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George H.W. Bush: Becoming Reagan's Vice-President (1980)

7/20/2017

Source: Jon Meacham. Destiny and Power:
The American Odyssey of George Herbert Walker Bush (2015)

For the five weeks between the Iowa caucuses and the New Hampshire primary, the political struggle between Bush and Reagan became intense and personal. Bush claimed that Reagan was too old and too extreme, while Reagan claimed that Bush was too effete and elite. Reagan was forced to emerge from his comfortable California cocoon and actually campaign in New Hampshire, in large part to show that being in his late-60s had no bearing on his energy/vigor. Reagan's most effective attack on Bush was that he wasn't a "true" Man of the Right.
The turning point before the New Hampshire primary occurred in Nashua. The debate was scheduled to only involve Bush and Reagan, but Reagan wanted all the challengers on the stage, just like in the first debate (Reagan felt he was justified in that he provided funding for the debate). Bush refused Reagan's proposal, and was on stage, alone and waiting. Reagan appeared on the stage with the other candidates in tow . . . Reagan shined, and Bush froze. The tumult from the crowd was such that the other candidates (including Senator Bob Dole of Kansas) left the stage. Bush discovered that Right Wing Conservatives would do anything to win, even if it meant breaking the clearly agreed-upon rules for the second debate.

What Bush should have done was meet with Reagan and the other candidates off the stage, and explain that the newspaper made the rules of the debate, not him. Bush's biggest mistake was that he didn't take the Reagan, et al perspective into account, a rare misstep by Bush; he didn't follow his well-honed political instincts. Reagan won the New Hampshire primary garnering 50% to Bush's 23%. The Massachusetts primary became Bush's line-in-the-sand, in that the state had far more moderate and liberal Republicans compared to conservatives. If Bush lost Massachusetts, former President Gerald Ford was ready to sweep into the fray. Bush won the Massachusetts primary, but Ford still loomed in the background.
In March, Reagan won the primaries in South Carolina, Florida, Georgia, and Illinois, while Bush won Connecticut. By the end of March, there were only three candidates left: Reagan, Bush, and John Anderson. Reagan then swept Kansas, Wisconsin, and Louisiana, and with those successes, Ford stayed out of the race. It was increasingly clear to Bush (and Baker) that he would not catch Reagan, but he stayed relevant by prevailing in the occasional primary and winning some delegates.

The magic number of delegates needed to win the Republican Nomination in 1980 was 998, and on the eve of the Pennsylvania primary, Reagan had 577 delegates, while Bush only had 109, a total to which he added after winning the Pennsylvania primary with 53% to Reagan's 46%. Bush had already used the phrase "Voodoo Economics" as a critique on Reagan's economic proposals, but in Pennsylvania, the media started to repeat the phrase. After Reagan won the Oregon primary, he had surpassed the threshold of 998 delegates to win the nomination at the Republican National Convention in Detroit in July.
Baker gave Bush the news that their campaign was running low on money, and to campaign in the California primary, in Reagan's home state, would be foolhardy. Baker told Bush that every day he stayed in the race under the present circumstances meant that Reagan would have less-and-less confidence in him for the Vice-Presidential slot. Bush loved to compete, but it was starting to cloud his vision and common sense. Baker kept up the pressure, mentioning that since 1932 five of the last eight Presidents had been Vice-Presidents or the nominee from their party for Vice-President (FDR, Truman, LBJ, Nixon, Ford). Faced with the cold hard facts, Bush finally, gracefully, dropped out of the race.
For the 49 days between Bush's withdrawal and the Republican Convention in Detroit, Reagan was advised to select a moderate for Vice-President, and many powerful and influential Republicans favored Bush. Also, thoughtful conservatives realized that Bush would be a boon to the ticket. Bush had become enthusiastic about being the nominee for Vice-President, and waited for Reagan's call . . . Bush knew that his political career was almost certain to be over if he wasn't selected as Vice-President. Yet again, Bush's fate was in the hands of someone more powerful than himself . . . little did Bush know that Reagan didn't want him as his running mate.

Reagan was very upset with Bush's use of "Voodoo Economics" to describe economic proposals, and he hadn't forgotten (or forgiven) Bush for criticizing his age, physical fitness, and his stamina. Also, Reagan hadn't forgotten Bush's "Nashua Freeze"; Reagan simply didn't believe that Bush could handle pressure (It didn't register to the civilian Reagan that Bush was a decorated Navy pilot in World War II, and was more than capable of handling anything that came his way). Once something was in Reagan's imagination, it was locked and loaded, and too often he didn't listen to practical advice, at least right away.
However, Reagan needed to show the convention, and the Republican Party, that he was a problem-solver, not a rigid doctrinaire; a moderate for VP would illustrate that reality. Conservatives like Jesse Helms and Jack Kemp were vying for VP, which only increased the odds for a moderate such as Bush. Moderate delegates were upset with the Conservative-driven (and very ideological) platform, and no one knew what Reagan would decide, including Reagan.
When Reagan arrived in Detroit on 14 July 1980, he was still in anyone-but-Bush mode for VP. Former President Gerald Ford spoke to the convention, which led to Reagan thinking (again) about Ford as VP. But the distance between the possibility and reality was great. Reagan offered the VP slot to Ford, and Ford turned it down, but Reagan asked Ford to take a day to think it over. Ford was noncommittal, and he didn't promote Bush; Ford was still torn as to whether-or-not to be on the ticket in order to exact political revenge against Carter from 1976. Ford responded, asking quite a bit from Reagan in terms of Vice-Presidential powers, and Reagan seemed flexible in response. Carter was ecstatic, believing that Ford as the VP candidate would show that Reagan needed to be supervised.

Bush was slated to speak to the Convention on 16 July at 8 pm; if he wasn't selected as Reagan's VP, he believed the speech would be the last thing he did as a major politician. Before Bush spoke, Ford was on CBS being interviewed by Walter Cronkite. Bush watched, as did Reagan. Ford wanted very substantive promises from Reagan on substantive matters, saying nothing less would be acceptable. Then Cronkite mentioned a "Co-Presidency", and while Ford didn't say that's what he wanted, the mention of that phrase ended Reagan's courtship of Ford. To Reagan, sharing sovereignty as President was unacceptable, but Bush believed Ford had cemented his bid as VP.
Bush gave his speech, gushing about Reagan to the cheering delegates. Before the speech, Baker and others involved running Bush's campaign were approached by Reagan's team, who wanted to know if Bush supported the platform. The Bush people said he supported the platform, but Bush believed that history would pass him by, in that a Reagan/Ford administration would only feature Reagan, Ford, and even some Nixon loyalists . . . but not him. Later that evening, Reagan was far-more upset with Ford from the interview than he was about anything Bush had said or done during the primaries. Reagan agreed to reconsider Bush if he was 100% in support of the (conservative) Republican platform.

By 11:35 pm on the penultimate night of the convention, Reagan still hadn't selected his running mate. Finally Reagan reached the point he always (eventually) reached, the point of pragmatism. At 11:37 pm, Baker answered the phone in the Bush quarters, and Reagan spoke directly to Bush, offering the VP slot. Bush replied, "I'd be honored, Governor". Out of the clear blue sky, Bush's political future as back on track; he was a saved political man.
Bush and Reagan had coffee the next morning. Bush knew if he could have a sit-down with Reagan, Reagan would like him "just fine", which happened. Later, Reagan asked Dole (one of the disaffected from Nashua, and still holding many grudges against Bush), to give the nominating speech to place Bush's name in front of the convention for Vice-President. The more Reagan talked to Bush, the more he heard Bush say "we" instead of "I"; Bush made it crystal clear, in his affable way, that he would be a loyal Vice-President. Bush was again active, on the move, and looking forward . . . other than his family, those were his favorite things in life.

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George H.W. Bush: Pursuing the Republican Nomination (1980)

7/9/2017

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Source: Jon Meacham. Destiny and Power:
The American Odyssey of George Herbert Walker Bush (2015)

Senator Frank Church (D; Idaho), who chaired the Church Committee that investigated the doings of the CIA, worried that George Bush would be too partisan and too eager to please his superiors, and that the CIA would be under the thumb of the Ford administration if he was confirmed as the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). Bush was very irritated, in that he believed he was being sent to the political equivalent of Siberia, yet he was accused of being involved in partisan politics.
Bush's confirmation hearing in the Senate as DCI hit a snag: some in the Senate committee wanted Bush to say, for the record, that he wouldn't be a candidate for Vice-President in 1976, and Bush refused to do so. A deal was struck when President Ford wrote Senator John Stennis (D; Mississippi) that Bush would not be considered for Vice-President in 1976. The Senate committee voted 12 - 4 in favor of confirming Bush, and the floor vote of 64 - 27 in the Senate confirmed Bush as DCI. One benefit for Bush as DCI was that he discovered that Brent Scowcroft was a kindred spirit (Scowcroft had admired Bush for years).

Once he became the presumptive nominee of the Democratic Party for President, Jimmy Carter asked President Ford for CIA briefings. Ford sent Bush to brief Carter in a series of meetings, and Carter and Bush would spend hours in discussion (Carter was a "Detail Man"). After Carter was elected President in 1976, Bush offered his resignation as DCI during a final briefing. Bush believed he stood a good chance of remaining DCI, since the last time there had been a change in the CIA with a new President was in 1953 when Eisenhower named Allen Dulles to be in charge of the agency. But Carter accepted Bush's resignation, and listened to one last briefing from the soon-to-be-former Director of the CIA.
Bush actually enjoyed running the CIA, calling it the job he had liked the most up to that point in his life. Bush liked the people, and he liked the power of the position as well. Carter accepted Bush's resignation mostly because he thought Bush was too closely associated with the D.C. power structure, and he wanted to have one of his own people running the CIA. Bush greatly improved morale at the CIA in just one year at the helm. Bush also learned an incredible amount about national security, which would have been impossible to obtain at any other posting in the government.

In January 1977, George and Barbara Bush returned to Houston. It was the first time that Bush was a private citizen since he was elected to the House of Representatives a decade earlier. Bush quickly became bored with life in Houston, and he started to organize pre-1980 fundraisers, featuring the slogan "A President We Won't Have to Train". The slogan was a jab at Carter, as well as a nod towards Ronald Reagan's age and his relative lack of overall experience compared to Bush. Already, Bush was trying to favorably position himself within the Republican Party to do battle as a moderate Conservative against the Reagan Conservatives, the growing right wing of the party.
By 1979 - 1980, Reagan was the candidate that was supported by foreign policy conservatives that wanted "rollback" with the USSR, not detente. Religious conservatives supported Reagan's effort to reverse the 1973 Supreme Court decision of Roe v. Wade. And economic conservatives loved Reagan's desire to cut taxes and reduce the size of the federal government, and its spending. Bush agreed with Reagan in terms of a smaller federal government and less spending, stronger markets, and a strong foreign policy dealing with the USSR. But Bush sharply disagreed on limiting a woman's rights in the area of abortion, as well as the impact of tax cuts (Bush saw inflation as the #1 economic concern).
Bush and the moderate Republicans saw politics in terms of consensus, whereas Reagan and the conservative Republicans saw politics in terms of uncompromising ideology. Bush favored careful stewardship instead of radical reforms. Simply put, the "Reagan Crowd" didn't think Bush was part of their crusade; Reagan could do no wrong, where in their eyes, Bush could do no right.

George Bush was the reason for the rise in national politics of James Baker III. Ford named Baker as Secretary of Commerce due in large part to Bush's endorsement. Bush also pushed for Baker to be Ford's "Delegate Hunter" in the 1976 primaries against Reagan. Ford must have liked what he saw, because Baker was Ford's convention manager in Kansas City to deal with Reagan, and then his campaign manager running against Carter in 1976. In 1978, Baker ran for Attorney General in Texas and lost, not taking Bush's advice to run for governor; afterwards, Baker admitted that he was wrong, and Bush was right. The good news after his defeat in Texas was that he was available to help Bush in his bid to gain the nomination of the Republican Party for President in 1980.
James Reston of the New York Times wrote that Bush needed Reagan and John Connally to be eliminated from contention, at which point the G.O.P. would turn to Bush as their standard-bearer. Baker made sure Bush was organized leading in to the Iowa Caucuses and the New Hampshire Primary, as well as packaging Bush as "acceptable" to Reagan Conservatives. On 1 May 1979, George Bush formally announced that he was a candidate for President. During his speech, Bush referred to himself as a life-long Republican, a political shot across the bow to both Reagan and Connally, who were former Democrats. Bush kept mentioning Eisenhower, and how he liked-and-appreciated the former moderate Republican President's approach/ideals. As a result, Reagan's campaign was forced on the defensive, instead of the broad-picture ideologically-based offensive that they preferred.
In Iowa, the first of a series of "straw polls" (non-scientific polling) was conducted before the caucuses, and Bush polled at 39.6%, with Reagan at 25.9%, and Connally at 10.7%. But then the Des Moines Register published their straw poll, and Bush placed 6th out of 7 Republicans, with President Ford finishing second. It was then that Bush knew Ford was seriously considering ("off the record") running again for President in 1980, which left Bush in a tough spot politically, in that Ford was also a moderate Republican.

In late-1979, Bush kept participating in various straw polls and contests, all of them informal non-scientific measurements of political popularity. Bush did well in Maine and Florida, unexpectedly so. Bush was gaining momentum, and was being taken seriously as a contender for the nomination before the caucuses and primaries started. Bush's foreign policy bona fides were further strengthened when in November 1979, the USSR invaded Afghanistan, and the Iranian Hostage Crisis began.
Bush spent 27 days in Iowa campaigning before the caucuses, while Reagan spent a total of 45 hours in the state. On 21 January 1980, Republicans in Iowa turned out in numbers five times greater than in 1976, and the results of the Iowa Caucuses were: Bush, 31.6%; Reagan, 29.5%, with Connally a non-factor. For Bush, he now had a tremendous amount of momentum heading into the New Hampshire primary in February 1980.

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George Herbert Walker Bush: U.S. Ambassador to China

7/1/2017

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Source: Jon Meacham. Destiny and Power:
The American Odyssey of George Herbert Walker Bush (2015)

During his tenure as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Bush learned that diplomacy required making personal connections. In China, Bush learned that diplomacy also required persistence and patience, which were not strengths he yet possessed. Bush liked action, movement, and making phone calls, all of which led to timely results. When Bush left China, he understood that diplomacy was a "Long Game", and change cold come rapidly or glacially depending on the circumstances of a given nation and/or situation.
Bush found out that China still wanted a powerful America, even in Asia, in that the powers-that-be in the Chinese government wanted the U.S. to be a powerful distraction to the USSR. Bush believed that the U.S. needed to be visible in Asia, but not pushy, muscular, or domineering. Bush violated the instructions given to his predecessor to avoid interacting with the Chinese. Bush intermingled with Chinese diplomats and government officials, cheerfully making the rounds. At the time, Secretary of State + National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger couldn't have disagreed more with Bush's approach towards the Chinese. George and Barbara Bush eschewed the official U.S. Government vehicle, choosing instead to get around by bicycle as often as possible.

Bush was actually having a good time in China, but he still yearned to know what was going on in Washington, D.C. In late-November 1974, Kissinger arrived in Beijing; Bush was fascinated by the "Kissinger Style", which was brilliant-yet-imperious. Kissinger was respectful to Bush, but very much less so with his entourage. Kissinger's questioning of Bush indicated that he was still in demand in D.C., and Bush dared to dream of running for President in 1980.
Bush discovered that China bent only when it chose to bend. China saw history, even reality itself, very much differently than Western nations. After the Fall of Saigon, Bush watched various nations from the Pacific Rim call on Beijing, just in case the U.S. pulled out of their region. Bush was convinced that the U.S. needed to remain engaged and relevant in the world, which required constant vigilance.
Bush asserted that the U.S. would never know ahead of time which relatively insignificant nation(s) would all of a sudden become critically important, whether regionally or globally. Kissinger returned to China in October 1975 in order to prepare for President Ford's visit later that year. Bush saw Mao Tse-Tung twice in 1975, first with Kissinger, then with Ford; Mao told Ford that he would hate to see Bush leave China as U.S. Envoy.

Donald Rumsfeld, the Chief of Staff, took a hard look at the Ford administration with an election year looming in 1976. The fate of Rockefeller was central, in that since 1964, the Republican Party had split along three factions: Goldwater Conservatives, Moderate-Conservatives (e.g. Ford/Bush), and Rockefeller's Liberal-Conservatives.
Ronald Reagan was on the ascendancy, with more-and-more Republicans identifying themselves as Reagan (formerly Goldwater) Conservatives. The Reagan Conservatives could accept Ford as President, but not with Rockefeller in tow. Ford realized that the antagonism the Reagan Conservatives had towards the liberal wing of the party would only increase as time went by.
Rockefeller agreed to no longer be Ford's Vice-President in 1976. Rumsfeld would be Secretary of Defense, and Dick Cheney would serve as Chief of Staff. Brent Scowcroft would head the National Security Agency, replacing Kissinger. Elliott Richardson would be the new SecCommerce, and William Colby would be out as Director of the CIA. On
1 November 1975, Bush was flabbergasted to learn, in a telegram from Kissinger, that Ford wanted him to be the new Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. The CIA was in disarray, and to complicate matters more for Bush, the Church Committee was investigating the intelligence agency.

To the Bushes, the situation seemed eerily similar to when he was forced to become Chairman of the Republican National Committee. Bush couldn't refuse, he would do his duty, but the CIA looked to be a political career-killer; Bush's future political prospects looked bleak. Bush believed that Rumsfeld was mainly to blame, trying to eliminate Bush as a political rival as the Election of 1976 drew closer.
Plenty in D.C. saw Rumsfeld advancing his bona fides for a future Vice-Presidency by positioning himself as SecDef, while marooning Bush in the CIA. According to Cheney, it was Ford that had Bush going to the CIA instead of being named SecCommerce . . . still, Rumsfeld was the main beneficiary. If true, Bush being moved to the CIA was almost certain to make Kissinger happy, in that Kissinger was now "only" Secretary of State, and Kissinger liked Bush. That mattered to Kissinger because the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency had to interact, and Kissinger wanted someone he knew and trusted as Director of the CIA.

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George H.W. Bush: Becoming Reagan's Vice-President (1980)

George H.W. Bush: Pursuing the Republican Nomination (1980)

George Herbert Walker Bush: U.S. Ambassador to China

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