Source: Garrett M. Graff. Watergate - A New History (2022)
In San Clemente, the Supreme Court’s ruling on the tapes utterly stunned Nixon and his inner circle. St. Clair had been very confident that he’d won the most important case of his distinguished career for his most important client, but instead he’d resoundingly lost. The tapes would have to be turned over to avoid a full constitutional crisis. Nixon felt totally betrayed by three justices he’d nominated to the Supreme Court: Chief Justice Burger, and Associate Justices Blackmun and Powell (he wasn't too happy with Rehnquist either, for abstaining).
For the first time in quite a while, Nixon personally talked to Buzhardt (on the phone, since Buzhardt was in DC), and told him there “might” be a problem with the 23 June 1972 tape. Nixon told Buzhardt to listen to the tape, and then tell Haig what he thought. As Buzhardt listened to the tape, which was a conversation between Nixon and Haldeman, he was filled with increasing dread. There was no mistaking the intent of their conversation, or the damage, in that the White House, with Nixon’s knowledge and approval, intended to stonewall and obstruct the FBI’s investigation of the Watergate break-in from the start by using the CIA. Just a week before, St. Clair had argued the opposite before the House Judiciary Committee’s impeachment hearings.
After listening to the tape, Buzhardt thought to himself “School’s Out”. He told Haig, “Well, we’ve found the smoking pistol”, and that Nixon needed to seriously think about his limited options. After hours of conversation with Haig and St. Clair, Nixon finally understood that there was no path forward, and that he had to fully comply. Nixon’s options had narrowed down to three: 1) Be impeached in the House and then removed in the Senate; 2) Be impeached but resign before being removed; 3) Resign before being impeached.
For the first time in quite a while, Nixon personally talked to Buzhardt (on the phone, since Buzhardt was in DC), and told him there “might” be a problem with the 23 June 1972 tape. Nixon told Buzhardt to listen to the tape, and then tell Haig what he thought. As Buzhardt listened to the tape, which was a conversation between Nixon and Haldeman, he was filled with increasing dread. There was no mistaking the intent of their conversation, or the damage, in that the White House, with Nixon’s knowledge and approval, intended to stonewall and obstruct the FBI’s investigation of the Watergate break-in from the start by using the CIA. Just a week before, St. Clair had argued the opposite before the House Judiciary Committee’s impeachment hearings.
After listening to the tape, Buzhardt thought to himself “School’s Out”. He told Haig, “Well, we’ve found the smoking pistol”, and that Nixon needed to seriously think about his limited options. After hours of conversation with Haig and St. Clair, Nixon finally understood that there was no path forward, and that he had to fully comply. Nixon’s options had narrowed down to three: 1) Be impeached in the House and then removed in the Senate; 2) Be impeached but resign before being removed; 3) Resign before being impeached.
The House Judiciary Committee had zeroed in on two articles of impeachment: Obstruction of Justice and Abuse of Power. The committee left open an option to add Obstruction of Congress, which dealt with Nixon ignoring their subpoenas. The three conservative Southern Democrats and seven Republicans on the committee had come together around the two articles of impeachment, which meant there would be a bipartisan majority vote. Drafting, revising, and finalizing the articles were conducted by Rodino’s committee in full public view, alternating between historic solemnity and a self-serving posturing circus.
The White House now had to deal with the difficult task of negotiating a schedule to hand over the tapes to Sirica’s court. Jaworski wanted an expedited schedule, with 20 tapes in two days, 21 tapes in six days, and the final 23 tapes in ten days. In Sirica’s courtroom, Jaworski and St. Clair agreed that Jaworski would receive most of the tapes within eight days. Sirica added a condition, insisting that St. Clair listen to the tapes, knowing that he had avoided doing so all this time. Sirica also knew that if he ordered St. Clair to listen to the tapes, then he would be legally and ethically bound as an officer of the court to ensure their accuracy as well as making sure Nixon complied.
The White House now had to deal with the difficult task of negotiating a schedule to hand over the tapes to Sirica’s court. Jaworski wanted an expedited schedule, with 20 tapes in two days, 21 tapes in six days, and the final 23 tapes in ten days. In Sirica’s courtroom, Jaworski and St. Clair agreed that Jaworski would receive most of the tapes within eight days. Sirica added a condition, insisting that St. Clair listen to the tapes, knowing that he had avoided doing so all this time. Sirica also knew that if he ordered St. Clair to listen to the tapes, then he would be legally and ethically bound as an officer of the court to ensure their accuracy as well as making sure Nixon complied.
On 27 July 1974, the House Judiciary Committee finally voted on impeachment. In the end, the only votes that really mattered were those of the 3 conservative Southern Democrats and the seven Republicans that had formed what they termed “The Unholy Alliance”. A verbal roll call vote was conducted, where each member of the committee had to state “Yes” or “No” in terms of recommending impeachment to go to the House floor for a vote; the final tally was 27 - 11. Nixon had just finished swimming in his vacation getaway in San Clemente when he received word of the committee’s vote. On 29 July 1974, Rodino’s committee approved a second article of impeachment, Abuse of Power, and on the next day a third article was approved, Obstruction of Congress (the committee voted 12 - 26 on the tax fraud article of impeachment).
On 31 July 1974, St. Clair turned over 20 tapes to Sirica, while in the House, the floor debate for impeachment was scheduled for 19 August 1974. Nixon had counted on having 35 Republican Senators to block removal, which was one more than the minimum of 34 (one more than one-third of the Senate). However, Haig started to get word that the actual number of senators was between 20 and 26, which proved to mark the end for any hope that Nixon had to complete his second term in office.
By then, St. Clair and Buzhardt had notified Haig that due to their knowledge of the “smoking gun”, if Nixon didn’t come forward himself to say that he had misled the court, then they were obliged to do so. Haig advised Nixon that it would be best if he announced his resignation, and that he quickly leave DC before the “smoking gun” became public, but Nixon refused.
On 31 July 1974, St. Clair turned over 20 tapes to Sirica, while in the House, the floor debate for impeachment was scheduled for 19 August 1974. Nixon had counted on having 35 Republican Senators to block removal, which was one more than the minimum of 34 (one more than one-third of the Senate). However, Haig started to get word that the actual number of senators was between 20 and 26, which proved to mark the end for any hope that Nixon had to complete his second term in office.
By then, St. Clair and Buzhardt had notified Haig that due to their knowledge of the “smoking gun”, if Nixon didn’t come forward himself to say that he had misled the court, then they were obliged to do so. Haig advised Nixon that it would be best if he announced his resignation, and that he quickly leave DC before the “smoking gun” became public, but Nixon refused.
On 1 August 1974, Haig explained the situation to a shocked and reeling Vice-President Gerald Ford, briefly touching on the topic of the pardon powers of the Presidency. To Ford, it seemed like Haig was dangling a request for a deal, but Ford refused to commit to offering a pardon for Nixon. After the meeting, an angry and disappointed Ford slouched in his chair, finally realizing that Nixon had lied to him; what Ford felt was total betrayal.
The next day Ford called Haig, making it clear that in no way had he committed to pardoning Nixon, and that he would not be open to any negotiations for one. With that phone call, in effect Ford declared his independence from Nixon, and allowed himself to focus on becoming the 38th President. Ford stood alone becoming President, having neither been elected President or Vice-President, and no one was more unhappy about his elevation to the highest office than Ford.
Gerald Ford absolutely loved being in the House of Representatives, representing his district from Michigan. Ford quickly came to love being Vice-President even more in that for the first time in his political career he was in control of his own schedule, not operating on a calendar that so often was developed by House Democrats. Ford found being VP as informative, flexible, and even fun, with new worlds that had opened up to him, such as foreign policy. Ford loved traveling the nation by plane (a two-propeller plane, which was his choice), in part because he could, and also because he didn’t feel the need to stay in DC for long periods of time as Vice-President. VP Ford had what he considered to be his dream job, but that all changed when he had his conversation with Haig. Up to that point, Ford trusted and supported Nixon, believing that the President had never lied to him.
The next day Ford called Haig, making it clear that in no way had he committed to pardoning Nixon, and that he would not be open to any negotiations for one. With that phone call, in effect Ford declared his independence from Nixon, and allowed himself to focus on becoming the 38th President. Ford stood alone becoming President, having neither been elected President or Vice-President, and no one was more unhappy about his elevation to the highest office than Ford.
Gerald Ford absolutely loved being in the House of Representatives, representing his district from Michigan. Ford quickly came to love being Vice-President even more in that for the first time in his political career he was in control of his own schedule, not operating on a calendar that so often was developed by House Democrats. Ford found being VP as informative, flexible, and even fun, with new worlds that had opened up to him, such as foreign policy. Ford loved traveling the nation by plane (a two-propeller plane, which was his choice), in part because he could, and also because he didn’t feel the need to stay in DC for long periods of time as Vice-President. VP Ford had what he considered to be his dream job, but that all changed when he had his conversation with Haig. Up to that point, Ford trusted and supported Nixon, believing that the President had never lied to him.
In a fit of pique at Camp David, Nixon’s new strategy was to hope for the Senate to acquit him after the House impeached him, but Haig, Ziegler, Buzhardt, and St. Clair did their best to dissuade the President. St. Clair was concerned that if Nixon kept resisting the obvious, that he would be charged with obstruction. It reached the point where Haig contacted House and Senate Republicans that were still giving their full-throated support to Nixon to stand down. By then, many of them had become privy to the “smoking gun”, which took all the air out of their sails for their support of the President.
Nixon decided to be with his family on the Sequoia (the Presidential yacht) when the “smoking gun” was made public, in large part because he didn’t want his family to see the evening news. On that same day the 11 Republicans that voted “No” on impeachment in the House Judiciary Committee publicly switched their vote to “Yes”, which meant that Rodino could claim that the entire committee supported impeachment.
Nixon decided to be with his family on the Sequoia (the Presidential yacht) when the “smoking gun” was made public, in large part because he didn’t want his family to see the evening news. On that same day the 11 Republicans that voted “No” on impeachment in the House Judiciary Committee publicly switched their vote to “Yes”, which meant that Rodino could claim that the entire committee supported impeachment.