Source: Lawrence O'Donnell. Playing With Fire - The 1968 Election
and the Transformation of American Politics (2017)
and the Transformation of American Politics (2017)
Republican Party Presidential candidate Richard Nixon had a 15 point leat in September 1968; if it wasn’t for his concerns about George Wallace (the Governor of Alabama was an Independent candidate), Nixon would have conducted a front-runner’s campaign. Wallace soon reached 20% in the polls while the Democratic nominee, Vice-President Hubert Humphrey, was centered at 28%. Nixon believed it was possible that Wallace could keep him below the magic number of 270 Electoral Votes to become President. Wallace was far more Nixon’s problem than Humphrey’s, and Nixon had to find a way to compete with Wallace without alienating the Southern Conservative Republican bloc led by Strom Thurmond. Nixon knew that he couldn’t “out-Wallace Wallace”, so he avoided campaigning in states that were certain to go to Wallace, and instead Nixon focused on southern states such as Florida, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia. Nixon’s mantra in those states was simple: a vote for Wallace was a wasted vote.
Nixon wasn’t worried about Wallace in northeastern states, since not only could Wallace not win those states, but Nixon probably wouldn’t either. To Nixon, the key battleground states included Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, Texas, and California . . . the West looked very strong for Nixon. Nixon was told by his advisors that it was possible that he could win 40 states (Nixon carried 32 states in 1968, and 49 in 1972). The voting bloc of Republican conservatives was growing, and had started to take form in 1968, but it wouldn’t be until 1980 that voting bloc became a political force when they lined up in support of Ronald Reagan.
Nixon wasn’t worried about Wallace in northeastern states, since not only could Wallace not win those states, but Nixon probably wouldn’t either. To Nixon, the key battleground states included Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, Texas, and California . . . the West looked very strong for Nixon. Nixon was told by his advisors that it was possible that he could win 40 states (Nixon carried 32 states in 1968, and 49 in 1972). The voting bloc of Republican conservatives was growing, and had started to take form in 1968, but it wouldn’t be until 1980 that voting bloc became a political force when they lined up in support of Ronald Reagan.
The Nixon campaign was run with corporate sophistication, with John Mitchell as the campaign manager (Chief Executive Officer) and Maurice Stans as the “money man” (Chief Financial Officer); the 1968 campaign was 180 degrees different from Nixon’s campaign in 1960, where he served as his own campaign manager. Where Wallace drew battle lines, Nixon preached unity, except for those that resorted to violence. Nixon focused on the “forgotten Americans” that worked and minded their own business, and didn’t have time to take to the streets; Nixon called them the “Silent Majority”.
A rumored quote that had been spread by the media that had Nixon stating that he had a “secret plan” to end the Vietnam War was not refuted or challenged by Nixon, and that false quote became the signature slogan of his campaign. Nixon basically criticized LBJ and Humphrey and kept his alternative policies vague, which was enough for millions of Americans to believe that he did indeed have a “secret plan”. Through the end of September 1968, Nixon experienced smooth-sailing in his campaign with the exception of worrying about Wallace.
Humphrey had selected Senator Edmund Muskie (ME) as his running mate, which was a common sense and safe choice. Nixon went with the nationally unknown governor of Maryland, Spiro Agnew, not wanting to make a choice that would cost him votes in what he assumed would be a very close election. Wallace wanted to run alone, but many states required a VP candidate, so on 3 October 1968, Wallace announced that his running mate would be former Air Force Major General Curtis LeMay. Under President Eisenhower, LeMay was the commander of the Strategic Air Command (SAC). LeMay was a “Hawk”, and his most famous quote before he was tabbed as Wallace’s running mate was that the best thing to do with North Vietnam was to “bomb them back into the Stone Age”, LeMay totally ignored Wallace and his advisors in terms of how to respond to questions regarding the Vietnam War and nuclear missiles, and was told to stay on message. But LeMay kept going on-and-on about how about how nuclear missiles weren’t really that bad and that they really should be used. LeMay wound up bombing Wallace’s campaign back to the Stone Age and the momentum of the campaign vaporized. LeMay had become a national laughingstock, and Wallace paid the political price.
A rumored quote that had been spread by the media that had Nixon stating that he had a “secret plan” to end the Vietnam War was not refuted or challenged by Nixon, and that false quote became the signature slogan of his campaign. Nixon basically criticized LBJ and Humphrey and kept his alternative policies vague, which was enough for millions of Americans to believe that he did indeed have a “secret plan”. Through the end of September 1968, Nixon experienced smooth-sailing in his campaign with the exception of worrying about Wallace.
Humphrey had selected Senator Edmund Muskie (ME) as his running mate, which was a common sense and safe choice. Nixon went with the nationally unknown governor of Maryland, Spiro Agnew, not wanting to make a choice that would cost him votes in what he assumed would be a very close election. Wallace wanted to run alone, but many states required a VP candidate, so on 3 October 1968, Wallace announced that his running mate would be former Air Force Major General Curtis LeMay. Under President Eisenhower, LeMay was the commander of the Strategic Air Command (SAC). LeMay was a “Hawk”, and his most famous quote before he was tabbed as Wallace’s running mate was that the best thing to do with North Vietnam was to “bomb them back into the Stone Age”, LeMay totally ignored Wallace and his advisors in terms of how to respond to questions regarding the Vietnam War and nuclear missiles, and was told to stay on message. But LeMay kept going on-and-on about how about how nuclear missiles weren’t really that bad and that they really should be used. LeMay wound up bombing Wallace’s campaign back to the Stone Age and the momentum of the campaign vaporized. LeMay had become a national laughingstock, and Wallace paid the political price.
The only good thing about the Humphrey campaign was Lawrence O’Brien, the former JFK campaign guru and advisor. Humphrey was all over the place in terms of his stance on anti-war protesters and the Vietnam War, and everywhere Humphrey went, the anti-war protesters waited. Humphrey looked very weak, and seemed unable to put the debacle that was the Democratic National Convention in Chicago behind him. O’Brien told Humphrey that the campaign was broke, and that confidence in Humphrey was very low. What was needed, O’Brien argued, was that Humphrey needed to break away from LBJ on Vietnam and call for a bombing halt. Humphrey agreed, and he called LBJ in order to give the President a heads-up on his upcoming campaign speech on Vietnam.
However, 45 minutes before Humphrey made that phone call, Nixon had called LBJ, informing him of much of Humphrey’s upcoming speech on Vietnam (significant portions of the speech had been leaked). LBJ not only told Nixon that Humphrey was on his own, but he also gave Nixon advice on how to attack Humphrey: the bombing halt would cost American lives.
In his speech, Humphrey stated that if he was elected, he would stop the bombing in order to pursue negotiations, but if North Vietnam balked, he would resume bombing. By 10 October 1968, the Humphrey campaign had $1 million, which paled in comparison to Nixon, but it showed that Humphrey had struck a chord. Not only did the anti-war protesters become less bothersome to Humphrey, he rose in the polls. Muskie’s job was to focus on the past shenanigans of “Tricky Dick” Nixon, and soon Agnew became the focus of Democratic attacks. Momentum for Humphrey also increased when Frank Sinatra started to campaign for the Vice-President, and when the campaign worked hard to get the labor vote, since many had defected to Wallace, but were now unsure about voting for him.
However, 45 minutes before Humphrey made that phone call, Nixon had called LBJ, informing him of much of Humphrey’s upcoming speech on Vietnam (significant portions of the speech had been leaked). LBJ not only told Nixon that Humphrey was on his own, but he also gave Nixon advice on how to attack Humphrey: the bombing halt would cost American lives.
In his speech, Humphrey stated that if he was elected, he would stop the bombing in order to pursue negotiations, but if North Vietnam balked, he would resume bombing. By 10 October 1968, the Humphrey campaign had $1 million, which paled in comparison to Nixon, but it showed that Humphrey had struck a chord. Not only did the anti-war protesters become less bothersome to Humphrey, he rose in the polls. Muskie’s job was to focus on the past shenanigans of “Tricky Dick” Nixon, and soon Agnew became the focus of Democratic attacks. Momentum for Humphrey also increased when Frank Sinatra started to campaign for the Vice-President, and when the campaign worked hard to get the labor vote, since many had defected to Wallace, but were now unsure about voting for him.
As Wallace plummeted in the polls, Humphrey rose, and by mid-October 1968, Humphrey was within five points of Nixon. Nixon had banked that being vague was the best campaign strategy, but Humphrey had closed the gap in large part because he was the candidate with specific stands on the issues. For example, Humphrey had a far clearer position on Vietnam than did Nixon and his “secret plan”, so now it was Nixon’s turn to regroup and re-strategize.
Humphrey gained enough leverage to challenge Nixon to a debate. Nixon, of course, wanted to keep Wallace away from any debate so he wouldn’t regain momentum and cost Nixon votes. So the simplest solution was to avoid the situation: the Campaign of 1968 did not feature a debate between the candidates. But it soon became apparent to Nixon that his most immediate problem was his Vice-Presidential running mate, Spiro Agnew. Pat Buchanan (who would become one of Nixon’s speechwriters) was traveling with Agnew, and he didn’t have many positives to report. Buchanan’s observations to Nixon basically stated that Agnew was living up to the Humphrey/Muskie attack ads, saying such nonsensical things as “if you’ve seen one slum, you’ve seen them all”. The Nixon campaign decided to keep Agnew on a very short leash and to minimize his appearances. Now Nixon focused on his biggest problem, which was that any positive developments in the negotiations in Paris would kill his chances of being elected President. A typical candidate would have viewed the situation as beyond his control . . . but Nixon did not see the situation in that way at all.
Humphrey gained enough leverage to challenge Nixon to a debate. Nixon, of course, wanted to keep Wallace away from any debate so he wouldn’t regain momentum and cost Nixon votes. So the simplest solution was to avoid the situation: the Campaign of 1968 did not feature a debate between the candidates. But it soon became apparent to Nixon that his most immediate problem was his Vice-Presidential running mate, Spiro Agnew. Pat Buchanan (who would become one of Nixon’s speechwriters) was traveling with Agnew, and he didn’t have many positives to report. Buchanan’s observations to Nixon basically stated that Agnew was living up to the Humphrey/Muskie attack ads, saying such nonsensical things as “if you’ve seen one slum, you’ve seen them all”. The Nixon campaign decided to keep Agnew on a very short leash and to minimize his appearances. Now Nixon focused on his biggest problem, which was that any positive developments in the negotiations in Paris would kill his chances of being elected President. A typical candidate would have viewed the situation as beyond his control . . . but Nixon did not see the situation in that way at all.
The Soviet Union told LBJ that if the halted the bombing, North Vietnam would agree to have South Vietnam participate in the negotiations. The USSR also told LBJ that North Vietnam was open to his three conditions as well, but it would have to appear that the US stopped the bombing before the North Vietnamese government would follow through. And, if the US stopped bombing, it would look like LBJ was following Humphrey’s stance on Vietnam, which could only help the Vice-President gain votes. To LBJ the end of the nightmare was in sight: he believed that he was truly on the brink of “Peace With Honor”, which would cement his historical legacy.
LBJ proceeded slowly, in that he wanted to find out if South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu was amenable to participating in the peace talks. Thieu readily agreed to take part, and then LBJ told North Vietnam that he would resume bombing if they reneged on South Vietnamese participation . . . LBJ was told that his message had been received. LBJ, in his customary phone calls to Presidential candidates as the outgoing President, mentioned none of these things to Humphrey, Nixon, or Wallace. It never crossed LBJ’s mind that the South Vietnamese government would betray his trust. LBJ’s advisors told him there was in essence no downside to proceeding with the negotiations, but LBJ remained slow-moving and cautious, which was consistent with his two greatest fears: failure and humiliation.
LBJ proceeded slowly, in that he wanted to find out if South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu was amenable to participating in the peace talks. Thieu readily agreed to take part, and then LBJ told North Vietnam that he would resume bombing if they reneged on South Vietnamese participation . . . LBJ was told that his message had been received. LBJ, in his customary phone calls to Presidential candidates as the outgoing President, mentioned none of these things to Humphrey, Nixon, or Wallace. It never crossed LBJ’s mind that the South Vietnamese government would betray his trust. LBJ’s advisors told him there was in essence no downside to proceeding with the negotiations, but LBJ remained slow-moving and cautious, which was consistent with his two greatest fears: failure and humiliation.