Source: Garrett M. Graff. Watergate - A New History (2022)
Jaworski’s office pressed forward with their tax evasion investigation on Nixon, which led to an IRS and Congressional report that Nixon owed $476k ($2.9m in 2022 dollars) in back taxes and interest during his years as President. It became all too clear to Vice-President Gerald Ford where Watergate was heading, knowing that most Republicans wanted Nixon out and him in as President, so he stayed as far removed from the fracas as he could manage.
Nixon continued to stonewall the House Judiciary Committee, and the committee had already burned through the budgeted $1m, and needed another appropriation. On 11 April 1974, the House Judiciary Committee gathered for a hearing. Minutes before the hearing started, St. Clair called Doar, promising that the first set of requested tapes would be turned over in the next day or so. Doar informed St. Clair that he would be allowed to participate in the committee’s impeachment hearings, but that the committee was only getting started in terms of requesting documentation from the White House.
That same day the House Judiciary Committee voted 33 - 3 to issue a subpoena to summon Nixon or any subordinate officer, official, or employee with custody of the requested tapes/documents to appear before the committee with the requested materials by no later than 25 April 1974. Meanwhile, Jaworski issued a subpoena for an additional 64 tapes, which included the 23 June 1972 conversation between Nixon and Haldeman, with 2 May 1974 the deadline for a response to that subpoena. The clock on a constitutional crisis was now ticking faster and louder.
Nixon continued to stonewall the House Judiciary Committee, and the committee had already burned through the budgeted $1m, and needed another appropriation. On 11 April 1974, the House Judiciary Committee gathered for a hearing. Minutes before the hearing started, St. Clair called Doar, promising that the first set of requested tapes would be turned over in the next day or so. Doar informed St. Clair that he would be allowed to participate in the committee’s impeachment hearings, but that the committee was only getting started in terms of requesting documentation from the White House.
That same day the House Judiciary Committee voted 33 - 3 to issue a subpoena to summon Nixon or any subordinate officer, official, or employee with custody of the requested tapes/documents to appear before the committee with the requested materials by no later than 25 April 1974. Meanwhile, Jaworski issued a subpoena for an additional 64 tapes, which included the 23 June 1972 conversation between Nixon and Haldeman, with 2 May 1974 the deadline for a response to that subpoena. The clock on a constitutional crisis was now ticking faster and louder.
On his end, in addition to simply stewing over the investigations against him, Nixon was immersed in editing tape transcripts, personally excising entire passages; there were many, many deletions, which were sure to raise questions and suspicions. Nixon decided to work on a speech with Pat Buchanan and Ron Ziegler in order to provide context and justification for the edited printed transcripts of the tapes, while St. Clair worked on a lengthy legal brief that attacked John Dean’s credibility. Nixon sensed momentum on his end when Mitchell and Stans were found not guilty in a trial that was separate from Watergate, believing it was time to move ahead with the release of the edited printed transcripts from the tapes.
On 29 April 1974, sitting in front of a tall pile of blue bound volumes, Nixon announced that he was publicly releasing 1300+ pages of transcripts from 46 tapes, most of which had been requested by Rodino’s committee. Nixon claimed that the transcripts would prove that he had no knowledge of the cover-up until Dean informed him on 21 March 1973. On 30 April 1974, 38 copies of the bound transcripts were delivered to each member of the House Judiciary Committee, with St. Clair’s cover letter explaining that the omissions were necessary in order to edit out coarse and foul language, as well as conversations that were not relevant to the President’s conduct concerning Watergate. Rodino’s committee soon discovered that the edited transcripts only featured 31 of the 42 requested tapes, and Jaworski saw that only 20 of the 64 tapes he subpoenaed were included.
On 29 April 1974, sitting in front of a tall pile of blue bound volumes, Nixon announced that he was publicly releasing 1300+ pages of transcripts from 46 tapes, most of which had been requested by Rodino’s committee. Nixon claimed that the transcripts would prove that he had no knowledge of the cover-up until Dean informed him on 21 March 1973. On 30 April 1974, 38 copies of the bound transcripts were delivered to each member of the House Judiciary Committee, with St. Clair’s cover letter explaining that the omissions were necessary in order to edit out coarse and foul language, as well as conversations that were not relevant to the President’s conduct concerning Watergate. Rodino’s committee soon discovered that the edited transcripts only featured 31 of the 42 requested tapes, and Jaworski saw that only 20 of the 64 tapes he subpoenaed were included.
As Rodino’s committee and the American people read the edited transcripts, it became very clear that St. Clair’s claim of deleting for language was a sham. The impact of the release of the edited transcripts was swift and nasty, with Newseek and Time running special sections, and the usually pro-Nixon Chicago Tribune published the entire transcript. The New York Times and the Washington Post published paperbacks of the edited transcripts, and both became best-sellers with 3 million copies printed. As people read the edited transcripts, fury grew, with Congress apoplectic and Nixon defenders struck dumb, while the general public was repelled and disgusted.
Throughout the 1000+ pages of the edited transcripts, the conversations radiated cynicism and indifference to everyone and everything, including the rule of law. It became clear that the White House’s only interest was in political and legal survival. Revealed in the edited transcripts was incompetent bungling and utter incomprehension to what was really happening outside the isolated bubble of the White House, and the language and sheer pettiness appalled millions of Americans.
There were also indications that the edited transcripts of the tapes didn’t match the tapes that were already in Jaworski’s possession in terms of content, tone, attributions, and omissions. Garment commented that Nixon released “a thousand pages of mumbled plotting, twisting, turning, and double-dealing, all the numbing sleaziness of political men in desperate trouble, the whole mess compounded by countless transcription mistakes, arbitrary omissions, and perhaps worst of all, innumerable references throughout to 'expletive deleted’”. It seemed that Nixon, in his last-ditch effort to end the battle over the tapes, had committed political suicide.
Throughout the 1000+ pages of the edited transcripts, the conversations radiated cynicism and indifference to everyone and everything, including the rule of law. It became clear that the White House’s only interest was in political and legal survival. Revealed in the edited transcripts was incompetent bungling and utter incomprehension to what was really happening outside the isolated bubble of the White House, and the language and sheer pettiness appalled millions of Americans.
There were also indications that the edited transcripts of the tapes didn’t match the tapes that were already in Jaworski’s possession in terms of content, tone, attributions, and omissions. Garment commented that Nixon released “a thousand pages of mumbled plotting, twisting, turning, and double-dealing, all the numbing sleaziness of political men in desperate trouble, the whole mess compounded by countless transcription mistakes, arbitrary omissions, and perhaps worst of all, innumerable references throughout to 'expletive deleted’”. It seemed that Nixon, in his last-ditch effort to end the battle over the tapes, had committed political suicide.
The edited transcripts proved to be politically damaging, but there was also a legal problem, in that they didn’t satisfy what Rodino’s committee requested, or what Jaworski subpoenaed in terms of actually turning over tapes. Rodino’s committee sent a new letter to Nixon outlining the President’s noncompliance with a 30 April 1974 deadline. On 5 May 1974, Jaworski and two staffers went to the White House and informed Haig and St. Clair that the grand jury had authorized the Special Prosecutor to name Nixon as an unindicted co-conspirator. Jaworski further informed both that the noncompliance with his subpoena was forcing him to reveal the charge in a public hearing, and then Jaworski showed the two his brief and the secret minutes of the grand jury session.
Jaworski offered Haig and St. Clair a compromise, in that he would drop the subpoena and delay his announcement of the grand jury’s finding on Nixon if the White House released 18 specific conversations from the 64 originally subpoenaed tapes. To St. Clair, the compromise was nothing more than blackmail. White House logs (made public later), showed that within minutes after that meeting ended the 18 tapes in question were retrieved from the secure storage area. That night Nixon listened to his 23 June 1972 conversation with Haldeman, where the worst of the cover-up had been discussed, the plan for conspiracy unmistakable, and the abuse of power clear.
Soon thereafter, St. Clair called Jaworski to inform him that no more tapes would be forthcoming from the White House. Jaworski correctly concluded that Nixon had listened to at least some of the tapes, and he saw them as beyond-incriminating. Jaworski also figured out that Haig and St. Clair were not privy to what was on those tapes, believing that those two men would never engage in a cover-up at this stage of Watergate. Nixon had backed himself into his final corner, and he would now go ahead alone, with no strategy other than to survive day-by-day.
Jaworski offered Haig and St. Clair a compromise, in that he would drop the subpoena and delay his announcement of the grand jury’s finding on Nixon if the White House released 18 specific conversations from the 64 originally subpoenaed tapes. To St. Clair, the compromise was nothing more than blackmail. White House logs (made public later), showed that within minutes after that meeting ended the 18 tapes in question were retrieved from the secure storage area. That night Nixon listened to his 23 June 1972 conversation with Haldeman, where the worst of the cover-up had been discussed, the plan for conspiracy unmistakable, and the abuse of power clear.
Soon thereafter, St. Clair called Jaworski to inform him that no more tapes would be forthcoming from the White House. Jaworski correctly concluded that Nixon had listened to at least some of the tapes, and he saw them as beyond-incriminating. Jaworski also figured out that Haig and St. Clair were not privy to what was on those tapes, believing that those two men would never engage in a cover-up at this stage of Watergate. Nixon had backed himself into his final corner, and he would now go ahead alone, with no strategy other than to survive day-by-day.
On 9 May 1974, the Chicago Tribune called for Nixon’s resignation, and that same day the House Judiciary Committee officially started impeachment hearings. By now many of the Republican members of that committee were no longer in support of Nixon, due to the disastrous fallout from the White House’s release of the edited transcripts of the tapes. Rodino knew that in order to gain a majority vote in the committee to sent the question of impeachment to the House floor for a vote, he needed to have three conservative Southern Democrats on board: James Mann (SC), Walter Flowers
(AL), and Ray Thornton (AR). For all three, impeachment needed to be directly tied to the functioning of the federal government. Once those three were convinced that was the case with Nixon, Rodino knew he’d have his majority, and he could then convince the moderates on the committee to follow suit. Rodino’s goal was to have a bipartisan majority vote in the committee, with some Republicans recommending impeachment.
In Sirica’s courtroom on 10 May 1974, Jaworski presented a 39 page legal brief that announced that the grand jury believed that Nixon was part of the Watergate cover-up, and that he would be named as an unindicted co-conspirator. In the courtroom, with the exception of the White House lawyers, Jaworski’s announcement came as a complete surprise. Sirica wanted the matter to be handled in a public hearing, but Jaworski wanted to keep things as secret as possible for a bit longer, to which of course the White House lawyers agreed. Sirica agreed with Jaworski’s request, and he ordered that the Special Prosecutor’s subpoena for the 64 tapes be enforced.
(AL), and Ray Thornton (AR). For all three, impeachment needed to be directly tied to the functioning of the federal government. Once those three were convinced that was the case with Nixon, Rodino knew he’d have his majority, and he could then convince the moderates on the committee to follow suit. Rodino’s goal was to have a bipartisan majority vote in the committee, with some Republicans recommending impeachment.
In Sirica’s courtroom on 10 May 1974, Jaworski presented a 39 page legal brief that announced that the grand jury believed that Nixon was part of the Watergate cover-up, and that he would be named as an unindicted co-conspirator. In the courtroom, with the exception of the White House lawyers, Jaworski’s announcement came as a complete surprise. Sirica wanted the matter to be handled in a public hearing, but Jaworski wanted to keep things as secret as possible for a bit longer, to which of course the White House lawyers agreed. Sirica agreed with Jaworski’s request, and he ordered that the Special Prosecutor’s subpoena for the 64 tapes be enforced.