British Prime Minister Asquith opened the meeting with Hoover by saying that he was unsympathetic to the CRB, and that he felt no moral or legal obligation to help Belgium. Asquith went on, claiming that it was monstrous to ask Britain to come to the rescue in Belgium, when Germany created the horrific situation. Hoover was not surprised by Asquith’s stance, and he spent the entire trip back to his home in London thinking about a response to the Prime Minister. When they next met, Hoover let Asquith have it over the British blockade, even threatening to send a letter to newspapers in the US saying that the British government was more than willing to let millions of Belgians starve to death. Asquith, not accustomed to being addressed in that manner, was taken aback, telling Hoover that he was an excellent diplomat, but his skills in diplomacy were wanting, and Hoover left empty handed. Asquith may have wanted to help, but his Cabinet was against any assistance to Belgium.
As 1914 came to a close, the CRB was spending $6 million a month in food and transportation, and running a deficit of $2 million a month. It reached the point where Hoover started to pledge the remains of his personal wealth as security against purchases of food. Hoover knew that unless he could relieve the financial pressures on the CRB, his days as a humanitarian were over, and Belgium would be in even more dire straits. Hoover started to think of other ways to bring in money for the CRB, since he could not count on government subsidies.
Hoover scheduled an appointment for 21 January 1915 with David Lloyd George, the Chancellor of the Exchequer (the approximate equivalent of the Secretary of the Treasury in the US). Hoover wanted Lloyd George to allow people outside of Belgium to send money to people in Belgium to pay for food and other items, lightening the burden on the CRB. Even this small request meant an exception to the British blockade, and Lloyd George was initially hesitant, saying that money flowing into Belgium would find its way into German hands, which would be a poor strategy since the war was now a war of attrition. Lloyd George believed that if push-came-to-shove, the Germans would feed Belgium.
As 1914 came to a close, the CRB was spending $6 million a month in food and transportation, and running a deficit of $2 million a month. It reached the point where Hoover started to pledge the remains of his personal wealth as security against purchases of food. Hoover knew that unless he could relieve the financial pressures on the CRB, his days as a humanitarian were over, and Belgium would be in even more dire straits. Hoover started to think of other ways to bring in money for the CRB, since he could not count on government subsidies.
Hoover scheduled an appointment for 21 January 1915 with David Lloyd George, the Chancellor of the Exchequer (the approximate equivalent of the Secretary of the Treasury in the US). Hoover wanted Lloyd George to allow people outside of Belgium to send money to people in Belgium to pay for food and other items, lightening the burden on the CRB. Even this small request meant an exception to the British blockade, and Lloyd George was initially hesitant, saying that money flowing into Belgium would find its way into German hands, which would be a poor strategy since the war was now a war of attrition. Lloyd George believed that if push-came-to-shove, the Germans would feed Belgium.
Having failed to bully Asquith, Hoover decided to reason with Lloyd George, arguing that the CRB was actually an integral part of the Allied war effort, in that Belgians would continue to refuse to cooperate with Germany if there was food on the table. Hoover went on to state that supporting the CRB would be incredibly smart and strategic military spending on Britain’s part. Lloyd George immediately authorized Hoover’s request, in part due to Hoover’s logical arguments, but also due to the reality that Britain needed the keep the US happy, since America was currently Britain’s financial savior, and almost certainly a future ally. Hoover was relieved to have gained this narrow exception to the blockade, but there were two problems, in that he still needed a government subsidy to balance the CRB’s books, and that Lloyd George’s exception could be canceled at any time.
At the same time, Germany imposed a war indemnity of $40m francs a month on Belgium, forcing the tiny occupied nation to subsidize the German military, just as Lloyd George had predicted. Hoover wondered how he could get any money from the British government under those circumstances, but Berlin’s move in Belgium had an unanticipated effect on the Asquith government. Sir Edward Grey told Hoover that if the CRB could change Berlin’s mind on the indemnity, then the British War Cabinet would be obligated to subsidize the CRB. The British government finally realized that the ability for the Belgians to resist Germany was directly tied to the food supply, which was exactly what Hoover told Lloyd George.
Taking up Grey’s challenge, Hoover set to travel to Berlin, but before doing so, he sent a cable to Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan in order to let him know he was heading to Germany, and why. Despite having no diplomatic standing, Hoover brazenly asked Bryan to speak with the German Ambassador to the US about the CRB. Hoover wanted Bryan to convince the German Ambassador that the CRB would do Germany a huge favor, in that by feeding Belgium, Germany would not have an unruly starving population with which to deal, and that the CRB and the Allies would foot the bill. That cable was of course the exact opposite of what Hoover told Lloyd George, and it also ran contrary to the official US government view that the CRB was a neutral humanitarian organization.
At the same time, Germany imposed a war indemnity of $40m francs a month on Belgium, forcing the tiny occupied nation to subsidize the German military, just as Lloyd George had predicted. Hoover wondered how he could get any money from the British government under those circumstances, but Berlin’s move in Belgium had an unanticipated effect on the Asquith government. Sir Edward Grey told Hoover that if the CRB could change Berlin’s mind on the indemnity, then the British War Cabinet would be obligated to subsidize the CRB. The British government finally realized that the ability for the Belgians to resist Germany was directly tied to the food supply, which was exactly what Hoover told Lloyd George.
Taking up Grey’s challenge, Hoover set to travel to Berlin, but before doing so, he sent a cable to Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan in order to let him know he was heading to Germany, and why. Despite having no diplomatic standing, Hoover brazenly asked Bryan to speak with the German Ambassador to the US about the CRB. Hoover wanted Bryan to convince the German Ambassador that the CRB would do Germany a huge favor, in that by feeding Belgium, Germany would not have an unruly starving population with which to deal, and that the CRB and the Allies would foot the bill. That cable was of course the exact opposite of what Hoover told Lloyd George, and it also ran contrary to the official US government view that the CRB was a neutral humanitarian organization.
Hoover saw no hypocrisy in his double-dealing with Britain and Germany, in that his sole goal was to keep Belgium from starving. Hoover met with many German government officials, even meeting with the same official that referred to Belgian neutrality as a “scrap of paper”. Hoover wanted Berlin to publicly state that the indemnity would stop only if Britain financed the CRB relief. The German officials that held sway were not impressed by Hoover’s arguments that the US was neutral in the war, and that Germany had nothing to fear from US public opinion on Belgium; Hoover returned to London empty handed.
While Hoover was disheartened with Berlin’s rejection, he did gain clarity from those meetings with German officials, and he returned to London in a different frame of mind. Seeing the fear that gripped both the British and German governments, Hoover now knew that appealing to their better nature was not going to work. Hoover decided to downplay the humanitarian angle and to increase the “fear factor”, in order to try and force the two governments to deliver on what he wanted for the CRB.
On 15 February 1915, Hoover briefed the British Foreign Office on how generous and flexible the Germans were in terms of a “loan” to Belgium. As Hoover anticipated, the British officials were aghast that the Belgians might throw their support to Germany in a fit of gratitude. The last thing Britain wanted was to have Germany look like a benevolent occupier, which would raise Germany’s standing in the world, especially with the US, and it would cost Britain, who chose to do nothing. The Asquith government simply could not afford to lose American benevolence and assistance in the Great War.
Two days later, Lloyd George called Hoover to tell him that the War Cabinet would meet the next day to discuss feeding Belgium. Lloyd George said that he supported the CRB, while Churchill and others remained opposed for military reasons. Lloyd George wanted Hoover to write a comprehensive memo about the situation in Belgium so he could present it at the meeting. About three hours later, Lloyd George had Hoover’s memo in hand. Hoover featured all the arguments in his arsenal for feeding Belgium, and it was powerfully worded (almost certainly Hoover had help in crafting the memo, given his less-than-stellar grammar, punctuation, and spelling). Hoover made sure to include that Britain entered the Great War when Germany violated Belgian neutrality. Hoover went on to argue that if Belgium wasn’t provisioned, then they would not be able to passively resist Germany, which meant that Britain entered the Great War for nothing. Hover included that the US government and public was watching to see what Britain would do concerning Belgium.
While Hoover was disheartened with Berlin’s rejection, he did gain clarity from those meetings with German officials, and he returned to London in a different frame of mind. Seeing the fear that gripped both the British and German governments, Hoover now knew that appealing to their better nature was not going to work. Hoover decided to downplay the humanitarian angle and to increase the “fear factor”, in order to try and force the two governments to deliver on what he wanted for the CRB.
On 15 February 1915, Hoover briefed the British Foreign Office on how generous and flexible the Germans were in terms of a “loan” to Belgium. As Hoover anticipated, the British officials were aghast that the Belgians might throw their support to Germany in a fit of gratitude. The last thing Britain wanted was to have Germany look like a benevolent occupier, which would raise Germany’s standing in the world, especially with the US, and it would cost Britain, who chose to do nothing. The Asquith government simply could not afford to lose American benevolence and assistance in the Great War.
Two days later, Lloyd George called Hoover to tell him that the War Cabinet would meet the next day to discuss feeding Belgium. Lloyd George said that he supported the CRB, while Churchill and others remained opposed for military reasons. Lloyd George wanted Hoover to write a comprehensive memo about the situation in Belgium so he could present it at the meeting. About three hours later, Lloyd George had Hoover’s memo in hand. Hoover featured all the arguments in his arsenal for feeding Belgium, and it was powerfully worded (almost certainly Hoover had help in crafting the memo, given his less-than-stellar grammar, punctuation, and spelling). Hoover made sure to include that Britain entered the Great War when Germany violated Belgian neutrality. Hoover went on to argue that if Belgium wasn’t provisioned, then they would not be able to passively resist Germany, which meant that Britain entered the Great War for nothing. Hover included that the US government and public was watching to see what Britain would do concerning Belgium.
The War Cabinet met on 18 February 1915, and decided against a direct subsidy for the CRB, instead authorizing a $5m loan to the exiled Belgian government in London, with the hope that the money would go to the CRB. Doing so allowed Lloyd George to bypass the House of Commons and to keep the whole deal secret, not wanting a public debate about scarce financial resources going to a German-occupied nation. Hoover was more-than-happy with the decision, in that he didn’t want Berlin to think that the British were in any way anxious about what was happening to the Belgians. Lloyd George and Lord Grey went so far as to publicly state that a direct subsidy of the CRB had been rejected by the War Cabinet.
In five months, Hoover had secured the financial security necessary to keep the largest humanitarian relief effort in the history of the world going. $1.8m worth of food per week was purchased from the US, Australia, and Argentina. Hoover arranged for a fleet of several dozen merchant ships plus 600 tugboats and barges to operate in the canals of Belgium and Holland, and he was in charge of tens of thousands of volunteers. Hoover expanded the scope of the CRB by providing relief to 2 million people in northern France. The CRB flew its own flag, and each CRB ship carried specific documents which served as passports. Hoover was even granted de facto diplomatic immunity by the belligerents, with the British allowing him to cross the English Channel at will and Berlin granting Hoover a document that stated that he could not be detained by the German military or government. Hoover moved across enemy lines more freely than any other man in the world during the Great War, and he had privileged access to generals, diplomats, and high level government officials. Hoover had personal contact with the leaders of the warring nations, and he negotiated agreements with the belligerents concerning humanitarian efforts.
The Belgian government in exile, as well as the British and French governments, channeled $150m a year to the CRB. By then, Hoover was a sovereign independent agent, with very little input or assistance from the US State Department. Hoover was in effect a benevolent pirate, receiving tribute from various governments. The press now started to pay attention to Hoover, who on the surface appeared to be put out by the coverage, but in reality was ecstatic. Hoover reveled in being publicly lauded, and he used the coverage to increase the money flowing to the CRB. The US government started to take an interest in Hoover, with the State Department starting a dossier, which Hoover viewed as a negative development.
In five months, Hoover had secured the financial security necessary to keep the largest humanitarian relief effort in the history of the world going. $1.8m worth of food per week was purchased from the US, Australia, and Argentina. Hoover arranged for a fleet of several dozen merchant ships plus 600 tugboats and barges to operate in the canals of Belgium and Holland, and he was in charge of tens of thousands of volunteers. Hoover expanded the scope of the CRB by providing relief to 2 million people in northern France. The CRB flew its own flag, and each CRB ship carried specific documents which served as passports. Hoover was even granted de facto diplomatic immunity by the belligerents, with the British allowing him to cross the English Channel at will and Berlin granting Hoover a document that stated that he could not be detained by the German military or government. Hoover moved across enemy lines more freely than any other man in the world during the Great War, and he had privileged access to generals, diplomats, and high level government officials. Hoover had personal contact with the leaders of the warring nations, and he negotiated agreements with the belligerents concerning humanitarian efforts.
The Belgian government in exile, as well as the British and French governments, channeled $150m a year to the CRB. By then, Hoover was a sovereign independent agent, with very little input or assistance from the US State Department. Hoover was in effect a benevolent pirate, receiving tribute from various governments. The press now started to pay attention to Hoover, who on the surface appeared to be put out by the coverage, but in reality was ecstatic. Hoover reveled in being publicly lauded, and he used the coverage to increase the money flowing to the CRB. The US government started to take an interest in Hoover, with the State Department starting a dossier, which Hoover viewed as a negative development.
Despite all of his accomplishments concerning the CRB, Hoover understood that he was actually hanging by a thread, in that the British indirect subsidy to the Belgian government in exile did not guarantee the long-term viability of the CRB. The greatest threat to the CRB came from Baron von Bissing, the German Governor-General of Belgium, who viewed the CRB as a vehicle that allowed Belgians to escape work. Bissing tried to seize control of the CRB, imposing restrictions on CRB agents. Hoover went over Bissing’s head to Berlin, threatening to withdraw the CRB from Belgium if Bissing was not contained. As a result, Hoover kept the CRB going in Belgium, but Bissing found another way which Hoover was powerless to prevent, deporting nearly 60k Belgians to work in German factories and munitions plants, and 62k to work in France and Belgium.
Elements of the British government also took a dim view of the CRB, with the Foreign Office often raising objections, but it was Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty, that had it in the most for the CRB. The CRB had opened holes in the British blockade that Churchill wanted closed. Churchill’s strategy was to publicly and privately discredit Hoover, which triggered his paranoia. Hoover would be a constant target of the Admiralty for his entire 30 month run as the head of the CRB. Hoover’s ace-in-the-hole was that messing with him meant messing with 7.5 million innocent Belgians.
Also in play was the CRB’s neutrality and high profile. Ironically, it was Hoover’s partner in Belgium that frustrated him the most, since the Belgian in charge didn’t think he needed Hoover at all. That infighting between two divas with massive egos was a needless distraction, and it wasn’t until December 1915 that the Belgian relented and acquiesced to Hoover. Then came accusations that Hoover was in violation of the Logan Act, a law passed by Congress in 1799 during the “Quasi-War” with France, which prohibited unauthorized citizens from negotiating with governments at odds with the US.
Hoover had friends in high places, most notably Colonel Edward House, President Wilson’s main advisor, Secretary of the Interior Franklin Lane, as well as Ambassador Page; it was Page that did the most to keep the State Department out of the way of the CRB. It was through Lane that Hoover gained a meeting with President Wilson on 3 November 1915. It was a good time to meet with Wilson, in that the President was in the midst of the best and most productive part of his first term, also having recently become engaged to Edith Bolling Galt. Wilson wanted the US to remain neutral, but he issued an official press release that supported Hoover, which made the accusations that Hoover violated the Logan Act disappear. Hoover still smarted from those attacks, and still publicly defended himself, since he (like Wilson) had the “no man will put me down” aspect in his personality.
Elements of the British government also took a dim view of the CRB, with the Foreign Office often raising objections, but it was Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty, that had it in the most for the CRB. The CRB had opened holes in the British blockade that Churchill wanted closed. Churchill’s strategy was to publicly and privately discredit Hoover, which triggered his paranoia. Hoover would be a constant target of the Admiralty for his entire 30 month run as the head of the CRB. Hoover’s ace-in-the-hole was that messing with him meant messing with 7.5 million innocent Belgians.
Also in play was the CRB’s neutrality and high profile. Ironically, it was Hoover’s partner in Belgium that frustrated him the most, since the Belgian in charge didn’t think he needed Hoover at all. That infighting between two divas with massive egos was a needless distraction, and it wasn’t until December 1915 that the Belgian relented and acquiesced to Hoover. Then came accusations that Hoover was in violation of the Logan Act, a law passed by Congress in 1799 during the “Quasi-War” with France, which prohibited unauthorized citizens from negotiating with governments at odds with the US.
Hoover had friends in high places, most notably Colonel Edward House, President Wilson’s main advisor, Secretary of the Interior Franklin Lane, as well as Ambassador Page; it was Page that did the most to keep the State Department out of the way of the CRB. It was through Lane that Hoover gained a meeting with President Wilson on 3 November 1915. It was a good time to meet with Wilson, in that the President was in the midst of the best and most productive part of his first term, also having recently become engaged to Edith Bolling Galt. Wilson wanted the US to remain neutral, but he issued an official press release that supported Hoover, which made the accusations that Hoover violated the Logan Act disappear. Hoover still smarted from those attacks, and still publicly defended himself, since he (like Wilson) had the “no man will put me down” aspect in his personality.
Ambassador Walter Page was beyond-impressed with Hoover, writing about him in glowing terms to Wilson. Interestingly, another high-profile supporter of Hoover was British Field Marshal Horatio Kitchener who even asked Hoover if he wanted to renounce his US citizenship and become a Brit. Kitchener was so impressed with Hoover that he advocated that he be placed in charge of the British munitions production. Kitchener and some other high-level British officials thought Hoover was the man that could solve Britain’s great industrial crisis; it would be that crisis that shortened Kitchener’s tenure as field marshal. Hoover of course refused, but he made sure to tell an incredulous Ambassador Page of Kitchener’s entreaties. Hoover’s greatest internal struggle was one of showing humility versus his desire for recognition, which explained why Hoover would reject an accolade, but then had to let others know (e.g. Page), thereby in a way crafting a compromise between those competing desires.
Hoover’s run as the head of the CRB ended in April 1917 when the US declared war on Germany. Since Hoover was no longer a neutral personage, he reluctantly handed over control of the CRB to Dutch and Spanish authorities. In 30 months the CRB had spent $200m, shipping 2.5 million tons of food, and by November 1918 the total amount spent would reach $865m (with the US by then kicking in $20m a month). The New York Times declared Hoover’s leadership of the CRB to be the most splendid American accomplishment in recent memory. That was exactly the kind of acclaim that Hoover wanted and needed as he set his sights for his next move in the Big Game, in which he would need President Wilson.
Hoover’s run as the head of the CRB ended in April 1917 when the US declared war on Germany. Since Hoover was no longer a neutral personage, he reluctantly handed over control of the CRB to Dutch and Spanish authorities. In 30 months the CRB had spent $200m, shipping 2.5 million tons of food, and by November 1918 the total amount spent would reach $865m (with the US by then kicking in $20m a month). The New York Times declared Hoover’s leadership of the CRB to be the most splendid American accomplishment in recent memory. That was exactly the kind of acclaim that Hoover wanted and needed as he set his sights for his next move in the Big Game, in which he would need President Wilson.