Source: Ron Chernow. Washington: A Life (2010)
Although George Washington experienced command in the wilderness during the French and Indian War (1754 - 1763), he was still a military neophyte. As 1775 unfolded, Washington knew he wasn't prepared to command troops in a large-scale conflict, and read volumes on military strategy. Despite this, Washington was the best-suited to lead when the time came to name a Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Army.
(Pictured: Washington's portrait of 1772)
Washington knew he didn't have the kind of experience that he felt was necessary, but he also knew that he wanted overall command - he appeared at the 2nd Continental Congress (he was one of Virginia's representatives) in his Fairfax County Militia uniform, looking like a general . . . to his fellow representatives, he looked like Mars (the Roman God of War) himself. The 2nd C/C lacked any consensus for independence, but they did favor a defensive military posture after Lexington and Concord. Adding to the complexity of the 2nd C/C's situation, was news that the fort at Ticonderoga had fallen, taken by Ethan Allen and his men (Benedict Arnold participated, but was denied credit by Allen). The 2nd C/C needed someone to bring order out of chaos in terms of overall military organization and strategy, and they turned to Washington; before there was a nation, a flag, or even a symbol, there was Commander-in-Chief George Washington.
(Pictured: Washington's portrait of 1772)
Washington knew he didn't have the kind of experience that he felt was necessary, but he also knew that he wanted overall command - he appeared at the 2nd Continental Congress (he was one of Virginia's representatives) in his Fairfax County Militia uniform, looking like a general . . . to his fellow representatives, he looked like Mars (the Roman God of War) himself. The 2nd C/C lacked any consensus for independence, but they did favor a defensive military posture after Lexington and Concord. Adding to the complexity of the 2nd C/C's situation, was news that the fort at Ticonderoga had fallen, taken by Ethan Allen and his men (Benedict Arnold participated, but was denied credit by Allen). The 2nd C/C needed someone to bring order out of chaos in terms of overall military organization and strategy, and they turned to Washington; before there was a nation, a flag, or even a symbol, there was Commander-in-Chief George Washington.
0n 25 May, 1775, the HMS Cerebus docked in Boston, bringing the British "Triumvirate" of Generals John Burgoyne, William Howe, and Henry Clinton. Based on the previous events, their arrival in the American Colonies dashed any hope for a happy or peaceful outcome with King George III. After their arrival, the new President of the 2nd C/C, John Hancock (pictured), hoped to be named the top Colonial military figure, but most of the representatives felt that the overall commander should be from Virginia; the consensus being that a Virginian would be best-suited to unify the Colonies.
The only other serious contenders for the position of what was being named "Major General" were Horatio Gates and Charles Lee, both former British Regular officers. Many factors separated Washington from Hancock, Gates, and Lee, including gravitas, as well as being a politician for the last 16 years; it was thought that he would answer to civilian authority.
The only other serious contenders for the position of what was being named "Major General" were Horatio Gates and Charles Lee, both former British Regular officers. Many factors separated Washington from Hancock, Gates, and Lee, including gravitas, as well as being a politician for the last 16 years; it was thought that he would answer to civilian authority.
On 14 June, 1775, the 2nd C/C officially took charge of the Colonial soldiers in Boston; it was the birth of the Continental Army, and a Commander-in-Chief was required. By this point, Washington's appointment was a fait accompli (so impressive was Washington to his colleagues!), but Hancock STILL believed that he was entitled to the post. Hancock expected John Adams to nominate him first, before Washington, but Adams nominated Washington first instead. Washington handled the nomination with dignity and aplomb, unlike what the egomaniacal Hancock would have done. What sealed the confirmation of the nomination was that both John and Samuel Adams, along with Hancock the pre-eminent politicians from Boston, supported Washington. On 16 June, 1775, the 2nd C/C officially named George Washington as the Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Army (a video segment from HBO's "John Adams" dramatizing this moment in history is below).
Major General George Washington responded to the appointment by showing that he could be trusted with great power. He decided to serve without pay, wanting only expenses; he also tried to lower expectations of what was expected of him and the army (which was a consistent character trait during Washington's life); Washington was a bundle of confidence and insecurity. Although Washington was in command of an unorganized and untrained army in an undeclared war, he needed subordinate generals to carry out his orders and strategies.
Among his major generals were Horatio Gates (pictured) and Charles Lee, which the 2nd C/C had forced upon him; they would not only turn out to be incompetent generals, but would also covet Washington's rank. Israel Putnam (Connecticut) was unfit for everything except fighting, and Philip Schuyler (New York) was more of a politician than a military man (but he would be the conduit for Alexander Hamilton joining Washington's artillery corps). Before he was able to head towards Boston, Washington opened a sealed dispatch addressed to Hancock in order to see if there was any timely information for him as Commander-in-Chief. In that communique was a summary of the Battle of Bunker Hill from 17 June, 1775; Washington saw the battle as a colossal missed opportunity for the Colonial forces - he blamed a lack of discipline as the main factor why the key high ground was abandoned to the British
(Below: a video segment from the Discovery Channel)
Among his major generals were Horatio Gates (pictured) and Charles Lee, which the 2nd C/C had forced upon him; they would not only turn out to be incompetent generals, but would also covet Washington's rank. Israel Putnam (Connecticut) was unfit for everything except fighting, and Philip Schuyler (New York) was more of a politician than a military man (but he would be the conduit for Alexander Hamilton joining Washington's artillery corps). Before he was able to head towards Boston, Washington opened a sealed dispatch addressed to Hancock in order to see if there was any timely information for him as Commander-in-Chief. In that communique was a summary of the Battle of Bunker Hill from 17 June, 1775; Washington saw the battle as a colossal missed opportunity for the Colonial forces - he blamed a lack of discipline as the main factor why the key high ground was abandoned to the British
(Below: a video segment from the Discovery Channel)
Washington's initial assessment of the soldiers under his command was that most of them would probably never amount to very much at all, especially those from New England. Among the few New Englanders that Washington quickly came to admire and trust was Nathanael Greene from Rhode Island; he was asthmatic, limped, and had little formal education, but he would become by far Washington's favorite general. Washington so admired Greene that he officially stated that Greene would be his successor as Commander-in-Chief.
Another of the few New Englanders that were in Washington's "Circle of Trust" was Henry Knox (pictured), a Boston bookseller, who would not only become Washington's artillery commander, but also his Secretary of War when he was President. Washington liked Knox's imagination, candor, and enterprise, and came to implicitly trust Knox's strategies in terms of how to properly use the artillery. Knox never breathed a word of criticism towards Washington, even when Washington made huge mistakes during the Revolutionary War.
Unlike the deceptive, disloyal, and eventually disgruntled Gates and Lee, Washington's best and most-daring generals were young, homegrown officers in which Washington saw great potential, and he groomed them for command . . . they were the officers he counted on for his great military maneuver / bluff at Dorchester Heights in March, 1776, where he convinced the British to abandon their occupation of Boston.
(Below: a video segment from the History Channel's "Revolution" on Dorchester Heights)
Another of the few New Englanders that were in Washington's "Circle of Trust" was Henry Knox (pictured), a Boston bookseller, who would not only become Washington's artillery commander, but also his Secretary of War when he was President. Washington liked Knox's imagination, candor, and enterprise, and came to implicitly trust Knox's strategies in terms of how to properly use the artillery. Knox never breathed a word of criticism towards Washington, even when Washington made huge mistakes during the Revolutionary War.
Unlike the deceptive, disloyal, and eventually disgruntled Gates and Lee, Washington's best and most-daring generals were young, homegrown officers in which Washington saw great potential, and he groomed them for command . . . they were the officers he counted on for his great military maneuver / bluff at Dorchester Heights in March, 1776, where he convinced the British to abandon their occupation of Boston.
(Below: a video segment from the History Channel's "Revolution" on Dorchester Heights)
On 4 July, 1775, the 2nd C/C formally incorporated state militias into the Continental Army. In late-July, Daniel Morgan and his men marched 600 miles to join the Continental Army in Boston (they would be Washington's sharpshooters). There were many soldiers from many different regions of the Colonies, all without any military discipline . . . so trouble among soldiers was predictable. Marblehead militiamen (Massachusetts) taunted Virginia militiamen based on what they considered to be "foppish" uniforms, and over 1000 soldiers engaged in what was in essence a huge outdoor bar room brawl. General Washington showed up on horseback, dismounted, and grabbed two of the fight's ringleaders by their necks, often lifting them up from the ground; hundreds of soldiers see Washington doing this, and they ran for the hills, and the fight was over . . . only 15 minutes passed from the start of the fight to the end . . . it was the beginning of Washington instilling discipline in his army.
(Pictured: General Washington officially taking command of the Continental Army in 1775)
Although Washington had started making inroads towards creating military discipline, he was badly outnumbered by the British (they had up to 10,000 more soldiers around Boston), and he had nowhere near enough food or ammunition in order to take the offensive; he had to become a "Master Bluffer"; out of necessity, secrecy and deception became part of Washington's military repertoire . . . he was able to convince General Howe that it would be folly to attack the Continental Army.
Adding to Washington's challenges in Boston was the real threat of a smallpox epidemic; Washington inoculated and quarantined hundreds of soldiers. The only "offensive" strategy employed by General Howe in 1775 was to dump 300 Americans with smallpox as close to Washington's lines as possible . . . even as Washington's command was in its infancy, his army was on the brink of disaster long before they were ready for any significant military engagement with the British.
(Pictured: General Washington officially taking command of the Continental Army in 1775)
Although Washington had started making inroads towards creating military discipline, he was badly outnumbered by the British (they had up to 10,000 more soldiers around Boston), and he had nowhere near enough food or ammunition in order to take the offensive; he had to become a "Master Bluffer"; out of necessity, secrecy and deception became part of Washington's military repertoire . . . he was able to convince General Howe that it would be folly to attack the Continental Army.
Adding to Washington's challenges in Boston was the real threat of a smallpox epidemic; Washington inoculated and quarantined hundreds of soldiers. The only "offensive" strategy employed by General Howe in 1775 was to dump 300 Americans with smallpox as close to Washington's lines as possible . . . even as Washington's command was in its infancy, his army was on the brink of disaster long before they were ready for any significant military engagement with the British.