Source: Stuart E. Eizenstat. President Carter: The White House Years (2018)
While the Panama Canal had reached almost mythic proportions in the US, it was seen by people in Latin America as “Yankee Imperialism”, which meant that millions in the Western Hemisphere felt that they were being treated as second class citizens by America. President Jimmy Carter changed that situation for the better, yet again he paid a heavy political price for doing what was right; in Panama’s perspective, the Canal Treaty was both boon and humiliation. In 1903, Panama declared independence from Colombia (which never would have happened without US assistance) and almost overnight the new nation ceded control of a fifty mile wide strip across the isthmus.
Panama had no access to the Panama Canal Zone during construction (other than laborers) and no right to operate the canal when it opened in 1917. The US Army Corps of Engineers operated the Panama Canal while Panamanians were the day-laborers in support; Panamanians were unhappy about the arrangement from the start, but endured. In the mid-1970s, the conservative wing of the Republican Party became the firebrand to keep the Panama Canal in US hands as it had been since it opened. Ronald Reagan, the former two term governor of California, in pursuit of the Republican nomination for President in 1976, used the Canal as a political tool to try and wrest the nomination from President Gerald Ford.
Panama had no access to the Panama Canal Zone during construction (other than laborers) and no right to operate the canal when it opened in 1917. The US Army Corps of Engineers operated the Panama Canal while Panamanians were the day-laborers in support; Panamanians were unhappy about the arrangement from the start, but endured. In the mid-1970s, the conservative wing of the Republican Party became the firebrand to keep the Panama Canal in US hands as it had been since it opened. Ronald Reagan, the former two term governor of California, in pursuit of the Republican nomination for President in 1976, used the Canal as a political tool to try and wrest the nomination from President Gerald Ford.
To most Americans, it was automatic that the Canal was simply an extension of US soil, and during the general campaign of 1976, Carter repeatedly stated that he would not relinquish practical control of the Canal. After being sworn in as President though, Carter put the Panama Canal at the top of his list of priorities, but it would take over two bruising years to get 2/3’s of the Senate to ratify treaties in order to turn operational control of the Canal over to Panama.
Carter had sound reasons for doing so. The President wanted better relations between the US and the other nations in the Western Hemisphere, and there was also the real threat of violence/terrorism in the Canal Zone. Carter wanted to find a way to negotiate a new Canal Treaty without giving up operational control, but to Panama, the issue was simply that of national pride and sovereignty.
Surprisingly, support for a new Canal Treaty came from former President Ford and former Secretary of State/National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger. When Ford briefed Carter on foreign policy after the Election of 1976, Ford put the Canal ahead of the Middle East and the USSR. Another factor in play for Carter was that the USSR still had a strong influence in Cuba, and containment was still the watchword with the Soviets. As with all the problems that Carter tackled, he refused to put off the new Canal Treaty until his second term, which had been the norm for his predecessors in dealing the major problems/issues that in their view didn’t need immediate attention. Carter saw the new Canal Treaty as a way to win friends in the Western Hemisphere, which would be very useful in dealing with the USSR in the Cold War.
Carter had sound reasons for doing so. The President wanted better relations between the US and the other nations in the Western Hemisphere, and there was also the real threat of violence/terrorism in the Canal Zone. Carter wanted to find a way to negotiate a new Canal Treaty without giving up operational control, but to Panama, the issue was simply that of national pride and sovereignty.
Surprisingly, support for a new Canal Treaty came from former President Ford and former Secretary of State/National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger. When Ford briefed Carter on foreign policy after the Election of 1976, Ford put the Canal ahead of the Middle East and the USSR. Another factor in play for Carter was that the USSR still had a strong influence in Cuba, and containment was still the watchword with the Soviets. As with all the problems that Carter tackled, he refused to put off the new Canal Treaty until his second term, which had been the norm for his predecessors in dealing the major problems/issues that in their view didn’t need immediate attention. Carter saw the new Canal Treaty as a way to win friends in the Western Hemisphere, which would be very useful in dealing with the USSR in the Cold War.
Carter also believed that the original Canal Treaty had been unfair towards Panama, and that Panama’s “patience machine” had run out of gas. Just before Election Day in 1976, 48 US Senators sponsored a resolution that stated that they would never support a treaty that “gave away” the Panama Canal. Senator Strom Thurmond (R; SC) even started to circulate another resolution that would keep the Senate from even entertaining the possibility of a new Canal Treaty.
The biggest hurdle in negotiations with Panama had been, and still was, the US demand to unilaterally intervene if the Canal was threatened, and to have the power forever; that had been written into the 1903 treaty and was still in effect. So, one of Carter’s point men on the new Canal Treaty had the idea of two separate treaties, one for operating the Canal, and another for its defense. Wisely, Carter et al understood that security had to come first before dealing with who actually ran the Canal, so the first proposed treaty dealt with security, in that both the US and Panama would defend the Canal. The second proposed treaty would end US operational control of the Panama Canal on 31 December 1999.
The biggest hurdle in negotiations with Panama had been, and still was, the US demand to unilaterally intervene if the Canal was threatened, and to have the power forever; that had been written into the 1903 treaty and was still in effect. So, one of Carter’s point men on the new Canal Treaty had the idea of two separate treaties, one for operating the Canal, and another for its defense. Wisely, Carter et al understood that security had to come first before dealing with who actually ran the Canal, so the first proposed treaty dealt with security, in that both the US and Panama would defend the Canal. The second proposed treaty would end US operational control of the Panama Canal on 31 December 1999.
The sticking point in negotiations with Panama (and with the US Senate) was under what circumstances could the US rush in and intervene in defending the Canal. Panama didn’t want the US to meddle in their domestic politics, but Carter knew that the Senate would never ratify a new Canal Treaty without the ability to defend the Canal against external threats. Panama came around to the aspect concerning external threats, but Panama insisted that they alone would protect the Canal from internal threats. Panama also agreed that US troops could be stationed in the Canal Zone until the year 2000.
It seemed that the only issue remaining concerning Panama was that of finances, and Panama wanted additional US funds. Panama’s mercurial dictator Omar Torrijos wanted $1 billion in a lump sum and $300 million a year in addition to the Canal tolls that Panama would collect. Panama started to back away from the agreement that the US could defend the Canal from external threats in perpetuity, which in effect meant that Panama had reneged on the agreement-in-principle. But Carter’s senior negotiator in Panama played hardball with Torrijos, and he immediately withdrew his concerns, which can often occur in a dictatorship.
It seemed that the only issue remaining concerning Panama was that of finances, and Panama wanted additional US funds. Panama’s mercurial dictator Omar Torrijos wanted $1 billion in a lump sum and $300 million a year in addition to the Canal tolls that Panama would collect. Panama started to back away from the agreement that the US could defend the Canal from external threats in perpetuity, which in effect meant that Panama had reneged on the agreement-in-principle. But Carter’s senior negotiator in Panama played hardball with Torrijos, and he immediately withdrew his concerns, which can often occur in a dictatorship.
Carter’s negotiators in Panama returned to the White House as soon as possible, and Carter announced the two treaties even before he had read the drafts and knew the details. Carter had even already notified all 100 Senators that the two treaties were heading their way very soon by way of personally handwritten notes. Carter even met individually with all the Senators that were not opposed to the two treaties, and adding to Carter’s momentum was that Ford and Kissinger were in public support. On 7 September 1977, the two treaties were signed in Washington, D.C. at the Pan American Union Building. Carter stated that fairness, not force, should be at the heart of America’s dealings with other nations, and that the world was much different in 1903 when the original Canal Treaty was signed.
The easy part, as it turned out, was reaching the stage of signing the two treaties with Panama; the much more difficult part lay ahead with not only ratification in the Senate but also the financial aspects with the House. It didn’t matter to conservatives that it was far better to turn over operational control to Panama rather than face the great possibility of guerilla warfare or terrorism in the Canal Zone. The debate over turning operational control of the Canal to Panama did much to strengthen the conservative wing of the Republican Party, and the two Canal Treaties became a tool that Reagan used in his ascendancy within the GOP in the late-1970s. Ironically, the very conservative iconic actor John Wayne had an estate in Panama and was also personal friends with Torrijos, so “The Duke” was in favor of the transfer of operational control.
The easy part, as it turned out, was reaching the stage of signing the two treaties with Panama; the much more difficult part lay ahead with not only ratification in the Senate but also the financial aspects with the House. It didn’t matter to conservatives that it was far better to turn over operational control to Panama rather than face the great possibility of guerilla warfare or terrorism in the Canal Zone. The debate over turning operational control of the Canal to Panama did much to strengthen the conservative wing of the Republican Party, and the two Canal Treaties became a tool that Reagan used in his ascendancy within the GOP in the late-1970s. Ironically, the very conservative iconic actor John Wayne had an estate in Panama and was also personal friends with Torrijos, so “The Duke” was in favor of the transfer of operational control.
Initially there was only a bare majority in the Senate, not the 2/3’s required under the Constitution to ratify a treaty with another nation. Carter and VP Walter Mondale were successful in convincing most Senators to delay their public opposition to the two treaties until Carter et al made their case. However by doing so, Carter opened himself up to attacks from conservatives who used the mantra “Don’t Take Away Our Canal”, and 78% of Americans polled supported that point-of-view. Conservative Senators lashed out that Torrijos’ brother ran a drug cartel, trying to derail any progress. The Senate actually forced the US and Panama to further clarify the limits of US intervention in the Canal Zone during their debate, which was a first in US History during the ratification process.
On 14 October 1977, Carter met w/ Torrijos in the White House which led to a Joint Statement of Understanding that same day which further clarified US intervention. But for Carter, that wasn’t enough, in that he an an opportunity to push Torrijos on human rights, and Torrijos basically promised to enact reforms, but he would die in a plane crash before he could follow through on what most likely were empty promises.
Carter discovered that an effective way to sway undecided Senators was to fly them to Panama to meet Torrijos, who always made a positive impression despite being a dictator. Almost half the Senate went to Panama in stages, and Carter had to repeatedly keep Torrijos calm since almost every Senator made demands that made the Panamanian dictator uncomfortable and/or frustrated.
On 14 October 1977, Carter met w/ Torrijos in the White House which led to a Joint Statement of Understanding that same day which further clarified US intervention. But for Carter, that wasn’t enough, in that he an an opportunity to push Torrijos on human rights, and Torrijos basically promised to enact reforms, but he would die in a plane crash before he could follow through on what most likely were empty promises.
Carter discovered that an effective way to sway undecided Senators was to fly them to Panama to meet Torrijos, who always made a positive impression despite being a dictator. Almost half the Senate went to Panama in stages, and Carter had to repeatedly keep Torrijos calm since almost every Senator made demands that made the Panamanian dictator uncomfortable and/or frustrated.
