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James Knox Polk and the Mexican War, Part Two

11/17/2019

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       Source: Robert W. Merry. A Country of Vast Designs - James K. Polk,
                     the Mexican War, and the Conquest of the American Continent (2009)
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     Unbeknownst to Polk and DC, General Winfield Scott and Nicholas Trist not only healed their rift, but they became close, developing an emotional bond so strong that it would last the rest of their lives. What helped form that bond was that they discovered that they both hated President Polk.  Trist wasn’t authorized to personally deliver the sealed packet to the Mexican government (Scott was the one authorized), but Trist wanted the Mexican government to receive the packet much sooner, so Trist asked a member of the British legation to deliver the packet on his behalf. Very soon after receiving the packet, Santa Ana called a “special session” to consider the US offer. 
     Scott and Trist actually offered Santa Anna a $1m bribe to end the war and to begin negotiations. Scott told his staff that bribes of that nature were how to deal with nations/governments such as Mexico. The bribe fell through when the Mexican legislature refused the give Santa Anna the necessary powers to negotiate with the US. As a result, Scott was forced to press the reality of war to the Mexican government, which meant he had to make his move on Mexico City.

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     In the Summer of 1847, Whig conventions burst forth with their support for Zachary Taylor to be the party’s candidate for President. All that mattered was that he was a war hero and therefore able to win votes for the Whigs in 1848. Few knew Taylor’s touchy/petulant side, as well as his lack of intellectual curiosity, ability, and imagination. Taylor released statements that sounded like he expected to go straight from the battlefield as a commander to the Presidency in a sort of political immaculate ascension, which proved to be a political blunder that slowed his momentum.
     The Whigs increasingly became more united on one front, in that no land should be taken from Mexico as a result of the war. The tactic was brilliant in a way, sidestepping the Wilmot Proviso while at the same time putting pressure on the Democrats. It was about at that time that Buchanan informed Polk that the US no longer had any more money to fund the war. An absolutely mystified/upset Polk ordered an investigation as to where the money went. It was soon discovered that $2m went to New Orleans brokers, who kept $1.1m of the money as a “handling fee”; although the money was distributed to far too many people/groups, it turned out that most of the money was still disbursed to the military.

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     In August 1847, Scott inflicted a series of defeats on Santa Anna, culminating with what would be his greatest military humiliation in Mexico City. On 20 August 1847, a broken and desperate Santa Anna convinced the Mexican government to negotiate a truce with Scott in order to shore up his defenses, and to also plan shenanigans. When approached by a Mexican official, Scott and Trist agreed to the proposed truce. Scott went further, ending Santa Anna an offer of armistice. Even though the war at that point was unwinnable, Santa Anna broke the truce by building fortifications for his troops, while also blocking the US from obtaining supplies from Mexico City. 
     On 7 September 1847, Scott ended the truce while Trist was working the diplomatic angle. Mexico remained firm on the Nueces River being the border between Texas and Mexico, and refused to sign anything that labeled them as a nation that had lost a war. Trist discovered that US military victories had only strengthened the resolve/resistance of the Mexican government. In principle, Trist agreed to a Nueces/Rio Grande mutual boundary area, and sent the proposal to DC. In short, Trist was tried to negotiate and end to what he considered to be a war started by Polk. On 4 October 1847, Polk instructed Buchanan to recall Trist.


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     By mid-September 1847, Scott had taken Mexico City and raised the US Flag in the National Palace. The only way to enter Mexico City was by the causeways (highways), and while Santa Anna had the roads defended, US artillery was able to scatter the resistance. Most of the casualties in the Mexican War occurred during Scott’s assault on Mexico City. For example, taking Molina del Ray, a foundry rumored to have Mexican artillery and shells, led to 116 KIA and 665 WIA, and in the end, there was no Mexican artillery . . . the high-cost battle was tactically worthless. 
     Scott was then inclined to hit Chapultepec Castle and the two major western causeways. Scott’s officer cadre wanted to advance from the three southern causeways, but Scott refused. Although the fighting was intense, it only took two hours to take Chapultepec and to secure the surrounding area. In the process, Santa Anna lost four times more than Scott, and by the end of the day, Scott had the southwest and northwest causeways that entered Mexico City. As Mexican resistance faded away, Santa Anna and his remaining force skulked out of Mexico City that night. 
     In the end, Scott was brilliant in his assault on Mexico City. With only 11,000 troops and cut off from supplies, he defeated 30k Mexican soldiers that were well-entrenched; it was a remarkable military achievement, and Scott became the second great hero of the war. Scott’s vainglorious behavior increased due to his victory, and among the generals on his staff, Major General Gideon Pillow did his best to undermine Scott’s reputation by constantly writing Polk (e.g. telling the President that the US took Mexico City in spite of Scott).

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    Pillow developed delusions of grandeur since he had powerful backers in DC, and he greatly exaggerated his role in the Mexico City campaign. Pillow kept cooling himself out of business with his fellow officers, even going so far as to keep a Mexican artillery piece as a souvenir, and he was caught. Pillow demanded a court-martial, which was a mistake in that the truth came out that he was a general that moved too slowly and wasn’t a team player . . . such was the drama of the US Army Officer Corps at the close of the war.
     Polk started to think of increasing the US military strength in Mexico City and wait for Mexico to “cry uncle”. On 13 November 1847, Henry Clay came back to the forefront with a speech in Lexington (KY) where he tried to unify the anti-war and anti-slavery blocs. Clay took a formal stand in favor of the Wilmot Proviso, which had been at least informally adopted on the Whig platform. While the speech helped the Whigs, it didn’t help Clay with the Whigs, who were still in love with Taylor. Polk focused on ending the war and keeping his pledge to only serve a single term; by then, Polk wanted out, in large part because the new House would be under the control of the Whigs.

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  Trist was dealing with far more moderate politicians in the Mexican government that were willing to negotiate when Trist received his recall notice from DC, as well as instructions to immediately stop negotiations. Trist ignored both instructions since he was finally making serious progress. Interestingly, Trist held no official diplomatic authority at that point, but the Mexican government either didn’t know or care about Trist’s new standing. 
     Trist believed that if he could make “The Deal” while openly defying Polk and DC, then he would be the one awash in glory. Trist knew that Polk as getting desperate in terms of ending the war, and US military forces in Mexico could very well increase as a result. On 4 December 1847 after talking to a newspaperman, Trist decided to “make the treaty”. On 7 December 1847, the 30th Congress convened, and Polk’s political standing and influence eroded further with the new Whig majority. Also, without knowing it, Polk would also lose unity in his Cabinet and cede authority for ending the war . . . the only thing Polk would control was how hard he worked (the “Martyrdom of Duty”).

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    Polk’s position was that a cession was required as a de facto indemnity from Mexico (read “war reparations”). In Polk’s eyes, that cession would legalize and justify the Mexican War. Polk made it very simple: no cession = no indemnity = the war wasn’t legal. As far as Polk knew, Mexico wasn’t negotiating, and he would have to intensify the military pressure on that government. Polk, the ultimate chessmaster, knew that if the US didn’t take California and New Mexico (which Mexico was unable to govern anyway), then Britain could fill that void, which would create a whole other major crisis. Opposition to Polk’s way of thinking was swift and furious, and the new debate centered around how much of Mexico the US should take. Some in the Cabinet thought the US should take all of Mexico (Polk definitely leaned towards that way of thinking). 
     In November 1847, General Zachary Taylor asked for and received a six month leave of absence. When Taylor entered New Orleans in December 1847, it was in a political, not a military, posture. On 2 February 1848, Polk received word that the troublesome (to Polk) John C. Fremont had been dismissed from the military due largely to his actions in California. The President was soon asked to show clemency towards “The Pathfinder”, and Polk, unhappy that the whole affair had been dumped on his lap, decided to restore Fremont to active duty. Fremont refused to accept Polk’s offer of remitting the court-martial’s sentence, believing that he never should have been charged in the first place. The immediate political result of the Fremont business was that Benton became a 100% Polk opponent (Benton even refused to make eye contact with the President), but Polk found himself on friendly terms with Henry Clay.

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James Knox Polk and the Mexican War, Part Three

11/17/2019

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  Source: Robert W. Merry. A Country of Vast Designs - James K. Polk,
                     the Mexican War, and the Conquest of the American Continent (2009)
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     Nicholas Trist worked hard to forge a treaty that was loyal and consistent to Polk’s outline from April 1847. Trist was firm on getting Upper California with San Diego; with Scott’s assistance, he was able to use the US Army Corps of Engineers (commanded by Robert E. Lee) to prove that San Diego was indeed in Upper CA. By January 1848, Trist had a treaty that was ready for consideration by the Mexican government. Trist increased the pressure on Mexico by telling them that they needed to act quickly before President Polk replaced General Scott. Trist also reminded the Mexican government that he could be forced to leave Mexico at any moment. 
     Mexico agreed to all of the terms in the draft treaty, including $15m from the US for CA and NM. The Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo was signed on 2 February 1848 by Trist and the relevant parties in the Mexican government. Trist wanted immediate approval from DC to not only end the whole process, but to also limit the level of humiliation for Mexico. When Polk received the treaty, he didn’t react with outrage towards Trist, but rather in a realistic fashion. Polk spent time with the treaty, making sure he was totally familiar with it and that it was acceptable, and then the President sent the treaty to the Senate for ratification.

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     Polk would have loved to take more territory since the war lasted much longer than he envisioned. Polk wanted Mexico to pay a price for it intransigence, but realism again took hold of the President. Polk knew that if he rejected the terms of the treaty and continued to prosecute the war, the opposition to the war would drastically worsen. Basically, Polk decided he couldn’t reject the terms he outlined in April 1847 to Nicholas Trist. Most Americans believed that the treaty needed to be ratified to, if nothing else, avoid a greater national evil. 
     The Senate needed to ratify the treaty by a 2/3’s majority, which meant that twenty Senators could kill the treaty (39 - 19 would ratify). Polk was stunned to find out from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that it wanted to renegotiate with Mexico along the same terms, but with someone other than Trist as the US diplomat. Polk was also beyond-stunned to discover that his own Secretary of State, James Buchanan, had been actively working in opposition to not only the treaty, but also in whispering campaigns against Polk in newspapers (Buchanan was trying to position himself for a run for the Presidency in 1848). 
     The pressure on Polk was immense, and he knew that his historical legacy was on the line. On 10 March 1848, Polk was informed that the treaty had been ratified in the Senate by a vote of 38 -14, with six Senators abstaining. Polk rushed the document to Mexico with a promise to send a new US envoy that would, unlike Trist, have full plenipotentiary powers.


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   On 4 May 1848, a bedraggled and nearly forgotten (in the public eye) Nicholas Trist reached New Orleans. Polk refused to pay Trist from the day he had been ordered to leave Mexico; interestingly, in Mexico Trist was seen as a man of high esteem and good character. On 1 May 1848, Genera Scott left Veracruz and reached his home in New Jersey on 20 May 1848. Scott was actually facing a Court of Inquiry which would resume on 5 June 1848 in Maryland (much of the scurrilous hoo-haw was due to Major General Pillow).
     Taylor let it be known that if he wasn’t the Whig nominee, we would run for President as an independent candidate in order to force the Presidential election in the Electoral College to the House of Representatives. On his end, Polk made it very clear to Democrats that were planning the 1848 convention that he was out of the running for the nomination. On 22 May 1848, the  Democratic National Convention started in Baltimore. A super-majority of 2/3’s of the delegates was voted on in order to nominate the party’s candidate, this time without any rancor or controversy as had occurred in previous conventions. Rival Democrats from New York, the “Hunkers” vs. the “Barnburners”, made the expansion of slavery a big issue in the convention. Three serious candidates emerged: Lewis Cass, James Buchanan, and Levi Woodbury (an associate Supreme Court justice). The results of the 1st ballot were Cass 125, Buchanan 55, and Woodbury 53; Cass would win the nomination on the 4th ballot.

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    To the Southern Democrats, Cass (from Michigan) was not supportive enough of the expansion of slavery, and to the growing number of Abolitionists, Cass wasn’t aggressive enough in his opposition to the expansion of slavery. During the convention, Cass pondered if Popular Sovereignty (white citizens in the actual territory decide whether or not to have slavery) just might be the cure for the debate concerning the expansion of slavery
     On 7 June 1848, the Whig National Convention started in Philadelphia. Conventional wisdom had the 71 year old Henry Clay getting the nomination over Zachary Taylor. The result of the 1st ballot was Taylor 114, Clay 97, and like Cass for the Democrats, Taylor captured the Whig nomination on the 4th ballot. Taylor’s nomination blurred the line between Whig and Democrat, which basically helped his overall electability as far as the Whigs were concerned. 
     The Senate ratified the treaty that was delivered from the Mexican government on 10 June 1848. By that point, Polk’s health had seriously declined due to the physical and psychological toll of US losses in the war. Polk was a politically diminished President, and there was nothing pressing for him to accomplish during his last eight months in office, other than finishing what he considered necessary concerning the war. Polk had no sense of proportion by that time, and little irritations vexed him greatly, which diminished his standing even further. 

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     On 4 July 1848, Polk presided over the cornerstone being laid for the Washington Monument​. A helpless Polk watched Congress move at a snail’s pace to approve territorial governments in the Mexican Cession due to the slavery debate. The Barnburners, headed by former President Martin Van Buren, created the Free Soil Party as a political home for anti-slavery Democrats and Whigs. MVB had to do some serious “spinning” in order to justify his current Abolitionist views compared to his views on slavery when he served in Jackson’s administration. MVB and the Free Soil Party simply wanted to destroy the existing political order using their moral opposition/outrage against slavery. 
     During August 1848, Polk signed a territory bill for Oregon that did not feature slavery, using the 36/30 line from the Missouri Compromise as justification. A few months later, Polk was very upset that Taylor won the Election of 1848 over Lewis Cass, which meant to the outgoing President that the Polk Era would be reversed. Due to the calendar, 4 March 1849 was Polk’s last full day in office, and he had hoped that he would be presented the territorial bills to sign for California and New Mexico. However, the debate in the Senate over the territorial bills went into the wee hours of 5 March 1849, and Polk was very frustrated that he was not allowed the honor of sealing the deal on the Mexican War. 
       Zachary Taylor was inaugurated as the 12th President on 5 March 1849, and the Kentuckian didn’t say anything about the slavery debate in his Inaugural Address. The Polks left DC on 6 March 1849 for New Orleans, and then went up the Mississippi River to Tennessee, and then east to Nashville. Polk’s health deteriorated on the trip home with among other ailments diarrhea and severe fatigue. Polk, with fatalist stoicism, accepted his looming death and was baptized and embraced Christianity for the first time. On 5 June 1849, James Knox Polk died in his sleep at the age of 53. 

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   No President in US History had a wider chasm between accomplishments and popular recognition (with the possible exception of Jimmy Carter); the main reason was the heated debate on the expansion of slavery. Critics of John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, Theodore Roosevelt, and Franklin Roosevelt have had almost no effect on their historical legacies as President, but those critics still negatively affect Polk’s legacy. There were three charges from that era that are especially remembered; first was the assertion of the Whigs that Polk usurped authority to wage an unnecessary war. Second was the statement made famous years later from Ulysses S. Grant (who served as a 2nd Lt. in the Mexican War) that the Mexican War was an unjust war. Third were the attacks from a freshman representative from Illinois, Abraham Lincoln, against Polk and the war. 
    To today’s sensibilities, the Mexican War was not a war defending human rights, but a nationalist war, and Polk is the main villain. However, ignored in all the anti-Polk focus was that the government and military of Mexico royally screwed up in virtually every phase of the war, from beginning-to-end, due to excessive pride/honor. Mexico’s actions with Texas after 1836, especially concerning annexation, were simply and purely tempting fate. Mexico fired the first shots and inflicted the first casualties of the Mexican War, which brought about Polk’s wrath. Added to the mix were voluminous reports beforehand of abuses towards US citizens in Mexico, leading to demands of indemnity, which leads to the question of how much was the US to take from Mexico in that regard. Also conveniently ignored is that Polk (the Chessmaster) was probably the only politician at that time that as President was able to bring the US vision/goal of westward expansion to reality; no other President before Polk had accomplished so much in a single term

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James Knox Polk and the Mexican War, Part One

11/17/2019

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      Source: Robert W. Merry. A Country of Vast Designs - James K. Polk,
                    the Mexican War, and the Conquest of the American Continent (2009)

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      On 4 January 1847, President James Knox Polk was informed that the Wilmot Proviso was introduced in the House of Representatives, and that Hannibal Hamlin (ME) was organizing opposition to the “10,000 Regiment Bill”. Unlike the Lt. General bill that was pending in Congress, the 10k Regiment Bill plus the reintroduction of the $2m war funding bill was far more crucial to Polk, in that both were necessary to take the war to the interior of Mexico (especially to Mexico City). 
  Polk’s falling political standing in Congress was mostly due to his lack of leadership skills. Unlike Jackson, Polk was not able to inspire loyalty or fear. Polk couldn’t manipulate men and votes like Henry Clay, and he offered no political incentives, threats, or punishments. Therefore, more-and-more in Congress and DC not only ignored Polk’s wishes, but attacked him in public. And those frontal assaults in essence started with his own Secretary of State, James Buchanan, and soon word was out that Polk was an easy mark.
  However, Polk had legendary perseverance, which his political enemies vastly underestimated. Polk’s problems multiplied when General Taylor proved to be uncooperative and uncommunicative in northern Mexico. By this early stage in the war, a very touchy and sensitive Taylor already felt unappreciated and victimized. Also, General Winfield Scott (Taylor’s superior) had leaked the plans of the attack on Veracruz to the press, mostly out of vanity. So, Polk not only had problems in Congress in terms of authorizing and funding more soldiers, but his two highest-ranking generals were high-maintenance divas. And then to complicate things further, news came from New Orleans that Santa Ana was moving an army towards Taylor.

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   On 11 January 1847, the House easily passed the 10x Regiment Bill, but it became stalled in the Senate. On 27 January 1847, the Senate finally passed a “Loan Bill” for Polk’s signature (remember, there was no National Bank), and then on 30 January 1847 the Senate passed the 10x Regiment Bill by a vote of 39 - 3, after which it was sent back to the House so that chamber could consider the Senate’s amendments to the bill. All of this had taken far too long to accomplish as far as Polk was concerned.
     On 5 February 1847, debate started in the Senate on what was now called the “$3m Bill”. On 8 February 1847, Lewis Cass
informed Polk that the Senate had rejected the 10x Regiment Bill conference committee report in that many Whigs had joined Democrats that supported John C. Calhoun in opposition. However, Polk’s supporters worked the 10x Regiment Bill through the next conference committee,, after which the bill was finally passed in the Senate. After the long delays in Congress, Polk finally had the ability to go inland in Mexico with US forces.

     On 9 February 1847, Calhoun rose in the Senate and argued that the military should only take and hold what was already being called the New Mexico Territory and California. Calhoun’s rationale was that by doing so, Mexico would be forced to attack what we already possessed, which would be a quicker/better path to wrapping up the war and negotiating a favorable peace. Therefore, Calhoun was very much opposed to any military landing at Veracruz; in essence, Calhoun claimed that he knew how to fight the war better than Polk.

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      Thomas Hart Benton then stood and accused Calhoun of actually starting the Mexican War. Calhoun was President Monroe’s SecWar during the acquisition of Spanish Florida in 1819, and was an avid and vocal supporter of the annexation of Texas as President Tyler’s SecState. Calhoun’s letter coveting Texas as a future slave state further polarized the debate on the expansion of slavery in the mid-1840s. Calhoun’s rebuttal to Benton’s charges were forced, defensive, and ineffective; Benton’s attack had hit home. 
     During the last 24 hours of the lame-duck session of Congress, the $3m Bill was passed without the Wilmot Proviso by a vote of 115 - 81 in the House; Wilmot had tried to pass his proviso separately, which was in direct opposition to his promise to Polk, but it failed by five votes. One of the results of the military and funding bills being passed by Congress was that Polk now had the ability to organize to regiments and to appoint new generals, including three major generals and two brigadier generals (but no #1 Lieutenant General, since that bill was still stalled). But Congress had failed to provide any measures for additional ( and future) revenue to pay for the war (again, the US didn’t have a National Bank). For the time being, however, Polk could concentrate on being Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces as President.

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      When news traveled slowly and came in fragments, tremendous suspense resulted. During March 1847, news hit DC that Taylor had suffered a terrible defeat at the hands of Santa Anna at Saltillo (a.k.a. Buena Vista). Polk understood that, if the report was true, Taylor’s defeat could very well do in his Presidency. Taylor was supposed to remain at Monterrey, but on his own volition he decided to go south to Saltillo, which did not feature nearly as much, or as high, quality defensive positions. 
     On the second day of the battle at Saltillo, Santa Anna had flanked Taylor, and was ready to close out the engagement. At great cost, Taylor repulsed Santa Anna from flanking him on his left by using bold attacks and artillery. That night, Sanata Anna realized he no longer had his advantage and retreated from the field. In effect, Saltillo was the Iwo Jima of the Mexican War, in that there was no strategic justification for Taylor to even be in that position, and the cost of victory was great. Taylor’s army suffered 665 casualties (WIA/KIA) out of a total of 4594 soldiers, which was a casualty percentage of 14.5% . . . and, Santa Anna’s army was still intact and mobile.

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    Once more news concerning Saltillo became known (especially Santa Anna’s retreat), Taylor was celebrated as an American military hero, and the Whigs contemplated him as their Presidential candidate in 1848. Polk saw Taylor’s “victory” in a different light, since it in no way would it shorten the war. One of the KIA at Saltillo was Henry Clay, Jr, who was wounded and lying on the ground when he was bayoneted to death. Clay was almost 70 years old, had lost many family members, and hadn’t achieved the Presidency that he had truly coveted . . . and to lose his son in a war started by a protege of Andrew Jackson was a personal and political dagger to his heart. 
     By March 1847, the Abolitionist movement had reached a level of numbers and influence where Calhoun organized a Southern backlash . . . it was the birth of the Southern Democrats. Polk had no patience for either the Abolitionists or the Southern Democrats, seeing both as unpatriotic. On 9 March 1847, General Scott’s force landed 12,000 men three miles south of Veracruz without much opposition. Very soon thereafter, Veracruz and its fortress surrendered to Scott and US Naval forces. Scott shelled the city and castle fortress for three days until the Mexican commander had to quit fighting.

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     Polk needed a diplomatic envoy to accompany Scott on his way to Mexico City. SecState Buchanan suggested Nicholas Trist who was his chief clerk in the State Department and was experienced and talented. Polk decided that Trist would be the envoy unless Mexico specifically asked for Buchanan (and for what it was worth, the Cabinet agreed). Trist married Thomas Jefferson’s granddaughter, and he even helped take care of Jefferson to the end of the former President’s life. Trist befriended Andrew Jackson Donelson at West Point, and soon became part of President Jackson’s Circle of Trust. 
     Trist succeeded Donelson as Jackson’s private secretary (kind of like today’s Chief of Staff), and that was when Trist in particular became politically connected. From 1833 - 1841, Trist was US Consul in Havana, but his career trajectory turned downward after the death of President William Henry Harrison in 1841 when Tyler’s Whigs had the votes to remove him from the post. Soon thereafter, Trist attached his star to James Buchanan, and he became one of Buchanan’s most trusted men. One of Trist’s character traits was similar to Jefferson and Madison, in that he believed that Virginians were naturally superior to all other Americans; that level of certitude would come into play soon enough. Trist was empowered to spend up to $30m for the Rio Grande and what would become the Mexican Cession. The generals in Mexico were ordered to stop all hostilities if Trist succeeded in his negotiations.

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     During May 1847, Scott defeated Santa Anna at Cerro Gordo, despite Santa Ana’s superior defensive position. Santa Ana escaped by mule and left behind 3000 soldiers and $6000 in payroll. Initially, Scott and Trist didn’t get along at all, and Polk didn’t know what to do about the two vain glory-hunters. It sour relationship started when Trist arrived in Mexico but did not personally present himself to Scott w/ the proper decorum. Instead Trist sent some important documents ahead with a terse cover letter, which infuriated Scott.
     Scott communicated to Trist that there was no way he was subservient to a clerk from the State Dept. Scott also stated that he, not Trist, would be the one in charge of all the diplomacy with Mexico. Scott also wrote to DC and found a way to drag Polk into his vainglorious rants. Polk and the Cabinet wanted to replace Scott, but that was logistically a near-impossibility. Scott kept writing to DC, and it soon reached a point where he basically dared the President to remove him. While both Polk and the Cabinet believed that both Scott and Trist should be removed and disciplined, the war was at a crucial juncture, and dealing with the two divas could seriously disrupt the momentum the US currently had prosecuting the war.

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John Adams vs. Thomas Jefferson & James Madison, Part Two

11/2/2019

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  Source: Joseph J. Ellis. Founding Brothers - The Revolutionary Generation (2000)
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     During Abigail’s absence (she was ill back in Quincy, MA), on 18 February 1799 Adams announced that he was sending another delegation to France, and he did so without consulting a single Federalist. Scuttlebutt in the newspapers was that Adams made the decision because Abigail wasn’t there to talk him out of it. That decision proved to be Adams’ greatest as President in that the delegation was able to end the quasi-war with France. In addition, Adams was the first to implement one of Washington’s main points from his Farewell Address. Also, Adams’ decision established a precedent of US isolationism from European wars that would last until WW I. But Adams’ unilateral (and historically correct) decision cost him politically, in that Adams alienated himself from almost all the Federalists since his decision was viewed as pro-French. 
   Adams sent the delegation for three reasons. The first reason
centered on Hamilton, who in 1798 pressed hard for the creation of a vastly expanded Provisional Army (“New Army”) of 10,000 - 30,000 men to be ready for war against France. Adams was more-than-fine with an expanded Navy, but he saw an expanded Army as dangerous, expensive, and utterly unnecessary/useless against France. Adams came to realize that Hamilton was trying to become an American Caesar with the New Army, with the ultimate goal of installing himself as a military dictator. So, if there was no war with France, there would be no need for the New Army, which would then de-fang Hamilton. Secondly, JQA had even more intelligence than Gerry, telling his father that Talleyrand himself was eager for peace with the US, which meant that the peace delegation would ultimately be successful. Thirdly, Adams found great personal satisfaction in succeeding in the face of what both rival parties wanted, and that his decision must have been the right one since both parties railed against his action. Like President Jimmy Carter, Adams valued long-term national interest over short-term politics.

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     It wasn’t the first time that Adams had run counter to what was expected of him . . . don’t forget that Adams decided to serve as the defense attorney for the British soldiers after the Boston Massacre in 1770, and that Adams had insisted on independence a full year before others came around. At his core, Adams was an iconoclastic contrarian who relished alienation (JQA and Henry Adams, his great-grandson, exhibited the same traits). In sending the delegation to France, Adams had basically declared himself to be politically independent from both parties. 
     Where Adams saw problems that needed to be solved for the good of the nation, Jefferson and Madison saw opportunities to advance the Republican cause at the expense of the Federalists, a political party that they believed was the enemy to the principles of the Revolution. To Jefferson and Madison, it was a Zero Sum Game, in that if the Republicans gained, the Federalists lost. Even though Adams alienated himself from the Federalists, Jefferson and Madison targeted Adams in the Republican newspapers nonetheless. Jefferson and Madison had talked themselves into believing that Adams actually wanted war with France, and they also believed that Adams had fabricated the entire XYZ Affair in order to mobilize public opinion for war (Interestingly, Jefferson knew better, since he knew that Washington had endorsed Adams’ decision, but he went along with Madison). Adams did his best to isolate himself from the ideological warfare between the two parties, while Jefferson and Madison focused on building momentum at the expense of Adams and the Federalists for the Election of 1800.

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     In Jefferson’s mind, he was taking the high road, but he contracted James Callender to be his pit bull publisher to go after Adams and the Federalists in 1798 (which made it easier for Adams to sign the Alien and Sedition Acts). Jefferson complained that the debate over the Alien and Sedition bills was aimed directly at him; he admitted to Madison that he had passed information to the French government via a pro-French Republican. That being said, Jefferson truly felt that he was in the right, in that the Alien and Sedition Acts and the New Army were Federalists power grabs that violated the tenets of the Revolution.  By today’s standards, Jefferson’s actions in giving information to the French would be an impeachable offense, but Hamilton was guilty of similar actions before/during the negotiations on the Jay Treaty with Great Britain (and Hamilton’s shenanigans with Adams’ Cabinet would have landed him in jail today). During the mid-to-late-1790s, there was no political center because that center simply didn’t exist. 
    The capstone of Jefferson’s and Madison’s opposition to the Federalists were the
Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions of 1798 - 1799. Jefferson visited Madison at Montpelier on 2 & 3 July 1798 in order to discuss strategy. The Alien and Sedition Acts passed on 4 July 1798; to the Federalists, it was the perfect day-and-way to celebrate the nation’s independence. During August/September 1798, Jefferson worked alone at Monticello in order to write the Kentucky Resolutions (in effect, Jefferson was a ghostwriter using the Kentucky state legislature as his publisher). Jefferson took what would become the classic states’ rights position, arguing that a state had the right to interpret, and then if desired, nullify an Act of Congress (and if ultimately necessary . . . secede). Fortunately for Jefferson, the Kentucky state legislature removed the passages concerning overt nullification and secession, in that such open defiance of federal authority was deemed too risky given the current political landscape.

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     Madison’s more judicious Virginia Resolutions claimed that the Alien and Sedition Acts violated the 1st Amendment. Madison went on to argue that the federal courts, not the states, were the ultimate arbiters of the Constitution. Jefferson’s arguments became the core gospel of the Confederacy in 1861, whereas Madison’s arguments trended towards judicial review. After a personal visit from Madison in September 1799, Jefferson softened his stand on secession, once again deferring to Madison’s judgment. Madison’s intervention may have saved Jefferson’s political future while also concealing a large difference in their interpretations of the Constitution relative to states’ rights. 
     The desire to project a unified Republican front against the Federalists trumped any differences Jefferson and Madison had over the question of where sovereignty should be located in the new republic. Jefferson and Madison had the extra advantage in that they didn’t have to do too much to tear down the Federalists, since the Federalists were doing a nice job of going down the road to ruin enforcing the Alien and Sedition Acts. Had the Election of 1800 in the Electoral College occurred a week or two later, Adams may have defeated Jefferson in that the news of the treaty that ended the quasi-war with France arrived after the election, and too late to help Adams. 

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     The expense of the New Army strained the federal budget to the point where the federal government needed new revenue, which meant that the cost of raising the New Army would be the responsibility of the voting public, but that revelation came too late to help Adams as well. Adams didn’t receive the political rewards that he deserved, and he took the blame for things that had been initiated/done by others. When Napoleon took power in France in 1799, Jefferson flipped his view on France on a dime, and went down the same path of neutrality as Washington and Adams had done. 
 In the end, the maneuverings/shenanigans of Aaron Burr in New York that gave Jefferson 12 Electoral Votes proved to be the difference in the Election of 1800 (Jefferson 73; Adams 65). Too late to have made a difference in the election as Hamilton’s 54 page diatribe against Adams in a pamphlet (Hamilton saw Adams as the villain that denied him glory as an American Caesar). Hamilton showed the deep divisions within the Federalists, and that he was out of his mind; writing that pamphlet was just as reckless as deciding to face Burr in The Duel.
     Jefferson saw his victory as a recovery (renewal) of the principles of the Revolutionary War. It turned out that Adams had it wrong, in that he could have separated the long-term collective national interest from partisan politics if he had chosen to do so, which in effect lost him re-election. Now that Jefferson was President, he no could no longer claim to be above the (political) fray. Meanwhile, Adams had to move to the new Presidential mansion in the new capital while the House of Representatives tried to sort out the tie in the Electoral College
between Jefferson and Burr (each received 73 Electoral Votes). Adams and Jefferson didn’t exchange another word for twelve years . . .

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John Adams & Thomas Jefferson: A Renewed Friendship

11/2/2019

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  Source: Joseph J. Ellis. Founding Brothers - The Revolutionary Generation (2000)
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    From early-1801 to late-1810, John Adams was at his farm stewing and lamenting the elevated mythological status of seemingly every figure of the Revolutionary Era except for him. Adams was especially piqued over the star status that had been conveyed upon Thomas Jefferson, whom Adams saw as a junior partner during the Revolutionary War. Benjamin Rush, a close friend of Adams, exchanged many letters in the first decade of the century with the former President. Rush did his best to get Adams and Jefferson to renew their correspondence. Adams broke the silence with a short letter to Jefferson dated 1 January 1811; by then, Adams’ never-ending vanity was under enough control for him to reach out. That first letter by Adams led to 158 letters between the two men over the next 14 years; that correspondence renewed their friendship. 
     What motivated Adams to write that initial letter, and then write twice as many to Jefferson as Jefferson wrote to him? Adams believed that Jefferson’s version of what the Revolution meant, though misguided, would dominate history. Adams knew that his letters to Jefferson would afford him the ability to get his version on the historical record. Both men knew they were writing letters for posterity as well as to each other.  Second, Adams’ letters to Jefferson meant that he could join Jefferson as the co-star of the Revolution in a “Final Act”, which just might elevate Adams’ status/mythology and be his ticket to historical immortality. Adding to the historical luster of these letters was that both men died within five hours of each other on 4 July 1826 on the 50th anniversary of the young nation.

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      Most of their letters were over safe subjects that both could write voluminously. Readers of the letters may be surprised that Adams held his own with Jefferson in terms of prose/style, in part because Adams was more heavily invested in the correspondence than Jefferson (Adams’ more aggressive exclamatory temperament also came through). One can almost visualize Jefferson, lean and standing tall waxing eloquent, while the shorter rotund Adams circled around him, pointing/gesturing and occasionally grabbing his friend by the lapels to make a point. During the first few years of their correspondence, Adams did fly off the handle somewhat, for example lamenting the overall downsizing of the US Navy before the War of 1812 under Jefferson’s watch. Jefferson was very shrewd in that in at least one letter he blamed the Hamiltonians for the rupture between the two men. In other letters, Jefferson hinted that it wasn’t the fault of Adams that he had been caught in the crossfire between the two political parties.  Jefferson knew, then and during their correspondence, that Adams was not a “real” Federalist; again and again, it was Jefferson that diffused Adams’ criticisms during their correspondence. ​
     In 1813, the letters changed tone, in that they became more focused on their competing versions of what the Revolution meant plus their historical legacies, and in the process, mutual trust between the two had been recovered, which opened up their dialog even further. On 15 July 1813, Abigail Adams attached a note of her own to her husband’s letter; it was the first time she had written Jefferson since she had really let him have it years prior. That attached note was the surest sign possible to Jefferson that he had been truly forgiven by both Adams. John Adams typically set the intellectual agenda for the correspondence, while Jefferson preferred to provide the larger framework for their debate to play out. Jefferson wrote that they had fought together against the British, served together in Europe as the dynamic duo of diplomats, then returned to serve their nation again in the new federal government. 


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   Jefferson saw the world in terms of clashing dichotomies, and due to the correspondence, Adams found himself on the same side as Jefferson, which he knew would be historically appealing. To Jefferson, the Federalists had been the “New Tories in Town”, and Jefferson knew (and now appreciated) that Adams had stood up to the Federalists on his own volition. By 1813, Adams finally had a venue/target in which to focus his immense firepower in writing to Jefferson. For Jefferson, the episodic ramblings of Adams fit perfectly with his temperament during those years in that he loved to revisit topics in no particular order, which allowed for a thematic overview. 
     From 1813 into 1814, the running argument in their letters focused on their different definitions of social equality and the role of the Elites in running the federal government. Adams was all-in on the “few” not only having the power, but those “few” (Elites) were the only ones that were deserving and that could be trusted. Jefferson’s point of view was that the Elites have a leading role, but it should be based on merit, not inherited as in an aristocracy. Ironically during their estranged years, Adams, the son of a New England farmer/shoe maker had been accused of having aristocratic leanings by Jefferson, who owned 10,000 acres and 200+ slaves, most of which he inherited. In his letters, Adams was more than happy to include Jefferson as a member of what he called the “natural aristocracy” of the Revolution.

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    Jefferson understood, where Adams did not, that the very word aristocracy was a four letter word in the US during/after the Revolutionary War in that to most it meant a violation of the war’s sacred principles. Jefferson also understood that the only Elites that would be tolerated by the people were those that repudiated aristocracy (Elitism) while claiming to speak for the masses. Jefferson and James Madison and the Republicans grasped that fact in the 1790s, and shrewdly used it against the Federalists. The Federalists, no more-or-less elite than the Republicans, simply didn’t grasp that concept/trend, and they went down the road to political ruin. As long as Adams clung to the word “aristocracy”, to many Americans he seemed to be denying a major principle of the Revolution.
   Starting in 1815, Adams and Jefferson added their views on the French Revolution to their correspondence. Ironically, it was Jefferson that first brought up the subject, and did so in conciliatory fashion, telling Adams that his prophecies on France proved better than his. Jefferson also acknowledged that Adams’ critical view of the French Revolution had been the major cause of his unpopularity as President (it was the nicest possible way to tell Adams that he had been historically correct, but not politically correct). Now that Napoleon had been defeated, Jefferson graciously admitted that Adams was owed an (historical) apology. It may not look like much today, but to those from the Revolutionary War Era, Jefferson’s admission was not only a huge reversal of perspective, but he also admitted that he was wrong on something he and the Republicans had been all-in on in the 1790s. In effect, Jefferson admitted to Adams that he had used the French Revolution as a political weapon to undermine Adams’ Presidency. Adams was gracious in his response, writing that Jefferson had simply misread the French Revolution instead of manipulating it for political advantage.

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    It wasn’t until the debate over the “Missouri Question” in 1819 that slavery became part of their letters (they had agreed beforehand to not broach the subject). Adams was the calmer of the two on the topic compared to Jefferson, which was not surprising. Jefferson couldn’t believe that the issue was even being debated in Congress . . . Jefferson knew that the constitutional argument over the authority of the federal government on slavery was a potential powderkeg for the nation. Adams wrote to others that he was glad that the debate on the expansion of slavery was taking place. Down the road, Jefferson’s position would be recognized as Popular Sovereignty, while Adams’ position would be recognized as a “House Divided Cannot Stand”. Nationwide, applying the tenets of the Revolution to slavery only led to contradictory intentions and perspectives. 
    The tradition established in Congress in 1790 (spearheaded by James Madison) concerning the debate on slavery was that of silence and avoidance, and that was what Jefferson thought should continue in 1819 - 1820. Adams kept his vow of silence concerning the debate on slavery in his letters with Jefferson, letting Jefferson rant on the topic on his own terms. In 1820, their correspondence shifted back to focusing on nostalgia; it still bothered Adams that 4 July 1776 had become THE seminal Revolutionary moment. Adams knew full well that it had been a culmination of moments, such as in 15 May 1776 when the Continental Congress called for each state to write their own constitutions (of course Adams had drafted and submitted that resolution. Abigail died in October 1818, and the process of aging crowded out the likelihood of any controversial topics being brought up by either men (By 1823, references to the scandals of the 1790s had become the basis for jokes between the two). In 1824 - 1825, When Lafayette made his triumphant tour of America (the future 6th President, Adams’ son John Quincy Adams, had been among those responsible for making Lafayette’s tour happen), Quincy, Massachusetts and Monticello were required stops for Lafayette, who whose presence further solidified the historical status of John Adams as a major Revolutionary figure in the eyes of Americans in the mid-1820s. 

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The Burr-Hamilton Duel: A Deeper Understanding II

9/1/2019

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  Source: Joseph J. Ellis. Founding Brothers - The Revolutionary Generation (2000)
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     After the Burr-Hamilton Duel, dueling came to be on its way out among the political elites, and it also presented a lesson on how not to go about one’s business before/during a duel. The Duel represented a momentary breakdown in the pattern of nonviolent conduct among America’s prominent political leaders during the Revolutionary Era. The struggle between the leading politicians in America after the Revolutionary War was hyper-passionate but not violent; The Duel proved to be the exception.
    In the world of Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson and John Adams were his main political enemies, but fellow New Yorker Aaron Burr had been Hamilton’s chief rogue since 1789. Since that year, Hamilton had focused most of his distinctive venom on Burr, but since Burr kept his own counsel and didn’t keep documents for posterity (e.g. personal letters or a diary), it’s impossible to know what Burr thought of Hamilton over those same years.
    What bothered Hamilton the most about Burr was that Burr kept positioning himself to be available and useful based on which way the political winds blew. To Hamilton, that meant that Burr didn’t stand for anything other than advancing his own political opportunities (and worse yet, Burr wasn’t even trying to disguise his intentions). To Hamilton, Burr was the antithesis of George Washington, valuing his own ambition and interests over what was good for the nation. In many ways, Hamilton had to admit that he shared many of the same qualities that he so despised in Burr, but in Hamilton’s opinion, Burr had failed every test thrown at him, while Hamilton had risen above the challenges presented to him.
    By the Summer of 1804, Hamilton and Burr were beyond politically frustrated in that both knew they were past their political peak since Jefferson was President, and worse yet for Hamilton, the Federalists were fading. So it’s very possible that Hamilton and Burr appeared at their arranged “interview” since both wished to still be regarded as politically relevant, deserving to be in the same company as such Revolutionary Era leaders as Thomas Jefferson
and James Madison.

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     The Question: what had Hamilton done in order to be challenged to a duel under the code duello? Hamilton had at least one chance to diffuse the situation after he received Burr’s initial challenge letter, but the former Secretary of the Treasury chose not to do so. Among the charges in Burr’s letter was that Hamilton had described Burr as “despicable” and “dangerous”, both universally accepted “duel words”. Hamilton could have simply responded to Burr that he never actually described Burr in the manner he had been told, and expressed regret that matters had reached the point they had, and then Burr would have had no choice but to let the affair of honor drop.
    Hamilton, under the advice of who would be his second at The Duel, Nathaniel Pendleton, sent Burr a letter that only “sort-of” apologized, claiming that Hamilton’s derogatory comments concerning Burr were political, not personal. It was at that point that Burr could have shrugged his shoulders at let the matter drop, but Burr chose to continue down the path towards the field of honor. Burr told Hamilton that he refused to settle for anything other than an unqualified blanket apology for all the bad things that Hamilton had ever said concerning Burr. Although Burr and Hamilton exchanged more letters, Hamilton found himself trapped in Burr’s web.
  On 27 June 1804, Burr’s patience ran out, and arrangements were made for both men to face each other on the field of honor. Hamilton’s actions before the duel appeared to be those of a man that finally understood that his past political actions/words had perhaps been too harsh. Hamilton also thought the odds of actually being killed in the duel were fairly low, but he wrote a “just in case I’m killed in the duel” letter where he stated that in no way did he want to shoot Burr, and that he if he fired his weapon, he would miss intentionally. Hamilton most likely wasn’t suicidal but regretful, more meditative than fatalistic.

     Hamilton went to the field of honor since he couldn’t take back all the bad things he had said/written about Burr in the last 15 years because it would be lying, and therefore dishonorable. Hamilton knew that whatever was left of his political life would have gone up in smoke had he apologized to Burr, and Hamilton was nowhere near ready to retire from public life. Hamilton went to the duel with a mix of ambition and insecurity, while Burr went to Weehawken (NJ) out of sheer frustration.

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     Hamilton was the party that was challenged, so he had the right to choose the pistols to be used. Hamilton selected a set of pistols that had been used in the death of his son, Philip, in a duel in 1801 (the death of his son weighed heavily on Hamilton, since he had encouraged his son to participate in the duel; that duel has also fed the “Guilt Trip” theory why Hamilton went down the path towards the duel; ironically that duel occurred at nearly the same spot as The Duel).
    What Hamilton knew, and Burr did not, was that the pistols had a concealed mechanism that gave the pistol a hair trigger. Without setting the mechanism, it took 20 pounds of pressure to fire the pistol, but with the hair trigger, it took only 1 pound of pressure. That being said, Hamilton told Pendleton to not set the hair trigger “this time”. The pistols were .54 caliber smooth bore weapons, and while large and powerful, the pistol wasn’t very accurate. Under the agreed-upon rules, if one fired before the other when the signal to fire was given, then the second of the one that hadn’t fired would count “1-2-3-Fire!”; if the duelist didn’t fire within that count he lost his turn. If both sides fired and missed, there would have been a mini-conference among Hamilton, Burr, and their seconds as to whether-or-not to continue.
    Hamilton and Burr took their positions, and Hamilton took out his eyeglasses and practiced aiming his pistol at Burr, which didn’t seem to be the actions of a man that intended to not fire or to miss; Burr took the delay in stride and waited. It was the next 4 to 5 seconds that will never be completely sorted out. Hamilton knew he had been hit with a mortal shot from Burr, and Burr was surprised and regretful with the result of his shot. Burr wanted to approach Hamilton and speak to him, but Burr’s second, William Van Ness, refused to allow him to do so, in effect for “plausible deniability”.

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   The overwhelming popular opinion in America was that Burr had murdered Hamilton in cold blood. The newspapers had all sorts of fake news associated with The Duel, such as Burr had worn a bullet-proof suit. Facing criminal charges as well as public scorn, Burr went south to Georgia. Van Ness and Pendleton agreed that both Burr and Hamilton had acted with honor during The Duel, and that both had fired their pistols, and that both shots were not simultaneous, which created an interval of a 'few seconds" between the shots.
    Neither Van Ness or Pendleton could agree on how many seconds passed, but they agreed that a discernible amount of time had passed, which makes the “official” Hamilton account of The Duel hard to digest. The crux of the Hamilton version was that Burr fired first, which had been fed by the knowledge of Hamilton’s letter where he wrote he wasn’t going to fire at Burr. Therefore, according to the Hamilton version, that meant that Burr fired first at Hamilton when Hamilton’s pistol wasn’t aimed at Burr. According to this version, Hamilton fired his weapon after he had been hit by Burr’s shot. For the Hamilton version to be true, the shots needed to be simultaneous, and they were not. Burr’s account also had problems, but was far more compatible in terms of the agreed-upon “few seconds”. According to Van Ness, Hamilton aimed at Burr and fired his pistol, but missed.

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    Burr waited for the smoke to clear from Hamilton’s shot that missed him (but apparently not by much) and waited for Pendleton to start the count of “1-2-3-Fire”. But Pendleton’s focus was entirely on Hamilton, and Burr took it upon himself to fire rather than take a chance that he would lose his shot. The Hamilton version needed Hamilton to be a martyr that never wanted to shoot Burr, and the Burr version needed to claim that Burr acted with honor within the rules of the code duello after risking his life in the face of Hamilton’s shot.
   But both versions have distortions: Hamilton fired his pistol first and he fired intentionally, but he almost certainly aimed to miss (which explained the severed branch in the tree above-and-behind Burr). So Hamilton did not withhold his shot as his apologists later claimed based on the letter. But Burr had no idea about Hamilton’s pledge not to fire in his letter, and he knew that he had just been shot at by Hamilton. According to the rules of the code duello, Burr had every right to shoot at Hamilton, but by killing Hamilton, Burr gained nothing and lost everything, which lends credence to the argument that Burr missed his shot as well, but he hit Hamilton with his missed shot. What Burr was thinking during those “few seconds” he took with him to his grave.

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Clay & Calhoun: Slavery and the Election of 1844

8/8/2019

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                         Source: H.W. Brands. Heirs of the Founders (2017)
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    The African slave population in the US according to the 1840 census was 2.5 million out of a total population of 17 million. In terms of the number of slaves, Virginia had the most, followed by South Carolina, and then basically a tie for third with North Carolina, Alabama, and Georgia. However, Virginia’s slave population in 1840 was smaller compared to 1830. In comparison, the slave populations in the Gulf Coast states were rapidly increasing due to the rising global demand for cotton. In VA, tobacco had worn out the soil, but that wasn’t the case with the states on the Gulf Coast. Jackson’s military campaigns against the Natives before, during, and after the War of 1812 opened up vast tracts of land for the Planter class in the Gulf Coast.
    The Second Middle Passage soon occurred, meaning that a mass forced migration of African slaves from states such VA to the Gulf Coast occurred. Planters in VA remained viable in large part because they had what planters in the Gulf Coast badly needed . . . slaves. Demand for slaves in the Gulf Coast soon became insatiable, and the value of slaves on large plantations exceeded the value of everything else on the plantation. Slaves were used as collateral for loans, which meant that any thought of freeing slaves were off the table until the debt had been paid. So, by the early-1840s, Southern states were beyond all-in in terms of keeping slavery, and also all-in with their opposition to even the hint of emancipation.

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     Planters in the East ironically supported and sought protections in the form of abolishing the slave trade, which meant that the price of slaves remained high, to their benefit. So while the planters in the Gulf Coast had the land, the planters in the East still had tremendous political clout. Due to the economics of the increased demand for cotton, and therefore slaves, the Southern desire for expanding slavery west was great.
    In time, the Gulf Coast would have more than enough slaves, and the value of slaves would regress to market value. However, before that point was reached, there was the issue of the Republic of Texas and other territories being added as slave states. The rising value of slaves led to Free Blacks being kidnapped if they were in a precarious situation, and it reached the point where Free Blacks just minding their own business in the North were taken against their will.

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     Calhoun still had political ambitions, though he could not really define them. Becoming President was no longer a possibility, and his estrangement from the two major political parties left him on the outside-looking-in. However, the death of WHH and the ascension of Tyler opened things up a bit for Calhoun, in that Tyler was only a Whig in name only. The proud Calhoun was not going to take anything less in the government than SecState, and Tyler was not going to get rid of SecState Webster, who had stood by the President.
    But Webster decided to step down after the Senate ratified the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, and event then Calhoun was passed over for SecState; Tyler nominated a fellow Virginian, Abel Upshur. Tyler figured he didn’t need to add to his already bulging list of political enemies by bringing Calhoun into his Cabinet. Upshur, like Tyler, was in favor of the annexation of Texas, and Upshur was quietly weaving his magic in the Senate, winning over even Thomas Hart Benton . . .and then tragedy struck. Over 400 DC dignitaries were on board the USS Princeton on an inspection cruise on the Potomac River. The ship had the largest gun on board any ship at that time, and it was nicknamed the “Peacemaker”.  Two mighty blasts from the gun were ordered, and were heard from ten miles away. President Tyler and the other dignitaries, once they got their hearing back, had lunch on the deck.

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     Later, as the Princeton was near Mount Vernon, the captain ordered the gun fired to honor Washington. The 400 dignitaries were scattered all over the ship, on and below deck when the captain pulled the lanyard to fire the gun. There was too much powder in the gun, whether by order or miscalculation, and when it fired searing flame and shrapnel blew to the side, and among the few instantly killed was SecState Upshur.  Tyler had been below deck and was coming up the ladder when the explosion occurred, escaping death by a few seconds.
    The tragedy on board the Princeton was significant, in that Tyler needed to find a new SecState, and the odds were low that he would find someone as skilled as Upshur in terms of working to annex Texas quietly . . . and Tyler needed to find a new SecState quickly. Tyler’s only real ally in Congress wrote Calhoun that SecState was his, and that he just needed to head to DC to make it official. However, Tyler did not know about the letter, and was aghast when he found out what had happened. As Tyler feared, Upshur’s careful work in massaging the annexation of Texas through Congress was undone the moment Calhoun became SecState, in that now opponents of Calhoun in Congress saw conspiracy concerning Texas.

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      Calhoun not only wanted Texas admitted as a slave state, but also international recognition of the moral righteousness and permanent legitimacy of slavery . . . and maybe another chance at the Presidency. Where Upshur worked quietly and behind the scenes, Calhoun banged the drums of Texas annexation as loudly has he could in order to place the focus on the expansion of slavery, whereas Upshur focused on closing a “real estate deal”.  In short order, the annexation treaty in the Senate was doomed, in that there was nowhere near the 2/3’s necessary to annex Texas, which Calhoun knew would happen. Calhoun also knew that one could become President with much less that 2/3’s of a popular vote.
    Clay still had his eyes on the White House, and he made the most of his break with Tyler in the Whigs. Clay resigned his seat in the Senate in the Spring of 1842 to rest, but also to ponder a final run for President. Clay gambled that if he was out of the spotlight for an appropriate amount of time, he might gain support and votes. Soon enough, Clay was the only Whig mentioned as a legitimate Presidential candidate.


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    In early-1844, Clay toured the South, and talked about everything except Texas. Clay discovered that the South was less opposed to protection (a protective tariff) as it was a decade earlier. Clay’s theme was compromise over confrontation, and Clay might have been successful in putting Texas on the backburner if it wasn’t for SecState Calhoun. Public support for the annexation of Texas, an independent nation since 1836, increased when former President Andrew Jackson weighed in. Jackson didn’t want Britain to gain any foothold in or with Texas, and Jackson demanded that the Democrats make Texas their top priority.
    Former President Martin Van Buren, who was pursuing the Democratic nomination, didn’t want to alienate Northerners, and Jackson abruptly rescinded his support of his first protege and swung it to his second protege, fellow Tennessean James Knox Polk. At the Democratic National Convention, the Dark Horse candidate Polk (who had only planned on pursuing VP) prevailed, and he made it clear that he was all-in on annexing Texas as well as further expansion West. Clay had expected to run against MVB, but now Clay had to restructure his stance on Texas. softening his previous statements against annexation. As before, Clay now found himself exposed and politically vulnerable by moving towards the middle. Clay’s moderate position on slavery cost him Michigan and New York, barely losing both states, and giving the very close election to Polk.

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Clay, Calhoun, and Webster: The Compromise of 1850, Part One

8/8/2019

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                           Source: H.W. Brands. Heirs of the Founders (2017)
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     The Whigs did not ostracize Daniel Webster for staying on board as President John Tyler’s Secretary of State for awhile, but many in the party thought that he made a serious mistake by not resigning in a time frame of their liking. There was nothing devious about Webster’s actions, but Clay and his Whig followers pounced nonetheless, openly questioning Webster’s loyalty to the party. Webster pondered retirement from politics, but financially he could not do so, and he still felt he had a mission to fulfill. Once again elected to the Senate from Massachusetts, Webster made sure that he stood for the Union and the Constitution when so many in the nation didn’t seem to be doing so.
    Webster continued to oppose the annexation of Texas, and agreed with many others in government that if Texas was added as a state, war with Mexico would be the result. Webster kept questioning the idea that the Three-Fifths Compromise in the Constitution should apply to any additional slave state, and he openly opposed the idea of even adding slave states. Webster was actually behind the times in that the North had long before acquiesced in terms of agreeing to additional slave states with the Missouri Compromise (1820). The election of James Knox Polk in 1844 guaranteed the annexation of Texas, which was a development that hadn’t yet truly registered with Webster. Polk’s election also put the final nail in the coffin of Calhoun’s Presidential hopes, but Calhoun angled to claim that Texas had been annexed on his watch as SecState, in that the lame duck Tyler could be the President that annexed Texas.

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    There was nowhere near a 2/3’s majority in the Senate to annex Texas, so Tyler and Calhoun chose the route of a joint resolution in both houses which only required simple majorities. The disadvantage of that strategy was that nobody knew for certain if annexing Texas via a joint resolution was constitutional. The US had never before annexed an independent nation, and Texas would be a slave state. The Constitution itself was silent on the matter of adding territory, but that didn’t stop President Thomas Jefferson, who, based on the advice of John Quincy Adams, used the treaty process in the Senate to officially add the Louisiana Territory.
    The joint resolution on annexing Texas passed on 2 March 1845, a couple of days before Tyler’s term as President ended. In the succeeding months, Texas had to ratify annexation, and then write a constitution that would pass muster in Congress. Webster, knowing that Texas statehood was a fait accompli, spoke out in opposition nonetheless; Texas was added as the 28th state in December 1845, which moved the US and Mexico closer to war. 
    President Polk’s war with Mexico was a land-grab packages as self-defense due to a border dispute between the Nueces and Rio Grande Rivers. Polk wanted to add California as well, but was rebuffed when no Mexican official of consequence would even meet with his envoy, John Slidell. Polk sent troops under the command of General Zachary Taylor to the Rio Grande to provoke an attack by Mexico, but Mexico wouldn’t take the bait for many weeks.

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     President Polk had a flimsy war message ready to sent Congress when Mexico crossed the Rio Grande, which allowed Polk to claim that Amerian blood had been shed on America soil by the Mexican army. Polk wanted unilateral control and authority to wage war (which Congress gave LBJ with the Tonkin Resolution), but among others, Calhoun refused to be stampeded to war. Calhoun and others were only able to slightly slow the march towards war in the Senate.
    The only real opposition to the war in Congress came from the Whigs, but Polk understood that in creating a situation in which he could claim US blood was shed on US soil, there was no way that the war could be stopped. Webster did his best to dodge the entire issue, since his constituents and conscience opposed the war, but he knew the price the Federalists paid for opposing the War of 1812, so when the vote was taken in the Senate, Webster was not in the chamber. But Webster reserved the right to complain as sis others such as Congressman David Wilmot (PA), whose Wilmot Proviso twice passed the House and twice failed in the Senate, but it became the lighting rod for the expansion of slavery west.
    Webster knew that unlike Clay and Calhoun, he still had a chance at the Presidency, and since Polk had in essence declared that he would only serve one term, the Election of 1848 seemed to be wide open. Almost by default, Webster had become the leading Whig in terms of Presidential timbre, which meant that Webster couldn’t risk alienating the various Whig factions, so he tried to walk the political fence on slavery. ​

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     General Zachary Taylor’s successes in the Mexican War, in particular Buena Vista, catapulted him into the conversation for Whig nomination in 1848. Although Polk didn’t plan to run again, he disliked the idea that Taylor could use his military success in the war as a platform to propel himself and the Whigs to the White House. In part to blunt Taylor’s political momentum, Polk positioned General Winfield Scott (and Taylor’s superior officer), to be the main war hero by landing at Vera Cruz and taking the war to Mexico City. Scott was also a Whig, but Polk gambled that two Whig war heroes would split the party in 1848, which would benefit the Democrats. On the sidelines, Webster hoped that the division of military fame and credit between Taylor and Scott would work in his favor for the Whig nomination.
    Polk’s envoy to Mexico City, Nicholas Trist, in essence decided to negotiate his own treaty with the Mexican government in defiance of Polk’s orders, which infuriated Polk to the point where he explored the possibility of taking all of Mexico. The US was tiring of the war, and the possibility that Taylor and Scott could become even more popular if he kept prosecuting the war led Polk to grudgingly decide to send Trist’s treaty to the Senate for ratification.
    The Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo (a.k.a. the Mexican Cession) provided that potentially seven states could be added to the US, which meant 14 Senators, equal to New England’s contingent, but the population of those states would not even equal that of Vermont. Webster and the other Senators that opposed the treaty were outvoted by a total of 38 - 14, and the ratified treaty went into effect on 4 July 1848 (during the process, Congressman John Quincy Adams died in the Capitol on 23 February 1848).

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     If communication was faster in 1848, then Mexico would have known about gold in California before negotiations with Nicholas Trist ended. But the news didn’t reach Mexico City until it war far too late, and it didn’t reach Washington, D.C. until after the Senate had ratified the treaty. The California Gold Rush turned the territory of California into perhaps the most diverse region in Earth, but Americans were by far the largest in number. It was beyond obvious that California needed a government as soon as possible and that it would be a free state since it didn’t have the necessary climate/terrain for plantations. California’s effort for quick statehood was the impetus for what became known as the Compromise of 1850.
    By 1849, Henry Clay was 73 years old and feeling poorly, and consumption would claim him before long. Clay assumed that his political life was over, and he had retired, like Jefferson at Monticello, to his happy place outside of Lexington (KY). Clay had many visitors, which he enjoyed entertaining and being flattered and complimented, but he also valued that those visitors kept him updated on what was going on in DC. Clay had meant to leave the affairs of the nation in the hands of the New Guard, but after the death of his son, Clay figured that the best tonic for his grief was to head back to the DC trenches, unsure if his health could stand the stress. Yet again, Kentucky elected Clay to the Senate, and outside of Calhoun and Webster, only a few from his generation remained in Congress.

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     Clay, ever the main-in-the-middle, had a much tougher time finding that ever-shrinking middle in Congress. Clay was an advocate of gradual emancipation liked to colonizing freed slaves in Africa, but Clay’s recommendation failed, and he was seen as an enemy by most Southerners. What Clay was really after was time, not emancipation, when he addressed the Senate in January 1850, where he formally introduced his compromise via a series of proposed resolutions. The first resolution was that California be admitted as a free state, the second wanted to establish one-or-more territorial governments in the remaining areas taken from Mexico. Other resolutions proposed the ban of the African Slave Trade in DC, and what would eventually become the Fugitive Slave Act. In total, Clay previewed eight resolutions.
    Clay hoped to mount his usual behind the scenes magic to get the resolutions passed, but the uproar in response to his floor speech meant that he had to be public in his defense of his resolutions, which he did on
5 & 6 February 1850. Clay argued that CA becoming a free state did not violate the Missouri Compromise as Southerners claimed. Clay argued that the 36/30 line did not guarantee slavery south of the line, but merely allowed it while forbidding slavery north of the line. Clay stated that slavery was being barred in CA by Californians, not Congress, and if Virgina voted to end slavery, or Ohio voted to have slavery, Congress would be powerless to act in either case. For the return of fugitive slaves, Clay vigorously agreed with the South, but in almost the same breath Clay stated that there was no constitutional right for secession.

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     Calhoun was not moved by Clay’s appeal for the Union above all else, and was also unimpressed with Clay’s proposed resolution concerning fugitive slaves. Calhoun wanted nothing to do with Clay’s compromise. Calhoun’s consumption was much further along than Clay’s, and he simply didn’t have the ability to stand and directly rebut Clay on the Senate floor. Days later, however, In early-March 1850, Calhoun dragged himself to the Senate where Senator James Mason (VA) read Calhoun’s missive.
   According to Calhoun, it was the actions and agitations of the radical Abolitionists that were the main threat to the Union, not the South. Calhoun went on to say that Clay’s proposed compromise would not save the Union, and that CA as a free state was totally unacceptable. Calhoun claimed that Clay wanted compromise, but he was after justice. Calhoun blamed the Missouri Compromise for leading the nation astray as well as placing the South in jeopardy, and that any compromise must first deal with the damage done by the Missouri Compromise (e.g. repeal). Calhoun demanded that the North must give the South the right to track down fugitive slaves as well as crack down on the radical Abolitionists.

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Clay, Calhoun, and Webster: The Compromise of 1850, Part Two

8/8/2019

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                       Source: H.W. Brands. Heirs of the Founders (2017)
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    The most daunting task of Webster’s political career awaited him; after Calhoun’s diatribe, it seemed that there was no hope for compromise since many in the Senate assumed that Calhoun had simply chosen secession as his solution. Webster wasn’t ready to reply to Calhoun right away, telling fellow Senators that he would respond in a couple of days. Webster spoke on the Senate floor on 7 March 1850, and expectations were incredibly high after the speeches of Clay and Calhoun.
    Webster started by reviewing the history of how the North and South had reached the current crisis. Webster then went on to say that he wished others shared his level of tolerance since those that did not on all sides were the reason why the nation had reached such a precarious moment. Webster mentioned that when the Constitution was written, both the North and South had similar perspectives concerning slavery, seeing it as at least a necessary evil, and had tolerated it because at that time slavery seemed to be on the decline. Webster pointed out that the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 had the entire support of the South, but that was before the cotton gin (1793) and the expansion of the Cotton Kingdom.

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     Webster refuted Calhoun’s assertion that the federal government had been pro-North in recent years, arguing that if anything, the government had enabled the South with the addition of 9 slave states. The annexation of Texas showed that things were going the South’s way for sure, Webster stated.  Webster caused a stir in the audience when he said he did not support the Wilmot Proviso, which in effect meant he was defying the Massachusetts state legislature that sent him to the Senate, contradicting his earlier vote in favor of the measure, and breaking ranks with the North as well as most of his fellow Whigs. Webster ignored the fuss and kept speaking.
    On the topic of fugitive slaves, Webster agreed with Clay and Calhoun, saying that the South was right and the North was wrong, and the gasps in the Senate were audible. Webster argued that Congress had the power to enact a fugitive slave provision, and it seemed to Northerners that Webster was in league with the slave catchers. Webster went on to say that Abolitionist societies caused more harm than good. Webster attributed positive motives on their end, but Webster stated that the negative consequences of their actions far exceeded any benefit in terms of their principles.


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     Webster went on to say that due to the machinations of the Abolitionists, the South created even more restrictions on their slaves and dug into their trenches even further. Webster said that the grievances from both the North and South should be acknowledged, but hey should not be encouraged, especially in the form of justifying disunion. Webster went on to say there was no such possibility as a peaceful secession. Webster didn’t want to finish on a grim note, and he said that it was the duty of all assembled, at this crucial turning point, to do their best to keep the Union going.
    Webster’s speech stunned the Senate and outraged New England, who in no way believed that the defense of slavery should be tolerated. It became conventional wisdom in the North that Webster was trying to position himself for a run at the Presidency in 1852, and Northern Whigs were highly motivated to do whatever they could to deny Webster the nomination. It reached the point where Calhoun was portrayed in a more honorable light than Webster because Calhoun didn’t stab his supporters in the back. It was difficult to tell whether Webster’s support of Clay’s compromise did any good for several weeks, in part because Calhoun died on 31 March 1850; Calhoun’s death deprived the opposition to Clay’s compromise its most powerful voice.

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     A second death came into play: President Zachary Taylor died of natural causes. Taylor was in opposition to Clay’s compromise, in large part because HE viewed himself the leader of the Whigs, not Clay. Clay had not asked or deferred to him on party matters, and Taylor felt upstaged by Clay. Taylor’s death left Clay the unchallenged leader of the Whigs, which meant the odds of his compromise moving forward greatly increased. Clay had been convinced to combine his resolutions into an omnibus bill, and with President Millard Fillmore, a veto was basically off the table.  
    A first term Democratic Senator from Illinois, Stephen Douglas, found majorities in the Senate for various parts of the bill. When Clay returned after the sweltering summer, he found that Douglas had done all the necessary work and all that really needed to be done was to get the bill to Fillmore. Clay believed that the Compromise of 1850 had bought the nation time, maybe 20 years, and by then, Clay hoped the sectional discord would be defused.

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     The Fugitive Slave Act greatly polarized the already existing tensions, in that it shifted the burden of proof from the slave hunters to the alleged escapees. Also, the act compelled the cooperation of Northern law enforcement and civilians, and miscarriages of justice under the act would result in many acts of kidnapping innocent Free Blacks.
    Southerners resented the Compromise of 1850, since with the admission of CA the North had a +2 advantage in the Senate, and with the political martyrdom of Calhoun, the idea of secession gained momentum. Clay’s compromise further agitated both the North and South, and both regions held Clay responsible as Abolitionism grew more powerful and influential. Clay watched as the anger grew worse, but he was powerless to stop it this time; Clay died of consumption in July 1852. In 1852, the Whigs again went with a war hero, nominating Winfield Scott, and again Webster was on the outside looking in. But Webster knew he didn’t have a chance, so he agreed to be Fillmore’s SecState, which gave Webster the out he needed to escape a still very angry Massachusetts.

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    In October 1852, Webster died of complications from a carriage accident that occurred in May. The deaths of Calhoun, Clay, and Webster marked the end of the second generation of America’s nationhood. Clay became the first American to lie in state in the rotunda of the Capitol, and before Lincoln’s Mourning Train back to Springfield (Ill) in 1865, Clay’s train back to Lexington (KY) was the train Americans waited on the tracks to mourn.
    The honors towards Calhoun were sectional; he in essence was given the honor of lying in state in the state capitol building in Richmond (VA), and Massachusetts had forgiven Webster, acknowledging the contributions of the state’s most famous adopted son (Webster was originally from New Hampshire). In battling the unfolding events that were the legacy of Calhoun, Lincoln turned to Clay and Webster, where Clay gave Lincoln his philosophy, and Webster gave Lincoln the words.


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Henry Clay: Abolitionism and the Elections of 1836 & 1840

8/1/2019

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                      Source: H.W. Brands. Heirs of the Founders (2017)
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     John Quincy Adams didn’t care much about the 2nd National Bank of the United States, but he did care about Abolitionism. Soon after losing the Election of 1828 to Jackson, JQA was sent to Congress by the 12th District in Massachusetts. It didn’t take long for John C. Calhoun and the South to find out that JQA was their polar opposite, and what both men had in common was their fear of what could happen in the future
    One result of the Nat Turner Revolt (1831) in Virginia was that Southern plantation owners cracked down even more on denying education to slaves (Turner probably was better educated that the vast majority of poor Southern whites). Virginia actually debated whether or not to abolish slavery in the aftermath of the Nat Turner Revolt, but the Planters perspective on gaining even more control over the “peculiar institution” won out. Among the restrictions enacted was that Abolitionist propaganda (e.g. William Lloyd Garrison's “The Liberator”) was not allowed in the South, which meant controlling the mail service.

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    JQA’s attacks on slavery, in the face of the Gag Rule in the House, provoked more extreme Southern reactions in the chamber. Calhoun led the Southern contingent in Congress, and he encouraged the the entire South to band together in defense, in that Abolitionism and the Union could not coexist. Calhoun asserted that slavery was not a necessary evil, but a positive good, which meant that the South claimed moral parity with the North, and therefore had nothing for which to apologize.
    However, Calhoun claimed more than parity, stating that slavery enhanced the stability of Southern society. Therefore, according to Calhoun, the Abolitionists were a major threat to the social structure of the South. Calhoun asserted that the Abolitionists would not stop with emancipation, but would pursue equal rights for the former slaves with Southern whites, which would mean that Southern whites would be at the mercy of their former slaves.


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     By the Congressional Elections of 1834, the combination of anti-Jackson factions, the National Republicans (of which Clay was part), and the Anti-Masons started to call themselves Whigs. In the Election Year of 1836, the strategy of the Whigs (who weren’t quite yet organized enough to hold a convention)  was to have four stout regional candidates that would draw enough Electoral Votes away from MVB, and then win the Presidency in the House of Representatives. Daniel Webster was one of those four, but he only won his home state of MA as the regional candidate of New England. The Whigs learned the hard way that their strategy of “Divide and Conquer” didn’t work when they were a divided and unorganized party.
    Martin Van Buren’s Presidency, like Herbert Hoover’s, didn’t take long to sink into the economic abyss; in MVB’s situation, it was the delayed impact of the destruction of the 2nd Nat’l Bank of the US. State banks, especially in the West, had expanded credit far too rapidly, which created a speculative bubble on Western lands, which was a major cause of the Panic of 1837 and the subsequent economic depression. Another cause of the depression was Jackson’s “Specie Circular”, which was an effort to restrain all that speculation by reducing the money supply. Americans turned against MVB in droves, and the Whigs felt that the Election of 1840 should go their way. Clay had spent much of his time since his defeat in 1832 trying to unify and organize the Whigs, and he became an early favorite for the nomination in 1840. Clay’s chances looked very good, in that Webster had not proven to be a national vote-getter in 1836, and former general William Henry Harrison, one of the four Whigs that ran in 1836, didn’t exactly run away and separate himself from the closest two pursuers. A hopeful/cautious Henry Clay, in short, liked his chances for the nomination of the Whigs in 1840.

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     Clay moved to politically isolate Calhoun as much as possible so he couldn’t be a serious threat. Webster continued to refuse to withdraw as a regional candidate, so Clay next targeted him. However, and unexpected event in 1838 dealt Clay’s hopes for the Whig nomination a serious blow. In Maine’s state elections, the Democrats prevailed soundly over the Whigs, and the resulting conventional wisdom was that the Whigs needed a war hero to get them over the hump in 1840, and the only Whig candidate that fit that bill was William Henry Harrison. Clay rejected out of hand that political diagnosis and prescription, and he suspected Webster as the originator of the web of deceit that threatened his nomination.
    Clay had been encouraged by those close to him that he should come out in favor of Abolitionism, but Clay didn’t want to offend either New England or the South. Clay hoped that taking a middle position on emancipation would be favored by a majority of Americans, but there was no guarantee that Clay’s strategy would lead to the nomination he so coveted. As the economic depression continued, the chances of the Whigs being victorious in 1840 increased, and to insure victory, more-and-more Whig leaders started to support the least-controversial candidate, William Henry Harrison (WHH) over Clay.


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    With his political fortunes failing, Clay decided to speak his conscience. Clay identified the radical Abolitionists as the branch of Abolitionism that represented a true threat, stating that the rights of property meant nothing to them, nor did the rule of law. Clay went on, saying that the radical Abolitionists were heedless of any consequences to their actions. The radical Abolitionists by that point had demanded an end slavery in the District of Columbia, and in the Florida Territory, as well as a ban on interstate commerce that involved slaves. The radicals also insisted that Congress bar the entry of any slaves from abroad.
    Clay argued that the goal of the radical Abolitionists, if peaceful Abolition wasn’t achieved, was to use violence to emancipate the slaves. To Clay, the radical Abolitionists dreamed of a world that couldn’t possibly exist. As a result of the rhetoric and actions of the radicals, Clay argued that slaves had it worse in the South. Clay mentioned that the radicals believed that they could change the world overnight, but Clay stated that emancipation would take time, but emancipation would come more swiftly and permanently if the movement was led by the federal government.

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     Clay now waited to see if he gained support in the South while not losing too much support in the North. Due to the confusion and lack of organization among Whigs, the convention kept getting delayed, which was exactly what WHH wanted. The longer he was able to sit on the political sideline, the better he believed his chances would be to win the nomination. As a result of the delays, Clay felt his support drift away from him and towards WHH, and reluctantly accepted the inevitable, and he endorsed WHH after the former general won the Whig nomination. From JQA’s point of view as a former President, it would take more than the Whigs winning the Election of 1840 to cure what ailed America.
    By 1840, candidates for public office had to display a common touch, in that voters expected to be wooed, entertained, and feted upon. In the days of George Washington, the people were willing to defer to their leaders, but now, the people expected their leaders to defer to them. WHH was no commoner, but he allowed himself to be portrayed as such, in what many historians call a “Log Cabin Campaign” (e.g. an artistic depiction of WHH with a dog). 4 March 1841, Inauguration Day: WHH not only didn’t bundle up during the longest-ever Inaugural Address, but at the age of 68, WHH also greeted well-wishers when he was still cold, wet, and shivering, despite being urged by many to at least change his clothes.
William Henry Harrison died of pneumonia and/or fever, or from other complications just one month into his Presidency.

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     The status of Vice-President John Tyler wasn’t clear, in that the Constitution didn’t exactly specify that the VP would automatically become President due to a death in office. Additionally, none of the Whig leaders intended that Tyler become President. Tyler acted as if he was President since he wielded Executive power, and in acting as President, Tyler became the 10th President of the United States. Webster was WHH’s SecState, and he suggested to Tyler that decisions from the Executive be through the Cabinet, with the President getting one vote. Tyler had none of that, and told Webster and the other members of the Cabinet that other than giving him advice, if they didn’t like following his lead, he would be more than happy to accept their resignations. As a result, relations between Tyler and his Cabinet deteriorated.
    Tyler didn’t do very well with the Whig leadership in Congress either. When a new bank bill worked its way through both houses, largely due to the efforts of Clay, Tyler vetoed it, even though it appeared that he had been in favor of the bill. Clay, now the de facto leader of the Whigs in Congress, publicly chastised Tyler, and he bent over backwards to try and convince both houses that Tyler was not a legitimate President.

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