Hoover deserved the acclaim he received in Europe, with the Doughboys, Allies, and US citizens fed. Agricultural production in the US was increased without using quotas, millions of Americans conserved enough food so there wasn’t any need for rationing, inflation was kept under control, and Hoover was able to return the $10m outlay to the US Treasury. However, the degree of volunteerism that Hoover envisioned was not reached; for example, only 50% of US housewives signed pledge cards. Hoover’s incentives in the pork market resulted in a billion pounds of surplus pork, and consumers cleared the shelves of sugar wherever it was sold. Hoover issued 800+ penalties and closed down over 150 businesses for violations of the Food Administration code, and by 1918 he had become the watchdog of prices in grocery stores.
Politically, Hoover left more bruises in DC than was necessary, standing out the most among the leading figures in Wilson’s high-minded administration. The US military, Congress, and the Cabinet felt that Hoover had been too rough with them, and he was very fortunate to not have alienated President Wilson. During 1917 in the US, there were 4450 labor strikes in the same wartime economic climate in which Hoover had to deal with a disgruntled agricultural sector. But overall, Hoover nailed his mission, taking an awful job with an unprecedented mandate in a climate of fear and panic, and with dire consequences if the whole smash failed. By 1918, Hoover became an inspiring leader to millions of Americans.
Politically, Hoover left more bruises in DC than was necessary, standing out the most among the leading figures in Wilson’s high-minded administration. The US military, Congress, and the Cabinet felt that Hoover had been too rough with them, and he was very fortunate to not have alienated President Wilson. During 1917 in the US, there were 4450 labor strikes in the same wartime economic climate in which Hoover had to deal with a disgruntled agricultural sector. But overall, Hoover nailed his mission, taking an awful job with an unprecedented mandate in a climate of fear and panic, and with dire consequences if the whole smash failed. By 1918, Hoover became an inspiring leader to millions of Americans.
Commerce and transportation were at a standstill in Europe, and there was rampant unemployment and destruction, food supplies were dangerously low, and nations were unable to pay for imports. It was estimated that at least 400 million people faced starvation after the Great War in Europe. President Wilson anticipated that chaos, and he told Hoover that he was again going to Europe. Hoover told Wilson that he didn’t want the job, but once he returned to Paris in December 1918, he did his best to concentrate his authority and power as the “food dictator of the world”, according to the British Prime Minister David Lloyd George. Both Hoover and Colonel House thought it would be best for Wilson to remain in DC and exert his moral authority from afar, but the
President insisted on being the savior, and he swept into Paris as the leader of the US delegation. Wilson’s ignorance of Europe was absolutely astounding, and the President was aware enough of that shortcoming that he made sure that Hoover was available when needed.
Hoover formalized his position in January 1919 by drafting for Wilson a post facto Executive Order that created the American Relief Administration (ARA), where he was authorized to feed Europe by any means that he believed was necessary. Hoover kept all of his US titles, and added others in Europe, such as the Chair of the European Coal Council. The ARA held sway over the 60+ commissions that were involved in the rebuilding of Europe - in effect, Hoover was the virtual ruler of the European economies. The actual delivery of relief was ingeniously improvised, and only Hoover, with his knowledge of Europe, his humanitarian experience, and his ability to see the “Big Picture” while also addressing the details made the relief effort look far easier than it was.
President insisted on being the savior, and he swept into Paris as the leader of the US delegation. Wilson’s ignorance of Europe was absolutely astounding, and the President was aware enough of that shortcoming that he made sure that Hoover was available when needed.
Hoover formalized his position in January 1919 by drafting for Wilson a post facto Executive Order that created the American Relief Administration (ARA), where he was authorized to feed Europe by any means that he believed was necessary. Hoover kept all of his US titles, and added others in Europe, such as the Chair of the European Coal Council. The ARA held sway over the 60+ commissions that were involved in the rebuilding of Europe - in effect, Hoover was the virtual ruler of the European economies. The actual delivery of relief was ingeniously improvised, and only Hoover, with his knowledge of Europe, his humanitarian experience, and his ability to see the “Big Picture” while also addressing the details made the relief effort look far easier than it was.
Hoover extended the tours of thousands of US Army officers, making the ARA agents in 32 nations. Hoover had the US Navy and Signal Corps create a far improved wireless communications system, and he rebuilt ports, canals, bridges,and railroads, and the ARA was the only entity that was able to arrange shipping between nations. Where currency was scarce, Hoover bartered for what was needed. In the process of all those challenges and achievements, Hoover gathered more intelligence concerning post-Great War Europe than any other individual, and what he didn’t learn by wire he found out in person, since many people personally visited Hoover to voice their concerns and problems. Hoover wrote down what he could on menus and napkins to have some record of what he learned so he could write it down for later reference. Hoover’s up-to-the-minute reports made him the main expert in Paris, and he was very often called to appear at various councils, commissions, and committees to impart his expertise.
Information was power, and Hoover used his knowledge and expertise as a lever to advance US interests in Europe; in that regard, Hoover was in step with Wilson’s idealistic goals at Versailles, seeing that it was America’s chance to correct centuries of tyranny and inequality in Europe. Hoover had two additional practical reasons for shipping food to Central Europe. First, Hoover envisioned US capitalists coming in to share in the profits of rebuilding Europe, benefiting from the rebuilt economies running full tilt. Both Hoover and Wilson believed that US prosperity was aligned with humanitarian and economic aid in Europe. Secondly, Hoover was desperate to unload huge surpluses of food in the US. Britain and France had backed out of contracts to purchase food after the Armistice (11 November 1918), and Hoover had an enormous surplus of meat and grain to distribute. Hoover needed to find a way through the still-active British blockade to unload his massive surplus of food in Austria and Germany, or suffer the wrath of US agriculture, who had expanded production at Hoover’s insistence.
Information was power, and Hoover used his knowledge and expertise as a lever to advance US interests in Europe; in that regard, Hoover was in step with Wilson’s idealistic goals at Versailles, seeing that it was America’s chance to correct centuries of tyranny and inequality in Europe. Hoover had two additional practical reasons for shipping food to Central Europe. First, Hoover envisioned US capitalists coming in to share in the profits of rebuilding Europe, benefiting from the rebuilt economies running full tilt. Both Hoover and Wilson believed that US prosperity was aligned with humanitarian and economic aid in Europe. Secondly, Hoover was desperate to unload huge surpluses of food in the US. Britain and France had backed out of contracts to purchase food after the Armistice (11 November 1918), and Hoover had an enormous surplus of meat and grain to distribute. Hoover needed to find a way through the still-active British blockade to unload his massive surplus of food in Austria and Germany, or suffer the wrath of US agriculture, who had expanded production at Hoover’s insistence.
At Versailles, Britain and France were in “punishment mode” , refusing to remove the blockade while the peace talks took place. Britain and France believed that the food would flow after Germany signed the Treaty of Versailles, taking full blame for the Great War and agreeing to pay massive reparations to the Allies. Also working against Hoover was that a majority of US citizens wanted Germany to suffer for the 120,000+ American casualties (KIA + WIA) in the Great War. The overall feeling was to make Germany pay for the nightmare of the Great War, which ran counter to what Wilson was trying to achieve at Versailles. Congress specifically prohibited the ARA from using any of the $100m in authorized funds to assist enemy nations, but Hoover kept working, undeterred by the opposition in Europe and the US.
Hoover used a series of moves so byzantine that it was hard for outsiders to see what he was really doing; 42% of the 1.7 million tons of food delivered to the ARA found its way to the former German and Austro-Hungarian Empires. Hoover was aware he was operating at least partly in violation of US, British, and French laws, but he also knew he was doing so for humanitarian reasons. Hoover wondered what Britain and France were thinking in terms of the harsh reparations, in that there was no way for Germany to pay the money if the nation was so destitute and desperate. While Wilson publicly supported Hoover, he still felt exposed, in that those that criticized Hoover focused on his manner for more than his methods. House wrote in his diary that Hoover preferred to dictate rather than collaborate, but House also wrote that the more he dealt with Hoover, the more he liked him.
On 7 May 1919 at 4 am, Hoover was awakened, in that the first draft of the Treaty of Versailles had been delivered, and it was to be presented to the Germans in a few days. Hoover’s heart sank when he read the drafted treaty, believing that the document plainly invited another war. When Hoover met with Wilson, he pointed out that Germany in no way would be able to pay the massive reparations outlined in the treaty without first recovering industrially and economically. Hoover didn’t want to antagonize Wilson, since their points-of-view concerning changing Europe for the better aligned, and he also supported Wilson’s proposed League of Nations. However, Hoover still spoke forcefully in his meetings with Wilson, airing his objections to the initial draft of the Treaty of Versailles. Wilson was not in a receptive mood for Hoover’s objections, in large part due to his health, as well as the sheer volume of unsolvable issues that had worn down the President. Wilson at times became very irritated with Hoover, and as a result he was no longer in Wilson’s inner circle, ostracized more-or-less in the same manner as Colonel House.
Hoover used a series of moves so byzantine that it was hard for outsiders to see what he was really doing; 42% of the 1.7 million tons of food delivered to the ARA found its way to the former German and Austro-Hungarian Empires. Hoover was aware he was operating at least partly in violation of US, British, and French laws, but he also knew he was doing so for humanitarian reasons. Hoover wondered what Britain and France were thinking in terms of the harsh reparations, in that there was no way for Germany to pay the money if the nation was so destitute and desperate. While Wilson publicly supported Hoover, he still felt exposed, in that those that criticized Hoover focused on his manner for more than his methods. House wrote in his diary that Hoover preferred to dictate rather than collaborate, but House also wrote that the more he dealt with Hoover, the more he liked him.
On 7 May 1919 at 4 am, Hoover was awakened, in that the first draft of the Treaty of Versailles had been delivered, and it was to be presented to the Germans in a few days. Hoover’s heart sank when he read the drafted treaty, believing that the document plainly invited another war. When Hoover met with Wilson, he pointed out that Germany in no way would be able to pay the massive reparations outlined in the treaty without first recovering industrially and economically. Hoover didn’t want to antagonize Wilson, since their points-of-view concerning changing Europe for the better aligned, and he also supported Wilson’s proposed League of Nations. However, Hoover still spoke forcefully in his meetings with Wilson, airing his objections to the initial draft of the Treaty of Versailles. Wilson was not in a receptive mood for Hoover’s objections, in large part due to his health, as well as the sheer volume of unsolvable issues that had worn down the President. Wilson at times became very irritated with Hoover, and as a result he was no longer in Wilson’s inner circle, ostracized more-or-less in the same manner as Colonel House.
On 28 June 1919, Hoover was in the Hall of Mirrors to witness Germany signing the Treaty of Versailles, and amid the celebrations afterwards among the Allies, Hoover was not happy. Those that knew Hoover kept telling him that he was too pessimistic, where Hoover responded by saying just wait five or so years from now and see what happens. Hoover remained in Paris during the Summer of 1919, working tirelessly to wrap up ARA business while venting his feelings and forebodings to Colonel House. The official mandate of the ARA expired on 1 July 1919; the ARA had distributed $1.1 billion in food in Europe. After that date, Hoover was able to focus more on the desperate children in Europe, obtaining Wilson’s permission to use the ARA surplus to endow the European Children's Fund as a new private charity. Over the next five years, 15 million children in horrible living conditions were provided food, clothing, and medicine.
Hoover’s final split with Wilson occurred over the League of Nations charter. Wilson was determined to ram the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations through the Senate with no amendments or reservations. Most objections in the Senate centered around Article X in the treaty, which binded member nations to come to the aid of other member nations when attacked; that article was not received well in mostly-Isolationist America. Wilson simply refused to compromise with the Senate, which led to the treaty being held hostage in the Foreign Relations Committee by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge (R; MA). Wilson decided to “go over the heads of the Senate down to the American people”, and he hit the hustings to campaign for the Treaty and the League in September 1919.
Hoover knew the only way to get the constitutionally-required two-thirds majority in the Senate to ratify the Treaty of Versailles was to cut a deal concerning Article X. Hoover wrote to Wilson that the proposed reservations were reasonable and urged the President to accept them. Hoover received no response from Wilson, and he would never again hear from him. John Maynard Keynes, the British economist who had been in Paris during the lengthy peace conference, shared Hoover’s pessimism about the Treaty of Versailles, wrote glowingly of Hoover, saying that only Hoover emerged from Paris with an enhanced reputation. Keynes’ view of Hoover was widely shared in Europe; a leading Austrian newspaper commented that it should have been Hoover, not Wilson, that received the Nobel Peace Prize for 1919. Hoover took great pains to keep all the relevant documents from his humanitarian efforts in the CRB and the ARA for posterity, but he would be remembered in the US mostly for the new career he would start on his return to America during the Fall of 1919 . . .
Hoover’s final split with Wilson occurred over the League of Nations charter. Wilson was determined to ram the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations through the Senate with no amendments or reservations. Most objections in the Senate centered around Article X in the treaty, which binded member nations to come to the aid of other member nations when attacked; that article was not received well in mostly-Isolationist America. Wilson simply refused to compromise with the Senate, which led to the treaty being held hostage in the Foreign Relations Committee by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge (R; MA). Wilson decided to “go over the heads of the Senate down to the American people”, and he hit the hustings to campaign for the Treaty and the League in September 1919.
Hoover knew the only way to get the constitutionally-required two-thirds majority in the Senate to ratify the Treaty of Versailles was to cut a deal concerning Article X. Hoover wrote to Wilson that the proposed reservations were reasonable and urged the President to accept them. Hoover received no response from Wilson, and he would never again hear from him. John Maynard Keynes, the British economist who had been in Paris during the lengthy peace conference, shared Hoover’s pessimism about the Treaty of Versailles, wrote glowingly of Hoover, saying that only Hoover emerged from Paris with an enhanced reputation. Keynes’ view of Hoover was widely shared in Europe; a leading Austrian newspaper commented that it should have been Hoover, not Wilson, that received the Nobel Peace Prize for 1919. Hoover took great pains to keep all the relevant documents from his humanitarian efforts in the CRB and the ARA for posterity, but he would be remembered in the US mostly for the new career he would start on his return to America during the Fall of 1919 . . .