Woodrow Wilson was not Hoover’s type of man, in that he once characterized the President as that loud-mouth professor from Princeton. Hoover didn’t trust those that were loquacious, and Wilson was also part of the Eastern Establishment and a career academic; so in Hoover’s point-of-view, Wilson was “0 for 3”. However, Hoover did admire Wilson as an achiever and a man of accomplishments, and he was flattered by Wilson’s attention towards him. Hoover had his foot in the door of the White House, and he didn’t intend for that opening to disappear.
Hoover and Wilson would form a long and productive relationship, and they would always be a curious pair. In some ways they were similar, both erudite and sons of ministers. Both were ambitious, hungry for power, tireless in its pursuit, and difficult to get to know. But they had stark differences, such as Hoover was “West Coast” and Wilson was “East Coast”. Hoover was in the real world of mining while Wilson had lived in the Ivory Tower of academia. However, a strange sort of harmony resulted between the two nonetheless. The largest impediment between the two men was Hoover’s reluctance to buy into Wilson’s idealism. Hoover admired ideals, but he thought they only took one so far, and the that person needed to deal with the reality of achieving the ideal. To Hoover, it mattered HOW things were done.
Like many idealists, Wilson lacked the temperament of an executive, preferring an academic approach; he admitted that he preferred to think, mull, and ponder rather than to act. To Hoover, that approach was a problem, even dangerous. Hoover believed that Wilson was “lost in the clouds” during the critical months towards the end of 1917 and the start of 1918.
Hoover and Wilson would form a long and productive relationship, and they would always be a curious pair. In some ways they were similar, both erudite and sons of ministers. Both were ambitious, hungry for power, tireless in its pursuit, and difficult to get to know. But they had stark differences, such as Hoover was “West Coast” and Wilson was “East Coast”. Hoover was in the real world of mining while Wilson had lived in the Ivory Tower of academia. However, a strange sort of harmony resulted between the two nonetheless. The largest impediment between the two men was Hoover’s reluctance to buy into Wilson’s idealism. Hoover admired ideals, but he thought they only took one so far, and the that person needed to deal with the reality of achieving the ideal. To Hoover, it mattered HOW things were done.
Like many idealists, Wilson lacked the temperament of an executive, preferring an academic approach; he admitted that he preferred to think, mull, and ponder rather than to act. To Hoover, that approach was a problem, even dangerous. Hoover believed that Wilson was “lost in the clouds” during the critical months towards the end of 1917 and the start of 1918.
To Hoover’s credit, he never showed his impatience with Wilson in public or in person, and he believed that Wilson fell into the “Great Man” category in spite of his idealism. The more likely it became that the US would go to war with Germany, the more Hoover needed Wilson for a future role in the President’s administration after the CRB. Hoover had a list of possible ventures in the future while he was heading the CRB (the President of Stanford University was one), but after becoming an international hero, Hoover adjusted his sights to high-profile public office . . . and he believed that becoming President was a possibility.
Audacity came easily to Hoover, and he had his key contacts let the Wilson administration know that he was available to serve his nation if America went to war. Hoover was in the US during January and February 1917, ostensibly for CRB fundraising, but really to insinuate himself into Wilson’s inner circle. On 1 February 1917, Hoover addressed the New York City Chamber of Commerce, pointing out that many US corporations were getting wealthy off of Europe’s woes in the Great War. Hoover argued that America’s “profits from misfortune” would only be justified if the nation ran point and assumed the burden towards the helpless in Europe. The argument for generosity for humanitarian reasons and for the protection of US economic interests would be made often by Hoover until his run at the CRB was over.
After his speech, Hoover didn’t have to wait long to hear from Colonel House, who wanted Hoover to write a memo on the logistical and economic challenges facing the US in a war in Europe. Hoover wasted no time writing the memo, where he argued that sending the Allies more food, ships, and money would make a greater impact than sending troops, while also arguing that the British blockade needed to become more restrictive (except, of course, towards the CRB). Hoover suggested that an appointee of Cabinet rank be placed in Europe to run the US war effort on Wilson’s behalf; Hoover made it clear that he was just the man for that exalted position.
Audacity came easily to Hoover, and he had his key contacts let the Wilson administration know that he was available to serve his nation if America went to war. Hoover was in the US during January and February 1917, ostensibly for CRB fundraising, but really to insinuate himself into Wilson’s inner circle. On 1 February 1917, Hoover addressed the New York City Chamber of Commerce, pointing out that many US corporations were getting wealthy off of Europe’s woes in the Great War. Hoover argued that America’s “profits from misfortune” would only be justified if the nation ran point and assumed the burden towards the helpless in Europe. The argument for generosity for humanitarian reasons and for the protection of US economic interests would be made often by Hoover until his run at the CRB was over.
After his speech, Hoover didn’t have to wait long to hear from Colonel House, who wanted Hoover to write a memo on the logistical and economic challenges facing the US in a war in Europe. Hoover wasted no time writing the memo, where he argued that sending the Allies more food, ships, and money would make a greater impact than sending troops, while also arguing that the British blockade needed to become more restrictive (except, of course, towards the CRB). Hoover suggested that an appointee of Cabinet rank be placed in Europe to run the US war effort on Wilson’s behalf; Hoover made it clear that he was just the man for that exalted position.
Colonel House sent the memo to Wilson, and four days later Hoover was summoned to the White House to meet with the President in private. Hoover left that meeting convinced that the US would enter the war, and that he would be Wilson’s “Food Guy” in the US during the war. Within days after Wilson asked Congress to declare war on Germany on 2 April 1917, Hoover was informed by Ambassador Page that he was needed back in the US to be in charge of the nation’s food supplies. Hoover soon discovered that the position was only part of the Council of National Defense, with no real power. Hoover took on the post with the intention of making it something more, much more.
Wholesale food prices in the US jumped 21% in early-1917, showing that even neutral nations could have a food panic; protests occurred in the US over food prices and shortages. Hoover believed that the first duty of the US as a belligerent was to supply its own soldiers and the Allies with food, and he in effect declared a food emergency to the press. Hoover then started to strategize how to achieve the goal of feeding allied nations in Europe during the Great War. Hoover’s business experiences had left him with the preference for centralized control, and he even advised Wilson that a de facto dictatorship in some areas of the war effort would be advisable, such as food production and transportation.
However, Hoover knew that he had to balance that centralized power with traditional democratic ideals in order to gain public support, planning on using public opinion to create the required framework. If he could convince Americans to consume less and to reduce waste, and to produce and export more food, then prices would remain stable. Hoover believed that centralizing power in the government could go too far, and should only be used in extreme circumstances. Hoover saw his plan for mobilizing the nation for sending food over to Europe as the same as Wilson’s decision for mobilizing and sending troops across the Atlantic.
Wholesale food prices in the US jumped 21% in early-1917, showing that even neutral nations could have a food panic; protests occurred in the US over food prices and shortages. Hoover believed that the first duty of the US as a belligerent was to supply its own soldiers and the Allies with food, and he in effect declared a food emergency to the press. Hoover then started to strategize how to achieve the goal of feeding allied nations in Europe during the Great War. Hoover’s business experiences had left him with the preference for centralized control, and he even advised Wilson that a de facto dictatorship in some areas of the war effort would be advisable, such as food production and transportation.
However, Hoover knew that he had to balance that centralized power with traditional democratic ideals in order to gain public support, planning on using public opinion to create the required framework. If he could convince Americans to consume less and to reduce waste, and to produce and export more food, then prices would remain stable. Hoover believed that centralizing power in the government could go too far, and should only be used in extreme circumstances. Hoover saw his plan for mobilizing the nation for sending food over to Europe as the same as Wilson’s decision for mobilizing and sending troops across the Atlantic.
On 3 May 1917, Hoover arrived in NYC, and a quick scan of the newspapers indicated to Hoover that he was lucky to be alive, since the Germans were sinking 10 ships a day on the Atlantic crossing. Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels admitted that the German U-Boats were far more destructive than originally believed. Also on that day, Hoover discovered that Wilson had asked Congress for the authority to regulate food and other essentials for the duration of the war. The vast expansion of the powers of the Executive Branch was reflected with the passage of the Food and Fuel Control Act (a.k.a. the Lever Act). Wilson had a free hand to fix prices, seize factories, ban inefficient practices, regulate exchanges, control railroads, and to ensure food supplies at fair prices. There was rampant speculation that Wilson would delegate most of those powers to Hoover, who would be the nation’s “Food Dictator”. In reality, Hoover was only a committee chair and advisor.
Hoover met with Colonel House with the hopes of being handed the reins, and House easily saw through Hoover’s “reluctance” to serve. House saw the potential clash between Hoover and SecAg David Houston, but he saw far more positives in Hoover. House advised Wilson that Hoover would inspire confidence in the US and Europe and do exceedingly well, but he also stated that unless SecAg Houston gave Hoover full control and authority, Hoover would not take the position While he waited to hear from Wilson, Hoover lobbied his contacts and connections, and he appeared before two Congressional agricultural committees.
Hoover met with Colonel House with the hopes of being handed the reins, and House easily saw through Hoover’s “reluctance” to serve. House saw the potential clash between Hoover and SecAg David Houston, but he saw far more positives in Hoover. House advised Wilson that Hoover would inspire confidence in the US and Europe and do exceedingly well, but he also stated that unless SecAg Houston gave Hoover full control and authority, Hoover would not take the position While he waited to hear from Wilson, Hoover lobbied his contacts and connections, and he appeared before two Congressional agricultural committees.
On 9 May 1917, Hoover met with Wilson, and the President was not in favor of a “Food Dictator”. Instead, Wilson proposed the formation of a Food Board, where Hoover would be the chair. Hoover protested that committees were inherently inefficient and indecisive, and that the word “dictator” was too negative a title, and that maybe “administrator” would suffice. Wilson ended the meeting without making a decision. Afterwards, Hoover informed the press that he had no intention of becoming the “Food Dictator”, and that he didn’t want public office, and that the CRB was a situation that had been forced upon him. When Wilson read the newspapers that featured Hoover’s sanctimony, he was probably at least a little bit irritated. SecNav Daniels told SegAct Houston to be prepared for the inevitable Hoover appointment, saying that only Hoover would have the cache and humanitarian credentials to get Americans to sacrifice. Hoover had made it very clear that he was prepared to walk away if his demands of centralized control were not met.
On 13 May 1917, Hoover was invited back to the White House, where Wilson in essence told Hoover that he was getting his wish; Hoover felt secure enough to rent a house in DC. Within a week, Wilson announced that Hoover would head the Food Board, and that the last three years had shown the necessity of placing one man in charge in order to deal with the challenges posed by Imperial Germany. While Hoover had cleared the “Wilson Hurdle”, he now needed to clear the “Congressional Hurdle”, in that his appointment under the Lever Act required confirmation.
On 13 May 1917, Hoover was invited back to the White House, where Wilson in essence told Hoover that he was getting his wish; Hoover felt secure enough to rent a house in DC. Within a week, Wilson announced that Hoover would head the Food Board, and that the last three years had shown the necessity of placing one man in charge in order to deal with the challenges posed by Imperial Germany. While Hoover had cleared the “Wilson Hurdle”, he now needed to clear the “Congressional Hurdle”, in that his appointment under the Lever Act required confirmation.