Source: Larry Tye. Bobby Kennedy - the Making of a Liberal Icon (2016)
Joe simply wanted the best possible choice for Vice-President so JFK would have the best possible chance to be elected President. Not only, according to Joe, would LBJ deliver votes in the South and the West, but he would also no longer be a possible impediment as Senate Majority Leader. As far as LBJ was concerned, knowing the true status of JFK's health, he doubted that JFK would live long enough to serve two terms. Lady Bird (LBJ's wife) told her husband that the Vice-Presidency (and then the Presidency) would be less demanding than continuing as the Senate Majority Leader.
Sam Rayburn even told LBJ that he needed to be the Democratic Vice-Presidential candidate to ensure victory on Election Day. JFK and RFK did the same Electoral College math, and there was no way around it: they needed a lot of help out of their running mate. Ironically, JFK made up his mind to select LBJ as VP while RFK was visiting Johnson trying to change the Senate Majority Leader's mind, offering LBJ the Chairmanship of the Democratic National Committee (which was an insult). LBJ and those loyal to him believed that RFK insulted LBJ out of pure hatred, which RFK repeatedly denied over the years. It was far more likely that JFK sent RFK to find out how much LBJ wanted to be VP; if LBJ said no, then Senator Stuart Symington (MO) would be the choice. And, if LBJ said yes, then JFK could play the part of the fair-and-square Democratic candidate with RFK yet again taking the blame for being ruthless. One thing was abundantly clear: there was no way that RFK and LBJ would ever get along in the future. In Beverly Hills, California, a relatively downcast JFK and a very downcast RFK went to visit their very upbeat father; Joe told JFK that within two weeks the press would say that LBJ as VP was the smartest move to make.
Sam Rayburn even told LBJ that he needed to be the Democratic Vice-Presidential candidate to ensure victory on Election Day. JFK and RFK did the same Electoral College math, and there was no way around it: they needed a lot of help out of their running mate. Ironically, JFK made up his mind to select LBJ as VP while RFK was visiting Johnson trying to change the Senate Majority Leader's mind, offering LBJ the Chairmanship of the Democratic National Committee (which was an insult). LBJ and those loyal to him believed that RFK insulted LBJ out of pure hatred, which RFK repeatedly denied over the years. It was far more likely that JFK sent RFK to find out how much LBJ wanted to be VP; if LBJ said no, then Senator Stuart Symington (MO) would be the choice. And, if LBJ said yes, then JFK could play the part of the fair-and-square Democratic candidate with RFK yet again taking the blame for being ruthless. One thing was abundantly clear: there was no way that RFK and LBJ would ever get along in the future. In Beverly Hills, California, a relatively downcast JFK and a very downcast RFK went to visit their very upbeat father; Joe told JFK that within two weeks the press would say that LBJ as VP was the smartest move to make.
The issues mattered less in the General Campaign of 1960 than they should have, and less compared to other Presidential Elections in memory. This was perhaps so since the US was on the brink of leaving one era and entering another, with Americans simultaneously embracing Ben-Hur and The Flintstones with the Birth Control Pill and The Twist. During the campaign, JFK (and RFK) called for closing the "Missile Gap" with the USSR, which wasn't even close to being true, but President Eisenhower couldn't release the actual information since he would give away the secret (and illegal) U-2 surveillance flights over Russia.
Under the layer of politics, not much separated JFK from the Republican nominee, Vice-President Richard Nixon. RFK framed JFK's campaign around the themes of style, hope, and optimism, knowing that by far Nixon had the advantage in terms of experience. RFK kept the focus on the intangibles, such as JFK's charisma, just as he had done in JFK's successful upset over Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. for a Senate seat in 1952. RFK understood that he had to get JFK on television, side-by-side with his comparatively less-than-handsome opponent. But even though JFK and Nixon would engage in the first-ever televised
Presidential debates, Nixon was the furthest thing from a TV neophyte (e.g. the "Checkers Speech"). However, Nixon simply couldn't match JFK's style, and he was not yet the master of dirty tricks, although Nixon would learn plenty from JFK and RFK during the General Campaign of 1960.
Under the layer of politics, not much separated JFK from the Republican nominee, Vice-President Richard Nixon. RFK framed JFK's campaign around the themes of style, hope, and optimism, knowing that by far Nixon had the advantage in terms of experience. RFK kept the focus on the intangibles, such as JFK's charisma, just as he had done in JFK's successful upset over Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. for a Senate seat in 1952. RFK understood that he had to get JFK on television, side-by-side with his comparatively less-than-handsome opponent. But even though JFK and Nixon would engage in the first-ever televised
Presidential debates, Nixon was the furthest thing from a TV neophyte (e.g. the "Checkers Speech"). However, Nixon simply couldn't match JFK's style, and he was not yet the master of dirty tricks, although Nixon would learn plenty from JFK and RFK during the General Campaign of 1960.
At most, the first televised debate switched the positions of JFK and Nixon, with the Vice-President becoming the slight underdog. But RFK knew that the post-debate bounce would disappear, since there were still 3.5 weeks until the election. So, RFK decided it was time to unleash his dirty tricks to stack the deck in favor of his brother. RFK compiled all the information possible on Nixon, calling it the "Nixonpedia". RFK leaked the fact that Howard Hughes lent Nixon's brother $205k, and reporters such as Jack Anderson ran with the story. The dirty tricks were such that Nixon changed politically, seeing dirty tricks as the way to winning/gaining/amassing power.
As soon as the arrest in Georgia of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. was made public, JFK and RFK started making calculations how they could help MLK, Jr. and also help themselves. Standing up for MLK, Jr. could cost them Georgia, but not standing up for him would cost them nationally in terms of African-American and Northern Liberal votes. RFK's solution was to have it both ways: JFK and RFK started to quietly make phone calls, starting with JFK's call to the Governor of Georgia. JFK and the governor each saw in the other a politician that they understood, and the governor started to get things done on his end, especially laying the groundwork with the key judge in the state.
As soon as the arrest in Georgia of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. was made public, JFK and RFK started making calculations how they could help MLK, Jr. and also help themselves. Standing up for MLK, Jr. could cost them Georgia, but not standing up for him would cost them nationally in terms of African-American and Northern Liberal votes. RFK's solution was to have it both ways: JFK and RFK started to quietly make phone calls, starting with JFK's call to the Governor of Georgia. JFK and the governor each saw in the other a politician that they understood, and the governor started to get things done on his end, especially laying the groundwork with the key judge in the state.
One campaign strategist, Harris Wofford, convinced another, Sargent Shriver, to convince JFK to make a sympathy phone call to Coretta Scott King. When RFK found out what JFK had done, he was very upset because he thought that the phone call could jeopardize his machinations already in the works, which featured working his way up to calling the Georgia judge that could actually release MLK, Jr. . . . which he did not long after chewing out everyone involved, including JFK.
The Governor of Georgia, Ernest Vandiver, not only paved the way for RFK to call the judge, but also convinced the judge that he could release MLK, Jr. pending an appeal, which let everyone off the hook while saving face. RFK told the judge that he would be a welcome visitor in the White House, an offer that the judge would later cash in. The judge released MLK, Jr. on bail, and the judge also hinted to reporters that RFK had made that happen . . . and by implication, that Nixon hadn't done a thing. RFK made sure ahead of time that his efforts to release MLK, Jr. wouldn't backfire, asking every state's Democratic Party chairman what their thoughts were on the potential release of MLK, Jr.
The Governor of Georgia, Ernest Vandiver, not only paved the way for RFK to call the judge, but also convinced the judge that he could release MLK, Jr. pending an appeal, which let everyone off the hook while saving face. RFK told the judge that he would be a welcome visitor in the White House, an offer that the judge would later cash in. The judge released MLK, Jr. on bail, and the judge also hinted to reporters that RFK had made that happen . . . and by implication, that Nixon hadn't done a thing. RFK made sure ahead of time that his efforts to release MLK, Jr. wouldn't backfire, asking every state's Democratic Party chairman what their thoughts were on the potential release of MLK, Jr.
RFK's gamble paid off bigger than anyone could have foreseen. RFK's calls were front page news, while JFK's call to Coretta Scott King was buried, just as RFK wanted in order to minimize white Southern reaction (the story behind the phone calls remained secret for 20+ years). In the African-American communities, the political grapevine lit up with pro-JFK chatter. And, just like in Wisconsin with the anti-Catholic leaflets that were attributed to Humphrey, RFK had 3 million "Blue Bomb" leaflets handed out days before the election to remind African-American voters what JFK and RFK did for MLK, Jr.; RFK made sure that those leaflets could not be directly attributed to JFK's campaign in any way.
President Eisenhower basically pegged it right why Nixon lost to JFK (the popular vote was JFK 49.7%, Nixon 49.6%): two phone calls. JFK called Coretta Scott King when he was near O'Hare International Airport, and RFK made his call to the Georgia judge from Long Island, both on behalf of a jailed MLK, Jr. Neither call lasted more than a few minutes, but those two calls (plus JFK's initial call to the GA Governor) resulted in MLK, Jr. being freed. Nixon did press Ike for some action on MLK, Jr.'s behalf, but the President refused, and Nixon didn't take the matter any further.
White America paid little attention to MLK, Jr.'s release from jail, but African-Americans knew all about it, and that JFK and RFK were the main reason MLK, Jr. gained his freedom. Nixon, who had been in the good graces of African-American voters for years, and had taken the time to meet MLK, Jr. face-to-face, captured only 1/3 of the African-American vote, a steep drop from Ike's total in 1956. That juxtaposition of the African-American vote accounted for JFK's razor-thin victory over Nixon; during the primaries, JFK had been the least-popular Democratic candidate among African-American voters. . . . the phone calls made by JFK and RFK were the difference in the very, very close Presidential Election of 1960.
President Eisenhower basically pegged it right why Nixon lost to JFK (the popular vote was JFK 49.7%, Nixon 49.6%): two phone calls. JFK called Coretta Scott King when he was near O'Hare International Airport, and RFK made his call to the Georgia judge from Long Island, both on behalf of a jailed MLK, Jr. Neither call lasted more than a few minutes, but those two calls (plus JFK's initial call to the GA Governor) resulted in MLK, Jr. being freed. Nixon did press Ike for some action on MLK, Jr.'s behalf, but the President refused, and Nixon didn't take the matter any further.
White America paid little attention to MLK, Jr.'s release from jail, but African-Americans knew all about it, and that JFK and RFK were the main reason MLK, Jr. gained his freedom. Nixon, who had been in the good graces of African-American voters for years, and had taken the time to meet MLK, Jr. face-to-face, captured only 1/3 of the African-American vote, a steep drop from Ike's total in 1956. That juxtaposition of the African-American vote accounted for JFK's razor-thin victory over Nixon; during the primaries, JFK had been the least-popular Democratic candidate among African-American voters. . . . the phone calls made by JFK and RFK were the difference in the very, very close Presidential Election of 1960.
