Source: Garrett M. Graff. Watergate - A New History (2022)
Jaworski asked the Supreme Court to immediately review the legality of his subpoena to Nixon, since the Court’s summer recess was coming up soon, and he didn’t want to wait for the normal process to play out. The last time the Supreme Court agreed to a similar request was during the Korean War, and the Court took their normal decision-making process before their ruling. Jaworski knew the risk he was taking, in that if the Supreme Court refused to act, it could well delay Watergate well into 1975. St. Clair, of course, wanted the normal appeals process to occur. Jaworski’s office delivered its
Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court, and the justices only took one day to approve their direct review. With his legal maneuver approved by the Court, Jaworski succeeded in reducing the President from an “office” to a “man”. The Court’s decision also transformed the battle over the tapes from Nixon vs. Sirica to the United States vs. Richard Nixon.
On 14 May 1974, VP Ford was told by the Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D; MT) that it was a 50-50 proposition that the Senate would hold a trial on whether or not to remove Nixon as President. Some junior staffers in the White House started to secretly plan for the transition from Nixon to Ford, vowing to keep it a secret, from Ford in particular. During the House Judiciary Committee’s impeachment hearings, which lasted ten weeks, the Watergate Scandal was being told as a single story, courtesy of the incredibly impressive preparations by Doar and his team. Doar made sure to tie in other scandals (e.g. the ITT controversy) into a sweeping indictment of Nixon’s abuse of power as President.
Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court, and the justices only took one day to approve their direct review. With his legal maneuver approved by the Court, Jaworski succeeded in reducing the President from an “office” to a “man”. The Court’s decision also transformed the battle over the tapes from Nixon vs. Sirica to the United States vs. Richard Nixon.
On 14 May 1974, VP Ford was told by the Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D; MT) that it was a 50-50 proposition that the Senate would hold a trial on whether or not to remove Nixon as President. Some junior staffers in the White House started to secretly plan for the transition from Nixon to Ford, vowing to keep it a secret, from Ford in particular. During the House Judiciary Committee’s impeachment hearings, which lasted ten weeks, the Watergate Scandal was being told as a single story, courtesy of the incredibly impressive preparations by Doar and his team. Doar made sure to tie in other scandals (e.g. the ITT controversy) into a sweeping indictment of Nixon’s abuse of power as President.
To the House Judiciary Committee, two elements of Doar’s narrative of Watergate were very troubling. First was Nixon’s blatant misuse of national security as a shield against actions that had nothing to do with national security. Secondly, they were disturbed by the indifference Nixon and his inner circle showed to the illegality of their actions, not caring about right and wrong. It would prove to be Nixon’s indifference to the illegality that would be particularly problematic for Nixon in his role as President under the Constitution.
By early-June 1974, St. Clair was in an impossible situation, being a lawyer in an increasingly weakening defense against Nixon, a very irritated judiciary tired of delays, and a very difficult client. On 3 June 1974, Charles Colson surprised everyone when he pleaded guilty. Colson had negotiated a plea deal with Jaworski after going through what he described as a religious awakening. Colson said his conscience now bothered him concerning his actions on behalf of the White House with Watergate. That being said, Colson insisted that he was not guilty of the conspiracy indictment he was under, agreeing instead to obstruction of justice by interfering with the Ellsberg trial.
On 5 June 1974, the Los Angeles Times broke the story that Nixon had been named an unindicted co-conspirator by the grand jury, and all the major newspapers featured that scoop. The House Judiciary Committee was taken by surprise with the news, since Doar hadn’t yet told the committee what he knew. Within a day, St. Clair admitted that the story was true; public knowledge of Nixon’s new status as an unindicted co-conspirator put him in a much weaker position in terms of hanging on to the tapes. Nixon’s brave statements and public resilience belied not only his lonely paralysis, but also that of the White House. In effect, Nixon had stopped working as President, with Chief of Staff Alexander Haig doing the heavy lifting so the Executive Branch functioned.
By early-June 1974, St. Clair was in an impossible situation, being a lawyer in an increasingly weakening defense against Nixon, a very irritated judiciary tired of delays, and a very difficult client. On 3 June 1974, Charles Colson surprised everyone when he pleaded guilty. Colson had negotiated a plea deal with Jaworski after going through what he described as a religious awakening. Colson said his conscience now bothered him concerning his actions on behalf of the White House with Watergate. That being said, Colson insisted that he was not guilty of the conspiracy indictment he was under, agreeing instead to obstruction of justice by interfering with the Ellsberg trial.
On 5 June 1974, the Los Angeles Times broke the story that Nixon had been named an unindicted co-conspirator by the grand jury, and all the major newspapers featured that scoop. The House Judiciary Committee was taken by surprise with the news, since Doar hadn’t yet told the committee what he knew. Within a day, St. Clair admitted that the story was true; public knowledge of Nixon’s new status as an unindicted co-conspirator put him in a much weaker position in terms of hanging on to the tapes. Nixon’s brave statements and public resilience belied not only his lonely paralysis, but also that of the White House. In effect, Nixon had stopped working as President, with Chief of Staff Alexander Haig doing the heavy lifting so the Executive Branch functioned.
On 10 June 1974, Nixon went on a 15k mile trip to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan, and Israel. At his first top in Australia, Nixon complained of an inflamed leg, but he refused to stop his trip. Nixon preferred an honorable death abroad over a slow political death at home. It was almost as if Nixon had a death wish, since he almost entirely ignored his doctor’s orders and walked/stood on his painful leg far too long. Three days after returning to DC, Nixon left for Belgium, and then for the USSR for a summit with Brezhnev. On 25 June 1974, Nixon flew back to the US on Air Force One with his leg elevated, experiencing crushing pain.
While Nixon was overseas, Woodward and Bernstein’s book All the President’s Men became a national sensation, spending 15 weeks on the best-seller lists. Their book told the Watergate saga from their roles as investigative reporters at the expense of all others that investigated. For example, Special Agent Angelo Lano’s name was not mentioned at all in the book. Woodward and Bernstein became wealthy beyond their imaginations, receiving $1m in paperback sales, $30k for excerpts of the book in Playboy magazine, $100k from the Book of the Month Club, and $450k selling the movie rights to Robert Redford. Their book also served as a guide for the Watergate Scandal as the whole affair was reaching its climax in the Summer of 1974.
It was an excerpt in Playboy that was the nation's first look at the book, and in that excerpt Woodward mentioned his secret source, “Deep Throat”. Woodward wanted to identify Mark Felt as “Deep Throat” in the book, but Felt angrily refused, telling Woodward to never again contact him. The revelation of “Deep Throat” in Playboy, and then in the book, astounded and fascinated readers, and immediately started the fevered speculation of who that secret source was. Among those speculated to be Woodward’s secret source were Haig, Buchanan, Dean, Gray, and lesser profile figures such as Diane Sawyer. Ironically, Felt was on the initial short list of possibilities, but was just as quickly discounted. All the President’s Men also set off long-running questions of how accurate a retelling it actually was concerning Watergate.
While Nixon was overseas, Woodward and Bernstein’s book All the President’s Men became a national sensation, spending 15 weeks on the best-seller lists. Their book told the Watergate saga from their roles as investigative reporters at the expense of all others that investigated. For example, Special Agent Angelo Lano’s name was not mentioned at all in the book. Woodward and Bernstein became wealthy beyond their imaginations, receiving $1m in paperback sales, $30k for excerpts of the book in Playboy magazine, $100k from the Book of the Month Club, and $450k selling the movie rights to Robert Redford. Their book also served as a guide for the Watergate Scandal as the whole affair was reaching its climax in the Summer of 1974.
It was an excerpt in Playboy that was the nation's first look at the book, and in that excerpt Woodward mentioned his secret source, “Deep Throat”. Woodward wanted to identify Mark Felt as “Deep Throat” in the book, but Felt angrily refused, telling Woodward to never again contact him. The revelation of “Deep Throat” in Playboy, and then in the book, astounded and fascinated readers, and immediately started the fevered speculation of who that secret source was. Among those speculated to be Woodward’s secret source were Haig, Buchanan, Dean, Gray, and lesser profile figures such as Diane Sawyer. Ironically, Felt was on the initial short list of possibilities, but was just as quickly discounted. All the President’s Men also set off long-running questions of how accurate a retelling it actually was concerning Watergate.
The book was not the only damaging account of Nixon’s activities that was published that month. The Watergate Committee released its 1094 page report which outlined in exhaustive detail the schemes of Nixon’s White House, but stopped short of assigning responsibility to Nixon. Many other official and literary accounts were out there as well, but there was as of yet no “Smoking Gun” that directly tied Nixon to Watergate.
On 24 June 1974, the House Judiciary Committee wrapped up the first phase of its hearings, and Rodino sensed that there were enough votes to recommend impeachment. The committee first voted to publicly release its evidence before its final vote, wanting to clue-in the American people of what they had uncovered. The House Judiciary Committee had just completed its draft on the articles of impeachment when Nixon returned from his summit with Brehznev.
On 2 July 1974, Rodino’s committee heard its first witness in its impeachment hearings, with Alexander Butterfield testifying for ten hours. Butterfield answered questions from Doar and his team, as well as from St. Claire. Butterfield’s testimony reinforced the notion that Nixon was too much of a control freak to now know what was going on with Watergate.
On 24 June 1974, the House Judiciary Committee wrapped up the first phase of its hearings, and Rodino sensed that there were enough votes to recommend impeachment. The committee first voted to publicly release its evidence before its final vote, wanting to clue-in the American people of what they had uncovered. The House Judiciary Committee had just completed its draft on the articles of impeachment when Nixon returned from his summit with Brehznev.
On 2 July 1974, Rodino’s committee heard its first witness in its impeachment hearings, with Alexander Butterfield testifying for ten hours. Butterfield answered questions from Doar and his team, as well as from St. Claire. Butterfield’s testimony reinforced the notion that Nixon was too much of a control freak to now know what was going on with Watergate.
Oral arguments in the Supreme Court over Jaworski’s subpoena for the 64 tapes from the White House started on 8 July 1974, with nine very inquisitive justices interrupting and asking questions of both Jaworski and St. Clair. On 9 July 1974, Rodino’s committee released its 131 page line-by-line comparison between the tapes and Nixon’s printed edited transcripts of the tapes, revealing a mountain of discrepancies, among them a total omission of the 22 March 1973 conversation between Nixon, Haldeman, Mitchell, Ehrlichman, and Dean, where Nixon ordered them to continue their efforts to stonewall all-things Watergate. Doar and his team released a far more lengthy and detailed account of evidence, and what he succeeded in doing was to further frustrate the public, in that millions of words concerning Watergate were in his report, but not a single sentence existed that explained the significance of their findings.
After the 4 July 1974 break, Dean took the stand during the House Judiciary Committee’s impeachment hearings, answering questions from St. Clair. To Nixon, this was the chance to publicly crush Dean, but St. Clair’s cross-examination of Dean crashed-and-burned, with Dean constantly correcting St. Clair on timelines and facts. When his time was up, St. Clair knew he had failed with Dean, and that it was now a near-certainty that Rodino’s committee would vote to recommend an impeachment vote in the House. Even more troubling for Nixon was that after St. Clair’s cross with Dean, a few Republicans on the committee were now very serious in wanting to know more about Nixon’s culpability.
On 12 July 1974, as Nixon was flying to San Clemente for two weeks, Ehrlichman was found guilty of four of five charges for the break-in at Dr. Fielding’s office to steal Ellsberg’s files, with Liddy, Barker, and Martinez also convicted. Doar’s final presentation for the House Judiciary Committee concerning impeachment was only days away, but he couldn’t shake the sense that he was still missing something important.
After the 4 July 1974 break, Dean took the stand during the House Judiciary Committee’s impeachment hearings, answering questions from St. Clair. To Nixon, this was the chance to publicly crush Dean, but St. Clair’s cross-examination of Dean crashed-and-burned, with Dean constantly correcting St. Clair on timelines and facts. When his time was up, St. Clair knew he had failed with Dean, and that it was now a near-certainty that Rodino’s committee would vote to recommend an impeachment vote in the House. Even more troubling for Nixon was that after St. Clair’s cross with Dean, a few Republicans on the committee were now very serious in wanting to know more about Nixon’s culpability.
On 12 July 1974, as Nixon was flying to San Clemente for two weeks, Ehrlichman was found guilty of four of five charges for the break-in at Dr. Fielding’s office to steal Ellsberg’s files, with Liddy, Barker, and Martinez also convicted. Doar’s final presentation for the House Judiciary Committee concerning impeachment was only days away, but he couldn’t shake the sense that he was still missing something important.
Doar re-checked his color index cards from 17 - 20 June 1972, the week of the Watergate break-in. Doar finally spotted something that seemed very peculiar, in that in the Presidential Daily Diary for 20 June 1972, Nixon’s first day back in DC from Key Biscayne and after the break-in, he met with Butterfield for three minutes, leaving at 9:04 am, and then . . . nothing. It appeared on the color index cards that Nixon sat by himself in the Oval Office for 76 minutes with no one entering or leaving, and no phone calls coming in or out.
Doar called in his assistants to help figure out what had gone on during those 76 minutes. With the color cards all laid out with multiple sets of eyes, they pieced together what they needed. While Nixon sat alone in the Oval Office, Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Mitchell had gone upstairs to talk, soon to be joined by Dean and Kleindienst. Then, according to the Presidential Diary, when that meeting ended, Nixon walked across to his hideaway office in the EOB, where he met alone with Ehrlichman from 10:25 - 11:20 am. Then just minutes later, Nixon met with Haldeman until 12:45 pm, which was the same meeting from which the 18+ minute intentional erasure had occurred.
None of what was pieced together made sense, since Nixon and Ehrlichman claimed that they had never had a conversation about Watergate, yet Ehrlichman was right in the middle of things that day. To Doar, that was the clearest sign yet that Nixon was in on the cover-up of the Watergate break-in from the very beginning. On 19 July 1974, Doar’s team organized Nixon’s misconduct into four articles of impeachment: 1) The Watergate break-in cover-up;
2) Presidential abuse of power, featuring dirty tricks; 3) Contempt of Congress for stonewalling subpoenas, and; 4) Nixon’s tax evasion.
Doar called in his assistants to help figure out what had gone on during those 76 minutes. With the color cards all laid out with multiple sets of eyes, they pieced together what they needed. While Nixon sat alone in the Oval Office, Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Mitchell had gone upstairs to talk, soon to be joined by Dean and Kleindienst. Then, according to the Presidential Diary, when that meeting ended, Nixon walked across to his hideaway office in the EOB, where he met alone with Ehrlichman from 10:25 - 11:20 am. Then just minutes later, Nixon met with Haldeman until 12:45 pm, which was the same meeting from which the 18+ minute intentional erasure had occurred.
None of what was pieced together made sense, since Nixon and Ehrlichman claimed that they had never had a conversation about Watergate, yet Ehrlichman was right in the middle of things that day. To Doar, that was the clearest sign yet that Nixon was in on the cover-up of the Watergate break-in from the very beginning. On 19 July 1974, Doar’s team organized Nixon’s misconduct into four articles of impeachment: 1) The Watergate break-in cover-up;
2) Presidential abuse of power, featuring dirty tricks; 3) Contempt of Congress for stonewalling subpoenas, and; 4) Nixon’s tax evasion.
Under pressure from Rodino, Doar was told to be very clear in reporting where things stood. Doar admitted that the evidence wasn’t perfect, and that they didn’t have all the answers they wanted. Doar then laid out for the House Judiciary Committee as many damning moments as he and his team had discovered concerning Nixon’s involvement and culpability. In the days afterwards, a few Republican representatives on the committee drafted their own articles of impeachment. Those Republican representatives met with the three conservative Southern Democrat representatives, and all of them agreed that Nixon should be impeached, which would make the committee’s vote bipartisan. Nixon heard about that meeting soon enough, and after failing to gain any traction by pressuring the few Republicans, Nixon said to Haig, “Well, there goes the Presidency”.
On 23 July 1974, Representative Larry Hogan (R; MD), a member of Rodino’s committee, became the first Republican to publicly support impeachment. Hogan argued that impeachment was the only proper move in terms of protecting the nation and the Presidency. And on that same day, the Supreme Court was only hours away from announcing their ruling on the tapes.
On 24 July 1974, the Supreme Court rendered their decision. Going point-by-point, Chief Justice Warren Burger ruled in favor of Jaworski, in that Nixon had to turn over the 64 tapes. Burger also asserted that it was the Supreme Court’s responsibility to remind the President what was constitutional, and what was not. Burger then stated that the verdict of the Supreme Court was unanimous (8 - 0; Rehnquist abstained citing a conflict of interest); Jaworski had gained an unquestioned and resounding victory.
On 23 July 1974, Representative Larry Hogan (R; MD), a member of Rodino’s committee, became the first Republican to publicly support impeachment. Hogan argued that impeachment was the only proper move in terms of protecting the nation and the Presidency. And on that same day, the Supreme Court was only hours away from announcing their ruling on the tapes.
On 24 July 1974, the Supreme Court rendered their decision. Going point-by-point, Chief Justice Warren Burger ruled in favor of Jaworski, in that Nixon had to turn over the 64 tapes. Burger also asserted that it was the Supreme Court’s responsibility to remind the President what was constitutional, and what was not. Burger then stated that the verdict of the Supreme Court was unanimous (8 - 0; Rehnquist abstained citing a conflict of interest); Jaworski had gained an unquestioned and resounding victory.