Source: Doris Kearns Goodwin. Leadership -
Lessons From the Presidents For Turbulent Times (2018)
Lessons From the Presidents For Turbulent Times (2018)
TR’s hands-on experience at different levels of government had exposed and sensitized him to the hidden dangers of the era, such as gigantic trusts, massive corruption, disparate wealth, an squalid living and working conditions. As a result, there was no way TR would continue McKinley’s conservative approach to the Presidency. TR’s experience also included his mistrust and fear of political bosses, and he had often disappointed the Progressives.
TR’s timing in becoming President was almost perfect, in that his “Dragonslaying” approach would meet with public approval overall. The Pennsylvania Coal Strike of 1902 was a case study on how TR’s Presidency would be different than those of his predecessors. During the Fall of 1902, there was no end in sight for the six month long strike/lock-out between the United Mine Workers vs. the coal mine owners and the railroad barons.
The mining of anthracite coal in Pennsylvania had stopped, which had the makings of a catastrophe in that the Northeast depended on anthracite coal for winter heating. A coal famine would produce panic, suffering, and violence. and even conservatives pressured TR to intervene to end the strike. However, there was no legal or Presidential precedent for TR to directly intervene, given the overall laissez-faire history of the US government towards business. TR was advised that unless PA asked for his intervention, he was on the outside-looking-in as President. Politically, TR risked alienating Big Business if he intervened, which would hurt the Republican Party as well as his political future.
TR’s timing in becoming President was almost perfect, in that his “Dragonslaying” approach would meet with public approval overall. The Pennsylvania Coal Strike of 1902 was a case study on how TR’s Presidency would be different than those of his predecessors. During the Fall of 1902, there was no end in sight for the six month long strike/lock-out between the United Mine Workers vs. the coal mine owners and the railroad barons.
The mining of anthracite coal in Pennsylvania had stopped, which had the makings of a catastrophe in that the Northeast depended on anthracite coal for winter heating. A coal famine would produce panic, suffering, and violence. and even conservatives pressured TR to intervene to end the strike. However, there was no legal or Presidential precedent for TR to directly intervene, given the overall laissez-faire history of the US government towards business. TR was advised that unless PA asked for his intervention, he was on the outside-looking-in as President. Politically, TR risked alienating Big Business if he intervened, which would hurt the Republican Party as well as his political future.
TR’s handling of ending the PA Coal Strike of 1902 unfolded in three seasonal stages. During May 1902, 147k mine workers walked off the job, knowing that strength in numbers as the only tool to combat the concentrated Coal Combination with the railroads, which had been organized mostly by J.P. Morgan, the “Merger King”. The main UMW labor leader was John Mitchell, who had been able to recruit workers to join the UMW, and by 1902 the union had a foothold in the anthracite region. Mitchell was under severe pressure from workers to reduce hours and increase pay and safety, so he went to NYC to meet with the leader of the Coal Combination. When Mitchell arrived in NYC, the Coal Combination leader refused to even meet with a “Common Coal Miner” who had become a Labor agitator. Mitchell was in a Catch-22, in that he didn’t think the UMW could survive a strike, but on the other hand, he had to act to remain credible and relevant. Such was Mitchell’s respect and authority in the UMW that almost all the PA anthracite coal miners in the union walked out on the first day of the strike.
TR had to carefully calculate the risks of getting involved, even in the Spring of 1902. TR was fully aware of the status of the strike, and also aware of the potential disaster if the strike remained unsettled. TR knew that if disaster struck, fairly or not he as President would be held accountable. TR’s view of the Presidency was the same as Lincoln’s, in that the President needed to be a “Steward of the People”, unless the Constitution specifically stated otherwise. TR refused to rush in to the fray, rather he chose to take a measured response which was very patient, which was a odds with his storied leadership style. The first thing TR did was to get all of the facts, understand the causes, and process the conditions of the problems related to the strike.
TR had to carefully calculate the risks of getting involved, even in the Spring of 1902. TR was fully aware of the status of the strike, and also aware of the potential disaster if the strike remained unsettled. TR knew that if disaster struck, fairly or not he as President would be held accountable. TR’s view of the Presidency was the same as Lincoln’s, in that the President needed to be a “Steward of the People”, unless the Constitution specifically stated otherwise. TR refused to rush in to the fray, rather he chose to take a measured response which was very patient, which was a odds with his storied leadership style. The first thing TR did was to get all of the facts, understand the causes, and process the conditions of the problems related to the strike.
On 8 June 1902, TR took his first measured step, directing the commissioner of labor to provide all the information requested, including statistics. TR made it clear through that commissioner that he believed the public good was threatened by the strike. The commissioner talked to both sides, getting their perspectives plus statistical information. The most important recommendation the commissioner gave TR was that a joint committee on conciliation should be formed, which might not solve the strike, but it would reduce the suspicion and irritation among the opposing interests. TR wisely chose to remain, at least publicly, uncommitted in the early phases of the strike, but the clock was ticking as the Summer of 1902 arrived, since every passing day meant that it would become more difficult and more expensive for consumer to obtain coal for the winter. The price of coal had already increased by 60%, which was a financial burden for millions, and far too much coal was in the hands of far too few powerful corporations.
TR wisely used history to provide perspective, realizing that the class struggle between Capital and Labor had been going on for many decades. Capital (Big Business) simply didn’t think that Labor (unions) would rise to any level of prominence and influence, and that Labor could be treated in the same manner as previous years. TR also understood that the concentration of wealth and the power of Capital could not be ignored. Most importantly, TR modeled himself after Lincoln, in that he would try and be good-natured and forbearing, and to be free from vindictiveness.
TR wisely used history to provide perspective, realizing that the class struggle between Capital and Labor had been going on for many decades. Capital (Big Business) simply didn’t think that Labor (unions) would rise to any level of prominence and influence, and that Labor could be treated in the same manner as previous years. TR also understood that the concentration of wealth and the power of Capital could not be ignored. Most importantly, TR modeled himself after Lincoln, in that he would try and be good-natured and forbearing, and to be free from vindictiveness.
TR was very good at dealing with reversals and abrupt intrusions that threatened his plans. On 30 July 1902, violence flared on a picket line in Shenandoah (PA) despite Mitchell’s pleas for no violence. Scabs (replacement workers) escorted by a sheriff were set upon by the picketing miners, and over 1000 bullets were fired, leading to multiple deaths and many injuries, which led to headlines such as “A Reign of Terror”. TR waited for the PA governor to act, and he was ready as President to send in troops of asked by the governor, but TR didn’t want to anger the business side of the dispute by doing so. TR’s patience was rewarded when it was Mitchell who acted quickly, showing up the next day to speak to 10k miners in order to stop the violence.
TR was constantly evaluating his options, and he was prepared to adjust his decision-making as the crisis escalated. Four months into the strike, the public started to freak out, and the coal mine owners and the UMW dug in even further for the long haul. The coal miners stated that the strike would be immediately over if the miners went back to work under the same conditions as before the strike, while also admitting defeat. TR was being questioned by the press as to why he wasn’t acting when he had acted very quickly against J.P. Morgan and Northern Securities earlier in 1902. TR’s Attorney General advised him that the coal miner owners were not actually a trust, which changed the situation as far as TR was concerned. TR decided to release the report from the commissioner of labor to the public, which feature a mountain of facts, statistics, and recommendations. Included in the report were many letters written by the coal mine owners and their lawyers to the UMW, which were very harsh and threatening. TR had decided that it was time for the public to know the “Inside Story” of the strike.
The report clearly revealed that in no way did the coal mine owners feel that they were answerable to the public, or the government. Owner after owner stated that everything would be fine if the President and everyone else simply got out of their way. TR made sure that his Attorney General included in the released report that TR neither had the responsibility or the authority to intervene. However, TR had come to see the situation differently by that time, and if he didn’t have clear Constitutional authority to intervene, he had a responsibility to be a chief “influencer”.
TR was constantly evaluating his options, and he was prepared to adjust his decision-making as the crisis escalated. Four months into the strike, the public started to freak out, and the coal mine owners and the UMW dug in even further for the long haul. The coal miners stated that the strike would be immediately over if the miners went back to work under the same conditions as before the strike, while also admitting defeat. TR was being questioned by the press as to why he wasn’t acting when he had acted very quickly against J.P. Morgan and Northern Securities earlier in 1902. TR’s Attorney General advised him that the coal miner owners were not actually a trust, which changed the situation as far as TR was concerned. TR decided to release the report from the commissioner of labor to the public, which feature a mountain of facts, statistics, and recommendations. Included in the report were many letters written by the coal mine owners and their lawyers to the UMW, which were very harsh and threatening. TR had decided that it was time for the public to know the “Inside Story” of the strike.
The report clearly revealed that in no way did the coal mine owners feel that they were answerable to the public, or the government. Owner after owner stated that everything would be fine if the President and everyone else simply got out of their way. TR made sure that his Attorney General included in the released report that TR neither had the responsibility or the authority to intervene. However, TR had come to see the situation differently by that time, and if he didn’t have clear Constitutional authority to intervene, he had a responsibility to be a chief “influencer”.
TR was developing the realization that the public had a crucial role to play, and the first segment of the nation that TR focused on was New England. At this point, TR decided to be visible and to cultivate support from those that would be directly affected by the coal famine. Even before the strike reached the level of crisis, TR planned a speaking tour in New England and the Midwest in order to build enthusiasm for the Republicans in the upcoming Congressional Elections of 1902. TR now had a vital issue of immediate importance on which to focus on his speaking tour. TR didn’t directly speak of the coal crisis, but he made clear inferences and allusions that were impossible to miss, such as commenting on the growing gap between the rich and the poor.
TR succeeded in stirring up public sentiment, and more Americans were looking to TR to get involved, and that increased public support gave TR the space and opportunity to act. TR made sure that he “cleared the deck” of all other important matters so he could focus on the crisis in the Fall of 1902. It was at this juncture that TR was nearly killed in a trolley-carriage accident in Pittsfield MA. TR’s left shin was in bad shape as a result of the accident, and it had become infected, so TR had to cancel the remainder of his tour and return to DC. Ironically, it was TR’s incapacity that provided him his real opportunity to get involved in the coal crisis. Also, the accident in a way cleared the deck for TR in that during his two weeks of recovery, TR made the precedent-breaking decision to get involved in the strike.
TR succeeded in stirring up public sentiment, and more Americans were looking to TR to get involved, and that increased public support gave TR the space and opportunity to act. TR made sure that he “cleared the deck” of all other important matters so he could focus on the crisis in the Fall of 1902. It was at this juncture that TR was nearly killed in a trolley-carriage accident in Pittsfield MA. TR’s left shin was in bad shape as a result of the accident, and it had become infected, so TR had to cancel the remainder of his tour and return to DC. Ironically, it was TR’s incapacity that provided him his real opportunity to get involved in the coal crisis. Also, the accident in a way cleared the deck for TR in that during his two weeks of recovery, TR made the precedent-breaking decision to get involved in the strike.
It was then that TR was getting pelted with missives from governors and mayors in northern states, saying that their citizens were on the brink of disaster for the upcoming winter. The lack of coal already had forced layoffs in factories, while tuberculosis and diphtheria were stressing the ability of hospitals to function, and the threat of violence filled the air. TR knew that the time on the clock to solve the coal crisis was clearly running out. TR decided that it was time to either find a legal way in, or to force himself into the crisis. TR wisely assembled a crisis management team from both in and out of his administration. All seven members that TR selected had at least a slightly different perspective of the crisis. TR’s incredible and varied experiences, combined with the recommendations of the committee, led to crucial decision-making in the next several weeks.
Among those on the committee of seven were SecWar Elihu Root, who had deep ties to Wall Street. Also in the committee was the commissioner on immigration, Frank Sargent, who had quite a bit of experience with unions, and he was friends with Samuel Gompers and John Mitchell. The governor of MA, who was not an alarmist, but he told TR that if nothing was done, the thin layer of civilization in his state would vanish.The governor of MA also had the idea to have both sides of the strike stay in the same hotel, but in different suites, with TR (or his designee) going back-and-forth between the two parties. TR seized upon that idea, and eventually all the committee except the Attorney General agreed that TR should get involved. Based on the MA governor’s recommendation, TR sent separate identical telegrams to Mitchell and the six coal mine owners, “inviting” them to attend a meeting on 3 October 1902 in Washington, D.C. The contents of the telegram were of course leaked, and the nation knew what TR had sent out to all parties involved. The conservative press immediately cried foul, saying the whole affair was an un-American experiment.
Among those on the committee of seven were SecWar Elihu Root, who had deep ties to Wall Street. Also in the committee was the commissioner on immigration, Frank Sargent, who had quite a bit of experience with unions, and he was friends with Samuel Gompers and John Mitchell. The governor of MA, who was not an alarmist, but he told TR that if nothing was done, the thin layer of civilization in his state would vanish.The governor of MA also had the idea to have both sides of the strike stay in the same hotel, but in different suites, with TR (or his designee) going back-and-forth between the two parties. TR seized upon that idea, and eventually all the committee except the Attorney General agreed that TR should get involved. Based on the MA governor’s recommendation, TR sent separate identical telegrams to Mitchell and the six coal mine owners, “inviting” them to attend a meeting on 3 October 1902 in Washington, D.C. The contents of the telegram were of course leaked, and the nation knew what TR had sent out to all parties involved. The conservative press immediately cried foul, saying the whole affair was an un-American experiment.