Source: William K. Klingaman. The Darkest Year -
The American Home Front, 1941 - 1942 (2019)
The American Home Front, 1941 - 1942 (2019)
Edward R. Murrow had been traveling across the US during January 1942, and he concluded that most Americans viewed the war as a mere spectacle and an inconvenience. Morrow’s perspective was that far too many Americans were ready to accept suppression and even slavery. Murrow was not alone in his views, with charges coming from all quarters that Americans were complacent in the face of overseas disasters.
Capitol Hill tried to get their constituents to realize that they had surrounded themselves with a false sense of security. Some members of Congress simply chalked up the lack of urgency to simple smugness. After touring defense plants on the West Coast and in his native Texas, Congressman Lyndon Johnson concluded that most Americans simply didn’t know what the war was about, which led to the general level of unconcern.
Perhaps the greatest reason for complacency was the continued government effort to suppress what was really going on with the war, especially in the Pacific, in terms of the staggering successes of the Axis Powers and the corresponding defeats of the US and the Allies. The government policy of censorship, with the tone set from FDR himself, was idiotic and harmful. FDR argued that Americans were getting more realistic about the war as every day passed. James Reston stated that Anglo-Saxons would not make revolutionary sacrifices that were necessary until they truly understood that the situation was desperate. How frustrated Reston must have been when he saw that the media still touted the smallest development in the war as a huge success in misguided attempts to boost the nation’s morale.
Capitol Hill tried to get their constituents to realize that they had surrounded themselves with a false sense of security. Some members of Congress simply chalked up the lack of urgency to simple smugness. After touring defense plants on the West Coast and in his native Texas, Congressman Lyndon Johnson concluded that most Americans simply didn’t know what the war was about, which led to the general level of unconcern.
Perhaps the greatest reason for complacency was the continued government effort to suppress what was really going on with the war, especially in the Pacific, in terms of the staggering successes of the Axis Powers and the corresponding defeats of the US and the Allies. The government policy of censorship, with the tone set from FDR himself, was idiotic and harmful. FDR argued that Americans were getting more realistic about the war as every day passed. James Reston stated that Anglo-Saxons would not make revolutionary sacrifices that were necessary until they truly understood that the situation was desperate. How frustrated Reston must have been when he saw that the media still touted the smallest development in the war as a huge success in misguided attempts to boost the nation’s morale.
In the midst of the sugar shortage, the media engaged in far too much sugar-coating which only fueled the overconfidence of most Americans. There was a major misconception that one American soldier could whip ten Japanese soldiers or five German soldiers; such was the sense of national/racial superiority which led to the lethargy. More sugar-coating occurred with the media, which grossly overstated and exaggerated the level of wartime production in the US, all of which led to a national assumption of victory. The truth was that the US hadn’t had to really engage in a serious war against a foreign enemy where its actual security was threatened since the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812, so there was zero “living memory” of what was necessary on the domestic front.
The War Production Board (WPB) challenged Americans to change their way of thinking in 1942 from what the US was going to do against the enemy to what the US was going to to in 1943. Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau suggested that a great way to show that shift of thinking would be for Americans to buy a lot more war bonds. By the end of January 1942, Americans had purchased $1B in war bonds and stamps, but that was far too little as far as Morgenthau was concerned, in that only 1 in 7 wage earners had bothered to purchase war bonds. Also, the percentage of war bonds sold in denominations under $100 meant that the working class had not yet been activated into action.
The working class was the crucial segment of the US population that needed to buy war bonds, in that it was the fastest-growing employment sector during the war. An added benefit to buying war bonds was that it would help keep the level of inflation low. The federal government relentlessly promoted war bonds in early-1942, which in a way clearly showed the high level of complacency of most Americans after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor that had occurred only several weeks prior.
The War Production Board (WPB) challenged Americans to change their way of thinking in 1942 from what the US was going to do against the enemy to what the US was going to to in 1943. Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau suggested that a great way to show that shift of thinking would be for Americans to buy a lot more war bonds. By the end of January 1942, Americans had purchased $1B in war bonds and stamps, but that was far too little as far as Morgenthau was concerned, in that only 1 in 7 wage earners had bothered to purchase war bonds. Also, the percentage of war bonds sold in denominations under $100 meant that the working class had not yet been activated into action.
The working class was the crucial segment of the US population that needed to buy war bonds, in that it was the fastest-growing employment sector during the war. An added benefit to buying war bonds was that it would help keep the level of inflation low. The federal government relentlessly promoted war bonds in early-1942, which in a way clearly showed the high level of complacency of most Americans after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor that had occurred only several weeks prior.
Instead of war bonds, Americans were buying more stuff in a record-setting buying spree. The panic-buying shifted to clothing after the government released news that the Army would soon get 50% - 75% of the nation’s wool supply. A typical soldier needed 270 pounds of wool a year compared to just 9 pounds for a civilian. Panic-buying spread to other goods, some of which the military did not need, such soap, radios, blankets, rugs, and carpets; department stores were jammed with hoarders.
The Federal Reserve noted that during the first week of January 1942, department store sales were 26% above January 1941. By the end of January 1942, the department store sales were up 32%, and the buying wave appeared to have no end. In the District of Columbia sales were up 66% from 1941, in Cleveland they were up 45%, and in Boston, 40%. It was clear to merchants that the buying wave was for “stocking up” (hoarding), not for immediate consumption. That behavior was exactly what FDR and the administration had hoped to discourage and avoid, going so far to say that foolish buying equaled sabotage, and that hoarding equaled treason.
In New Orleans due to the war, Mardi Gras was canceled for only the third time in 85 years. The population in DC grew far faster than the district could accommodate the new arrivals, the vast majority of whom were going to work in the government sector. Housing was the main problem, and there was no quick solution to the overcrowding and overpricing, which led to more slum conditions as well as an increase in contagious diseases (e.g. tuberculosis and syphilis). The DC systems network of services was severely stressed to almost the breaking point in the weeks following Pearl Harbor.
The Federal Reserve noted that during the first week of January 1942, department store sales were 26% above January 1941. By the end of January 1942, the department store sales were up 32%, and the buying wave appeared to have no end. In the District of Columbia sales were up 66% from 1941, in Cleveland they were up 45%, and in Boston, 40%. It was clear to merchants that the buying wave was for “stocking up” (hoarding), not for immediate consumption. That behavior was exactly what FDR and the administration had hoped to discourage and avoid, going so far to say that foolish buying equaled sabotage, and that hoarding equaled treason.
In New Orleans due to the war, Mardi Gras was canceled for only the third time in 85 years. The population in DC grew far faster than the district could accommodate the new arrivals, the vast majority of whom were going to work in the government sector. Housing was the main problem, and there was no quick solution to the overcrowding and overpricing, which led to more slum conditions as well as an increase in contagious diseases (e.g. tuberculosis and syphilis). The DC systems network of services was severely stressed to almost the breaking point in the weeks following Pearl Harbor.
FDR,who had just celebrated his 60th birthday, stated that anyone in DC that was not directly supporting the war effort needed to leave. Predictably the President’s directive was ignored since everyone in DC saw themselves as instrumental and integral, and that everyone else was a parasite that needed to leave. FDR even used the word “parasite” to that effect, which didn’t help matters. Critics stated that FDR should relocate the thousands of New Deal bureaucrats who were doing nothing helpful with the war.
Congress got into the act, looking for ways to downsize the federal government, starting with the OCD and its hiring/spending. It appeared that the FDR administration eschewed the kind of sacrifices that it had demanded from Americans. FDR and Eleanor countered that it was the same criticism from the same groups that had opposed the New Deal. Pearl Harbor didn’t really change the attitudes of the Isolationists, or the anti-FDR / anti-New Deal crowd; Pearl only delayed the desire, especially the Republicans, to get back to the attack against FDR and the Democrats. Whatever remained of the post-Pearl Harbor political truce ended in February 1942 when Alf Landon (the Republican Presidential candidate in 1936) on NBC radio used Lincoln’s Birthday to accuse FDR of incompetent and unskillful leadership as a wartime President
Other prominent Republicans chimed in, arguing that FDR was using the war to consolidate even more power to the Executive branch. By mid-February 1942, the Democrats and Republicans were back to their normal political war against each other, with the Republicans far more concerned about taking back control in the House of Representatives than helping turn the tide of the war.
Congress got into the act, looking for ways to downsize the federal government, starting with the OCD and its hiring/spending. It appeared that the FDR administration eschewed the kind of sacrifices that it had demanded from Americans. FDR and Eleanor countered that it was the same criticism from the same groups that had opposed the New Deal. Pearl Harbor didn’t really change the attitudes of the Isolationists, or the anti-FDR / anti-New Deal crowd; Pearl only delayed the desire, especially the Republicans, to get back to the attack against FDR and the Democrats. Whatever remained of the post-Pearl Harbor political truce ended in February 1942 when Alf Landon (the Republican Presidential candidate in 1936) on NBC radio used Lincoln’s Birthday to accuse FDR of incompetent and unskillful leadership as a wartime President
Other prominent Republicans chimed in, arguing that FDR was using the war to consolidate even more power to the Executive branch. By mid-February 1942, the Democrats and Republicans were back to their normal political war against each other, with the Republicans far more concerned about taking back control in the House of Representatives than helping turn the tide of the war.
Tourism in California in 1942 dropped by nearly half, due to the rationing but also the never-ending belief that cities along the Pacific Coast in CA would be attacked by Japan. The already-existing divide between whites in CA, OR, and WA concerning Japanese-Americans/Nationals became extreme enmity in the weeks/months after Pearl Harbor. Fueling the fire were completely undocumented/unverified reports from Hawaii that a Japanese 5th Column was mostly responsible for the attack at Pearl. Anti-Japanese feelings were most intense and clustered among the low income / poorly educated whites, but it was spreading to other social class fast.
The Attorney General for CA, Earl Warren, was a member of the influential xenophobic fraternity known as the Native Sons of the Golden West. That group viewed Japanese-Americans/Nationals in California as the state’s Achilles’ Heel concerning civil defense efforts. California’s governor was fearful that the hostility of whites towards Japanese-Americans/Nationals would reach a dangerous level, with white Californians believing that they were living among enemies.
The War Department persuaded the reluctant Attorney General of the US to order an evacuation of Axis nationals from 88 designated military zones by 24 February 1942, which included such locations as Los Angeles Harbor, the San Francisco Waterfront, and land surrounding nearly every airport, dam, power station, and defense plant. The Attorney General dragged his feet since he possessed accurate information/intelligence that showed that the threat of sabotage the public believed to be present was at a significantly lower level.
The Attorney General for CA, Earl Warren, was a member of the influential xenophobic fraternity known as the Native Sons of the Golden West. That group viewed Japanese-Americans/Nationals in California as the state’s Achilles’ Heel concerning civil defense efforts. California’s governor was fearful that the hostility of whites towards Japanese-Americans/Nationals would reach a dangerous level, with white Californians believing that they were living among enemies.
The War Department persuaded the reluctant Attorney General of the US to order an evacuation of Axis nationals from 88 designated military zones by 24 February 1942, which included such locations as Los Angeles Harbor, the San Francisco Waterfront, and land surrounding nearly every airport, dam, power station, and defense plant. The Attorney General dragged his feet since he possessed accurate information/intelligence that showed that the threat of sabotage the public believed to be present was at a significantly lower level.
J. Edgar Hoover blamed the whole fiasco on public hysteria (the FBI had provided the Attorney General the information). The Attorney General believed it would be beyond-unwise to persecute Axis nationals, which would perhaps create the very 5th Column that was believed to be in place. California simply that the US Attorney General didn’t have a clue what was going on in the West Coast in terms of the domestic threat. Drew Pearson craned up the pressure further saying that the government was not even close to recognizing and acting upon enemy 5th Columns that were a clear-and-present danger, and that far too many in Congress were concerned about civil liberties instead of security.
The House Un-American Activities Committee chairman, Martin Dies (D; TX), decried FDR’s “maudlin attitude” towards 5th Columnists. Those that had previously dismissed Dies as a crackpot were not convinced that he knew what he was talking about. Eighty percent of the Nisei population (Japanese-Americans) that were in CA were concentrated on Southern California. Whites in that region of CA were in panic-mode when Earl Warren stated that all of California was wide open for sabotage. Local governments immediately started to demand that the federal government begin to relocate Japanese-Americans/Nationals into internment areas.
Enrollment in the nation’s colleges and universities sharply declined, in many cases as much as 20% when the next semester started in February 1942, due mostly to military enlistments and the Selective Service. Colleges and universities tried all sorts of tricks to keep students on campus, such as condensing four years into three (and sometimes two) years, and providing summer courses. Professional schools followed suit, trying to keep those pursuing medical degrees to finish.
There was an overall sense that academia was an out of touch “Ivory Tower”, and what was really needed were skilled technical training and research and development. Curriculum changes hit higher learning as well as public schools, which an increased emphasis on science and math, as well as foreign language and history. As course offerings increased, the number of qualified teachers decreased, with a forecast that half of rural American’s teachers would be gone by the end of 1942.
The House Un-American Activities Committee chairman, Martin Dies (D; TX), decried FDR’s “maudlin attitude” towards 5th Columnists. Those that had previously dismissed Dies as a crackpot were not convinced that he knew what he was talking about. Eighty percent of the Nisei population (Japanese-Americans) that were in CA were concentrated on Southern California. Whites in that region of CA were in panic-mode when Earl Warren stated that all of California was wide open for sabotage. Local governments immediately started to demand that the federal government begin to relocate Japanese-Americans/Nationals into internment areas.
Enrollment in the nation’s colleges and universities sharply declined, in many cases as much as 20% when the next semester started in February 1942, due mostly to military enlistments and the Selective Service. Colleges and universities tried all sorts of tricks to keep students on campus, such as condensing four years into three (and sometimes two) years, and providing summer courses. Professional schools followed suit, trying to keep those pursuing medical degrees to finish.
There was an overall sense that academia was an out of touch “Ivory Tower”, and what was really needed were skilled technical training and research and development. Curriculum changes hit higher learning as well as public schools, which an increased emphasis on science and math, as well as foreign language and history. As course offerings increased, the number of qualified teachers decreased, with a forecast that half of rural American’s teachers would be gone by the end of 1942.
In locations were there were large defense plants, and therefore a huge influx of workers, the social welfare agencies were swamped. While no longer called Hoovervilles, shanty communities appeared outside cities with defense plants. H.L. Mencken watched the inflow of new workers that descended into his beloved Baltimore, most of them hillbillies from Appalachia and the Southern Tidewater, calling them “true savages”.
On 13 February 1942, an ad hoc collection of members of Congress from the West Coast met, all of them “hot” to relocate Japanese-Americans/Nationals, and they passed a resolution that demanded that FDR relocate all persons of Japanese lineage. The US Attorney General Francis Biddle and Secretary of War Henry Stimson stated that there was no threat by Japanese-Americans/Nationals, which only deepened the suspicions of West Coast whites and increased their fears. Earl Warren actually argued that the very lack of sabotage was in and of itself an ominous sign, and that CA was being lulled into a false sense of security. After visiting the West Coast in early-February 1942, Walter Lippmann agreed with Warren, stating that the region was prime for an attack from within and from without. Lippmann, like Warren, believed that Japanese-Americans/Nationals were waiting to unleash another Pearl Harbor in California. New raids conducted by the FBI in CA on Japanese-Americans/Nationals uncovered enough “evidence” that more Americans believed Warren and Lippmann.
Inflaming tensions further were the first published photos of what happened to the USS Arizona at Pearl Harbor. On 15 February 1942, the supposedly impregnable Singapore was taken by Japan, which in effect meant that Jaan controlled the entire Western Pacific. Very soon thereafter, Japanese forces from Singapore were sent to the Philippines to end the resistance from the trapped US forces under the command of MacArthur. Two days later Senator Thomas Stewart (D; TN) introduced legislation to imprison all Japanese-Americans/Nationals for the duration of the war. The following day, Congress authorized $300,000 for a federal investigation in the West Coast concerning Japanese 5th Column activities. In the aftermath of the Fall of Singapore, on 19 February 1942 FDR signed Executive Order #9066, ordering Japanese-Americans/Nationals on the West Coast to internment camps; news of doing so was delayed for 24 hours.
Addendum: FDR, the Government, and War Production . . .
On 13 February 1942, an ad hoc collection of members of Congress from the West Coast met, all of them “hot” to relocate Japanese-Americans/Nationals, and they passed a resolution that demanded that FDR relocate all persons of Japanese lineage. The US Attorney General Francis Biddle and Secretary of War Henry Stimson stated that there was no threat by Japanese-Americans/Nationals, which only deepened the suspicions of West Coast whites and increased their fears. Earl Warren actually argued that the very lack of sabotage was in and of itself an ominous sign, and that CA was being lulled into a false sense of security. After visiting the West Coast in early-February 1942, Walter Lippmann agreed with Warren, stating that the region was prime for an attack from within and from without. Lippmann, like Warren, believed that Japanese-Americans/Nationals were waiting to unleash another Pearl Harbor in California. New raids conducted by the FBI in CA on Japanese-Americans/Nationals uncovered enough “evidence” that more Americans believed Warren and Lippmann.
Inflaming tensions further were the first published photos of what happened to the USS Arizona at Pearl Harbor. On 15 February 1942, the supposedly impregnable Singapore was taken by Japan, which in effect meant that Jaan controlled the entire Western Pacific. Very soon thereafter, Japanese forces from Singapore were sent to the Philippines to end the resistance from the trapped US forces under the command of MacArthur. Two days later Senator Thomas Stewart (D; TN) introduced legislation to imprison all Japanese-Americans/Nationals for the duration of the war. The following day, Congress authorized $300,000 for a federal investigation in the West Coast concerning Japanese 5th Column activities. In the aftermath of the Fall of Singapore, on 19 February 1942 FDR signed Executive Order #9066, ordering Japanese-Americans/Nationals on the West Coast to internment camps; news of doing so was delayed for 24 hours.
Addendum: FDR, the Government, and War Production . . .