Source: Doris Kearns Goodwin. Leadership -
Lessons From the Presidents For Turbulent Times (2018)
Lessons From the Presidents For Turbulent Times (2018)
TR made sure that he framed the narrative for the big meeting on 3 October 1902 and beyond. TR was still in his wheelchair when the parties concerned met in the temporary White House in the second floor parlor. TR made it clear that he was neither in the camp of Labor or Capital, but 100% in the camp of the American public. TR also made it clear that he wasn’t into discussion or debate, but only in finding solutions. Then it was Mitchell’s turn to control the narrative when he jumped up and proclaimed that the striking miners would immediately go back to work if the question of solving the strike was left up to the committee of seven plus the President. Mitchell’s statement took both the owners and the President by complete surprise.
TR then asked the coal mine owners what they thought of Mitchell’s proposition, and their answer was that they would never agree to any proposition from Mitchell or the UMW. TR told both parties that they would reconvene at 3 pm and to have their propositions in writing. The coal mine owners at that point tried to wrest the narrative when they issued a written statement stating that 20k miners were ready to go back into the mines, but Mitchell and his goons prevented them from doing so. The leader of the owners, George Baer, looked right at TR and stated that federal troops were needed to end the strike, and if TR didn’t do so, then the federal government (and TR’s Presidency) was a complete failure.
One of the owners stood up and, invading TR’s personal space in his wheelchair, asked (shouted) if TR was demanding that the owners deal with outlaws. TR kept his temper in check, even though the arrogant owners did all they could do to provoke both Mitchell and TR. The President was astounded at Mitchell’s self-control, never once losing his cool. There would be no resolution on 3 October 1902, since the owners were beyond-resolute in their refusal to even begin negotiations.
TR then asked the coal mine owners what they thought of Mitchell’s proposition, and their answer was that they would never agree to any proposition from Mitchell or the UMW. TR told both parties that they would reconvene at 3 pm and to have their propositions in writing. The coal mine owners at that point tried to wrest the narrative when they issued a written statement stating that 20k miners were ready to go back into the mines, but Mitchell and his goons prevented them from doing so. The leader of the owners, George Baer, looked right at TR and stated that federal troops were needed to end the strike, and if TR didn’t do so, then the federal government (and TR’s Presidency) was a complete failure.
One of the owners stood up and, invading TR’s personal space in his wheelchair, asked (shouted) if TR was demanding that the owners deal with outlaws. TR kept his temper in check, even though the arrogant owners did all they could do to provoke both Mitchell and TR. The President was astounded at Mitchell’s self-control, never once losing his cool. There would be no resolution on 3 October 1902, since the owners were beyond-resolute in their refusal to even begin negotiations.
TR made sure that he documented every step of the proceedings, including what occurred on 3 October 1902. A stenographer took down every word from that first meeting, and a pamphlet was printed up in time to meet the deadlines of the newspapers for their morning editions. By doing so, TR tried to keep control of the narrative in the press. Any anxiety TR felt by getting involved vanished when he read newspaper accounts of how Presidential he was and how out-of-control and disrespectful the owners were. The idea that the President being involved as a third party reached critical mass in terms of public support. Public sentiment also went towards Mitchell and the UMW and away from the owners in the following days. A morality play of sorts played out in the newspapers for the public to consume. Although the public supported the conference hosted by TR, it was unclear if the public would support anything more direct, and the nation waited to see what TR would do.
In the midst of all this, TR needed to find ways to relieve stress, which before the accident included a “sport” TR made up that he called “Singlestick”. However, with his leg in a bad way, TR turned to books, which were the chief building block of TR’s identity. TR asked the chief librarian for the Library of Congress to send him specific books to suit his desires, tastes, and curiosities. Like Lincoln and plays, TR relieved his stress at least somewhat by reading, but by doing so he was also strategically thinking about his next steps. TR was prepared in that he had multiple strategies and back-up plans in tow. What each strategy/plan had in common was to get the coal out of the mines to avoid a crisis of which would be second only to the Civil War. TR decided to directly act, telling his Attorney General and Secretary of War that he would do so.
In the midst of all this, TR needed to find ways to relieve stress, which before the accident included a “sport” TR made up that he called “Singlestick”. However, with his leg in a bad way, TR turned to books, which were the chief building block of TR’s identity. TR asked the chief librarian for the Library of Congress to send him specific books to suit his desires, tastes, and curiosities. Like Lincoln and plays, TR relieved his stress at least somewhat by reading, but by doing so he was also strategically thinking about his next steps. TR was prepared in that he had multiple strategies and back-up plans in tow. What each strategy/plan had in common was to get the coal out of the mines to avoid a crisis of which would be second only to the Civil War. TR decided to directly act, telling his Attorney General and Secretary of War that he would do so.
While TR was ready to act in an unprecedented and extreme manner, he kept working on less-direct avenues. Trying to show that the owners’ claim that 20k workers were ready to go back into the mines if the picket lines were forced to disband was true, the PA governor sent in the militia. The result was that only a smattering of miners went back to work, which showed that the owners’ claim was beyond-false and ridiculous. A vast majority of miners, whether members of the UMW or not, decided to remain on strike.
TR then authorized the creation of a Blue Ribbon Commission (the ringer in the group was former President Grover Cleveland) to investigate the causes of the strike and to make recommendations for executive and legislative action.TR argued that he was empowered to do so due to his duty to report on the State of the Union from time-to-time. The commission was purely symbolic with no authority, but it signaled bipartisan support for ending the strike before the Congressional Elections of 1902. TR needed the greatest level of public support just in case he had to go hammer-down on one or both sides of the dispute. TR knew that if he had to hit, he had to hit very hard, but by mid-October 1902, the Blue Ribbon commission hadn’t yet finished its work. TR knew urgent action was needed, and that the time frame was in hours, not in weeks, or even days.
TR’s last-ditch plan was to have 10k soldiers “invade” the mines to get the coal moving again. In the process, the owners would have their mines confiscated until the crisis ended. TR had retired general John Scofield ready on deck, and he instructed Scofield that if he received a writ that he was to send it to the President since he was serving his Commander-in-Chief. TR made sure, via a PA US Senator, that the PA governor would, at TR’s urging, request federal troops.
TR then authorized the creation of a Blue Ribbon Commission (the ringer in the group was former President Grover Cleveland) to investigate the causes of the strike and to make recommendations for executive and legislative action.TR argued that he was empowered to do so due to his duty to report on the State of the Union from time-to-time. The commission was purely symbolic with no authority, but it signaled bipartisan support for ending the strike before the Congressional Elections of 1902. TR needed the greatest level of public support just in case he had to go hammer-down on one or both sides of the dispute. TR knew that if he had to hit, he had to hit very hard, but by mid-October 1902, the Blue Ribbon commission hadn’t yet finished its work. TR knew urgent action was needed, and that the time frame was in hours, not in weeks, or even days.
TR’s last-ditch plan was to have 10k soldiers “invade” the mines to get the coal moving again. In the process, the owners would have their mines confiscated until the crisis ended. TR had retired general John Scofield ready on deck, and he instructed Scofield that if he received a writ that he was to send it to the President since he was serving his Commander-in-Chief. TR made sure, via a PA US Senator, that the PA governor would, at TR’s urging, request federal troops.
All of that may have been a great bluff by TR, in that he didn’t have anything in the coal systems network ready to load or transport the coal where it was needed. Then again, given TR’s temperament, he probably wasn’t bluffing. TR later claimed that it was the threat to confiscate the mines that broke open the dam in terms of the owners being willing to engage in negotiations. it was the threat of using the “Big Stick” that worked the magic, according to TR.
One of TR’s main men in his administration, Elihu Root, met with J. P. Morgan in NYC. Morgan was the only one that could force the coal mine owners to the bargaining table, since he had already done so in 1900 during a Presidential Election year. Before Root left to meet with Morgan, Root told TR that he knew of a way for the owners to get out of the morass without being humiliated, but in order to do so he needed 100% freedom to negotiate with Morgan. TR, willing to find ways for all parties to save face in the crisis, wisely gave Root his permission to do so.
Root sensed that the owners would negotiate if Mitchell (or any labor leader) was not involved. Root wondered if it would work better if the owners themselves originated the idea of arbitration, which would allow them the fiction of not dealing directly with Mitchell. Root knew it was a flat-out lie that the owners had the idea of arbitration, since it was originally Mitchell’s idea from 3 October 1902, and it was on the record. However, that juxtaposition looked good on paper, and it massaged the massive egos of the owners. Morgan met with the owners, saying if they continued to dig in and refuse to negotiate, TR would have to use the Army; finally, the owners agreed to sign the document signalling their willingness to engage in arbitration.
One of TR’s main men in his administration, Elihu Root, met with J. P. Morgan in NYC. Morgan was the only one that could force the coal mine owners to the bargaining table, since he had already done so in 1900 during a Presidential Election year. Before Root left to meet with Morgan, Root told TR that he knew of a way for the owners to get out of the morass without being humiliated, but in order to do so he needed 100% freedom to negotiate with Morgan. TR, willing to find ways for all parties to save face in the crisis, wisely gave Root his permission to do so.
Root sensed that the owners would negotiate if Mitchell (or any labor leader) was not involved. Root wondered if it would work better if the owners themselves originated the idea of arbitration, which would allow them the fiction of not dealing directly with Mitchell. Root knew it was a flat-out lie that the owners had the idea of arbitration, since it was originally Mitchell’s idea from 3 October 1902, and it was on the record. However, that juxtaposition looked good on paper, and it massaged the massive egos of the owners. Morgan met with the owners, saying if they continued to dig in and refuse to negotiate, TR would have to use the Army; finally, the owners agreed to sign the document signalling their willingness to engage in arbitration.
The coal mine owners demanded that the arbitration committee consist of five members from the military, a mining engineer, a PA judge, a businessman knowledgeable about coal mining, and a “sociologist” . . . but no labor representative at all. Mitchell trusted TR (who tried to get him on the committee), but he knew that if a labor leader wasn’t on the arbitration committee, the UMW wouldn’t recognize the decision. Mitchell also wanted a Catholic bishop on the committee, since most miners were Catholic. The owners would rather have had another Civil War than a labor leader on the committee, and almost before it was too late, TR realized that the owners were actually objecting to the title, not the actual person. As long as the labor leader was under the category of “Eminent Sociologist”, the owners were happy. E. E. Clarke, the leader of the Railway Conductors, was named the “sociologist”, and the arbitration committee was finally set.
The Wilkes-Barre convention started a few days later and the miners, almost to a man, agreed to immediately return to the mines, long before the arbitration committee would give their decision. After 163 days, the most potentially-devastating strike in US History to that point was peacefully resolved. TR wisely shared the credit for the peaceful solution, starting with Morgan, then his committee of seven advisors. In private, TR vented his hatred and contempt of the coal mine owners, but in public, TR was very generous. The arbitration committee hearings lasted three months, and in the end the committee, in a unanimous vote, decided to retroactively increase wages by 10% and to also reduce the working day from ten hours to nine hours. The arbitration committee also stated that a board of conciliation needed to be formed to deal with all future impasses
A permanent adjustment had been made, in that it wasn’t Capital v. Labor anymore, but Capital v. Labor with the federal government involved as a watchdog. TR then made sure that he left a concise record of what he did and why for future Presidents. TR (and his successors) now had the ability and authority to supervise and regulate Big Business if the public good was threatened; the mood of reform swept the nation, and by 1902 (if not earlier), the progressive era was now the Progressive Era.
The Wilkes-Barre convention started a few days later and the miners, almost to a man, agreed to immediately return to the mines, long before the arbitration committee would give their decision. After 163 days, the most potentially-devastating strike in US History to that point was peacefully resolved. TR wisely shared the credit for the peaceful solution, starting with Morgan, then his committee of seven advisors. In private, TR vented his hatred and contempt of the coal mine owners, but in public, TR was very generous. The arbitration committee hearings lasted three months, and in the end the committee, in a unanimous vote, decided to retroactively increase wages by 10% and to also reduce the working day from ten hours to nine hours. The arbitration committee also stated that a board of conciliation needed to be formed to deal with all future impasses
A permanent adjustment had been made, in that it wasn’t Capital v. Labor anymore, but Capital v. Labor with the federal government involved as a watchdog. TR then made sure that he left a concise record of what he did and why for future Presidents. TR (and his successors) now had the ability and authority to supervise and regulate Big Business if the public good was threatened; the mood of reform swept the nation, and by 1902 (if not earlier), the progressive era was now the Progressive Era.