Source: William Stevenson. A Man Called Intrepid - The Incredible True Story
of the Master Spy That Helped Win World War II (1976, 2000)
of the Master Spy That Helped Win World War II (1976, 2000)
Hitler saw himself as the second-coming of Barbarossa, the great medieval conqueror, and when William Stephenson (WS) found out that Hitler named the offensive against the USSR Operation Barbarossa, WS believed that Hitler's superstitious mind could be unbalanced by experiencing failures . . . many, many failures. That belief was to lead to the greatest intelligence coup of World War II, delaying Operation Barbarossa, which then led to the Wehrmacht being stopped in its tracks during the Russian Winter of 1941-42.
British Prime Minister Winston Churchill (who years ago had helped organize the "Secret War" of intelligence against the Nazis) requested that William Donovan be sent to the Balkans on Britain's behalf (Donovan was FDR's right-hand man in terms of intelligence, just as WS was Churchill's right-hand man). Churchill wanted Donovan to do what he could to frustrate Hitler's timetable for unleashing Barbarossa. Donovan left under an assumed name, but he intentionally kept his initials on his luggage (WJD) in order to draw attention to himself so others could operate in the dark.
German intelligence had Donovan tabbed as FDR's emissary since 1937, and they were aware that Donovan was in London . . . and in following Donovan, Hitler was led into the trap. While Donovan scattered clues wherever he could, WS left nothing on his trail; in essence Donovan's role was to be the "clown" providing cover for WS. In response to Charles Lindbergh
and the American First movement (the "Firsters"), FDR wanted to demonstrate that the true first line of defense for the US was in Europe, and even in the Mediterranean. WS let it be known in not-so-carefully coded radio transmissions that Donovan was the source in the US for what Britain desperately needed during the war (e.g. bombsights), which was enough to explain Donovan's movements as an American "neutral".
British Prime Minister Winston Churchill (who years ago had helped organize the "Secret War" of intelligence against the Nazis) requested that William Donovan be sent to the Balkans on Britain's behalf (Donovan was FDR's right-hand man in terms of intelligence, just as WS was Churchill's right-hand man). Churchill wanted Donovan to do what he could to frustrate Hitler's timetable for unleashing Barbarossa. Donovan left under an assumed name, but he intentionally kept his initials on his luggage (WJD) in order to draw attention to himself so others could operate in the dark.
German intelligence had Donovan tabbed as FDR's emissary since 1937, and they were aware that Donovan was in London . . . and in following Donovan, Hitler was led into the trap. While Donovan scattered clues wherever he could, WS left nothing on his trail; in essence Donovan's role was to be the "clown" providing cover for WS. In response to Charles Lindbergh
and the American First movement (the "Firsters"), FDR wanted to demonstrate that the true first line of defense for the US was in Europe, and even in the Mediterranean. WS let it be known in not-so-carefully coded radio transmissions that Donovan was the source in the US for what Britain desperately needed during the war (e.g. bombsights), which was enough to explain Donovan's movements as an American "neutral".
Churchill was convinced via the Ultra network that Hitler would attack Russia on May 1941, but those advising the Prime Minister didn't think that Hitler would do so until he finished off Great Britain. Churchill's real problem at the moment was to convince Stalin that Hitler was heading his way, and so far Stalin had totally fallen for Hitler's lies and misdirection. Churchill's plan was to have events in the Balkans delay the Germans enough so that the USSR could recover from the initial onslaught of Barbarossa. Donovan's job was to convince the leaders in the Balkans to not only avoid signing a pact with the Germans but to also resist.
Ultra had known for quite some time about Hitler's plan to invade the USSR, but the British couldn't reveal how they discovered that information, which made it impossible to change Stalin's mind. On 18 December 1940 Ultra intercepted/decoded a German transmission that confirmed Barbarossa, but Britain could do little with that intelligence. Hitler was about to unleash the greatest military surprise in history, and Stalin was an unwitting accomplice. So, Churchill thought, if Stalin refused to see the reality of the situation, then he needed to figure out a way to delay the Wehrmacht so that the Russian Winter would hit them hard and buy the USSR some time . . . it was under those limitations that Donovan headed to the Balkans to stir up trouble.
Ultra had known for quite some time about Hitler's plan to invade the USSR, but the British couldn't reveal how they discovered that information, which made it impossible to change Stalin's mind. On 18 December 1940 Ultra intercepted/decoded a German transmission that confirmed Barbarossa, but Britain could do little with that intelligence. Hitler was about to unleash the greatest military surprise in history, and Stalin was an unwitting accomplice. So, Churchill thought, if Stalin refused to see the reality of the situation, then he needed to figure out a way to delay the Wehrmacht so that the Russian Winter would hit them hard and buy the USSR some time . . . it was under those limitations that Donovan headed to the Balkans to stir up trouble.
Ironically, Hitler delayed the invasion of Russia to the very day and hour of Napoleon's invasion of Russia; somehow the superstitious Hitler wasn't aware of that omen. The reason why Hitler was so concerned about the Balkans wasn't purely out of concern for his southern flank, but also because trouble in the Balkans would present an unwanted obstacle in his goal of controlling both ends of the Mediterranean Sea. Donovan headed first to Sofia; his goal was to force Hitler to secure his southern flank by getting pro-Fascist regimes in the Balkans to back him (and Britain), not Hitler. Donovan planted the seeds of doubt in the minds of the Bulgarian regime (who had already signed the Tripartite Pact with Nazi Germany) as to the wisdom of cooperating with Hitler. Churchill hoped for a delay of one day by the Bulgarian government before they acquiesced to the Nazis, but Donovan secured a delay of eight days.
Donovan also "allowed" German agents to take "top secret" documents from his room that stated that the US would intervene in the Balkans if Hitler went too far in the region. Donovan went so far to pretend he was totally drunk at a party (he was a teetotaler), despondent that he had lost the documents . . . and Joseph Goebbels, the Nazi Minister of Propaganda, bought the ruse. The forged documents the Germans had taken from Donovan were incredibly well-made by a small unit WS had set up near Toronto (Camp X), and the Germans believed that the US was cooperating with the British Secret Service, who was viewed with both respect and hatred by the Nazis.
Donovan also "allowed" German agents to take "top secret" documents from his room that stated that the US would intervene in the Balkans if Hitler went too far in the region. Donovan went so far to pretend he was totally drunk at a party (he was a teetotaler), despondent that he had lost the documents . . . and Joseph Goebbels, the Nazi Minister of Propaganda, bought the ruse. The forged documents the Germans had taken from Donovan were incredibly well-made by a small unit WS had set up near Toronto (Camp X), and the Germans believed that the US was cooperating with the British Secret Service, who was viewed with both respect and hatred by the Nazis.
Donovan next headed to Belgrade, hoping to weave the same magic as he had in Sofia. However, there was only one group in Yugoslavia that could organize/execute any meaningful resistance, and they were led by Marshal Tito and his fellow Communists. While Stalin and other Communist leaders were busy appeasing Hitler, Tito was getting ready for war. Tito also had no love for Stalin, seeing how lesser Communist nations had been treated by the USSR. The only useful guidance and information Tito received was from Donovan, who said that anyone that resisted Hitler, even Communists, would receive support from the US.
Donovan made it clear to Tito that if Prince Paul (the de facto leader of Yugoslavia) caved to the Nazis, he needed to revolt; when Donovan left Belgrade, the Germans were nervous and trigger-happy. On 22 March 1941 a Nazi ultimatum was presented to the Yugoslav government, and officers within the military overthrew Prince Paul, and Tito waited on the sidelines, biding his time. On 25 March 1941, Donovan, who had returned to the US, made a national radio address in which he spoke of the courage of those in the Mediterranean that were standing up to Hitler. The speech was designed to provoke Hitler into another fit of rage, which it did; it was known to Churchill, et al by then that Hitler made mistakes when he was in true fit that wasn't staged for effect.
Donovan's speech was recorded/filmed and was widely distributed, and it received a tremendous amount of global publicity. As a result, FDR could circumvent the Neutrality Acts by labeling the Mediterranean Sea, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf as as no longer combat zones.
Donovan made it clear to Tito that if Prince Paul (the de facto leader of Yugoslavia) caved to the Nazis, he needed to revolt; when Donovan left Belgrade, the Germans were nervous and trigger-happy. On 22 March 1941 a Nazi ultimatum was presented to the Yugoslav government, and officers within the military overthrew Prince Paul, and Tito waited on the sidelines, biding his time. On 25 March 1941, Donovan, who had returned to the US, made a national radio address in which he spoke of the courage of those in the Mediterranean that were standing up to Hitler. The speech was designed to provoke Hitler into another fit of rage, which it did; it was known to Churchill, et al by then that Hitler made mistakes when he was in true fit that wasn't staged for effect.
Donovan's speech was recorded/filmed and was widely distributed, and it received a tremendous amount of global publicity. As a result, FDR could circumvent the Neutrality Acts by labeling the Mediterranean Sea, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf as as no longer combat zones.
On 6 April 1941, German bombers hit Belgrade after Hitler declared it an Open City, which meant that under international law Hitler could do what he wanted; 24,000 were killed in Belgrade and untold numbers of innocent people were never found. Belgrade, like other locations in World War II, was a victim of the Secret War, in that knowledge gained by Ultra couldn't be released out of fear that the Germans would figure out Ultra's sources of information. On 7 April 1941, with the bombing of Belgrade continuing, German troops arrived in Belgrade to "defend" German civilians in Yugoslavia.
The resistance forces in Yugoslavia went active, and they were similar to those in Belgium against Germany in World War I in that once again the Germans were delayed in achieving a greater goal, needing to use divisions that were supposed to be part of Barbarossa to deal with Yugoslavia, and then resistance in Greece and Turkey. Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel complained that Barbarossa could be delayed by four weeks, but the reality would be closer to six weeks. Hitler's Operation Punishment in the Balkans would commit Germany to being involved in a quagmire against guerilla forces that would last the rest of the war. The key to initially committing the Germans to a quagmire was to overthrow the regime of Prince Paul in Yugoslavia, which was something Britain had wanted to occur for at least five months, but was unable to do . . . until Churchill enlisted the services of William Donovan, and the Nazis overreacted.
The resistance forces in Yugoslavia went active, and they were similar to those in Belgium against Germany in World War I in that once again the Germans were delayed in achieving a greater goal, needing to use divisions that were supposed to be part of Barbarossa to deal with Yugoslavia, and then resistance in Greece and Turkey. Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel complained that Barbarossa could be delayed by four weeks, but the reality would be closer to six weeks. Hitler's Operation Punishment in the Balkans would commit Germany to being involved in a quagmire against guerilla forces that would last the rest of the war. The key to initially committing the Germans to a quagmire was to overthrow the regime of Prince Paul in Yugoslavia, which was something Britain had wanted to occur for at least five months, but was unable to do . . . until Churchill enlisted the services of William Donovan, and the Nazis overreacted.
When Hitler tasked divisions of the Wehrmacht to defeat the British forces in Greece, the cost to Britain was high, but in relative terms the cost was acceptable to keep Ultra secret from the Germans; but the British military took a public relations beating at home and in America. On 22 June 1941 Operation Barbarossa began, and 1400 Russian planes were caught napping on the ground. In short order the Luftwaffe controlled the skies and the Wehrmacht moved 400 miles in just 4 weeks.
What saved the USSR was that Hitler was delayed enough by the British shenanigans in the Balkans that the Russian Winter came into play; the delay was something Stalin and most Russians to this day don't either know or appreciate.
What saved the USSR was that Hitler was delayed enough by the British shenanigans in the Balkans that the Russian Winter came into play; the delay was something Stalin and most Russians to this day don't either know or appreciate.
