Source: Doris Kearns Goodwin. Leadership -
Lessons From the Presidents For Turbulent Times (2018)
Lessons From the Presidents For Turbulent Times (2018)
During the four days between JFK’s Assassination and his funeral, LBJ understood that he needed to project command as well as continuity, or at least symbolic continuity. LBJ also knew that he needed to show the nation and the world that the US government was not paralyzed. LBJ knew that he needed to take immediate command with the nation, likening the situation to wandering cattle that needed direction. In the short run after taking command, LBJ showed deference to JFK’s Circle of Trust. Unlike TR who had three years before worrying about being nominated/elected in his own right as President, and therefore could take his time, LBJ had less than a year, which meant he couldn’t sweep JFK’s men out of his administration.
Again, this time on the grandest stage, LBJ took on the role of humble apprentice that strived to gradually obtain mastery. For at least a little while, LBJ realized that JFK’s Circle was going to struggle with being on the outside while still being on the inside, since now that he was President, LBJ fully intended to use the power he now had. From the moment he took the Oath of Office on Air Force One, LBJ knew where he wanted to take the nation, which meant that he needed the government to take on a much larger role in the nation, similar to the New Deal. LBJ’s never-ceasing drive combined with his desire to not be alone were of great benefit as the next days, weeks, and months unfolded.
Again, this time on the grandest stage, LBJ took on the role of humble apprentice that strived to gradually obtain mastery. For at least a little while, LBJ realized that JFK’s Circle was going to struggle with being on the outside while still being on the inside, since now that he was President, LBJ fully intended to use the power he now had. From the moment he took the Oath of Office on Air Force One, LBJ knew where he wanted to take the nation, which meant that he needed the government to take on a much larger role in the nation, similar to the New Deal. LBJ’s never-ceasing drive combined with his desire to not be alone were of great benefit as the next days, weeks, and months unfolded.
Among LBJ’s first goals was to get JFK’s tax cut out of the Senate Finance Committee, where it was being held hostage due to the pending/stalled Civil Rights bill. LBJ didn’t want a watered-down Civil Rights bill, this time wanting to strengthen it from where it stood. LBJ envisioned a real voting rights act as well as educational reform so those in poverty received an education. LBJ also wanted to pass Truman’s medical insurance bill that had become dormant on Capitol Hill. LBJ was already outlining what would become some of the hallmark components of what he would call the Great Society. LBJ truly believed that the role of government was to help those in need, and now he was President with the federal government potentially in tow.
LBJ needed to make a dramatic start in order to make his vision a reality, which meant that he had to dispel any doubts and apprehensions that he was not up to the task of being President. All of his life, LBJ realized that getting off to a quick start was crucial in achieving his goals, and he followed the same pattern in this situation (the few times in his life when LBJ chose to not get off to a quick start, it was due to his twin fears of failure and humiliation). LBJ chose to speak to a Joint Session of Congress (he was comfortable on Capitol Hill) and to a national television audience; up to that point in his political career, LBJ had never been an effective orator. LBJ did not want to address the nation from the Oval Office, knowing that he wouldn’t come off nearly as well on television. Adding to the pressure was LBJ’s knowledge that when he stepped off the podium, it was all-or-nothing in terms of how the nation perceived him.
LBJ used his speech to triple-dog-dare Congress to pass crucial domestic bills that were introduced when JFK was President but were currently held hostage in committees. At that juncture, LBJ was very fortunate to be President, since it was a relatively tranquil period in terms of global affairs, which meant he could focus on domestic challenges. LBJ did something that JFK should have done (JFK far too often ignored LBJ’s legislative advice), and he did not ask Congress to consider a myriad of bills all at once. Rather, LBJ focused on the stalled tax and Civil Rights bills as his top two legislative priorities.
LBJ needed to make a dramatic start in order to make his vision a reality, which meant that he had to dispel any doubts and apprehensions that he was not up to the task of being President. All of his life, LBJ realized that getting off to a quick start was crucial in achieving his goals, and he followed the same pattern in this situation (the few times in his life when LBJ chose to not get off to a quick start, it was due to his twin fears of failure and humiliation). LBJ chose to speak to a Joint Session of Congress (he was comfortable on Capitol Hill) and to a national television audience; up to that point in his political career, LBJ had never been an effective orator. LBJ did not want to address the nation from the Oval Office, knowing that he wouldn’t come off nearly as well on television. Adding to the pressure was LBJ’s knowledge that when he stepped off the podium, it was all-or-nothing in terms of how the nation perceived him.
LBJ used his speech to triple-dog-dare Congress to pass crucial domestic bills that were introduced when JFK was President but were currently held hostage in committees. At that juncture, LBJ was very fortunate to be President, since it was a relatively tranquil period in terms of global affairs, which meant he could focus on domestic challenges. LBJ did something that JFK should have done (JFK far too often ignored LBJ’s legislative advice), and he did not ask Congress to consider a myriad of bills all at once. Rather, LBJ focused on the stalled tax and Civil Rights bills as his top two legislative priorities.
Unlike JFK’s Inaugural Address where he hawkishly focused on international affairs and containing Communism in the Cold War, LBJ in his first speech as President focused on domestic affairs. LBJ argued that passing the Civil Rights bill would be the greatest memorial possible to JFK, intentionally and wisely using the assassination as a guilt trip of sorts to jump-start momentum for the bill. LBJ channeled his inner-FDR during the speech, paraphrasing some of what FDR had stated during his first term. With that first speech, LBJ seized the reins of power while also providing a shared sense of direction for the nation, which was what FDR had done on 4 March 1933.
LBJ needed a battle plan to get the stalled Civil Rights bill through the mazes of Congress. After discussions with the most influential figures on Capitol Hill and within his administration, LBJ decided to get the tax bill through first so it couldn’t be held hostage. Of course Theodore Sorensen, JFK’s main speechwriter, disagreed with LBJ’s strategy, since JFK wanted the Civil Rights bill worked through first; but LBJ, not JFK or Sorensen, knew how the legislature truly worked.
Senator Harry Byrd (D; VA) was the chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, and he was holding the tax bill hostage, in that government spending had become a crusade for the fiscally-conservative Byrd. Through many phone calls, LBJ found out that if the proposed budget was under $100B, then Byrd would release the tax bill from his committee. LBJ sought to meet that psychological barrier to obtain the necessary votes, even if Byrd wouldn’t vote in favor of the bill in the end; LBJ simply needed the bill to be released by Byrd. LBJ and Byrd met at the White House, and after LBJ promised to propose a budget that was under $100B, the two sealed the deal with a handshake; LBJ knew from his days in the Senate that Byrd was a man of his word. Of course JFK’s men argued that there was no way to get the budget under $100B, but LBJ would have none of that, and soon enough Secretary of the Defense Robert McNamara cut $1B from the Pentagon’s proposed budget.
LBJ needed a battle plan to get the stalled Civil Rights bill through the mazes of Congress. After discussions with the most influential figures on Capitol Hill and within his administration, LBJ decided to get the tax bill through first so it couldn’t be held hostage. Of course Theodore Sorensen, JFK’s main speechwriter, disagreed with LBJ’s strategy, since JFK wanted the Civil Rights bill worked through first; but LBJ, not JFK or Sorensen, knew how the legislature truly worked.
Senator Harry Byrd (D; VA) was the chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, and he was holding the tax bill hostage, in that government spending had become a crusade for the fiscally-conservative Byrd. Through many phone calls, LBJ found out that if the proposed budget was under $100B, then Byrd would release the tax bill from his committee. LBJ sought to meet that psychological barrier to obtain the necessary votes, even if Byrd wouldn’t vote in favor of the bill in the end; LBJ simply needed the bill to be released by Byrd. LBJ and Byrd met at the White House, and after LBJ promised to propose a budget that was under $100B, the two sealed the deal with a handshake; LBJ knew from his days in the Senate that Byrd was a man of his word. Of course JFK’s men argued that there was no way to get the budget under $100B, but LBJ would have none of that, and soon enough Secretary of the Defense Robert McNamara cut $1B from the Pentagon’s proposed budget.
Byrd told LBJ that he needed to see the proposed budget in writing, and to have time for him and his staff to peruse the document. LBJ knew that Byrd would uncover any creative shenanigans, so LBJ submitted a $97.5B budget to Byrd in order to provide some “wiggle room” if Byrd cried foul. LBJ appealed to Byrd’s sense of honor and his desire for a historical legacy, making it clear to Byrd that the Senator from Virginia would go down in history as the first one to force a President to reduce a proposed budget. At that point in time, LBJ didn’t care about who received the credit, he just wanted the bill released from Byrd’s committee. In early-February 1964, Byrd released the tax bill.
The battle was now to get the bill passed at a much faster pace than normal, so it was “Go Fever” and then some. LBJ made sure his allies in Congress quashed any amendments being added to water down the tax bill, and he had his Cabinet pressure borderline Senators. On 26 February 1964, the tax bill passed both houses and LBJ signed the bill into law in a publicized ceremony. During that ceremony, LBJ made it clear that he would now have an “Eye of Sauron” focus on gaining passage of the stalled Civil Rights bill.
Like Lincoln and FDR, LBJ knew that people were more easily influenced by stories, and that they remembered stories far longer than facts or figures. LBJ used his own experiences for stories, varying them depending on the audience, all in order to convince enough members in Congress that the days of Jim Crow were over. In 1964, LBJ knew when to push all his chips to the center of the table on an issue, which was exactly what he did with the Civil Rights bill. On the surface, it seemed that LBJ had everything to lose and nothing to gain by going all-in with the Civil Rights bill, especially since his greatest twin fears were failure and humiliation.
The battle was now to get the bill passed at a much faster pace than normal, so it was “Go Fever” and then some. LBJ made sure his allies in Congress quashed any amendments being added to water down the tax bill, and he had his Cabinet pressure borderline Senators. On 26 February 1964, the tax bill passed both houses and LBJ signed the bill into law in a publicized ceremony. During that ceremony, LBJ made it clear that he would now have an “Eye of Sauron” focus on gaining passage of the stalled Civil Rights bill.
Like Lincoln and FDR, LBJ knew that people were more easily influenced by stories, and that they remembered stories far longer than facts or figures. LBJ used his own experiences for stories, varying them depending on the audience, all in order to convince enough members in Congress that the days of Jim Crow were over. In 1964, LBJ knew when to push all his chips to the center of the table on an issue, which was exactly what he did with the Civil Rights bill. On the surface, it seemed that LBJ had everything to lose and nothing to gain by going all-in with the Civil Rights bill, especially since his greatest twin fears were failure and humiliation.
JFK was pragmatist, whereas with Civil Rights in 1964, LBJ was passionate. rallying support around his strategic target, which was necessary because in the House, Representative Judge Howard Smith (D; VA) held the bill hostage as the chairman of the House Rules Committee. LBJ decided to use the very rare House procedure of a discharge petition, where with 218 votes the bill would be forced out of the Rules Committee. The tradition in the House was to respect seniority, so discharge petitions were rarely used. LBJ knew that he couldn’t use a charm offensive with Smith (who was 80 yrs old) as he had with Byrd, and that he couldn’t directly pressure for the discharge petition. LBJ enlisted outside groups, such as Civil Rights leaders, to directly pressure Congressmen and Senators. LBJ used the “Johnson Treatment” on the phone to get various outsiders on board, and he secretly taped those phone calls.
It soon became clear that 50 to 60 House Republicans would be needed to reach 218 votes. LBJ triple-dog-dared House Republicans to put-up-or-shut-up, in that they were members of the Party of Lincoln, and that they were either for Civil Rights, or they were not. LBJ pressured newspapers, such as the Washington Post, to show photos and write editorials of reluctant members of Congress, especially Republicans. When the number of votes reached 209, it became obvious to all in the House chamber, including Judge Smith, that 218 votes were a foregone conclusion. Smith caved, releasing the bill in order to avoid the humiliation of being overridden with a rare discharge petition. The bill was officially released when Congress reconvened before Christmas 1963, and it reached the House floor for a vote on 31 January 1964. On 10 February 1964, the House passed the strongest Civil Rights bill since 1875.
It soon became clear that 50 to 60 House Republicans would be needed to reach 218 votes. LBJ triple-dog-dared House Republicans to put-up-or-shut-up, in that they were members of the Party of Lincoln, and that they were either for Civil Rights, or they were not. LBJ pressured newspapers, such as the Washington Post, to show photos and write editorials of reluctant members of Congress, especially Republicans. When the number of votes reached 209, it became obvious to all in the House chamber, including Judge Smith, that 218 votes were a foregone conclusion. Smith caved, releasing the bill in order to avoid the humiliation of being overridden with a rare discharge petition. The bill was officially released when Congress reconvened before Christmas 1963, and it reached the House floor for a vote on 31 January 1964. On 10 February 1964, the House passed the strongest Civil Rights bill since 1875.