Source: Scott W. Berg. 38 Nooses: Lincoln, Little Crow,
and the Beginning of the Frontier's End (2012)
and the Beginning of the Frontier's End (2012)
On 21 August 1862, news of the Dakota War reached the War Department in Washington, D.C. The telegraph room in the War Dept. had already become Lincoln's headquarters; the President's strategy was to take control of the war over his generals and to stay connected in real time with developments in the field as the technology allowed. The first telegram from Minnesota concerning the Dakota War was sent by Governor Ramsey to Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, and there was probably no worse time than late-summer 1861 for Ramsey to expect a quick reply from Stanton or Lincoln.
Lincoln was under pressure from Horace Greeley, perhaps the most powerful newspaper publisher in the world, to immediately free the slaves with an official statement. Greeley had at least tacitly supported President Lincoln so far, since both were former Whigs that became Republicans. But Greeley had become apoplectic at Lincoln's refusal to issue an order of immediate emancipation. Lincoln paid attention to Greeley, since he was basically the voice of the Liberal Republicans, and he needed that wing of the party to support the war effort.
On the same day that news of the Dakota War reached the War Department, Lincoln received a copy of an open letter Greeley had published in New York titled "The Prayer for the 20 Millions". In that open missive, Greeley accused Lincoln of dereliction of duty as President in terms of emancipation, telling Lincoln to get a backbone and declare slavery illegal everywhere so the Civil War could shift to a war for human rights. Lincoln wanted/needed to quickly respond, but the President was walking a political tightrope, in that he had already sent out secret "feelers" to publishers, including Greeley, about emancipation. As it turned out, Greeley published his open letter before he received Lincoln's secret letter concerning emancipation.
Lincoln was under pressure from Horace Greeley, perhaps the most powerful newspaper publisher in the world, to immediately free the slaves with an official statement. Greeley had at least tacitly supported President Lincoln so far, since both were former Whigs that became Republicans. But Greeley had become apoplectic at Lincoln's refusal to issue an order of immediate emancipation. Lincoln paid attention to Greeley, since he was basically the voice of the Liberal Republicans, and he needed that wing of the party to support the war effort.
On the same day that news of the Dakota War reached the War Department, Lincoln received a copy of an open letter Greeley had published in New York titled "The Prayer for the 20 Millions". In that open missive, Greeley accused Lincoln of dereliction of duty as President in terms of emancipation, telling Lincoln to get a backbone and declare slavery illegal everywhere so the Civil War could shift to a war for human rights. Lincoln wanted/needed to quickly respond, but the President was walking a political tightrope, in that he had already sent out secret "feelers" to publishers, including Greeley, about emancipation. As it turned out, Greeley published his open letter before he received Lincoln's secret letter concerning emancipation.
Lincoln's personal secretary, John G. Nicolay, arrived in St. Paul on 22 August 1862. Nicolay, more than any other observer in Minnesota at that time, was closest to Lincoln. Nicolay and John Hay were Lincoln's most trusted aids, and both came to see Lincoln as a father figure. Nicolay was the sour-and-crusty counter to Hay, who was a rakish people-person; they were an oddly paired but very effective/efficient team. Nicolay was part of a group sent by Lincoln to negotiate with the Ojibwe tribe for land in northern Minnesota. Nicolay was in the state to help the Department of the Interior gain the additional lands with making an additional mess of the situation. Nicolay and the other members of the President's group were trying to secure the last section of Minnesota for whites still held by Natives.
By the time Nicolay reached St. Paul, the Dakota War was in its fourth day, with warriors having already attacked Fort Ridgely and the town of New Ulm, and hundreds of whites had been killed or captured. Several companies of soldiers from Fort Snelling had been sent to the Minnesota River Valley to engage-and-defeat the Dakota warriors. Minnesota whites saw Natives everywhere in the state as a threat, with the conventional wisdom holding that the Ojibwe would soon be on the warpath in support of the Dakota as well as to protect their own lands. Nicolay started to head north per Lincoln's instructions, but the negotiations with the Ojibwe would be much different and more difficult than he or President Lincoln had originally envisioned.
By the time Nicolay reached St. Paul, the Dakota War was in its fourth day, with warriors having already attacked Fort Ridgely and the town of New Ulm, and hundreds of whites had been killed or captured. Several companies of soldiers from Fort Snelling had been sent to the Minnesota River Valley to engage-and-defeat the Dakota warriors. Minnesota whites saw Natives everywhere in the state as a threat, with the conventional wisdom holding that the Ojibwe would soon be on the warpath in support of the Dakota as well as to protect their own lands. Nicolay started to head north per Lincoln's instructions, but the negotiations with the Ojibwe would be much different and more difficult than he or President Lincoln had originally envisioned.
By late-August 1862, it had become very difficult for the state of Minnesota to meet Lincoln's quotas for soldiers and to deal with the Dakota War. After being refused by SecWar Stanton and General-in-Chief Henry Halleck for additional support, Governor Ramsey sent a telegram directly to Lincoln; it was the first time Lincoln had been directly told what was going on in Minnesota. Very soon thereafter, Lincoln received a telegram from Nicolay on the Dakota War, which increased Lincoln's attention, since the telegram was from one of Lincoln's favorite people. Nicolay sent a much longer/detailed telegram to SecWar Stanton, and given Nicolay's reputation for understatement, his telegram (and those that followed), raised eyebrows in Washington, D.C. For the first time, Lincoln started paying attention to events occurring in Minnesota.
Lincoln notified Nicolay to inform Ramsey that he could hold back sending men to the Union Army to "attend to the Indians", but to not use the President's name in doing so. On 25 August 1862, the same day Little Crow began his retreat to the northwest, Greeley published two items in his New York Tribune. One of the items was Lincoln's reply to Greeley's "Prayers", which contained Lincoln's statement that if he could save the Union by freeing all, some, or none of the slaves, he would do so. Little did Greeley know at the time (nor did anyone else), but that phrase would become historically significant, showing Lincoln's political/military acumen at a crucial stage of the Civil War.
Lincoln notified Nicolay to inform Ramsey that he could hold back sending men to the Union Army to "attend to the Indians", but to not use the President's name in doing so. On 25 August 1862, the same day Little Crow began his retreat to the northwest, Greeley published two items in his New York Tribune. One of the items was Lincoln's reply to Greeley's "Prayers", which contained Lincoln's statement that if he could save the Union by freeing all, some, or none of the slaves, he would do so. Little did Greeley know at the time (nor did anyone else), but that phrase would become historically significant, showing Lincoln's political/military acumen at a crucial stage of the Civil War.
Next to Lincoln's reply was Greeley's totally unfounded opinion that the Dakota War had been instigated by Confederates or sympathizers (far too many whites in Minnesota believed that the South was behind the uprising). It never dawned on Greeley, or anyone else that believed in that conspiracy, that the Dakota themselves would have a reason to revolt. While Greeley's reply was based on total ignorance, he did hit the bullseye in terms of national anxiety that Confederate machinations were seemingly everywhere.
Soon, neighboring states to Minnesota sent telegrams to Washington, D.C. claiming sudden Native unrest and agitation (but nothing of the level that was happening in Minnesota). All of the movement and unrest was seen as the work of unseen sinister Confederate forces. In reality, there was no way Natives were able to unite in the way whites claimed, but the belief that the Confederacy was backing/instigating Native unrest continued for the duration of the Civil War. The unity that existed was among whites, fearful that Natives were ganging up on them to take their land.
By February 1863, Lincoln would formally (and very quietly) dismiss the idea of a coordinated offensive of Natives organized by the Confederacy; Lincoln correctly saw the idea as pure fantasy. One of the consequences from not having as many soldiers from Minnesota in the Union Army was that Lincoln, sooner than what he wanted, authorized African-Americans soldiers to be used.
Soon, neighboring states to Minnesota sent telegrams to Washington, D.C. claiming sudden Native unrest and agitation (but nothing of the level that was happening in Minnesota). All of the movement and unrest was seen as the work of unseen sinister Confederate forces. In reality, there was no way Natives were able to unite in the way whites claimed, but the belief that the Confederacy was backing/instigating Native unrest continued for the duration of the Civil War. The unity that existed was among whites, fearful that Natives were ganging up on them to take their land.
By February 1863, Lincoln would formally (and very quietly) dismiss the idea of a coordinated offensive of Natives organized by the Confederacy; Lincoln correctly saw the idea as pure fantasy. One of the consequences from not having as many soldiers from Minnesota in the Union Army was that Lincoln, sooner than what he wanted, authorized African-Americans soldiers to be used.
Little Crow knew that Colonel Henry Sibley was finally moving towards his retreating band of Dakota with great force. A message from Sibley was delivered to Little Crow telling him to release his captives, and then they would discuss matters, and talk like men. Little Crow had decided, even before hostilities had actually started, that he would die in the way of a Dakota warrior rather than be captured and hanged.
Sibley also sent out an open letter to Dakotas not involved, telling them in effect to get out of his way, and to make it obvious that they were not combatants (e.g. fly a "truce flag"). Little Crow was not only a target of white soldiers, but also of many Dakota, and even some of those around Little Crow were thinking of ways to capture him to end the war. Little Crow calculated that engaging Sibley and his men very soon would provide a chance to hit-and-then-run to the Great Plains, where Sibley would have to suspend the chase due to the winter.
On 13 September 1862, Nicolay left St. Paul for Washington, D.C., carrying a report for Lincoln and notes that would become the basis for the first article about the Dakota War to appear in the Eastern press. After the disastrous Union defeat at the 2nd Battle of Bull Run in late-August 1862, where Lee gained control of all of Virginia, Lincoln had to figure out what to do with the disgraced General John Pope. Lincoln had replaced General George B. McClellan with Pope (the son of a judge that Lincoln knew and admired) in order to find a general that would defeat General Lee in battle; the move not only backfired, but Lincoln had to place McClellan back in command of the Army of the Potomac. Lincoln decided to send Pope to Minnesota, which in essence federalized the Dakota War. Pope, of course, saw the posting as nothing more than punishment and exile, an insult to his honor and abilities . . .
Sibley also sent out an open letter to Dakotas not involved, telling them in effect to get out of his way, and to make it obvious that they were not combatants (e.g. fly a "truce flag"). Little Crow was not only a target of white soldiers, but also of many Dakota, and even some of those around Little Crow were thinking of ways to capture him to end the war. Little Crow calculated that engaging Sibley and his men very soon would provide a chance to hit-and-then-run to the Great Plains, where Sibley would have to suspend the chase due to the winter.
On 13 September 1862, Nicolay left St. Paul for Washington, D.C., carrying a report for Lincoln and notes that would become the basis for the first article about the Dakota War to appear in the Eastern press. After the disastrous Union defeat at the 2nd Battle of Bull Run in late-August 1862, where Lee gained control of all of Virginia, Lincoln had to figure out what to do with the disgraced General John Pope. Lincoln had replaced General George B. McClellan with Pope (the son of a judge that Lincoln knew and admired) in order to find a general that would defeat General Lee in battle; the move not only backfired, but Lincoln had to place McClellan back in command of the Army of the Potomac. Lincoln decided to send Pope to Minnesota, which in essence federalized the Dakota War. Pope, of course, saw the posting as nothing more than punishment and exile, an insult to his honor and abilities . . .
. . . President Lincoln Gets Involved . . .
