Source: Joseph J. Ellis. Founding Brothers - The Revolutionary Generation (2000)
What was new on the topic of slavery in 1790 was that it was actually being publicly debated in Congress, which meant that the debate would spread from the nation’s capital. Based on the (first) Census of 1790, the attitudes towards slavery could be seen in large part statistically, in that where the ratio of slaves (blacks) to whites was the highest, then the attitudes towards slavery were more entrenched. To the South, slavery was the only way to guarantee segregation of the races.
But the Census of 1790 also showed that if any state was going to show the way towards emancipation, it would be Virginia. Also, the window of ending slavery was not opening, per the conventional wisdom of the era, but closing, even before the invention of the cotton gin in 1793. The fading Revolutionary War ideology was arrayed against the growing racial demography, which bolstered the Deep South’s contention that emancipation was wildly unwise and impractical. The Census of 1790 showed, even before the cotton gin, that those that believed slavery would slowly die a natural death were naive. In addition, the relocation of even the existing slaves to various regions of the nation was also a naive notion that had no plan.
While there were no specifics concerning emancipation, the idea was being publicly debated nonetheless. All the plans for gradual emancipation rested on the assumption that slavery was a moral/economic problem that needed a political solution. Also, any plan for gradual emancipation needed to combine speed and slowness, since the window was closing. Speed was necessary to act quickly before the slave population increased, and slowness was necessary in order to absorb the costs of emancipation.
But the Census of 1790 also showed that if any state was going to show the way towards emancipation, it would be Virginia. Also, the window of ending slavery was not opening, per the conventional wisdom of the era, but closing, even before the invention of the cotton gin in 1793. The fading Revolutionary War ideology was arrayed against the growing racial demography, which bolstered the Deep South’s contention that emancipation was wildly unwise and impractical. The Census of 1790 showed, even before the cotton gin, that those that believed slavery would slowly die a natural death were naive. In addition, the relocation of even the existing slaves to various regions of the nation was also a naive notion that had no plan.
While there were no specifics concerning emancipation, the idea was being publicly debated nonetheless. All the plans for gradual emancipation rested on the assumption that slavery was a moral/economic problem that needed a political solution. Also, any plan for gradual emancipation needed to combine speed and slowness, since the window was closing. Speed was necessary to act quickly before the slave population increased, and slowness was necessary in order to absorb the costs of emancipation.
It was assumed that slave owners would be compensated with funds coming from some kind of taxation combined with the sale of Western lands. It was also assumed that the bulk of freed slaves would be transported elsewhere, either to Africa or some designated location in the West. The cost of freeing slaves in 1790 was generally estimated to be $140 million; further thought of actual emancipation decreased dramatically as a result of that estimated cost (the federal budget for that fiscal year was $7m). However, the Hamiltonian approach with the federal government leading the fiscal side of things with a
National Bank could have managed such a discrepancy.
So the actual question in 1790 wasn’t the total cost of emancipation, but the initial capital cost. The ability to accrue debt with a public debt and a National Bank became a reality in the early-1790s, but the desire to incorporate gradual emancipation with that fiscal systems network fizzled and went nowhere. It was much easier to talk about emancipation in an ideological (and remote) sense in a Northern state such as Massachusetts compared to a state in the Deep South such as Georgia (90% of the black population in the US was below the Potomac River). Any plan for gradual emancipation had to feature WHERE the freed slaves would be relocated, and that was a problem that had no solution. Added to the mix was the reality that only the federal government could run point on gradual emancipation, and to the South, that smacked of even more “consolidation”.
National Bank could have managed such a discrepancy.
So the actual question in 1790 wasn’t the total cost of emancipation, but the initial capital cost. The ability to accrue debt with a public debt and a National Bank became a reality in the early-1790s, but the desire to incorporate gradual emancipation with that fiscal systems network fizzled and went nowhere. It was much easier to talk about emancipation in an ideological (and remote) sense in a Northern state such as Massachusetts compared to a state in the Deep South such as Georgia (90% of the black population in the US was below the Potomac River). Any plan for gradual emancipation had to feature WHERE the freed slaves would be relocated, and that was a problem that had no solution. Added to the mix was the reality that only the federal government could run point on gradual emancipation, and to the South, that smacked of even more “consolidation”.
So then, by the Spring of 1790 it was already basically impossible to make any major decision against slavery, and in some ways it came down to leadership. In addition to being named a delegate from Pennsylvania to the Constitutional Convention in 1787, that same year he agreed to serve as the new president of the Pennsylvania Abolitionist Society. Franklin made gradual emancipation his last great cause And unlike being an almost-too-late Patriot in the 1770s, Franklin had been against slavery since at least 1729, even speaking out against claims that blacks were racially inferior. But Franklin had never before thrown his full weight against slavery until the late-1780s during the Constitutional Convention.
Vice-President John Adams, his anti-slavery credentials long-standing, agreed to avoid the anti-slavery petitions read on the Senate floor. Hamilton didn’t support the debate against slavery in the House since it could further complicate/delay passage of this fiscal plan. President Washington wanted the House debate to be terminated, since it was a “nuisance”. Where Franklin was basically all big ideas, James Madison was concerned with details, and by the Spring of 1790, he decided to become involved in the slavery debate. If Franklin and Madison were on the same team, they would have been unbeatable, but on the slavery debate in 1790, they were on opposite sides.
Vice-President John Adams, his anti-slavery credentials long-standing, agreed to avoid the anti-slavery petitions read on the Senate floor. Hamilton didn’t support the debate against slavery in the House since it could further complicate/delay passage of this fiscal plan. President Washington wanted the House debate to be terminated, since it was a “nuisance”. Where Franklin was basically all big ideas, James Madison was concerned with details, and by the Spring of 1790, he decided to become involved in the slavery debate. If Franklin and Madison were on the same team, they would have been unbeatable, but on the slavery debate in 1790, they were on opposite sides.
Madison’s strategy could be described as the “Virginia Straddle”. Madison had no patience for the Deep South, but he favored self-imposed paralysis on slavery, despite using some anti-slavery rhetoric. In effect, Madison thought the whole subject of slavery on either side was taboo. So Madison favored a strategy of “enlightened obfuscation” to try and remove the explosive issue of slavery from the political agenda. Madison had worked his magic behind the scenes to the point where some Northern representatives that had sided with the Quakers expressed regret that the matter had got out of hand.
In terms of the committee, the Deep South, now with support from Massachusetts and Virginia, tried to have the report tabled, wanting to avoid future debate. But Madison wanted more than just to end the debate: he wanted to establish a precedent that made clear the power (or lack of) that Congress had on the issue. Madison welcomed the 29 - 25 vote to release the committee’s report. Before the existence of judicial review, Madison wanted to use the vote on the committee report to create the equivalent of a landmark decision that would prohibit any plan of emancipation.
The report gave the Deep South the protection they demanded by denying Congress the power to pass any gradual emancipation legislation. The report also aligned the year 1808 concerning the slave trade with emancipation, so in effect, the Deep South got what it wanted for a limited time, since after 1808, Congress wcould do whatever it wished concerning slavery.
In terms of the committee, the Deep South, now with support from Massachusetts and Virginia, tried to have the report tabled, wanting to avoid future debate. But Madison wanted more than just to end the debate: he wanted to establish a precedent that made clear the power (or lack of) that Congress had on the issue. Madison welcomed the 29 - 25 vote to release the committee’s report. Before the existence of judicial review, Madison wanted to use the vote on the committee report to create the equivalent of a landmark decision that would prohibit any plan of emancipation.
The report gave the Deep South the protection they demanded by denying Congress the power to pass any gradual emancipation legislation. The report also aligned the year 1808 concerning the slave trade with emancipation, so in effect, the Deep South got what it wanted for a limited time, since after 1808, Congress wcould do whatever it wished concerning slavery.
Madison’s magic worked as the report went through the conference committee so the same version was presented to both houses. The Virginia delegation in the House had its marching orders to support the amended report from the conference committee, and the delegations from Massachusetts and New York were pressured to do the same. Seven resolutions from the original report were reduced to three by the conference committee, with the tax on the slave trade dropped altogether.
The final report passed the House by a vote of 29 - 25, making clear that the states had the power concerning slavery, not Congress, which in effect extinguished any federal plan/effort towards emancipation. Gradual emancipation disappeared from the political agenda in Congress, as both Madison and Washington wanted. It wasn’t until John Quincy Adams entered Congress after his term as President that the debate over slavery in the House would resume. The major piece of unfinished business from the Revolutionary War Era, slavery, remained unfinished.
The final report passed the House by a vote of 29 - 25, making clear that the states had the power concerning slavery, not Congress, which in effect extinguished any federal plan/effort towards emancipation. Gradual emancipation disappeared from the political agenda in Congress, as both Madison and Washington wanted. It wasn’t until John Quincy Adams entered Congress after his term as President that the debate over slavery in the House would resume. The major piece of unfinished business from the Revolutionary War Era, slavery, remained unfinished.