Source: Bruce J. Schulman. The Seventies - The Great Shift in
American Culture, Society, and Politics (2001)
American Culture, Society, and Politics (2001)
A similar pattern was seen in federal housing policy, in that Nixon didn’t want the federal government to get out of the business of providing housing for the poor, as Goldwater and Reagan advocated. Nixon, as with the NEA, increased federal housing spending while at the same time working around, or even destroying, the liberal Democratic systems network that had always supported, benefited, and controlled public housing.
It was a strange political alliance that supported public housing: developers that received government money, often in areas where securing private funds was impossible + construction companies that won lucrative contracts + labor unions + social services departments. All of those groups distrusted, disliked, and even hated each other, but they all benefited from federal funding for housing, and they all supported liberal Democrats who favored the program via campaign donations, campaign workers, and votes.
Nixon wanted to sabotage that alliance, but cutting federal spending on housing would have united that alliance more than ever, and also increase their opposition towards him. Nixon followed the NEA blueprint and increased funding on public housing, but he rechanneled and redirected funding, in that whenever possible, money was awarded in block grants instead of for specific projects. Block grants caused the semi-united members of the alliance to become not-so-united, since they had to compete with each other for federal spending.
It was a strange political alliance that supported public housing: developers that received government money, often in areas where securing private funds was impossible + construction companies that won lucrative contracts + labor unions + social services departments. All of those groups distrusted, disliked, and even hated each other, but they all benefited from federal funding for housing, and they all supported liberal Democrats who favored the program via campaign donations, campaign workers, and votes.
Nixon wanted to sabotage that alliance, but cutting federal spending on housing would have united that alliance more than ever, and also increase their opposition towards him. Nixon followed the NEA blueprint and increased funding on public housing, but he rechanneled and redirected funding, in that whenever possible, money was awarded in block grants instead of for specific projects. Block grants caused the semi-united members of the alliance to become not-so-united, since they had to compete with each other for federal spending.
Nixon also shifted resources from building and maintaining public housing to handing out rent subsidies for the poor, which allowed poor tenants to rent from private landlords. That meant, in effect, the liberal systems network for public housing was defunded, in that far less federal money would flow to the developers, builders, and labor unions. Nixon hoped (and it indeed happened) that the various groups in the public housing alliance would not support liberal Democratic candidates nearly as much as in the past. Urban Democrats could not oppose Nixon when so much more federal money was being spent on public housing, as well as federal subsidies for poor renters. The result was that liberal Democrats lost control of federal housing policy and also lost support from the public housing systems network.
Nixon repeated the pattern with environmental protection, with the exception of national parks. Nixon had little interest in promoting natural resources or limiting pollution, but with the Santa Barbara oil spill and smog running amok in Los Angeles, and with the rising Counterculture’s (and middle class) focus on the environment, Nixon was under pressure to act. A mood of hysteria existed in DC in terms of needing to do something to benefit the environment, and the media’s focus on the issue became intense while Congress passed bills that directly or indirectly addressed environmental concerns. Nixon was in danger of being behind the curve on the environment, not only politically, but also against groups he absolutely hated.
Nixon repeated the pattern with environmental protection, with the exception of national parks. Nixon had little interest in promoting natural resources or limiting pollution, but with the Santa Barbara oil spill and smog running amok in Los Angeles, and with the rising Counterculture’s (and middle class) focus on the environment, Nixon was under pressure to act. A mood of hysteria existed in DC in terms of needing to do something to benefit the environment, and the media’s focus on the issue became intense while Congress passed bills that directly or indirectly addressed environmental concerns. Nixon was in danger of being behind the curve on the environment, not only politically, but also against groups he absolutely hated.
Despite very strong reservations, Nixon signed into law the Clear Air Act (1970). Nixon wanted a law that was far more friendly to business, but he knew his veto would be overridden. Shortly thereafter, Nixon created the EPA. Nixon delivered a special address to Congress in February 1970 on the environment, in which the 37th President outlined a 37 point proposed program including 22 bills which featured among other things limits on strip mining, ocean dumping, pesticides, and noise, air, and water pollution.
Nixon was no environmentalist, in that while he appointed strong leaders to head the EPA, he drew a line where he believed the difference existed between sensible conservation and extreme environmentalism. Nixon believed that the liberal environmentalists embedded in the Counterculture wanted to tear down the entire political/economic system. To Nixon, the choice was between “Jobs and Smoke”, and jobs would win out every time.
Nixon refused to even remotely acknowledge the celebrations of the first Earth Day in April 1970; key members of his administration made the rounds, but the President kept his distance. Nixon in no way wanted to associate himself with the activist core of the environmentalists. On that first Earth Day, Nixon actually directed the Secretary of the Interior to endorse construction of the Alaska oil pipeline during the secretary’s Earth Day address.
Nixon was no environmentalist, in that while he appointed strong leaders to head the EPA, he drew a line where he believed the difference existed between sensible conservation and extreme environmentalism. Nixon believed that the liberal environmentalists embedded in the Counterculture wanted to tear down the entire political/economic system. To Nixon, the choice was between “Jobs and Smoke”, and jobs would win out every time.
Nixon refused to even remotely acknowledge the celebrations of the first Earth Day in April 1970; key members of his administration made the rounds, but the President kept his distance. Nixon in no way wanted to associate himself with the activist core of the environmentalists. On that first Earth Day, Nixon actually directed the Secretary of the Interior to endorse construction of the Alaska oil pipeline during the secretary’s Earth Day address.
Again and again Nixon made sure that environmental regulations ran secondary to economic growth, making sure that all EPA decisions ran on a cost-benefit review. The result of Nixon’s approach was that the EPA became far less powerful than the environmentalists envisioned. In 1972, Nixon vetoed the Clean Water bill, stating that far too much federal money would be spent, an anti-capitalist “budget buster”. Nixon believed that zero emissions on cars, secondary treatments for city water, and severe punishments for violators would cripple business and cost taxpayers. Nixon’s open opposition to the bill led to his veto easily being overridden, which resulted in a humiliating political defeat for the President. That veto proved to be an exception to his preferred subterranean back-channel efforts at devolving and redirecting federal spending and resources.
Nixon took advantage of nearly every opportunity, using his back-channel strategy to advance conservatism at the expense of the liberal Democratic Elites. Yet another example was Nixon’s “Legacy of the Parks”, in which he wanted spaces for recreation accessible to regular citizens in the face of the relentless expansion of suburbs. Nixon wanted new financing methods to purchase open lands before the cities/suburbs absorbed them, since then the land would be forever lost. Nixon’s plan was to instead of spending federal funds to buy open spaces, to give away federally-controlled lands to state/local governments. Nixon (and Gerald Ford) converted more than 80k acres of government property for recreational use, creating 642 parks, something which Nixon truly valued. While doing so, Nixon again drained resources from federal bureaucrats, and once again, Nixon had “socked it” to the liberal Democrats / Establishment in a way they could not oppose.
Nixon took advantage of nearly every opportunity, using his back-channel strategy to advance conservatism at the expense of the liberal Democratic Elites. Yet another example was Nixon’s “Legacy of the Parks”, in which he wanted spaces for recreation accessible to regular citizens in the face of the relentless expansion of suburbs. Nixon wanted new financing methods to purchase open lands before the cities/suburbs absorbed them, since then the land would be forever lost. Nixon’s plan was to instead of spending federal funds to buy open spaces, to give away federally-controlled lands to state/local governments. Nixon (and Gerald Ford) converted more than 80k acres of government property for recreational use, creating 642 parks, something which Nixon truly valued. While doing so, Nixon again drained resources from federal bureaucrats, and once again, Nixon had “socked it” to the liberal Democrats / Establishment in a way they could not oppose.
Most Americans agreed that something needed to be done about welfare, with liberal Democrats wanting to empower the poor using public assistance (e.g. “welfare is a right”). The huge increase of welfare applicants in the 1960s was due to the already-eligible poor actually applying. In 1960, about 33% of those eligible received welfare, but by 1970 it was 90%.
On the conservative side, a leading voice was the conservative economist Milton Friedman, who proposed a negative income tax. Friedman’s views were that the federal government needed to get out of the welfare business, and that the main cause of poverty was lack of cash. Friedman’s proposal of a negative income tax, in his view, would solve both problems at once. Friedman saw his plan as empowering the poor to buy what they needed instead of what social workers and Congress thought they needed. Of course, the shift to a negative income tax would undermine the established/entrenched federal welfare bureaucracy.
Nixon boldly proposed a “Guaranteed Income” that would be federal minimum support for those that qualified, including work incentives/requirements. In seemed that Nixon was pressing for a liberal goal, but he was really pursuing a conservative agenda. Nixon’s true goal was to completely eliminate the welfare system, but what he care about even more was, via his proposal, to undercut liberal opposition.
On the conservative side, a leading voice was the conservative economist Milton Friedman, who proposed a negative income tax. Friedman’s views were that the federal government needed to get out of the welfare business, and that the main cause of poverty was lack of cash. Friedman’s proposal of a negative income tax, in his view, would solve both problems at once. Friedman saw his plan as empowering the poor to buy what they needed instead of what social workers and Congress thought they needed. Of course, the shift to a negative income tax would undermine the established/entrenched federal welfare bureaucracy.
Nixon boldly proposed a “Guaranteed Income” that would be federal minimum support for those that qualified, including work incentives/requirements. In seemed that Nixon was pressing for a liberal goal, but he was really pursuing a conservative agenda. Nixon’s true goal was to completely eliminate the welfare system, but what he care about even more was, via his proposal, to undercut liberal opposition.
Nixon announced a bold plan, but he didn’t lift a finger (intentionally so) to try and get enough votes to gain passage in Congress. Democrats in Congress denounced Nixon’s guaranteed income plan as too low with far too many strings attached. Conservatives opposed the plan in that they believed that the welfare system would actually expand, adding to the federal budget. In the Senate, the Finance Committee, controlled by Southern Senators, buried Nixon’s plan. Nixon actually resubmitted his plan three times, but never worked to gather the votes to gain passage over the opposition. The result was that by 1972, the idea of replacing welfare with cash grants became the source of derisive jokes.
But Nixon in no way failed, in that by introducing his guaranteed income plan, he divided his opponents and destroyed any chances for more generous welfare proposals from passing. Nixon’s apparent boldness in his repeated proposals insulated him from criticism, in that no liberal Democrat could claim that the President watched from afar and did nothing while NYC and other major cities went broke. Nixon’s on-the-surface support for the working poor, his hatred for the welfare bureaucracy, and the stringent work requirements appealed to millions of blue collar voters, while at the same time it appeased the rising conservative wing of the Republican Party. Even in defeat, Nixon had designed a remarkable strategic and tactical victory.
But Nixon in no way failed, in that by introducing his guaranteed income plan, he divided his opponents and destroyed any chances for more generous welfare proposals from passing. Nixon’s apparent boldness in his repeated proposals insulated him from criticism, in that no liberal Democrat could claim that the President watched from afar and did nothing while NYC and other major cities went broke. Nixon’s on-the-surface support for the working poor, his hatred for the welfare bureaucracy, and the stringent work requirements appealed to millions of blue collar voters, while at the same time it appeased the rising conservative wing of the Republican Party. Even in defeat, Nixon had designed a remarkable strategic and tactical victory.