Source: Brenda Wineapple. The Impeachers -
The Trial of Andrew Johnson and the Dream of a Just Nation (2020)
The Trial of Andrew Johnson and the Dream of a Just Nation (2020)
With the process of impeachment stalled, Republicans believed that they had sufficiently blocked Johnson from doing any more damage. Sumner didn’t buy into that conventional wisdom, and he begged his Congressional colleagues to return in session in July 1867. While Congress was in recess, Johnson did his absolute best to circumvent Congress, such as making sure that the military commanders didn’t have the right to remove civilian officials, which cut out the heart of the 1st Reconstruction Act. It wasn’t just Johnson vs. Congress, it was also Johnson vs. the military, which proved to be just as much of a factor leading to his impeachment as were the Republicans in Congress.
General Sheridan ignored the opinion of the Attorney General which limited the authority of military commanders. Sheridan was the commander of the LA/TX district, and it wasn’t until the was placed in command of that district that his views fell in line with those of the Radical Republicans. Sheridan removed from office civilians that he believed had orchestrated and/or been involved in the New Orleans Massacre. An added incentive for doing so was that Sheridan wanted to publicly embarrass Johnson. Grant and Stanton approved of Sheridan’s actions, and it was Grant’s support that made it almost impossible for Johnson to remove Sheridan from his post.
Seeing the writing on the wall, Congress reconvened in July 1867, and shortly thereafter the 3rd Reconstruction Act was passed, which gave Grant complete authority over Congressional Reconstruction. The act included that military commanders had complete authority with their district, and provided $500m in funding. Johnson vetoed the bill, and yet again Congress overrode his veto. Starting in the Summer of 1867, Grant, unwillingly for the most part, entered the political arena. That being said, no one could yet pin down Grant’s party affiliation, since his statements and actions had given pause to both the Republicans and the Democrats. Grant remained very circumspect, but whats wasn’t under question was the general’s devotion to his beloved military.
Grant’s belief was that there would never be real Reconstruction unless Af/Am’s could vote, which meant that he wished to follow (and enforce) the Reconstruction Acts. Grant readily assisted the district commanders as well as shielding them from interference from the President. In Grant’s eyes, Johnson who was defying Congress, so therefore the military could legally defy Johnson, which was a recipe for conflict. Grant had the backing of Stanton, who had formally stated that he would enforce the Reconstruction Acts as SecWar; SecNav Welles felt that Stanton had at last shown his untrustworthy hand.
General Sheridan ignored the opinion of the Attorney General which limited the authority of military commanders. Sheridan was the commander of the LA/TX district, and it wasn’t until the was placed in command of that district that his views fell in line with those of the Radical Republicans. Sheridan removed from office civilians that he believed had orchestrated and/or been involved in the New Orleans Massacre. An added incentive for doing so was that Sheridan wanted to publicly embarrass Johnson. Grant and Stanton approved of Sheridan’s actions, and it was Grant’s support that made it almost impossible for Johnson to remove Sheridan from his post.
Seeing the writing on the wall, Congress reconvened in July 1867, and shortly thereafter the 3rd Reconstruction Act was passed, which gave Grant complete authority over Congressional Reconstruction. The act included that military commanders had complete authority with their district, and provided $500m in funding. Johnson vetoed the bill, and yet again Congress overrode his veto. Starting in the Summer of 1867, Grant, unwillingly for the most part, entered the political arena. That being said, no one could yet pin down Grant’s party affiliation, since his statements and actions had given pause to both the Republicans and the Democrats. Grant remained very circumspect, but whats wasn’t under question was the general’s devotion to his beloved military.
Grant’s belief was that there would never be real Reconstruction unless Af/Am’s could vote, which meant that he wished to follow (and enforce) the Reconstruction Acts. Grant readily assisted the district commanders as well as shielding them from interference from the President. In Grant’s eyes, Johnson who was defying Congress, so therefore the military could legally defy Johnson, which was a recipe for conflict. Grant had the backing of Stanton, who had formally stated that he would enforce the Reconstruction Acts as SecWar; SecNav Welles felt that Stanton had at last shown his untrustworthy hand.
Grant and Stanton controlled the military under laws passed by Congress over Johnson’s vetoes; the overall purpose was to undercut and eliminate Johnson’s power in reconstructing the South. Congress was again in recess in August 1867, and it was during that month that a livid Johnson decided to remove Sheridan and Stanton. Grant advised Johnson against doing so, since Sheridan was very popular and Stanton was protected by the Tenure of Office Act. Even Welles advises Johnson to leave Sheridan be, but the SecNav was using reverse psychology on the President, with the endgame being the removal of Stanton. As far as Welles was concerned, Stanton needed to go in order to defang the Reconstruction Acts, to restore the Southern Way of Life, as well as to get the locked-out Southern members of Congress properly seated.
On 5 August 1867, Johnson sent Stanton a note saying that his resignation as SecWar would be accepted. Stanton responded with a written missive saying that he wasn’t going to resign before Congress reconvened. Stanton believed that the TOA protected him unless the Senate voted to remove him. Johnson hoped that there would be a public condemnation of Stanton for staying in office in spite of the wishes of the President, so he let the matter be for a few days, wanting to “sweat” Stanton. Johnson told Grant that his actual intention was to suspend Stanton in order to avoid violating the TOA, and he also told the general that he planned on appointing him as the interim SecWar. Johnson calculated that with Congress in recess, he could again do whatever he wanted, and he assumed that when Congress reconvened, Grant would be confirmed as SecWar.
Johnson counted on Grant’s cooperation and popularity to smooth over any difficulties. Johnson also wanted to drive a wedge between Grant and Stanton, who had been working well together running the military districts and enforcing the Reconstruction Acts. Despite receiving advice not to do so, as well as running against his own misgivings, on 11 August 1867, Grant officially accepted his appointment as interim SecWar. On 12 August 1867, Johnson suspended SecWar Stanton. Stanton informed Johnson that he had no right to suspend him without cause. However, since Grant had been appointed interim SecWar, Stanton, who was boiling with anger, wrote that he would, under protest, submit to a superior force. When Johnson received Stanton’s response, he told an advisor that the Rubicon had been crossed.
On 5 August 1867, Johnson sent Stanton a note saying that his resignation as SecWar would be accepted. Stanton responded with a written missive saying that he wasn’t going to resign before Congress reconvened. Stanton believed that the TOA protected him unless the Senate voted to remove him. Johnson hoped that there would be a public condemnation of Stanton for staying in office in spite of the wishes of the President, so he let the matter be for a few days, wanting to “sweat” Stanton. Johnson told Grant that his actual intention was to suspend Stanton in order to avoid violating the TOA, and he also told the general that he planned on appointing him as the interim SecWar. Johnson calculated that with Congress in recess, he could again do whatever he wanted, and he assumed that when Congress reconvened, Grant would be confirmed as SecWar.
Johnson counted on Grant’s cooperation and popularity to smooth over any difficulties. Johnson also wanted to drive a wedge between Grant and Stanton, who had been working well together running the military districts and enforcing the Reconstruction Acts. Despite receiving advice not to do so, as well as running against his own misgivings, on 11 August 1867, Grant officially accepted his appointment as interim SecWar. On 12 August 1867, Johnson suspended SecWar Stanton. Stanton informed Johnson that he had no right to suspend him without cause. However, since Grant had been appointed interim SecWar, Stanton, who was boiling with anger, wrote that he would, under protest, submit to a superior force. When Johnson received Stanton’s response, he told an advisor that the Rubicon had been crossed.
Johnson believed that he had accomplished two things: removing Stanton and sidelining Grant. The President also thought he had successfully broken any link between Grant and the Radical Republicans. Johnson thought the Radical Republicans would view Grant as a sell-out, and to some, such as Phillips, grant had indeed stabbed Stonton in the back. Grant told his wife (Julia) that he thought it was the right move to accept the post of interim SecWar, sine the War Department needed someone in charge that Johnson could not manipulate. Grant’s main goal was to protect the military, execute the laws of Congress, and to protect the former slaves. However, Grant did not fully appreciate the intricate politics involved with his acceptance of the post of interim SecWar.
On 17 August 1867, Johnson removed Sheridan from command, totally ignoring Grant’s advice that if he did so, Johnson would be directly going against Congress and the Reconstruction Acts. Johnson stated that he was the one acting on behalf of the Constitution and state sovereignty, which was too much for Grant, and he released his opposing response to Johnson and to the press. In that released response, Grant argued that Johnson had acted in violation of Congressional acts when he suspended Stanton, and then removed three military commanders, most prominently Sheridan. Johnson pondered removing the head of the Freedman’s Bureau, planning on naming an Af/Am as his replacement, thinking that so many whites would quit the department that the Bureau would become ineffective. Johnson went so far to offer the post to prominent Af/Am’s, such as Frederick Douglass, but wisely, none accepted.
As a result, many came to Grant’s defense, echoing what Grant had told his wife, and that he did so to protect the military as well as trying to contain the reckless actions of Johnson. At the same time, opposition to Grant increased, in that many saw Grant as an obstacle to Reconstruction and the Radical Republicans. Grant’s popularity skyrocketed even further, with “Grant Clubs” springing up nationwide. Moderate Republicans increasingly viewed Grant as the nation’s insurance against the Radical Republicans. The paranoia of Johnson, and even Welles, became palpable, with both wondering what Grant would do if the impeachment progressed and escalated, for example would Grant follow the orders of the President. For an answer, Johnson made a personal visit to Grant. As Johnson understood their conversation, Grant promised to obey the President, and that he would step down as interim SecWar if the Senate tried to reinstate Stanton.
On 17 August 1867, Johnson removed Sheridan from command, totally ignoring Grant’s advice that if he did so, Johnson would be directly going against Congress and the Reconstruction Acts. Johnson stated that he was the one acting on behalf of the Constitution and state sovereignty, which was too much for Grant, and he released his opposing response to Johnson and to the press. In that released response, Grant argued that Johnson had acted in violation of Congressional acts when he suspended Stanton, and then removed three military commanders, most prominently Sheridan. Johnson pondered removing the head of the Freedman’s Bureau, planning on naming an Af/Am as his replacement, thinking that so many whites would quit the department that the Bureau would become ineffective. Johnson went so far to offer the post to prominent Af/Am’s, such as Frederick Douglass, but wisely, none accepted.
As a result, many came to Grant’s defense, echoing what Grant had told his wife, and that he did so to protect the military as well as trying to contain the reckless actions of Johnson. At the same time, opposition to Grant increased, in that many saw Grant as an obstacle to Reconstruction and the Radical Republicans. Grant’s popularity skyrocketed even further, with “Grant Clubs” springing up nationwide. Moderate Republicans increasingly viewed Grant as the nation’s insurance against the Radical Republicans. The paranoia of Johnson, and even Welles, became palpable, with both wondering what Grant would do if the impeachment progressed and escalated, for example would Grant follow the orders of the President. For an answer, Johnson made a personal visit to Grant. As Johnson understood their conversation, Grant promised to obey the President, and that he would step down as interim SecWar if the Senate tried to reinstate Stanton.
In a meeting with Sherman, Johnson asked the general a myriad of questions, and whatever Sherman told Johnson, the President was soothed, at least a little. Sherman was not a favorite of the Radical Republicans, and rumors spread that the meeting between Johnson and Sherman hatched a conspiracy leading to armed insurrection. The House Judiciary Committee decided to vote again on impeachment when Congress reconvened in the Fall of 1867. One of the committee’s members changed his vote, due to unproven allegations of financial corruption. On 24 November 1867 the committee voted 5 - 4 to recommend impeachment., which meant that the process was forwarded for the full House to consider. After the Civil War, the amount of money involved in political corruption went off the charts, and the line between the federal government and Big Business became even more blurry.
The fight over currency created very different opposing groups, with factions that hated Johnson on every other front agreeing with the President on hard currency (Gold Standard) instead of continuing Greenbacks. Staring everyone in the face on Capitol Hill was the $2.3B Civil War debt, and many war bonds were coming due, so the problem was how should the lenders be paid back, with hard currency or Greenbacks. There were schisms in both parties when it came to the currency debate.
Congressional fiscal policy was dominated by the Republicans, and they largely favored lowering the amount of Greenbacks in circulation, while Democrats largely favored Greenbacks and not restricting the money supply. Voters in key states voiced their preference, sending Democrats to the governor’s mansion. It also seemed that voters were drifting away from the Radical Republicans, which to many meant that Grant could step in as the moderate voice of reason. Most Republicans did not want to make a martyr out of Johnson, and figures such as Horace Greeley argued that the Election of 1868 was right around the corner, so let the voters decide what to do with Johnson. However, Phillips didn’t want to take the chance that Johnson wouldn’t do something far worse than what he already had done if he was allowed to finish his term.
The fight over currency created very different opposing groups, with factions that hated Johnson on every other front agreeing with the President on hard currency (Gold Standard) instead of continuing Greenbacks. Staring everyone in the face on Capitol Hill was the $2.3B Civil War debt, and many war bonds were coming due, so the problem was how should the lenders be paid back, with hard currency or Greenbacks. There were schisms in both parties when it came to the currency debate.
Congressional fiscal policy was dominated by the Republicans, and they largely favored lowering the amount of Greenbacks in circulation, while Democrats largely favored Greenbacks and not restricting the money supply. Voters in key states voiced their preference, sending Democrats to the governor’s mansion. It also seemed that voters were drifting away from the Radical Republicans, which to many meant that Grant could step in as the moderate voice of reason. Most Republicans did not want to make a martyr out of Johnson, and figures such as Horace Greeley argued that the Election of 1868 was right around the corner, so let the voters decide what to do with Johnson. However, Phillips didn’t want to take the chance that Johnson wouldn’t do something far worse than what he already had done if he was allowed to finish his term.
Most moderate and conservative Republicans wanted impeachment off the table, Grant elected as President, the GOP united, and the Radical Republicans run out of DC. These Republicans saw impeachment as the way the Radical Republicans would conduct a palace coup, in that by removing Johnson one of their own, Benjamin Wade, would be President before the election; and that was exactly what the Radical Republicans wanted.
Mark Twain arrived in DC in 1867 as the Washington correspondent for several newspapers, including the New York Tribune and the New York Herald. Twain’s reputation was as a humorist and lecturer, not as a journalist, but Twain proved to be as keep a political observer/commentator as any in the nation’s capital. Twain did his job very well, but he absolutely hated Washington, D.C. Twain was in attendance in the House on 3 December 1867, witnessing the delivery of Johnson’s Presidential Address to Congress in a bulky parcel. After the message was read out loud, with the members reading along in their own copies, pandemonium ensued.
Johnson’s message was a masterpiece of venom and vitriol. The President was obviously emboldened by the reduction of the number of Radical Republicans in Congress after the Congressional Elections of 1866, as well as more recent state elections. Johnson rehashed the same policies, but what was new was his use of the word slavery, in that he used that word towards Southern whites if Af/Am’s gained such civil rights as suffrage. Johnson also referred to “military despotism” with the five military districts. Johnson went on to say that he had ruled out using the military against Congress since he didn’t want another Civil War. Johnson kept going, stating that if he did use military force, the Constitution would be on his side. The address was incendiary, illogical, and it united the Republicans like nothing had done before.
Twain commented that before Johnson’s address, impeachment was going nowhere in the House, but after the address, impeachment gained serious momentum. That being said, Twain, as well as many other observers, simply didn’t think the Republicans in Congress had the guts to seriously pursue impeachment. Soon Twain and those others would be proven right when the House voted 108 - 57 against impeachment. And, just as Phillips had predicted, Johnson let loose, removing more military commanders, including General John Pope, who was removed by Johnson when the general publicly stated that Af/Am’s should be allowed to serve on juries. On 12 December 1867, Johnson sent Congress a message explaining why he had suspended Stanton, which was very vitriolic and at times very illogical, and Johnson also found the time to laud the job Grant had been doing as interim SecWar.
Mark Twain arrived in DC in 1867 as the Washington correspondent for several newspapers, including the New York Tribune and the New York Herald. Twain’s reputation was as a humorist and lecturer, not as a journalist, but Twain proved to be as keep a political observer/commentator as any in the nation’s capital. Twain did his job very well, but he absolutely hated Washington, D.C. Twain was in attendance in the House on 3 December 1867, witnessing the delivery of Johnson’s Presidential Address to Congress in a bulky parcel. After the message was read out loud, with the members reading along in their own copies, pandemonium ensued.
Johnson’s message was a masterpiece of venom and vitriol. The President was obviously emboldened by the reduction of the number of Radical Republicans in Congress after the Congressional Elections of 1866, as well as more recent state elections. Johnson rehashed the same policies, but what was new was his use of the word slavery, in that he used that word towards Southern whites if Af/Am’s gained such civil rights as suffrage. Johnson also referred to “military despotism” with the five military districts. Johnson went on to say that he had ruled out using the military against Congress since he didn’t want another Civil War. Johnson kept going, stating that if he did use military force, the Constitution would be on his side. The address was incendiary, illogical, and it united the Republicans like nothing had done before.
Twain commented that before Johnson’s address, impeachment was going nowhere in the House, but after the address, impeachment gained serious momentum. That being said, Twain, as well as many other observers, simply didn’t think the Republicans in Congress had the guts to seriously pursue impeachment. Soon Twain and those others would be proven right when the House voted 108 - 57 against impeachment. And, just as Phillips had predicted, Johnson let loose, removing more military commanders, including General John Pope, who was removed by Johnson when the general publicly stated that Af/Am’s should be allowed to serve on juries. On 12 December 1867, Johnson sent Congress a message explaining why he had suspended Stanton, which was very vitriolic and at times very illogical, and Johnson also found the time to laud the job Grant had been doing as interim SecWar.
Johnson was the chief architect of his own impeachment, choosing conflict (even with Grant) which accelerated a crisis that he didn’t know how to or want to resolve. In early-January 1868, the Senate Committee on Military Affairs was in the process of exploring whether or not to reinstate Stanton. Grant realized that if the Senate did so, then he, as interim SecWar, would be in violation of the TOA, and he could be fined and/or imprisoned. It was on
11 January 1868 that Grant personally told Johnson that if the Senate reinstated Stanton that he would step down. Johnson offered to pay the fine and serve the jail sentence, but when Grant politely declined the offer, Johnson told Grant the he would prefer that Grant step down soon so he could appoint another interim SecWar.
According to Johnson, Grant indicated that he would resign before the Senate voted on Stanton. Grant, on the other hand, denied making any promises to Johnson, instead claiming that he told Johnson that if the Senate reinstated Stanton, then his duties as interim SecWar ended at that point. Johnson thought that they would again meet in a day or so, but Grant held firm that he never promised to meet the President. No matter the truth of what occurred in the meeting, what was plain was that there was clearly growing friction between the President and the General.
Grant and Sherman met, and they decided that Sherman would tell Johnson that Grant would resign if he appointed a moderate Republican. The easiest choice was Ohio’s governor, General Jacob Cox, who would have been easily confirmed in the Senate. However, Johnson didn’t appoint anyone, and Sherman suspected that the President had in mind a Copperhead. The Senate overruled Johnson’s suspension of Stanton by a vote of 35 - 6, reinstating him as SecWar, with even moderate Republicans voting in favor. Johnson, Stanton, and Grant were all very stubborn, which played a major role in the upcoming events concerning impeachment.
Addendum: Andrew Johnson -
The Architect Of His Own Impeachment
11 January 1868 that Grant personally told Johnson that if the Senate reinstated Stanton that he would step down. Johnson offered to pay the fine and serve the jail sentence, but when Grant politely declined the offer, Johnson told Grant the he would prefer that Grant step down soon so he could appoint another interim SecWar.
According to Johnson, Grant indicated that he would resign before the Senate voted on Stanton. Grant, on the other hand, denied making any promises to Johnson, instead claiming that he told Johnson that if the Senate reinstated Stanton, then his duties as interim SecWar ended at that point. Johnson thought that they would again meet in a day or so, but Grant held firm that he never promised to meet the President. No matter the truth of what occurred in the meeting, what was plain was that there was clearly growing friction between the President and the General.
Grant and Sherman met, and they decided that Sherman would tell Johnson that Grant would resign if he appointed a moderate Republican. The easiest choice was Ohio’s governor, General Jacob Cox, who would have been easily confirmed in the Senate. However, Johnson didn’t appoint anyone, and Sherman suspected that the President had in mind a Copperhead. The Senate overruled Johnson’s suspension of Stanton by a vote of 35 - 6, reinstating him as SecWar, with even moderate Republicans voting in favor. Johnson, Stanton, and Grant were all very stubborn, which played a major role in the upcoming events concerning impeachment.
Addendum: Andrew Johnson -
The Architect Of His Own Impeachment