Source: Erik Larson. Dead Wake - The Last Crossing of the Lusitania (2015)
Turner was surprised and dismayed when the Admiralty laid the blame of the Lusitania Disaster on him. Churchill ordered that Turner was to be blamed, all to cover up the Admiralty’s role, or lack thereof, in the disaster.. The day after the disaster, the Admiralty had circulated secret documents that blamed Turner for ignoring Admiralty directives, especially to zig-zag and to give coastlines a wide berth. The Admiralty held that Turner had not steamed at full speed and had proceeded on the usual trade route, inviting disaster. Much to the Admiralty’s irritation, a coroner’s inquest was held on behalf of five victims, where Turner was lauded and the German U-Boat was blamed.
12 May 1915: The Admiralty issued documents that accused Turner of negligence and/or incompetence, even hinting that Turner was “got at” by Germany. The Admiralty kept almost everything secret, including their questioning of Turner. US Consul Frost sensed that the Admiralty was making Turner the scapegoat, which was confirmed as early as 9 May 1915 from meeting with Admiralty officials. Frost was shown the messages sent to the Lusitania, and saw that there were no real details that would have helped Turner, such as no instructions or interpretations. Frost knew the Admiralty had dropped the ball and was desperately covering up that fact. Frost also noticed that in no way could he get the Admiralty to discuss the lack of destroyer escorts for the Lusitania.
12 May 1915: The Admiralty issued documents that accused Turner of negligence and/or incompetence, even hinting that Turner was “got at” by Germany. The Admiralty kept almost everything secret, including their questioning of Turner. US Consul Frost sensed that the Admiralty was making Turner the scapegoat, which was confirmed as early as 9 May 1915 from meeting with Admiralty officials. Frost was shown the messages sent to the Lusitania, and saw that there were no real details that would have helped Turner, such as no instructions or interpretations. Frost knew the Admiralty had dropped the ball and was desperately covering up that fact. Frost also noticed that in no way could he get the Admiralty to discuss the lack of destroyer escorts for the Lusitania.
Why the Admiralty focused on Turner instead of the obvious-and-easy villain Germany is perplexing and bothersome, since blaming Germany would have created far more global support for Britain. The simple answer was that the Admiralty desperately kept the cover-up going at full blast in order to hide its negligence, incompetence, lack of foresight, lack of preparation, etc. Another reason was that the Admiralty in no way wanted Germany to be aware of R40. Among the intercepted-and-decoded cables from U-20, R40 knew that Schwieger only fired one torpedo, when the rest of the world “knew” it had to be two torpedoes. The Admiralty didn’t want to answer questions asking why the Lusitania sank to due one torpedo, since then it would have to get into the munitions cargo and the design of the ship. Therefore, the Admiralty kept Schweiger’s communications with his base secret at all costs, even if that meant Turner was sacrificed.
The inquiry began on 15 June 1915, but by then Churchill had been removed as the First Lord of the Admiralty due to supply problems as well as disasters such as Gallipoli in the Dardanelles. Therefore, a new group ran the Admiralty, but the focus remained on Turner being to blame. Lord Mersey convened many secret sessions during the inquiry, with the first questioning Turner. The Admiralty’s counsel treated Turner as if he was a murder suspect. Turner testified that by his standards he was in mid-channel, in that under normal circumstances he would be hugging coastal points such as the Old Head of Kinsale. Past photographs proved that Turner did indeed sail that close to the coast under normal circumstances, and no one, not even the Admiralty, could dispute that the Lusitania sank 12 miles from that point. The Admiralty argued that if Turner had been running the Lusitania at 25 knots and zig-zagging, the U-Boat wouldn’t have had the chance to even fire a torpedo. Of course the Admiralty didn’t bring up that Turner was in effect zig-zagging anyway, trying to pinpoint his location, or that he had been ordered by Cunard to only run three boilers to conserve coal.
The inquiry began on 15 June 1915, but by then Churchill had been removed as the First Lord of the Admiralty due to supply problems as well as disasters such as Gallipoli in the Dardanelles. Therefore, a new group ran the Admiralty, but the focus remained on Turner being to blame. Lord Mersey convened many secret sessions during the inquiry, with the first questioning Turner. The Admiralty’s counsel treated Turner as if he was a murder suspect. Turner testified that by his standards he was in mid-channel, in that under normal circumstances he would be hugging coastal points such as the Old Head of Kinsale. Past photographs proved that Turner did indeed sail that close to the coast under normal circumstances, and no one, not even the Admiralty, could dispute that the Lusitania sank 12 miles from that point. The Admiralty argued that if Turner had been running the Lusitania at 25 knots and zig-zagging, the U-Boat wouldn’t have had the chance to even fire a torpedo. Of course the Admiralty didn’t bring up that Turner was in effect zig-zagging anyway, trying to pinpoint his location, or that he had been ordered by Cunard to only run three boilers to conserve coal.
Lord Mersey heard testimony from 36 witnesses, including crew, passengers, and experts. At no time during the secret sessions did the Admiralty admit that it knew about what U-20 was doing, and where, or its efforts to protect the Orion. The Admiralty made no effort to disabuse anyone of Mersey’s ruling that two torpedoes sank the Lusitania. The inquiry never asked why the Lusitania wasn’t directed to the safer Northern route over the top of Ireland, or why there weren’t any destroyer escorts. At the conclusion of the inquiry, Mersey absolved Turner from any blame, defying the wishes of the Admiralty, as well as finding Cunard’s decision to not run the fourth boiler as irrelevant. Mersey laid the blame entirely on the commander of the German U-Boat. Cunard kept Turner on its roster of captains; Turner was relieved, but he also felt that he had been unjustly treated nonetheless.
Within the Admiralty records there is no hint of dismay or regret about its actions (or inactions) in terms of not using its intelligence to save over a thousand lives. Later on, British historians would uncover evidence that indicated that there was a plot, albeit imperfect, to endanger the Lusitania to convince the US to enter the Great War. That conclusion carries a lot of water in that the Admiralty did everything it could for the Orion, but didn’t lift a finger for the Lusitania. Also, given that over 20 merchant ships had been sunk in the war zone by early-May 1915, the lack of destroyer escorts for the Lusitania is even more glaring.
Within the Admiralty records there is no hint of dismay or regret about its actions (or inactions) in terms of not using its intelligence to save over a thousand lives. Later on, British historians would uncover evidence that indicated that there was a plot, albeit imperfect, to endanger the Lusitania to convince the US to enter the Great War. That conclusion carries a lot of water in that the Admiralty did everything it could for the Orion, but didn’t lift a finger for the Lusitania. Also, given that over 20 merchant ships had been sunk in the war zone by early-May 1915, the lack of destroyer escorts for the Lusitania is even more glaring.
As far as the cause of the second explosion, the cargoes of munitions in no way could have been that explosive. The most plausible cause was coal dust, even if some have stated that condensation in the ship’s hull rendered the coal dust impotent. Turner’s theory was that the torpedo hit a main steam line, which carried steam under high pressure. The torpedo’s explosion plus the high pressure steam plus the cold seawater slamming into the line causing thermal shock is what most likely caused the second, far larger, explosion. Evidence in support of that theory: the steam pressure plummeted after the torpedo strike.
In a way, the exact reason for the second explosion doesn’t matter, in that it was a chance confluence of variables that doomed the Lusitania, a week-plus “Perfect Storm” of variables. As with the Titanic, if even one of those variables was altered, the Lusitania would have been safe, such as waiting two hours to sail in order to transfer passengers from the Cameronia / Cunard ordering Turner to sail with only three boilers instead of four, since 25 knots would have put the Lusitania past U-20 and in Liverpool before Schwieger would have even been close to the Irish Coast / Had the fog lifted a half hour later, neither the Lusitania or U-20 would have crossed paths / The torpedo worked, and hit the Lusitania in the only place it was truly vulnerable, filling the longitudinal coal bunkers so quickly / Schwieger’s calculation of 21 knots instead of the actually 18 knots, which meant that the torpedo would have hit farther back causing much less damage, and almost certainly not sinking the ship. The only saving grace was the nice weather and calm seas, which saved hundreds of lives.
In a way, the exact reason for the second explosion doesn’t matter, in that it was a chance confluence of variables that doomed the Lusitania, a week-plus “Perfect Storm” of variables. As with the Titanic, if even one of those variables was altered, the Lusitania would have been safe, such as waiting two hours to sail in order to transfer passengers from the Cameronia / Cunard ordering Turner to sail with only three boilers instead of four, since 25 knots would have put the Lusitania past U-20 and in Liverpool before Schwieger would have even been close to the Irish Coast / Had the fog lifted a half hour later, neither the Lusitania or U-20 would have crossed paths / The torpedo worked, and hit the Lusitania in the only place it was truly vulnerable, filling the longitudinal coal bunkers so quickly / Schwieger’s calculation of 21 knots instead of the actually 18 knots, which meant that the torpedo would have hit farther back causing much less damage, and almost certainly not sinking the ship. The only saving grace was the nice weather and calm seas, which saved hundreds of lives.
President Wilson said nothing about the disaster for several days, sticking to his normal routines. Wilson thought that if he asked for a declaration of war from Congress, he would get it, but he knew the nation was unprepared for war. In fact, other than Theodore Roosevelt and his ilk, most of the nation agreed with Wilson. In Germany, the reaction to the disaster was one of jubilation and exaltation: as far as Germany was concerned, it was an abject lesson for the US that there was a war going on in Europe, and the US wasn’t immune.
10 May 1915: Wilson gave a mostly extemporized speech, which wasn’t wise given his emotional state. The phrase that the media latched on to was “there is such as thing as a man being too proud to fight”. That phrase struck a dull chord in that while the nation didn’t want to go to war, being “too proud” had nothing to do with it. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge (R; MA) thought the phrase was the most unfortunate thing ever uttered by Wilson.
Shortly thereafter, Wilson worked on a protest he was planning on sending to Germany. The President wanted to be firm-and-direct, but not belligerent. Wilson sent the missive over the objections of his Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, who thought that Wilson should also send a protest note to Britain to be “fair”, in that Britain was blockading Germany’s coastline on the North Sea (Bryan resigned as Secretary of State soon thereafter). The
so-called “First Lusitania Note” was the first in a line of a two year long “War on Paper” between the US and Germany.
Addendum: The Rest of the Story for the Lusitania Disaster . . .
10 May 1915: Wilson gave a mostly extemporized speech, which wasn’t wise given his emotional state. The phrase that the media latched on to was “there is such as thing as a man being too proud to fight”. That phrase struck a dull chord in that while the nation didn’t want to go to war, being “too proud” had nothing to do with it. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge (R; MA) thought the phrase was the most unfortunate thing ever uttered by Wilson.
Shortly thereafter, Wilson worked on a protest he was planning on sending to Germany. The President wanted to be firm-and-direct, but not belligerent. Wilson sent the missive over the objections of his Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, who thought that Wilson should also send a protest note to Britain to be “fair”, in that Britain was blockading Germany’s coastline on the North Sea (Bryan resigned as Secretary of State soon thereafter). The
so-called “First Lusitania Note” was the first in a line of a two year long “War on Paper” between the US and Germany.
Addendum: The Rest of the Story for the Lusitania Disaster . . .