Source: Bruce J. Schulman. The Seventies - The Great Shift in
American Culture, Society, and Politics (2001)
American Culture, Society, and Politics (2001)
The decades before the 1970s were not kind to conservatism, in that from the 1930s through the 1960s, conservatism attracted few followers on the political landscape; most Americans embraced the liberalism of the New Deal coalition during those decades. Conservatives during those years were divided on multiple fronts, lacking organization and leadership. Before the mid-1960s, the moderate wing of the Republican Party held sway (e.g. Ike), which saw its goal to be a “gentle corrective” to New Deal liberalism, while accepting the welfare state and unions. During those years, committed conservatives toiled in the political wilderness in fringe organizations, being noisy for the sake of being noisy. Conservatives were viewed, even in the Republican Party, as the “Irrelevant Right’.
Among the first conservative voices that was take seriously was William F. Buckley, who was able to unite some conservative factions, e.g. religious conservatives, libertarians, and hard line anti-Communists. Buckley created a forum for conservative views with the National Review, and in 1960 he created the Young Americans for Freedom. Next was Senator Barry Goldwater (R; AZ), who took positions that the majority of the Republican Party avoided, including rapid escalation of the Vietnam War. Goldwater spoke his mind, perhaps too much, and the media in some cases twisted the meaning of what he said. However, Goldwater was on the record for using “tactical” nuclear weapons, getting rid of popular government programs, and he viewed Civil Rights as a matter for the states, which endeared him to most white Southerners.
Among the first conservative voices that was take seriously was William F. Buckley, who was able to unite some conservative factions, e.g. religious conservatives, libertarians, and hard line anti-Communists. Buckley created a forum for conservative views with the National Review, and in 1960 he created the Young Americans for Freedom. Next was Senator Barry Goldwater (R; AZ), who took positions that the majority of the Republican Party avoided, including rapid escalation of the Vietnam War. Goldwater spoke his mind, perhaps too much, and the media in some cases twisted the meaning of what he said. However, Goldwater was on the record for using “tactical” nuclear weapons, getting rid of popular government programs, and he viewed Civil Rights as a matter for the states, which endeared him to most white Southerners.
Even though Goldwater lost to LBJ in a landslide in the Election of 1964, he was crucial in the development of modern conservatism, in that he energized the first real conservative base. During the Republican National Convention in the Cow Palace in San Francisco in the Summer of 1964, it was the new conservative wing of the Republican Party that prevailed over the liberal and moderate wings in order to nominate Goldwater. During Goldwater’s campaign, Governor Ronald Reagan (R; CA), the first true conservative elected to major office in US History, made his national political debut in a half-hour political “infomercial” promoting Goldwater, conservatism, and of course himself. The conservative wing of the Republican Party would only grow in numbers and power from that point on.
By the mid-1970s, conservatism became institutionalized, organized, disciplined, and financed, but still not quite united, calling itself the “New Right”. This New Right used push-button issues in order to galvanize support, such as right-to-life, the right to bear arms, and opposition to the Equal Rights Amendment. Single issue groups were one thing, but conservatism really started to develop across a broad spectrum, with highly motivated followers rushing into action when prompted. Multi-issue groups such as the Conservative Caucus and the Heritage Foundation strategized and organized at the grassroots level, not only lobbying and funding, but also pushing for ballot initiatives and using protest tactics (e.g. “Guerilla Theater”).
This New Right network assembled for the first time in 1974 when President Ford announced that Nelson Rockefeller (a liberal Republican), was his choice for Vice-President. To Goldwater conservatives, Rockefeller was the political devil, since he had vociferously opposed Goldwater in during the convention. At that time in the Senate, there was no way conservatives had even close to enough members to block Rockefeller’s ascension to VP. However, Rockefeller becoming VP was a key moment, in that conservatives recognized their relative impotence/irrelevance, and that far more organization and unification needed to occur.
By the mid-1970s, conservatism became institutionalized, organized, disciplined, and financed, but still not quite united, calling itself the “New Right”. This New Right used push-button issues in order to galvanize support, such as right-to-life, the right to bear arms, and opposition to the Equal Rights Amendment. Single issue groups were one thing, but conservatism really started to develop across a broad spectrum, with highly motivated followers rushing into action when prompted. Multi-issue groups such as the Conservative Caucus and the Heritage Foundation strategized and organized at the grassroots level, not only lobbying and funding, but also pushing for ballot initiatives and using protest tactics (e.g. “Guerilla Theater”).
This New Right network assembled for the first time in 1974 when President Ford announced that Nelson Rockefeller (a liberal Republican), was his choice for Vice-President. To Goldwater conservatives, Rockefeller was the political devil, since he had vociferously opposed Goldwater in during the convention. At that time in the Senate, there was no way conservatives had even close to enough members to block Rockefeller’s ascension to VP. However, Rockefeller becoming VP was a key moment, in that conservatives recognized their relative impotence/irrelevance, and that far more organization and unification needed to occur.
A political systems network was created in the New Right that started to realize and value the role of communication in politics. For conservatives in the 1970s, the best form of communication was direct mail. New Right leaders realized that they needed to communicate outside the standard methods (e.g. TV and newspapers). In other words, the New Right wanted to make an end-run around traditional media outlets, which they believed were controlled by liberals. Ironically, it was the post-Watergate campaign finance laws that allowed direct mail to work its wonders for conservatism, in that it was all about volume in mailing, since campaign contributions by individuals couldn’t exceed $1000, which meant an ocean of small donors was needed. Conservative leaders used computers and software to identify at least 15 million conservatives for direct mail, which meant a lot of money would be funneled to the conservative cause, matching or even exceeding funds raised for organized labor.
Direct mail was not just used for fundraising, but also for organization, education, motivation, and advertising. A well-placed and well-timed direct mailing meant thousands of letters, phone calls, and telegrams to members of Congress. By the late-1970s, conservatives were well-organized and funded, and a genuine political movement was in place, growing in participants and power. For the first time since the 1930s, conservatives had issues with which to organize and galvanize adherents. First was national defense: conservatives hated the fact that the role and stature of the US had diminished on a global scale (e.g. Vietnam). In particular, conservatives hated detente, which Nixon started, and Ford and Carter continued. The New Right opposed arms controls and wanted a significant military/nuclear buildup for the US.
Direct mail was not just used for fundraising, but also for organization, education, motivation, and advertising. A well-placed and well-timed direct mailing meant thousands of letters, phone calls, and telegrams to members of Congress. By the late-1970s, conservatives were well-organized and funded, and a genuine political movement was in place, growing in participants and power. For the first time since the 1930s, conservatives had issues with which to organize and galvanize adherents. First was national defense: conservatives hated the fact that the role and stature of the US had diminished on a global scale (e.g. Vietnam). In particular, conservatives hated detente, which Nixon started, and Ford and Carter continued. The New Right opposed arms controls and wanted a significant military/nuclear buildup for the US.
In late-1977, conservatives mounted a campaign against the Panama Canal being transferred to Panama. The Establishment supported the transfer, and Carter understood that if it wasn’t done then properly and peacefully, down the road in Panama there would be trouble. Conservatives viewed the Panama Canal Treaty as an affront to the honor of the US and a threat to national security. Unlike the easy vote for Rockefeller in the Senate for VP, the Panama Canal Treaty was only passed by two votes in the Senate (it needed a 2/3’s majority, since it was a treaty). That defeat further galvanized conservatives, and in 1978 and 1980, 20 members of Congress that supported the Panama Canal Treaty were defeated, as well as a Senator from NH. In many ways, the passage of the new treaty with Panama provided Reagan his first real foothold on the national political scene. Reagan became the de facto leader of the New Right in that he had been the most vocal opponent of the treaty.
Second was anti-elitism. This passionate class resentment was a reversal of sorts, in that for decades the “Country Club Set” was the poster child for conservatism, but that was not the case by the late-1970s. Conservative leaders allied themselves with the Common Man, while labeling the liberal Establishment as the “Country Club Set”. Anti-Elitism focused on the federal government bureaucracy, intellectuals, and the haughty Elites that sneered at Mom, Apple Pie, Hot Dogs, and the US flag. This conservative class warfare meant that schools and teachers were under attack. Nixon’s first VP, Spiro Agnew, was perhaps the first Republican politician that spoke out vehemently against the Elites, and years later the New Right escalated this onslaught. Liberals were also accused of immorality, with conservatives claiming that liberals showed contempt for “Family Values”.
Second was anti-elitism. This passionate class resentment was a reversal of sorts, in that for decades the “Country Club Set” was the poster child for conservatism, but that was not the case by the late-1970s. Conservative leaders allied themselves with the Common Man, while labeling the liberal Establishment as the “Country Club Set”. Anti-Elitism focused on the federal government bureaucracy, intellectuals, and the haughty Elites that sneered at Mom, Apple Pie, Hot Dogs, and the US flag. This conservative class warfare meant that schools and teachers were under attack. Nixon’s first VP, Spiro Agnew, was perhaps the first Republican politician that spoke out vehemently against the Elites, and years later the New Right escalated this onslaught. Liberals were also accused of immorality, with conservatives claiming that liberals showed contempt for “Family Values”.
Those “Family Values” were the third major focus of the New Right, which featured Phyllis Schlafly, right-to-lifers, textbook protesters, curriculum “purifiers”, and anti-gay protesters. For religious conservatives, their galvanizing moment occurred during Carter’s Presidency, when private Christian schools (which had dramatically increased in number during Forced Busing) faced the possibility that they would have to pay taxes like public schools. Liberals viewed these schools as nothing more than “lily white academies”, solely organized to resist integration, and in that liberals weren’t all that wrong. Liberals wanted the tax-exempt status for these private Christian schools revoked by the IRS. During previous decades, religious conservatives were politically quiet, but no longer after this moment.
President Carter and the IRS basically kicked a sleeping dog awake, and religious conservatives have been forever more on the political/social attack. The head of the IRS asked for Secret Service protection since he had received voluminous death threats via mail by conservatives. This event proved to be the link for religious conservatives to join in the tax revolt, which united religious and secular conservatives in essence for the first time. In 1979, Jerry Falwell organized the “Moral Majority”, drawing at least 50% of his initial support from the Christian schools imbroglio. The Moral Majority would play a key role in galvanizing religious conservatives to vote for Reagan in 1980.
President Carter and the IRS basically kicked a sleeping dog awake, and religious conservatives have been forever more on the political/social attack. The head of the IRS asked for Secret Service protection since he had received voluminous death threats via mail by conservatives. This event proved to be the link for religious conservatives to join in the tax revolt, which united religious and secular conservatives in essence for the first time. In 1979, Jerry Falwell organized the “Moral Majority”, drawing at least 50% of his initial support from the Christian schools imbroglio. The Moral Majority would play a key role in galvanizing religious conservatives to vote for Reagan in 1980.
Despite the momentum of the New Right, there remained a “residual scariness” among most US citizens towards conservatism. What needed to occur was that the New Right needed its edges smoothed, and what it supported/opposed to become more palatable to mainstream Americans. Enter the neoconservatives, which was created and ran parallel to the New Right. Many neoconservatives were former liberals that became disenchanted with their former cause. Neoconservatives were highly educated and urban, and mostly Jewish or Catholic, strangers to the Sunbelt conservatives that dominated the New Right. Neoconservatives had grown up in the “Old Left” in the 1960s, facing the wrath of the New Left, and had become sickened and turned off by the experience. Neoconservatives were then, in effect, liberals who had been changed by reality, and their new-found conservatism was mor practical and far-less crusading in nature, far closer to the mainstream than the New Right.
Neoconservatives exerted influence far beyond their small numbers, in that they were able to take the edge off conservative extremism (e.g. Goldwater conservatives), in the end making Reagan electable to the mainstream American voter. Reagan was a neoconservative, in that he was a former Democrat and New Dealer who had become disgusted with liberalism. With all the ingredients in place, the tax revolt of the late-1970s created the unity necessary for conservatives to not only galvanize themselves, but also mainstream moderates, so much so that Reagan was elected in a landslide in 1980.
Neoconservatives exerted influence far beyond their small numbers, in that they were able to take the edge off conservative extremism (e.g. Goldwater conservatives), in the end making Reagan electable to the mainstream American voter. Reagan was a neoconservative, in that he was a former Democrat and New Dealer who had become disgusted with liberalism. With all the ingredients in place, the tax revolt of the late-1970s created the unity necessary for conservatives to not only galvanize themselves, but also mainstream moderates, so much so that Reagan was elected in a landslide in 1980.