On 16 September 1919 in the Grand Ballroom of the Waldorf Astoria, 1200 men from the mining industry applauded when it was mentioned that Hoover would be a great President. In effect, that night was Hoover’s “Coming Out Party”. Hoover delivered a very political speech that night, featuring the role of the US in human affairs, especially in relation to the rising tide of Socialism in Europe, and the far more virulent strain of Bolshevism. Hoover wanted American-style democracy and free markets, which was the best combination in world history as far as he was concerned. Hoover asserted that nothing revolutionary was required, since both could be accomplished under the existing political and economic landscapes. Hoover also stated that the Senate needed to ratify both the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations in order to secure the peace in Europe, which was the necessary foundation for future global security and prosperity. Hoover, like Wilson, was blunt: If the US remained isolated, then the American effort and sacrifices during the Great War would have been wasted.
Hoover told the press that he had no interest in running for the Presidency in 1920, but after the announcement, the press treated him as a serious contender. Much of that interest was generated by the feeling that Hoover wasn’t a traditional Democrat (or Republican). Hoover had no roots in either party, which meant he didn’t have any organization to support him, dooming any chances he may have had in being a serious Presidential contender in 1920. Added to that was Hoover’s lack of ability in the arena of political mixing and schmoozing; in short, by 1920 Hoover was simply not yet a politician.
Hoover told the press that he had no interest in running for the Presidency in 1920, but after the announcement, the press treated him as a serious contender. Much of that interest was generated by the feeling that Hoover wasn’t a traditional Democrat (or Republican). Hoover had no roots in either party, which meant he didn’t have any organization to support him, dooming any chances he may have had in being a serious Presidential contender in 1920. Added to that was Hoover’s lack of ability in the arena of political mixing and schmoozing; in short, by 1920 Hoover was simply not yet a politician.
Not long after the Election of 1912, where Hoover had been a staunch supporter of Theodore Roosevelt and the Bull Moose Party, Hoover renounced his membership in the Republican Party. Both the Republicans and Democrats suspected Hoover of being a closet member of the other party. However, Hoover’s natural home was the Republican Party, which was the party of business. By 1920, Hoover’s public speaking skills were lackluster, and he feared crowds, hated glad-handing, small talk with strangers. and he was also very uncomfortable under the intense gaze of the press. Hoover hated the political “Inside Game”, in large part because he didn’t have any influence or power in that arena. Basically, Hoover wanted to be drafted and “hired” for the Presidency, very similarly to how he became in charge of the CRB and the ARA.
From the time Hoover returned to the US in the Fall of 1919 to the brink of the conventions in the Summer of 1920, Hoover had been continuously featured in the press and various publications. Hoover’s initial strategy was to try and make the political process and the power-brokers come to him. His plan was to remain on the sidelines, and by the time of the political conventions, one of the two parties would draft him as their nominee. Colonel House knew exactly what Hoover was trying to do; discarded by Wilson, House had stayed in the political arena by being a freelance advisor to prospective candidates from either party. In his discussions with House, Hoover was not coy about his Presidential ambition. House advised Hoover that he could only be aloof for so long until he cooked his political goose for good. Basically, Hoover had no strategy, other than planning on waiting until the party platforms were declared before he announced with which party he was affiliated.
From the time Hoover returned to the US in the Fall of 1919 to the brink of the conventions in the Summer of 1920, Hoover had been continuously featured in the press and various publications. Hoover’s initial strategy was to try and make the political process and the power-brokers come to him. His plan was to remain on the sidelines, and by the time of the political conventions, one of the two parties would draft him as their nominee. Colonel House knew exactly what Hoover was trying to do; discarded by Wilson, House had stayed in the political arena by being a freelance advisor to prospective candidates from either party. In his discussions with House, Hoover was not coy about his Presidential ambition. House advised Hoover that he could only be aloof for so long until he cooked his political goose for good. Basically, Hoover had no strategy, other than planning on waiting until the party platforms were declared before he announced with which party he was affiliated.
During March of 1920, Hoover was still a Democrat. Among the party’s power-brokers, there was some consideration for a Hoover/Franklin Roosevelt ticket, which House believed was the best chance for victory by the Democrats. By that time, Hoover and FDR were regular dinner companions, and both men liked each other well enough. But Hoover didn’t want to be the “Sacrificial Lamb” for the Democrats in 1920, so during that same month he declared that he was once again a Republican.
Hoover’s announcement was far too late, even though he had won the Michigan Republican primary without even entering the race. Hoover skipped most of the Republican primaries (before 1972, there were not very many primaries), committing only to California, where he lost badly. The Republican establishment and most primary voters weren’t the least bit interested in Hoover in 1920. Hoover found political life every bit as distasteful as he predicted, being reduced to proving that he had lived in the US for 14 consecutive years in order to be eligible to run. Also, some of the mining scandals from his past were resurrected, and Hoover showed a very thin skin by threatening legal action against anyone that had a different version or interpretation of past events compared to his versions.
Nonetheless, Hoover’s popularity remained high; at the Republican National Convention in 1920, Hoover was 13th out of 15 candidates in the first ballot. Senator Warren G. Harding (R; OH) won the Republican nomination on the 10th ballot. Hoover experienced an epic fail in his initial foray into US politics. The overall result, however, was that Hoover was more determined than ever to dominate the Republican Party and become President. Hoover abandoned the idea that fate alone would deliver him to the White House, and he started to build a base within the GOP (the Grand Old Party, the nickname of the Republican Party) with the goal of becoming a party regular, and then leader. Hoover decided that the best way to get started down that path towards success was to vigorously campaign for the Republican ticket of Harding and Calvin Coolidge (Governor of MA). Hoover’s strategy was to learn to play the “Inside Game”, wait, and then take full advantage of his next chance.
Hoover’s announcement was far too late, even though he had won the Michigan Republican primary without even entering the race. Hoover skipped most of the Republican primaries (before 1972, there were not very many primaries), committing only to California, where he lost badly. The Republican establishment and most primary voters weren’t the least bit interested in Hoover in 1920. Hoover found political life every bit as distasteful as he predicted, being reduced to proving that he had lived in the US for 14 consecutive years in order to be eligible to run. Also, some of the mining scandals from his past were resurrected, and Hoover showed a very thin skin by threatening legal action against anyone that had a different version or interpretation of past events compared to his versions.
Nonetheless, Hoover’s popularity remained high; at the Republican National Convention in 1920, Hoover was 13th out of 15 candidates in the first ballot. Senator Warren G. Harding (R; OH) won the Republican nomination on the 10th ballot. Hoover experienced an epic fail in his initial foray into US politics. The overall result, however, was that Hoover was more determined than ever to dominate the Republican Party and become President. Hoover abandoned the idea that fate alone would deliver him to the White House, and he started to build a base within the GOP (the Grand Old Party, the nickname of the Republican Party) with the goal of becoming a party regular, and then leader. Hoover decided that the best way to get started down that path towards success was to vigorously campaign for the Republican ticket of Harding and Calvin Coolidge (Governor of MA). Hoover’s strategy was to learn to play the “Inside Game”, wait, and then take full advantage of his next chance.
While he lay in wait, Hoover needed to stay busy and relevant in national politics. Hoover concluded that his political relevance depended on being close to the seat of power, which meant living in-or-near DC, and he figured that being in Harding’s Cabinet would keep him in the political spotlight. Harding was the “Great Harmonizer” (and also the “Great Womanizer”), preferring to make friends and connections over taking a stand on staunch principles. Harding rarely pushed for something unless it was clearly popular, and he didn’t oppose anything until it was completely dead. Harding had a fetish for mending fences, as well as sitting on them. After two terms of Woodrow Wilson, Harding was exactly what the Republicans needed in 1920, with the nation on political, social, and economic shaky ground.
For a myriad of reasons, America in the immediate aftermath of the Great War was a society in chaos. Harding stated that the nation didn’t need heroics, but healing and “Normalcy”. Despite Harding’s lack of eloquence, his presence, words, and tone were soothing for millions of Americans in 1920. Ironically, Harding didn’t have near the confidence in himself that he inspired in others. A high level of insecurity combined with political ambition and a powerful need to conform led him to marry a powerful socialite he didn’t love (Florence Kling, who was far more politically astute than her husband). Harding had a long-lasting extramarital affair with his best friend’s wife, and spent the war years messing around with a recent high school graduate that led to the birth of a child. Harding continued his reckless philandering behavior even when President. Harding needed self-soothing, which included the affairs, food, drink, card-playing, cigars, cigarettes, time with his “Ohio Cronies”, and time with his beloved Airedale Terrier, Laddie Boy; by these means, Harding was able to maintain his splendidly pleasant public facade.
For a myriad of reasons, America in the immediate aftermath of the Great War was a society in chaos. Harding stated that the nation didn’t need heroics, but healing and “Normalcy”. Despite Harding’s lack of eloquence, his presence, words, and tone were soothing for millions of Americans in 1920. Ironically, Harding didn’t have near the confidence in himself that he inspired in others. A high level of insecurity combined with political ambition and a powerful need to conform led him to marry a powerful socialite he didn’t love (Florence Kling, who was far more politically astute than her husband). Harding had a long-lasting extramarital affair with his best friend’s wife, and spent the war years messing around with a recent high school graduate that led to the birth of a child. Harding continued his reckless philandering behavior even when President. Harding needed self-soothing, which included the affairs, food, drink, card-playing, cigars, cigarettes, time with his “Ohio Cronies”, and time with his beloved Airedale Terrier, Laddie Boy; by these means, Harding was able to maintain his splendidly pleasant public facade.
On Election Day in 1920 (2 November), Harding won .602 of the popular vote, becoming the first Presidential candidate to win over 60% (FDR in 1936, LBJ in 1964, and Nixon in 1972 would join Harding in that exclusive Presidential club). Harding demolished the Democratic ticket of James Cox and FDR, carrying 37 of the 48 states. Six days after the election, Harding invited Hoover to Marion (OH) for what was in essence an interview for a Cabinet position. There was much opposition to Hoover in the GOP, but there wasn’t much that any influential Republican could do in terms of denying Hoover’s rise as long as Harding liked Hoover. The Cabinet post that Hoover coveted was Secretary of State, and he tried his best to convince Harding that he was the best for the position. But Harding wanted Hoover to be either the Secretary of the Interior, or the Secretary of Commerce. Harding was impressed with Hoover, but he was also aware of the massive opposition to Hoover within the GOP, so tapping Hoover for SecState was a nonstarter.
Time was running out before Inauguration Day; Harding told Senator Henry Cabot Lodge (R; MA) that Senate Republicans would only get Andrew Mellon as SecTreas if they tolerated someone they didn’t support as SecCommerce. With that political angle solved, on 22 February 1921 Harding sent Hoover a telegram telling him to get in touch as soon as possible. Initially, Hoover didn’t like the idea of being SecCommerce, seeing the posting to be beneath his talents and status, but when Harding offered SecCommerce to Hoover, he accepted. Hoover made it clear to Harding that it was a conditional acceptance, in that he wanted to reorganize the department and to further its scope to being involved in international commerce. Again, Hoover had taken a position that was not what he had originally envisioned or wanted and restructured the position to match his talents and ambitions. Hoover, in full “Diva Mode”, didn’t publicly state his acceptance of SecCommerce until Harding confirmed that he would have a free hand in remaking the department.
Time was running out before Inauguration Day; Harding told Senator Henry Cabot Lodge (R; MA) that Senate Republicans would only get Andrew Mellon as SecTreas if they tolerated someone they didn’t support as SecCommerce. With that political angle solved, on 22 February 1921 Harding sent Hoover a telegram telling him to get in touch as soon as possible. Initially, Hoover didn’t like the idea of being SecCommerce, seeing the posting to be beneath his talents and status, but when Harding offered SecCommerce to Hoover, he accepted. Hoover made it clear to Harding that it was a conditional acceptance, in that he wanted to reorganize the department and to further its scope to being involved in international commerce. Again, Hoover had taken a position that was not what he had originally envisioned or wanted and restructured the position to match his talents and ambitions. Hoover, in full “Diva Mode”, didn’t publicly state his acceptance of SecCommerce until Harding confirmed that he would have a free hand in remaking the department.