Source: H.W. Brands. Heirs of the Founders (2018)
Missouri was the first territory from the Louisiana Purchase to become a state after Louisiana, which had been added as a slave state in noncontroversial fashion, but not so with Missouri. Both Northerners and Southerners viewed the potential state as a valuable and strategic addition to their own region, at the expense of the other. Slavery was legal in the Missouri Territory, and slaveholders dominated the territory’s politics.
Congressman James Tallmadge (NY) introduced a bill that would grant Missouri status as a slave state, However, his bill would ban new slaves from entering the state and freedom for existing slaves when they reached the age of 25. To Tallmadge, Missouri could enter as a slave state, but slavery would soon disappear. The Tallmadge Amendment passed the House of Representatives since Northerners outnumbered Southerners, but it stalled in the Senate.
Southern Senators argued that the amendment was unconstitutional, in that the Constitution in no way gave power to Congress to restrict slavery in the states. As a result, Missouri was not added as a state in 1819, but the territory continued to grow, as did the pressure to find a compromise. The “Missouri Question” was all Washington, D.C. could think about as 1820 dawned.
Congressman James Tallmadge (NY) introduced a bill that would grant Missouri status as a slave state, However, his bill would ban new slaves from entering the state and freedom for existing slaves when they reached the age of 25. To Tallmadge, Missouri could enter as a slave state, but slavery would soon disappear. The Tallmadge Amendment passed the House of Representatives since Northerners outnumbered Southerners, but it stalled in the Senate.
Southern Senators argued that the amendment was unconstitutional, in that the Constitution in no way gave power to Congress to restrict slavery in the states. As a result, Missouri was not added as a state in 1819, but the territory continued to grow, as did the pressure to find a compromise. The “Missouri Question” was all Washington, D.C. could think about as 1820 dawned.
The compromise that Henry Clay had in mind revolved around Maine, which in a case of excellent timing wanted to be rid of Massachusetts. To Clay, adding Missouri and Maine as states together would make the North and South happy and unhappy all at once, which was usually the sign of an excellent compromise. Clay’s real problem was dealing with the Tallmadge Amendment, where Clay argued it was not only imprudent, but also unconstitutional. Clay argued that when slavery had to compete against free white labor, slavery would lose, which would advance the reality of emancipation.
Clay also in essence scolded the North, arguing that their resistance only emboldened the South. It’s possible that not even Clay truly believed his arguments, and he didn’t change many, if any, minds, but he believed he had put a gloss of respectability on his upcoming compromise. Clay had the Senate go first, and they voted to add Missouri and Maine as states in mid-February 1820, The Senate also voted to allow Missouri to write a state constitution without any restrictions on slavery. An amendment by Senator Jesse Thomas (OH) introduced the 36 Degrees, 30 Minutes North (36/30) concept, which was approximately at the mouth of the Ohio River. Under his 36/30 proposal, states south of the line would be slave states, and north of the line free states, which would in theory keep balance in the Senate between North and South. Under the proposed amendment, Missouri was the only exception to 36/30.
Clay also in essence scolded the North, arguing that their resistance only emboldened the South. It’s possible that not even Clay truly believed his arguments, and he didn’t change many, if any, minds, but he believed he had put a gloss of respectability on his upcoming compromise. Clay had the Senate go first, and they voted to add Missouri and Maine as states in mid-February 1820, The Senate also voted to allow Missouri to write a state constitution without any restrictions on slavery. An amendment by Senator Jesse Thomas (OH) introduced the 36 Degrees, 30 Minutes North (36/30) concept, which was approximately at the mouth of the Ohio River. Under his 36/30 proposal, states south of the line would be slave states, and north of the line free states, which would in theory keep balance in the Senate between North and South. Under the proposed amendment, Missouri was the only exception to 36/30.
Northern Senators believed that they were giving away very little by voting for 36/30, and even better, they could claim political victory to the opponents of slavery. The Thomas Amendment of 36/30 benefited Clay the most, politically, and Clay believed he could shepherd the various versions of the bill from both houses through the Conference Committee. And Clay did just that: the South gained an unrestricted slave state with Missouri as well as the lower portion of the Louisiana Territory. The North gained a free state in Maine and the upper Louisiana Territory; to Clay, 36/30 was a solution that would last for decades.
But there were growing voices that opposed any possibility of the expansion of slavery in the West, and Southern zealots were all-in on making sure there were no restrictions on the spread of slavery towards the West. What Clay had bought the US was time, where he hoped the issue of slavery could be decided (peacefully), before the nation expanded all the way to the Pacific Ocean.
But there were growing voices that opposed any possibility of the expansion of slavery in the West, and Southern zealots were all-in on making sure there were no restrictions on the spread of slavery towards the West. What Clay had bought the US was time, where he hoped the issue of slavery could be decided (peacefully), before the nation expanded all the way to the Pacific Ocean.
A panic in 1819 took hold of the nation’s financial system, which caused an economic depression that affected the West the most. A distressed population demanded relief from both state and federal levels of government. Clay held bad debts during the depression which left him exposed when his debtors defaulted. Clay liquidated property, but it wasn’t enough, and he concluded that he couldn’t afford to remain in politics, which meant he wouldn’t run for re-election in his Congressional district in 1820.
Clay tried to think of ways to get back his fortune, or at the very least stay out of debtors’ prison, and he formed a new law practice in Lexington (KY). Clay even resigned as Speaker before his term in the House ended, but the House floundered as a result, since the chamber was used to his leadership. As a result, the still pending Missouri Compromise seemed to be on the verge of unraveling. So Clay came to the rescue, getting himself appointed to chair a special committee to deal with the “Missouri Problem”. Then came the issue of whether Missouri’s three Electoral Votes in the Election of 1820 actually counted, since technically Missouri was not yet a state.
Clay tried to think of ways to get back his fortune, or at the very least stay out of debtors’ prison, and he formed a new law practice in Lexington (KY). Clay even resigned as Speaker before his term in the House ended, but the House floundered as a result, since the chamber was used to his leadership. As a result, the still pending Missouri Compromise seemed to be on the verge of unraveling. So Clay came to the rescue, getting himself appointed to chair a special committee to deal with the “Missouri Problem”. Then came the issue of whether Missouri’s three Electoral Votes in the Election of 1820 actually counted, since technically Missouri was not yet a state.
Clay’s electoral compromise proposal was that two Electoral Vote totals be tallied, one with Missouri, and the other not counting Missouri. Clay knew that Monroe would win re-election by a large margin (the Election of 1820 was the last “closed” Elector election, and Monroe received all but one of the Electoral Votes, with JQA receiving the single vote), so then both totals would be forwarded to and from the Senate in order to certify the election. Both houses approved Clay’s compromise, but while the compromise didn’t fan the flames, it didn’t dissipate hard feelings either.
Eventually the House and the Senate agreed to admit Missouri as a state on the condition that Missouri’s legislature never adopt legislation abridging the rights of any citizens from any other state, and the votes were close, with the hardliners from both the North and South seeing the situation as intolerable. Missouri gave in, but in the same breath the state legislature denied that Congress had the authority to restrict them in that manner. Clay didn’t care about the close margins, only that the Missouri Compromise, as it became to be called, passed . . . the crisis had passed, but not the underlying causes, or danger.
Eventually the House and the Senate agreed to admit Missouri as a state on the condition that Missouri’s legislature never adopt legislation abridging the rights of any citizens from any other state, and the votes were close, with the hardliners from both the North and South seeing the situation as intolerable. Missouri gave in, but in the same breath the state legislature denied that Congress had the authority to restrict them in that manner. Clay didn’t care about the close margins, only that the Missouri Compromise, as it became to be called, passed . . . the crisis had passed, but not the underlying causes, or danger.
John C. Calhoun became President James Monroe’s Secretary of War because Clay simply refused to accept the post. Monroe sought regional balance in his Cabinet: John Quincy Adams of Massachusetts (SecState), William Crawford of Georgia (SecTreas), and to honor the West, Clay from Kentucky as SecWar. But Clay actually declined the position even before it was officially offered by Monroe. Clay almost certainly would have accepted SecState, and most likely SecTreas, but to Clay, SecWar looked to be the political equivalent of a backwater posting in the military.
Monroe considered Andrew Jackson, but the general wanted to remain in the field. Monroe settled on South Carolina’s Calhoun, who was seen as not much more than a proxy for Clay by 1820. Where Clay saw SecWar as an insult, Calhoun saw the Cabinet position as a great opportunity. But Calhoun had no idea what he was getting into, especially with General Jackson. Jackson continued to see Spain in Florida as a threat, and as harborers for the Seminoles . . . so Jackson thought, why not just take Florida from Spain? Monroe reached the same conclusion, albeit more slowly than Jackson. But the crux of the matter was that the President and the nation’s most famous general knew that Florida would need to be taken from Spain by force.
Monroe considered Andrew Jackson, but the general wanted to remain in the field. Monroe settled on South Carolina’s Calhoun, who was seen as not much more than a proxy for Clay by 1820. Where Clay saw SecWar as an insult, Calhoun saw the Cabinet position as a great opportunity. But Calhoun had no idea what he was getting into, especially with General Jackson. Jackson continued to see Spain in Florida as a threat, and as harborers for the Seminoles . . . so Jackson thought, why not just take Florida from Spain? Monroe reached the same conclusion, albeit more slowly than Jackson. But the crux of the matter was that the President and the nation’s most famous general knew that Florida would need to be taken from Spain by force.
President Monroe authorized JQA to pursue the diplomatic possibility of gaining Florida from Spain via negotiations or purchase. At the same time, Monroe indirectly encouraged Jackson to flex his military muscles to show that Spain had no way to control or secure Florida. Jackson’s plan to Monroe was to run roughshod over Spanish Florida, ostensibly in order to deal with the Seminoles. But Jackson also made it clear that his aggressive actions would not implicate the government, and that appealed very much to Monroe.
Intrigue and controversy ensued once SecWar Calhoun was informed of the plan. Jackson claimed that Calhoun had agreed with Monroe and sent him a letter authorizing him to proceed. However, Jackson said that he had destroyed the letter, claiming that Monroe wanted him to do so in case Jackson was captured or killed. Monroe publicly disavowed Jackson’s actions in Florida, since Jackson had found a way to offend the British in the process.
Jackson expected that disavowal, but when he caught news that his reputation had been attacked by SecTreas Crawford, who called Jackson uncontrollable and insubordinate, he was infuriated. Jackson had no way of knowing that Calhoun, not Crawford, was the ringleader of the anti-Jackson chorus in DC. Calhoun borrowed trouble in assailing Jackson, but payment would come years later, in that Jackson had no idea of Calhoun’s shenanigans. Calhoun sent Jackson letters which made it seem that the SecWar was in the general’s corner: Calhoun would be able to keep his political gamesmanship secret from Jackson for over a decade.
Intrigue and controversy ensued once SecWar Calhoun was informed of the plan. Jackson claimed that Calhoun had agreed with Monroe and sent him a letter authorizing him to proceed. However, Jackson said that he had destroyed the letter, claiming that Monroe wanted him to do so in case Jackson was captured or killed. Monroe publicly disavowed Jackson’s actions in Florida, since Jackson had found a way to offend the British in the process.
Jackson expected that disavowal, but when he caught news that his reputation had been attacked by SecTreas Crawford, who called Jackson uncontrollable and insubordinate, he was infuriated. Jackson had no way of knowing that Calhoun, not Crawford, was the ringleader of the anti-Jackson chorus in DC. Calhoun borrowed trouble in assailing Jackson, but payment would come years later, in that Jackson had no idea of Calhoun’s shenanigans. Calhoun sent Jackson letters which made it seem that the SecWar was in the general’s corner: Calhoun would be able to keep his political gamesmanship secret from Jackson for over a decade.