Source: Bruce J. Schulman. The Seventies - The Great Shift
in American Culture, Society, and Politics (2001)
in American Culture, Society, and Politics (2001)
Nixon’s ultimate aim was to amass as much power as possible as President. In order to be as politically invincible as possible, Nixon wanted to create a new majority coalition in the US, something he had envisioned doing long before entering the White House. By 1968, Nixon’s campaign hinged on winning over two sets of voters that traditionally voted Democratic, but appeared to be wavering. The first group Nixon targeted was white Southerners. Nixon’s
“Southern Strategy” was all about hinting, using “code” for what couldn’t be stated outright in the political arena at the time. Nixon made it clear, albeit using coded political language (e.g. “states rights”), that he was not a supporter of Civil Rights, and that he would slow down the pace of desegregation. Nixon’s “Southern Strategy” attracted Southern conservative Democrats as well as prosperous newcomers to the region into the Republican fold. Nixon also targeted as many Northern blue collar voters as possible, which were dominated by white working class ethnics that traditionally voted Democratic, along union lines. This voting bloc had become very alarmed about social issues such as crime, drugs, anti-war protesters, militants, and loose morals.
Nixon welcomed the votes of disgruntled segregationists, but he was in competition for that voting bloc with Wallace. Nixon enlisted the help of Senator Strom Thurmond (R; SC), a recent convert to the Republican Party (he had been the Presidential candidate of the “Dixiecrat” Party in 1948). Thurmond assured white Southerners that Nixon supported local control of public schools. Also, Thurmond and his acolytes tried to convince white Southerners that if they voted for Wallace, they would be throwing away their votes. That being said, the “New Nixon” of 1968 did not want to follow in the same footsteps as Goldwater in 1964, or kow-tow too much to Thurmond, knowing that if he did so, he would alienate moderate voters, and even some conservatives.
“Southern Strategy” was all about hinting, using “code” for what couldn’t be stated outright in the political arena at the time. Nixon made it clear, albeit using coded political language (e.g. “states rights”), that he was not a supporter of Civil Rights, and that he would slow down the pace of desegregation. Nixon’s “Southern Strategy” attracted Southern conservative Democrats as well as prosperous newcomers to the region into the Republican fold. Nixon also targeted as many Northern blue collar voters as possible, which were dominated by white working class ethnics that traditionally voted Democratic, along union lines. This voting bloc had become very alarmed about social issues such as crime, drugs, anti-war protesters, militants, and loose morals.
Nixon welcomed the votes of disgruntled segregationists, but he was in competition for that voting bloc with Wallace. Nixon enlisted the help of Senator Strom Thurmond (R; SC), a recent convert to the Republican Party (he had been the Presidential candidate of the “Dixiecrat” Party in 1948). Thurmond assured white Southerners that Nixon supported local control of public schools. Also, Thurmond and his acolytes tried to convince white Southerners that if they voted for Wallace, they would be throwing away their votes. That being said, the “New Nixon” of 1968 did not want to follow in the same footsteps as Goldwater in 1964, or kow-tow too much to Thurmond, knowing that if he did so, he would alienate moderate voters, and even some conservatives.
Nixon basically conceded the segregated Deep South to Wallace. Nixon anticipated a close election, and he focused on gaining as many votes as possible among the white middle class in the increasingly industrialized and suburbanized South. Nixon recognized that the population growth in the South featured an increasing number of professional-class citizens and skilled workers that had moved in from outside the region, most of whom had come of age after the
Brown Decision (1954) and viewed massive resistance to change self-defeating.
During September 1968, Nixon campaigned in Charlotte (NC), where he addressed a crowd that was mostly composed of polite well-dressed middle class citizens. Interviewed afterwards, Nixon played the middle ground, stating that he supported Brown, but he also criticized the Democrats and the courts for pushing desegregation too hard and fast. Nixon’s moderate approach was very cunning and clever. Nixon neither championed minority rights like Humphrey, and didn’t support segregation like Wallace. Nixon found a way to simultaneously endorse local desegregation efforts while also openly opposing what became known as forced busing.
Nixon’s strategy was crucial in winning swing voters away from Humprhey, which resulted in Nixon winning VA, NC, SC, FL, TN, and KY. Nixon’s “Southern Strategy” played out brilliantly in terms of winning votes, but it was also based on the fact that Nixon foresaw the massive demographic and economic changes that were about to occur in the South (and the Sunbelt) in the 1970s, which shaped the political, social, and economic landscapes of the US to this day. Nixon and some of his key advisors knew that the Sunbelt would become a new power base in the US, and given the conservative leanings of the region, it would be far more favorable for Republicans than Democrats in the fairly near future. The huge migration of Americans, by far mostly middle class, to the Sunbelt meant that the South would “lighten up” in some areas, such as being less entrenched in terms of segregation. That change in attitude and behavior needed to occur in order to become more attractive to massive investment and additional population growth, while at the same time remaining “dug in” on many conservative issues.
Brown Decision (1954) and viewed massive resistance to change self-defeating.
During September 1968, Nixon campaigned in Charlotte (NC), where he addressed a crowd that was mostly composed of polite well-dressed middle class citizens. Interviewed afterwards, Nixon played the middle ground, stating that he supported Brown, but he also criticized the Democrats and the courts for pushing desegregation too hard and fast. Nixon’s moderate approach was very cunning and clever. Nixon neither championed minority rights like Humphrey, and didn’t support segregation like Wallace. Nixon found a way to simultaneously endorse local desegregation efforts while also openly opposing what became known as forced busing.
Nixon’s strategy was crucial in winning swing voters away from Humprhey, which resulted in Nixon winning VA, NC, SC, FL, TN, and KY. Nixon’s “Southern Strategy” played out brilliantly in terms of winning votes, but it was also based on the fact that Nixon foresaw the massive demographic and economic changes that were about to occur in the South (and the Sunbelt) in the 1970s, which shaped the political, social, and economic landscapes of the US to this day. Nixon and some of his key advisors knew that the Sunbelt would become a new power base in the US, and given the conservative leanings of the region, it would be far more favorable for Republicans than Democrats in the fairly near future. The huge migration of Americans, by far mostly middle class, to the Sunbelt meant that the South would “lighten up” in some areas, such as being less entrenched in terms of segregation. That change in attitude and behavior needed to occur in order to become more attractive to massive investment and additional population growth, while at the same time remaining “dug in” on many conservative issues.
Shortly after becoming President, Nixon changed his official address from New York to Florida, saying it was time to “stop kicking the South around”. Nixon saw that the rising Sunbelt had a different set of attitudes towards race, taxes, defense, government spending, and social mores, all of which Nixon thought would spread to the working class in the North. During August 1970, while Nixon vacationed at San Clemente (CA), Pat Buchanan told the President about the book titled The Real Majority, which was designed as a political manual for the 1970s. The book was written by two unhappy and disaffected Democrats, who ironically predicted what needed to happen in Nixonian terms to rescue the Democrats. The authors argued that the key to assembling a winning coalition was being politically attractive, even just palatable, to a 47 year old Catholic housewife in Dayton (OH) whose husband was a machinist. Since the 1930s, she and her husband had voted Democratic via their pocketbook, looking to liberal Democrats for strong unions, high wages, cheap mortgages, and student loans. The authors also argued that as of the late-1960s, that same couple might defect to the Republicans since their focus had become increasingly conservative on social issues. The two authors went on, saying the couple had mixed views about Civil Rights even before moving to the suburbs. The couple had lived in a neighborhood in which many minorities lived, and that they should never have to move (the reality was they couldn’t move again) if their new neighborhood went downhill, in their view. This couple would also be very concerned to find out that their son attended a community junior college where LSD was found.
The book absolutely thrilled, electrified, and energized Nixon to his core. If he promised to not reduce blue collar wages, as well as hitting hard on rioters, protesters, and drugs, he could forge a new conservative majority. Nixon wanted to take control of the social landscape in order to force the Democrats on the defensive. Nixon wanted to target blue collar workers as well as working class white ethnics as the starting point to for what he would, in 1969, call the “Silent Majority".
The book absolutely thrilled, electrified, and energized Nixon to his core. If he promised to not reduce blue collar wages, as well as hitting hard on rioters, protesters, and drugs, he could forge a new conservative majority. Nixon wanted to take control of the social landscape in order to force the Democrats on the defensive. Nixon wanted to target blue collar workers as well as working class white ethnics as the starting point to for what he would, in 1969, call the “Silent Majority".
Nixon reached the point where he thought it was possible to create a separate political party, which he wanted to call the Independent Conservative Party. Nixon wanted this new party to unite white Southerners, the Silent Majority, and traditional suburban/rural conservatives around social issues, while at the same time ostracizing and minimizing social liberals. Nixon also wanted to envelope liberal Republicans (the economically conservative but socially minded Eastern Establishment wing of the party) while also attacking liberal Democrats. Nixon’s new party would appeal to the “Okie From Muskogee", the hero from Merle Haggard's 1969 hit song. Nixon viewed Haggard’s song as a sort of anthem for the Silent Majority, which honored the values of millions of worried/disgruntled Americans (Nixon even invited Haggard to perform in the White House).
Soon enough, Nixon discovered that it wasn’t realistic or even feasible to create a separate political party along the lines he had identified, at least in the short run. Nixon went about targeting the Silent Majority, et al, if for nothing else, create a coalition that would create an insurmountable base of support within the Republican Party and beyond. Nixon fanned the flames of social unrest and appealed to the pride of working Americans, but he took concrete steps as well, such as reaching out to organized labor. Nixon recognized that the vast majority of union members were traditionally social conservatives and deeply patriotic. Nixon believed that he could siphon away a large number of union voters that had been with FDR and the liberal Democrats for decades. Nixon went out of his way to offer generous loopholes for labor among wage/price controls, which horrified Wall Street and the business world.
Soon enough, Nixon discovered that it wasn’t realistic or even feasible to create a separate political party along the lines he had identified, at least in the short run. Nixon went about targeting the Silent Majority, et al, if for nothing else, create a coalition that would create an insurmountable base of support within the Republican Party and beyond. Nixon fanned the flames of social unrest and appealed to the pride of working Americans, but he took concrete steps as well, such as reaching out to organized labor. Nixon recognized that the vast majority of union members were traditionally social conservatives and deeply patriotic. Nixon believed that he could siphon away a large number of union voters that had been with FDR and the liberal Democrats for decades. Nixon went out of his way to offer generous loopholes for labor among wage/price controls, which horrified Wall Street and the business world.
Nixon named John Connally as Secretary of the Treasury, who was a former protege of LBJ. Nixon wanted to use Connally to siphon off conservative Democrats to his coalition; Nixon even viewed Connally has his political successor (he also viewed Connally as a “Man’s Man”). Nixon knew that Connally would not interfere with the Republican economic platform, focusing instead on keeping people as happy as possible with their wages while Nixon went after Democrats on social issues. Henry Kissinger thought that Nixon viewed Connally with absolute awe, in large part to Connally’s swaggering confidence and self-reassurance. Connally was one of the very few that Nixon did not disparage to others in private, a rare honor in “Nixon Land”.
During August 1971, Nixon adopted wage/price controls in order to try and deal with rising inflation while also cutting taxes to stimulate the economy in time for the Election of 1972. Nixon also ended the Gold Standard, which meant that the US dollar had to “float” against other currencies. Connally returned to Texas in 1972 and took control of “Democrats for Nixon after his tenure as SecTreas. Nixon was still holding out hope that he could form that third party, which might mean he could get control of Congress through realignment, not an election. By 1976, Nixon hoped, Connally would be his natural successor in that new third party.
Nixon made a big deal aboutSan Clemente (CA), referring to it as the “Western White House”, which was a symbolic strategy to show that the power base of the federal government wasn’t limited to the East. By 1971, Nixon saw that the center of the US political spectrum had shifted to the right, with millions in the Silent Majority becoming fed up with big government, federal bureaucracy, and liberals, and many moved to the Sunbelt. Another shift was taking place, in that millions of Americans believed that the government only helped other people, but never them.
During August 1971, Nixon adopted wage/price controls in order to try and deal with rising inflation while also cutting taxes to stimulate the economy in time for the Election of 1972. Nixon also ended the Gold Standard, which meant that the US dollar had to “float” against other currencies. Connally returned to Texas in 1972 and took control of “Democrats for Nixon after his tenure as SecTreas. Nixon was still holding out hope that he could form that third party, which might mean he could get control of Congress through realignment, not an election. By 1976, Nixon hoped, Connally would be his natural successor in that new third party.
Nixon made a big deal aboutSan Clemente (CA), referring to it as the “Western White House”, which was a symbolic strategy to show that the power base of the federal government wasn’t limited to the East. By 1971, Nixon saw that the center of the US political spectrum had shifted to the right, with millions in the Silent Majority becoming fed up with big government, federal bureaucracy, and liberals, and many moved to the Sunbelt. Another shift was taking place, in that millions of Americans believed that the government only helped other people, but never them.
During the 1972 Presidential campaign, Nixon ordered his administration to take a harder, more conservative stance on social issues. Nixon won the Election of 1972 by taking 49 states (Reagan would match that number in 1984), and winning 520 Electoral Votes (Reagan surpassed that total in 1984). In the process, Nixon had formed a coalition that basically exceeded Nixon’s expectations, if not his dreams, in that organized labor and the White South voted overwhelmingly for Nixon. Nixon decided that his second term was the time to promote a conservative revolution. The 37th President understood that most Americans didn’t support Big Government, but they demanded government programs that benefited them. In other words, people were not in favor of expansive government, but they were most definitely in favor of government spending channeled their way.
Nixon packaged his government spending cuts by claiming they were necessary to control inflation and to avoid raising taxes. Nixon didn’t want to have debates on specific programs, so the overall budget became the focus of Nixon’s conservative revolution; Nixon set stringent budget targets for the fiscal year ending in June 1973. Nixon refused to spend more than the $12B already appropriated by Congress, which infuriated enough members of both chambers to start informal discussions about impeachment. Nixon wanted to slash domestic government spending, and his proposed budget for 1974 featured deep cuts. Nixon even wanted to eliminate urban renewal, soil management spending for farmers, the Rural Electrification Act, mental health facilities, etc. In effect, Nixon wanted to reverse LBJ’s Great Society. However, Nixon would never be able to complete his envisioned conservative revolution due to the
Watergate Scandal. The main effect of Watergate was that as a result, people’s distrust of government became the new national default setting.
Nixon packaged his government spending cuts by claiming they were necessary to control inflation and to avoid raising taxes. Nixon didn’t want to have debates on specific programs, so the overall budget became the focus of Nixon’s conservative revolution; Nixon set stringent budget targets for the fiscal year ending in June 1973. Nixon refused to spend more than the $12B already appropriated by Congress, which infuriated enough members of both chambers to start informal discussions about impeachment. Nixon wanted to slash domestic government spending, and his proposed budget for 1974 featured deep cuts. Nixon even wanted to eliminate urban renewal, soil management spending for farmers, the Rural Electrification Act, mental health facilities, etc. In effect, Nixon wanted to reverse LBJ’s Great Society. However, Nixon would never be able to complete his envisioned conservative revolution due to the
Watergate Scandal. The main effect of Watergate was that as a result, people’s distrust of government became the new national default setting.