Source: Doris Kearns Goodwin. Leadership -
Lessons From the Presidents For Turbulent Times (2018)
Lessons From the Presidents For Turbulent Times (2018)
LBJ converted procedural matters and practical operations into actual power. While doing so was on a much larger scale, it was similar to being the gatekeeper for the president at the teachers college in Texas in the 1920s. As Minority Leader, LBJ was responsible for scheduling bills for floor debate, and he made sure that he came through in that regard, making himself indispensable in the process. LBJ found a loophole in the Senate rules that allowed him to transfer the power of assigning offices to the Minority Leader. Before long, LBJ’s allies had the best office spaces, and those not in LBJ’s favor had lesser accommodations.
At the center of LBJ’s success was his ability to read people, to gauge each Senator’s desires, ambitions, needs, and hopes. In short, LBJ memorized people, traditions, and rules. LBJ understood what they had in common, which was the desire for fame and honor, and LBJ discovered for each Senator THE emotion that most controlled him. Like TR, what LBJ learned, he never forgot. As LBJ’s profiles of each Democratic Senator became more detailed, his political instincts became more unerring as well. In 1955, by a single Senator, the Democrats gained control of the chamber, and LBJ became the youngest Senate Majority Leader in history. At the pinnacle of Senate leadership, LBJ started to focus on at least some Republican Senators that could be helpful to his goals and ambitions.
At the center of LBJ’s success was his ability to read people, to gauge each Senator’s desires, ambitions, needs, and hopes. In short, LBJ memorized people, traditions, and rules. LBJ understood what they had in common, which was the desire for fame and honor, and LBJ discovered for each Senator THE emotion that most controlled him. Like TR, what LBJ learned, he never forgot. As LBJ’s profiles of each Democratic Senator became more detailed, his political instincts became more unerring as well. In 1955, by a single Senator, the Democrats gained control of the chamber, and LBJ became the youngest Senate Majority Leader in history. At the pinnacle of Senate leadership, LBJ started to focus on at least some Republican Senators that could be helpful to his goals and ambitions.
On 2 July 1955 while actually taking some time off at a friend’s estate in Virginia, LBJ had a heart attack. A co-traveller recognized what was happening, and LBJ was taken to Bethesda Naval Hospital in Maryland, which was the closest hospital. As Lady Bird worried and waited, LBJ hovered between life and death, and his odds for survival only increased as the next days passed. LBJ was told that his career as a politician was likely over, and LBJ was written off in DC, even by his fellow Democrats. LBJ’s depression became so deep it was as if he was grieving over his own death. Everything he had gained and held dear was, if not gone, at serious risk. Then all of a sudden, LBJ came back to life in his hospital room, turning his room and the corridor into a de facto Senate office.
What made LBJ spring out of his despondency were the thousands of letters he received wishing him well. LBJ was bound-and-determined to reciprocate that affection, and he responded to every single letter. Doing so didn’t just reinvigorate him, it rescued LBJ from the abyss. A byproduct of the heart attack was that LBJ learned that he had to slow down his pace, at least a little, given what had happened to his health. Once released from the hospital, LBJ spent the next six months at his ranch in the Hill Country in Texas. LBJ replaced cigarettes for breakfast with healthier options, and he had healthier fare for dinner instead of everything-fried. LBJ exercised (swimming), drank less, and he lost forty pounds. The sharp edges were at least being softened, and LBJ learned to modify his pace at least a little bit, even treating those around him better. Like Lincoln and Nixon, LBJ’s time away from politics reinvigorated and reinvented him, and once again LBJ linked power with purpose and vision, and his desire to use his political power to help people returned.
What made LBJ spring out of his despondency were the thousands of letters he received wishing him well. LBJ was bound-and-determined to reciprocate that affection, and he responded to every single letter. Doing so didn’t just reinvigorate him, it rescued LBJ from the abyss. A byproduct of the heart attack was that LBJ learned that he had to slow down his pace, at least a little, given what had happened to his health. Once released from the hospital, LBJ spent the next six months at his ranch in the Hill Country in Texas. LBJ replaced cigarettes for breakfast with healthier options, and he had healthier fare for dinner instead of everything-fried. LBJ exercised (swimming), drank less, and he lost forty pounds. The sharp edges were at least being softened, and LBJ learned to modify his pace at least a little bit, even treating those around him better. Like Lincoln and Nixon, LBJ’s time away from politics reinvigorated and reinvented him, and once again LBJ linked power with purpose and vision, and his desire to use his political power to help people returned.
LBJ made his first political appearance after his heart attack at a dedication for a dam in Texas during November 1955. LBJ obsessed about his upcoming speech in the same way that FDR had done for his political “re-debut” in 1924. Since LBJ was the Senate Majority Leader, the national media was present, and the overall reactions to LBJs speech were very positive. LBJ, and he was back in the saddle. LBJ truly resumed his role as Senate Majority Leader in January 1957, and his focus in large part was on passing a Civil Rights bill.
For 82 years, the bloc of conservative Southern Democrats had blocked passage of any Civil Rights bill, usually by using (or threatening to use) a filibuster. LBJ understood that it was time for Congress to act on Civil Rights in the landscape after the Brown decision in 1954, and LBJ’s strategy unfolded in three acts. In the first act, LBJ had to convince Russell that this time a filibuster would prove to be a Pyrrhic victory, since LBJ told Russell that the 2/3s Cloture vote to end a filibuster would be a certainty this time. LBJ also argued that a filibuster would hurt what also needed to be done in terms of working on economic recovery in the South. LBJ was blunt, telling Russell that if Southern Senators blocked the Civil Rights bill, the South would remain an economic backwater. Among the promises LBJ made to Russell, the main one was that the bill’s focus would be on voting rights, not integration. Russell agreed to stay on the sidelines, watching to see if LBJ’s promises were carried out, but he told LBJ that he would not remain off to the side if he believed a promise was broken.
The second act featured LBJ focusing on the mountain states of the West, since those Senators had very few African-American voters, and although in favor of Civil Rights in general terms, LBJ feared those Senators could be swayed to join Russell’s Southern block if push-came-to-shove. LBJ hoped that it would be these Western Senators on which he could strongly rely, so LBJ worked to get the votes for the Hells Canyon Dam, on the border of Idaho and Oregon (it was a larger-scale project of LBJ’s crusade to bring electricity to the HIll Country in Texas in 1935). It was those Western Senators that provided the impetus to delete the most objectionable parts of the Civil Rights bill to appease the Southern bloc, which increased the odds that the bill would pass. All the while, LBJ was omnipresent, personally keeping the bill on track,and with his wheeling-and-dealing, LBJ had drafted the only Civil Rights bill that had a chance to pass since Reconstruction.
For 82 years, the bloc of conservative Southern Democrats had blocked passage of any Civil Rights bill, usually by using (or threatening to use) a filibuster. LBJ understood that it was time for Congress to act on Civil Rights in the landscape after the Brown decision in 1954, and LBJ’s strategy unfolded in three acts. In the first act, LBJ had to convince Russell that this time a filibuster would prove to be a Pyrrhic victory, since LBJ told Russell that the 2/3s Cloture vote to end a filibuster would be a certainty this time. LBJ also argued that a filibuster would hurt what also needed to be done in terms of working on economic recovery in the South. LBJ was blunt, telling Russell that if Southern Senators blocked the Civil Rights bill, the South would remain an economic backwater. Among the promises LBJ made to Russell, the main one was that the bill’s focus would be on voting rights, not integration. Russell agreed to stay on the sidelines, watching to see if LBJ’s promises were carried out, but he told LBJ that he would not remain off to the side if he believed a promise was broken.
The second act featured LBJ focusing on the mountain states of the West, since those Senators had very few African-American voters, and although in favor of Civil Rights in general terms, LBJ feared those Senators could be swayed to join Russell’s Southern block if push-came-to-shove. LBJ hoped that it would be these Western Senators on which he could strongly rely, so LBJ worked to get the votes for the Hells Canyon Dam, on the border of Idaho and Oregon (it was a larger-scale project of LBJ’s crusade to bring electricity to the HIll Country in Texas in 1935). It was those Western Senators that provided the impetus to delete the most objectionable parts of the Civil Rights bill to appease the Southern bloc, which increased the odds that the bill would pass. All the while, LBJ was omnipresent, personally keeping the bill on track,and with his wheeling-and-dealing, LBJ had drafted the only Civil Rights bill that had a chance to pass since Reconstruction.
It was in the third act that LBJ had to convince Northern Senators that passing the watered-down Civil Rights bill was better than not passing a bill at all. LBJ understood that the bill was a preliminary step, not a cure-all, and that the passage of the Civil Rights bill was far more important than its content. On 9 September 1957, LBJ signed the Civil Rights Act of 1957 into law, and it was in the form that LBJ had envisioned seven months prior. If the bill was a steer, then LBJ’s brand was seared on the bill for all to see. There was a general consensus that LBJ had become the most powerful Senate Majority Leader in history, and even Adlai Stevenson and JFK publicly stated that LBJ had Presidential timbre.
In 1935 when FDR predicted that LBJ would be a legitimate candidate for President, he qualified his prediction that it would only occur if the balance of power in the nation would shift to the South and West. That political shift didn’t occur to the degree LBJ needed in 1960 to garner the Democratic nomination, and JFK was able to secure the nomination on the first ballot in the Democratic National Convention. Also in play was LBJ’s hesitation to formally announce his candidacy for President, which proved to be politically deadly. LBJ’s plan was to play the “Inside Game” behind the scenes with the delegates at the convention after the first ballot failed to produce a nominee. LBJ also believed, incorrectly, that his stellar record as Senate Majority Leader would carry him to the finish line, but the governors and delegates didn’t have the same perspective. JFK shrewdly offered LBJ the Vice-Presidential slot on the ticket, and to the surprise of most in the know, LBJ accepted. LBJ gambled that once again he could transform a relatively meaningless office into something important, this time on the largest stage. And, in the process, LBJ hoped to enhance his chances of being elected President.
In 1935 when FDR predicted that LBJ would be a legitimate candidate for President, he qualified his prediction that it would only occur if the balance of power in the nation would shift to the South and West. That political shift didn’t occur to the degree LBJ needed in 1960 to garner the Democratic nomination, and JFK was able to secure the nomination on the first ballot in the Democratic National Convention. Also in play was LBJ’s hesitation to formally announce his candidacy for President, which proved to be politically deadly. LBJ’s plan was to play the “Inside Game” behind the scenes with the delegates at the convention after the first ballot failed to produce a nominee. LBJ also believed, incorrectly, that his stellar record as Senate Majority Leader would carry him to the finish line, but the governors and delegates didn’t have the same perspective. JFK shrewdly offered LBJ the Vice-Presidential slot on the ticket, and to the surprise of most in the know, LBJ accepted. LBJ gambled that once again he could transform a relatively meaningless office into something important, this time on the largest stage. And, in the process, LBJ hoped to enhance his chances of being elected President.
Although LBJ tried to reinvent the office of the Vice-President, JFK and RFK would not allow him to do so, and LBJ was forced to sit at the “Kiddie Table” as VP. LBJ was beyond-upset that a motion among the Senate Democrats wasn’t overwhelmingly passed, which would have allowed the VP to be the presiding officer when the Senate Democrats formally met. LBJ took the 46 - 17 vote passing the motion as a personal affront, and he abandoned hope of having an influential role as VP with the Senate Democrats. LBJ’s hissy fit meant that he wasn’t nearly as active on the legislative front as he could and should have been as VP, which was an area, as it turned out, that JFK badly needed LBJ.
Once again LBJ became depressed, and he mostly filled his time as VP focusing on the President’s Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity, where LBJ’s tone and rhetoric surpassed that of JFK until early-1963. When LBJ was in meetings, he didn’t say much, choosing to in essence stay on the sidelines and pout, since he felt marginalized. The ceremonial aspects of the Vice-Presidency meant nothing at all to LBJ, and LBJ felt the same way as TR had in 1901, that he had come to the end of his political road.
Once again LBJ became depressed, and he mostly filled his time as VP focusing on the President’s Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity, where LBJ’s tone and rhetoric surpassed that of JFK until early-1963. When LBJ was in meetings, he didn’t say much, choosing to in essence stay on the sidelines and pout, since he felt marginalized. The ceremonial aspects of the Vice-Presidency meant nothing at all to LBJ, and LBJ felt the same way as TR had in 1901, that he had come to the end of his political road.