Source: Stuart Eizenstat. President Carter - The White House Years (2018)
Carter didn’t help the Shah of Iran when the President made a New Year’s Eve visit to Teheran in 1977. During the state dinner that night, Carter went off-script during his remarks, calling the Shah an “Island of Stability” in a “turbulent corner of the world”. At the time, Carter believed the whole event was a great gala in that he was the 7th President to have successfully dealt w/ the Shah, and there were many other dignitaries in attendance such as King Hussein of Jordan and Walter Cronkite of CBS News. With 20-20 hindsight, Carter’s remarks were viewed as remarkably naive, and those words intensified the fires of revolution in Iran.
As early as 7 January 1978, protests started against the Shah in Iran that gained in momentum and intensity as the weeks passed, with Khomeini pulling many of the strings from exile. To the CIA, the protests were a result of the Shah’s modernization, not his close ties with the US. So, the question for Carter was how best to respond to events in Iran that called into question four decades of unwavering support for the Shah, and a large part of that answer was that Carter approved most of the Shah’s military requests. The forces loyal to Khomeini sensed weakness in the Shah, and it would be the Islamic radicals, not the secular opposition, that would seize power after the Shah left Iran. On 5 September 1978, thousands of protesters filled Jaleh Square in Teheran, and the Iranian army killed hundreds.
As early as 7 January 1978, protests started against the Shah in Iran that gained in momentum and intensity as the weeks passed, with Khomeini pulling many of the strings from exile. To the CIA, the protests were a result of the Shah’s modernization, not his close ties with the US. So, the question for Carter was how best to respond to events in Iran that called into question four decades of unwavering support for the Shah, and a large part of that answer was that Carter approved most of the Shah’s military requests. The forces loyal to Khomeini sensed weakness in the Shah, and it would be the Islamic radicals, not the secular opposition, that would seize power after the Shah left Iran. On 5 September 1978, thousands of protesters filled Jaleh Square in Teheran, and the Iranian army killed hundreds.
On 10 October 1978, the Shah met with the US Ambassador to Iran, and openly wondered if he should allow Khomeini back in the nation as well as wondering if his military was still loyal. Then inexplicably, the Shah asked Saddam Hussein to relocate Khomeini; the Iraqi dictator was only more than happy to get rid of the cleric. Khomeini was advised by an Iranian nationalist that was with him at the time to go to France instead of a Muslim nation such as Algeria, knowing that Khomeini would have a world stage and that a media circus would ensue. When Khomeini asked France for permission to enter, France agreed as long as the Shah did as well, and the Shah did just than, sealing his fate.
Ironically, Khomeini would take full advantage of the freedom of the press in France which was something he would not allow once he established an Islamic State in Iran. Khomeini located himself just outside Paris on property owned by an Iranian activist, and Khomeini erected a tent on the grounds for prayers, sermons, and especially for media events. Every day Khomeini’s entourage updated the cleric on what had been done and said by the Shah and President Carter.
Ironically, Khomeini would take full advantage of the freedom of the press in France which was something he would not allow once he established an Islamic State in Iran. Khomeini located himself just outside Paris on property owned by an Iranian activist, and Khomeini erected a tent on the grounds for prayers, sermons, and especially for media events. Every day Khomeini’s entourage updated the cleric on what had been done and said by the Shah and President Carter.
It was about at that time that (what would become) the Revolutionary Guard was created around Khomeini, which would defend the Islamic Revolution from internal enemies. The CIA didn’t know about the brewing revolution in Iran, the Shah’s illness, or Khomeini’s activities in France, even though the cleric’s speeches were in the public record and all over the media. Just like Adolf Hitler and Mein Kampf and the Weimar Republic, there wasn’t any understanding by the US government of Khomeini’s end game. Many of those around Khomeini regarded him as only a figurehead that would inspire revolution, not someone that would actually take the reins of power afterwards.
After the Watergate Scandal, the CIA no longer used assassination as a tool, so other eans had to be used to contain Khomeini. US diplomats could have pressured the French government to refuse Khomeini’s request to return to Iran, and the CIA could have spied on Khomeini and gathered quality intelligence. Carter was preoccupied with among other things finalizing the treaty between Egypt and Israel, and Carter hadn’t yet held a specific meeting regarding the Shah and the situation in Iran, in large part because he wasn’t properly apprised of the increasingly revolutionary atmosphere in Iran.
After the Watergate Scandal, the CIA no longer used assassination as a tool, so other eans had to be used to contain Khomeini. US diplomats could have pressured the French government to refuse Khomeini’s request to return to Iran, and the CIA could have spied on Khomeini and gathered quality intelligence. Carter was preoccupied with among other things finalizing the treaty between Egypt and Israel, and Carter hadn’t yet held a specific meeting regarding the Shah and the situation in Iran, in large part because he wasn’t properly apprised of the increasingly revolutionary atmosphere in Iran.
On 5 November 1978, events in Iran took a turn for the worse when the army fired on students at Teheran University, and soon afterward attacks on Western hotels/businesses were encouraged by the mullahs. The British Embassy was burned and overrun while the US Embassy in Teheran was threatened, yet the Shah did not crack down on the violence. Instead, the Shah turned over the government to his generals, which showed even more weakness. The demonstrations resumed in late-November 1978 which included oil field strikes which led to the 2nd Oil Shock of the 1970s in the US. Carter was very irate on 9 November 1978 when a cable from the US Ambassador in Iran made its way to the White House which stated that events had reached a boiling point in Iran, and that the US should abandon the Shah. The reason why Carter was upset was that the cable was the first instance in which he found out what was really occurring in Iran. Whether or not he realized it, Carter had stayed in the Shah’s corner far too long, constantly expressing public confidence on his behalf.
Carter asked Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd (D; WVA), who was already in the Middle East, to travel to Teheran, as was SecTreas Blumenthal, and both separately reported dire news. Added to the mix was another unscripted blunder by Carter. On 7 December 1978, Carter was asked by a reporter if the Shah could survive the revolution, and Carter in effect disavowed the Shah, saying that the situation was in the hands of the Iranian people. Whether or not Carter knew it, that statement meant that he had in effect endorsed the revolution in Iran.
Carter asked Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd (D; WVA), who was already in the Middle East, to travel to Teheran, as was SecTreas Blumenthal, and both separately reported dire news. Added to the mix was another unscripted blunder by Carter. On 7 December 1978, Carter was asked by a reporter if the Shah could survive the revolution, and Carter in effect disavowed the Shah, saying that the situation was in the hands of the Iranian people. Whether or not Carter knew it, that statement meant that he had in effect endorsed the revolution in Iran.
In the end, both the Shah and the US government were outmaneuvered by Khomeini, who masterfully manipulated the extremists in the revolution, the same faction that would overrun the US Embassy. Khomeini, following wise advice, did not declare a holy war in Iran, which almost certainly would have led to the revolution losing momentum and credibility, since non-radical Muslims and secular Iranians opposed to the Shah would have been locked out of the revolution, and eventually targeted. Instead, Khomeini ordered a far more passive-aggressive strategy that involved encouraging Iranians to stop paying for their utilities and to not show up for work, especially government jobs. Also, Khomeini wanted Iranians to ask soldiers why they were killing fellow citizens in an effort to divide/distract the army; that strategy paid of handsomely, giving far more Iranians than otherwise a chance to be directly part of the revolution. Strikes broke out across Iran and tens of thousands demonstrated in the streets; the revolution spread unchecked.
As the Shah’s regime crumbled, on 27 December 1978 he appointed a new prime minister, but at that point the Shah only had two choices: leave the nation or crack down hard with the military. At the same time, Khomeini was trumpeting to the world’s media that he would allow free elections in his Islamic State as well as other freedoms (e.g. freedom of the press). On 16 January 1979, the Shah left Iran, and also on that day Carter admitted to Congressional leaders that there was nothing the US could do and that he didn’t know how events would play out in Iran.
When the Shah left the throne after 37 years in power (technically, he didn’t actually renounce his throne), he blamed everyone but himself, and by that point, he was well past the point of being willing-and-able to shed oceans of blood to hang on to power. Carter was accused of “losing” Iran, which simply wasn’t true, just as Truman never “lost” China in 1949. The Shah lost his own nation, and there were limits to what a President could do to change or maintain a regime, as was seen in the early-1960s with Fidel Castro in Cuba. But the Carter administration didn’t exactly cover themselves with glory, with the lack of quality intelligence concerning Iran the most glaring example.
As the Shah’s regime crumbled, on 27 December 1978 he appointed a new prime minister, but at that point the Shah only had two choices: leave the nation or crack down hard with the military. At the same time, Khomeini was trumpeting to the world’s media that he would allow free elections in his Islamic State as well as other freedoms (e.g. freedom of the press). On 16 January 1979, the Shah left Iran, and also on that day Carter admitted to Congressional leaders that there was nothing the US could do and that he didn’t know how events would play out in Iran.
When the Shah left the throne after 37 years in power (technically, he didn’t actually renounce his throne), he blamed everyone but himself, and by that point, he was well past the point of being willing-and-able to shed oceans of blood to hang on to power. Carter was accused of “losing” Iran, which simply wasn’t true, just as Truman never “lost” China in 1949. The Shah lost his own nation, and there were limits to what a President could do to change or maintain a regime, as was seen in the early-1960s with Fidel Castro in Cuba. But the Carter administration didn’t exactly cover themselves with glory, with the lack of quality intelligence concerning Iran the most glaring example.