery compared to the Deep South (mostly because they dominated the cotton market and had enough slaves), the state was adamantly against ceding any control over their slave populations to the federal government.
All that being said, slavery in fact was too intertwined on too many levels, including in the North, at least indirectly (e.g. textile mills). The false optimism of the inevitable decline of slavery led to inaction. Also, the major Revolutionary War problems were political, not economic like slavery, which to many Northerners was also seen as a property rights issue.
With the passage of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 (under the Articles of Confederation), slavery was prohibited north of the Ohio River, which was interpreted by the South as an endorsement of the spread of slavery below the Ohio in the future. The NW Ordinance of 1787 was probably the main reason why the Northern and Southern delegates at the Constitutional Convention felt that they didn’t have to directly deal with slavery.
The “Great Compromise” (a.k.a. the “Sectional Compromise”) during the Constitutional Convention in 1787 basically came down to this agreement: New England agreed to back an extension of the African Slave Trade for 20 years in return for the Deep South (the Carolinas and Georgia) agreeing to make the federal regulation of commerce a simple majority vote instead of a super-majority (2/3’s). Both sides claimed victory, and then moved on to other items on the agenda. Although Virginia was relatively moderate on its stand on slavery compared to the Deep South (mostly because they dominated the cotton market and had enough slaves), the state was adamantly against ceding any control over their slave populations to the federal government.
The slavery debate in 1790 had three sides: the 1776 POV, the 1787 POV, and the moderate POV (VA). The debate in Congress during February 1790 exposed these differences of opinion on slavery to the public for the first time. On 8 March 1790, the House committee that dealt with the petitions prepared to submit its report, which guaranteed the debate would see the light of day. On 16 March 1790, the committee made its report to the House, and members from the Deep South were ready to give the greatest pro-slavery argument yet, with Jackson alone speaking for two hours.
Among Jackson’s arguments was that in terms of future emancipation, where would all the freed slaves go, being that there was no answer to that question, nor would there be one in the foreseeable future. On 17 March 1790, another Southern representative held the floor for two hours echoing Jackson’s points. The full pro-slavery argument was now out in the open and in the national bloodstream.
If one looked to the future based on the debate on slavery in 1790, one could see those Southern arguments becoming the bulwark of John C. Calhoun's defense on slavery in the 1840s. If one looked back, Jackson and his fellow Southerners in Congress gave the most defiant and systematic defense of slavery in the short history of the republic. That being said, no American politician in 1790 seriously considered that the US should be a biracial nation/society, but the rising tenor of Anglo-Saxon dominance/superiority that had always been lurking in the background came to the forefront in the Spring of 1790. For the first time, publicly anyway, racial superiority/inferiority had become part of the justification of slavery. What had also been lurking in the background for quite some time was the somewhat silent agreement that slavery not be discussed at all in Congress . . . and that was thrown out the window in the Spring of 1790.
Among Jackson’s arguments was that in terms of future emancipation, where would all the freed slaves go, being that there was no answer to that question, nor would there be one in the foreseeable future. On 17 March 1790, another Southern representative held the floor for two hours echoing Jackson’s points. The full pro-slavery argument was now out in the open and in the national bloodstream.
If one looked to the future based on the debate on slavery in 1790, one could see those Southern arguments becoming the bulwark of John C. Calhoun's defense on slavery in the 1840s. If one looked back, Jackson and his fellow Southerners in Congress gave the most defiant and systematic defense of slavery in the short history of the republic. That being said, no American politician in 1790 seriously considered that the US should be a biracial nation/society, but the rising tenor of Anglo-Saxon dominance/superiority that had always been lurking in the background came to the forefront in the Spring of 1790. For the first time, publicly anyway, racial superiority/inferiority had become part of the justification of slavery. What had also been lurking in the background for quite some time was the somewhat silent agreement that slavery not be discussed at all in Congress . . . and that was thrown out the window in the Spring of 1790.