Source: Stuart E. Eizenstat. President Carter - The White House Years (2018)
Carter did have some allies in Congress, the “Watergate Babies”, those that had been elected to “clean things up” in Washington, D.C. Carter also reached out to fiscally-conservative Republicans, and with the “Watergate Babies”, Carter needed at least 144 votes in the House to sustain a veto on the $10 billion public works bill, of which water projects were a small part. Carter wound up with 194 votes in the House, but his joy would quickly turn to sorrow based on the inexperienced President making yet another rookie mistake.
The Senate watered down their public works bill in order to line it up better for the Conference Committee. The Senate had actually come halfway to Carter, and the President had veto-proof in the House . . . so of course the rookie President found a path that led to disaster based on his inexperience and his idiosyncratic way of making decisions early in his Presidency. Carter threw away all his support with a three minute phone call with the Speaker of the House, Tip O’Neill (D; MA) on 15 July 1977, where he formed a compromise with the Speaker without consulting any member of his administration or those in Congress that supported him. The deal with O’Neill was that if the Speaker stopped spending on several targeted water projects in a year, Carter would not veto the public works bill.
The Senate watered down their public works bill in order to line it up better for the Conference Committee. The Senate had actually come halfway to Carter, and the President had veto-proof in the House . . . so of course the rookie President found a path that led to disaster based on his inexperience and his idiosyncratic way of making decisions early in his Presidency. Carter threw away all his support with a three minute phone call with the Speaker of the House, Tip O’Neill (D; MA) on 15 July 1977, where he formed a compromise with the Speaker without consulting any member of his administration or those in Congress that supported him. The deal with O’Neill was that if the Speaker stopped spending on several targeted water projects in a year, Carter would not veto the public works bill.
Carter had literally snatched defeat from the jaws of victory, and his allies in Congress felt that they had been sold out. As a result, the media and the public started to view Carter as a weak President that had caved under pressure from the Establishment. Those that had supported Carter in Congress had bucked the legislative system and had nothing to show for their risky efforts other than the enmity from the Old Guard.
In effect, Speaker O’Neill and Jim Wright (D; TX), the House Majority Leader, had played Carter for their benefit, correctly gambling that Carter wouldn’t see through their shenanigans. The result was the perception in Congress, the media, and the public was that Carter could be rolled in the face of pressure from Capitol Hill. Carter signed the public works bill into law on 7 August 1977, but the Water Wars would start up again in 1978, sucking even more precious political capital from President Carter.
In effect, Speaker O’Neill and Jim Wright (D; TX), the House Majority Leader, had played Carter for their benefit, correctly gambling that Carter wouldn’t see through their shenanigans. The result was the perception in Congress, the media, and the public was that Carter could be rolled in the face of pressure from Capitol Hill. Carter signed the public works bill into law on 7 August 1977, but the Water Wars would start up again in 1978, sucking even more precious political capital from President Carter.
Carter did not easily accept defeat, but nonetheless he learned lessons, yet he once again started out in an uncompromising stance when the Water Wars heated up again. But by then Carter had admitted that it had been a mistake to not veto the public works bill in 1977, and sure enough, Carter vetoed the 1978 public works bill. Although his veto was sustained, the bitterness from 1977 was still at the top of everyone’s mind. While Carter mishandled most everything in the Water Wars, especially in 1977, his vision proved right in the long run. President Ronald Reagan continued Carter’s approach but in a far more politically savvy and disarming way (which included dealing with the federal budget). Carter had accomplished much in the first half of his Presidency, but it came at great political cost, and it is that cost by which Carter is mostly remembered. During the scurrilous hoo-haw of the Water Wars, Carter also ended the Congressional practice of earmarking local projects that were immune from review, which was an positive unintended consequence.
Carter learned from his travails during the Water Wars, which could be seen by what he accomplished by negotiating, securing passage, and signing into law the Alaska National Interests Lands Conservation Act as a lame-duck President after losing the Election of 1980 to Ronald Reagan. That law has proven to be one of the most significant environmental laws in US History, and its scope was breathtaking: 157 million acres for national parks, national wildlife refuges (especially the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge), national monuments, as well as protecting rivers. The law was balanced legislation in that 95% of Alaska was opened up for unrestricted oil and gas exploration.
Alaska’s two US Senators, Ted Stevens (Republican) and Mike Grave (Democrat) were united against the bill which was proposed by Representative Morris Udall (D; AZ) to protect the natural “crown jewels” of Alaska. There was a deadline in that 45 million acres would be open for exploration in Alaska if Congress didn’t act to counter that eventuality by 18 December 1978. In Carter’s hip pocket was the Antiquities Act of 1906, which Theodore Roosevelt bypassed Congress in order to protect lands, and that law was still in effect.
Alaska’s two US Senators, Ted Stevens (Republican) and Mike Grave (Democrat) were united against the bill which was proposed by Representative Morris Udall (D; AZ) to protect the natural “crown jewels” of Alaska. There was a deadline in that 45 million acres would be open for exploration in Alaska if Congress didn’t act to counter that eventuality by 18 December 1978. In Carter’s hip pocket was the Antiquities Act of 1906, which Theodore Roosevelt bypassed Congress in order to protect lands, and that law was still in effect.
The Antiquities Act had been used over 100 times by previous Presidents to further protect such natural treasures as the Grand Canyon and the Grand Tetons, but the act had never been used to protect such a huge area of pristine territory. Carter issued a Formal Designation of Monuments before the deadline, which could only be canceled by a future President or Congress, which also bypassed the opposition from Alaska’s two US Senators.
Carter warned Congress that the designated land in Alaska would remain permanent monuments and would be off-limits for exploration/development unless Congress made some further provisions for the lands. In using the Antiquities Act of 1906, Carter had outflanked Congress. Carter was actually burned in effigy in Fairbanks (AK) and there was the Great Denali Trespass where Alaskans entered national parks and illegally fired guns and started campfires.
Carter warned Congress that the designated land in Alaska would remain permanent monuments and would be off-limits for exploration/development unless Congress made some further provisions for the lands. In using the Antiquities Act of 1906, Carter had outflanked Congress. Carter was actually burned in effigy in Fairbanks (AK) and there was the Great Denali Trespass where Alaskans entered national parks and illegally fired guns and started campfires.
In didn’t take Senator Stevens too long to conclude that any further opposition would be politically harmful to him, in that he needed, for Alaska’s benefit and his, to get rid of the draconian limits imposed by Carter’s monuments declaration. Carter, ever the micro-manager, was very involved in the negotiations/discussions, even while he worked to free the American hostages in Iran; Carter was focused on protecting Alaskan lands before he left the Presidency.
The final deal also protected the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge from development unless the President and both houses of Congress allowed it. Carter elevated the environmental movement to a high political level where it has remained, and despite his political missteps early in his Presidency, he had done more than any other President to put the US on a course to protect in precious natural heritage.
The final deal also protected the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge from development unless the President and both houses of Congress allowed it. Carter elevated the environmental movement to a high political level where it has remained, and despite his political missteps early in his Presidency, he had done more than any other President to put the US on a course to protect in precious natural heritage.