Source: Les Payne. The Dead Are Arising - The Life of Malcolm X (2020)
Malcolm X was visiting/preaching at the NOI Atlanta temple in the Fall of 1960. Security at the temple was quadrupled due to Malcolm X’s visit, and he was being recorded in order to play it back on the radio where several cities aired the weekly broadcast “Mr. Muhammad Speaks”. Trips to the “Bible Belt” stimulated the crusader in Malcolm X, and his first official task in the South was to inaugurate the Atlanta temple (#15). During Malcolm X’s sermon, Jeremiah X (the Atlanta temple’s minister) was given a telegram from the Georgia Ku Klux Klan, requesting a meeting with the NOI. Malcolm X was handed the telegram after his sermon, and he was caught totally by surprise, wondering what the real motive was behind the request.
Unknown to Malcolm X was that the FBI was fully aware of the cable, monitoring the communications of the KKK and the NOI. As it turned out, J. Edgar Hoover had around 2000 paid FBI informants in the KKK. It was possible that the telegram was actually a move by Hoover to discredit Malcolm X and the NOI, and to even get informants inside the NOI. The original telegram was destroyed long ago, and the KKK kept the telegram secret for decades. However, very much like Ida Tarbell researching Rockefeller’s actions in the 1870s, where documentary evidence was scant, the author pieced together what most likely occurred, interviewing many that were in-the-know.
Unknown to Malcolm X was that the FBI was fully aware of the cable, monitoring the communications of the KKK and the NOI. As it turned out, J. Edgar Hoover had around 2000 paid FBI informants in the KKK. It was possible that the telegram was actually a move by Hoover to discredit Malcolm X and the NOI, and to even get informants inside the NOI. The original telegram was destroyed long ago, and the KKK kept the telegram secret for decades. However, very much like Ida Tarbell researching Rockefeller’s actions in the 1870s, where documentary evidence was scant, the author pieced together what most likely occurred, interviewing many that were in-the-know.
The Brown v. the Board of Education at Topeka decision in 1954 directly led to existing Civil Rights organizations to work harder to end segregation, and new groups were formed, such as the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (MLK’s organization). Those efforts were met with increased opposition by whites, not only in the South. The KKK had stepped up its terror after the Brown decision by several-fold. That racist terror was intended to derail the Civil Rights organizations that were trying to end segregation. The NOI operated as a sort of “3rd rail”, in that it opposed integration on the African-American side of the equation. EM had long stated that African-Americans needed to withdraw from the de facto segregation in the North, and the de jure segregation in the South. To the NOI in the mid-1950s, the Brown decision simply didn’t matter or register on their radar.
Adding to the likelihood that the KKK telegram was a Hoover creation, few whites in the South even remotely cared about the NOI, seeing it as a relatively harmless Northern group, whereas MLK was a Southerner. Malcolm X was fully aware that Marcus Garvey had met with the 2nd KKK in 1922, and he was also aware of the price Garvey paid among Civil Rights groups. Needless to say, Malcolm X wanted to avoid a similar disaster. But the risk-taker in him had never gone away from his criminal past, and Malcolm X believed he would score big with the media in Harlem if he played his cards right with the KKK.
Malcolm X telephoned EM with the news, per protocol, and “The Messenger” was very circumspect on the phone, aware of the possible eavesdropping (the procedure was 3 minutes or less on the phone). Matters of any significance were to be personally reported, but these security procedures were very often ignored, even by EM. As it turned out, on 4 January 1957, four telephone bugs had been planted by the FBI in EM’s palatial compound in Chicago, with additional wiretaps in other NOI locations by 1960.
Adding to the likelihood that the KKK telegram was a Hoover creation, few whites in the South even remotely cared about the NOI, seeing it as a relatively harmless Northern group, whereas MLK was a Southerner. Malcolm X was fully aware that Marcus Garvey had met with the 2nd KKK in 1922, and he was also aware of the price Garvey paid among Civil Rights groups. Needless to say, Malcolm X wanted to avoid a similar disaster. But the risk-taker in him had never gone away from his criminal past, and Malcolm X believed he would score big with the media in Harlem if he played his cards right with the KKK.
Malcolm X telephoned EM with the news, per protocol, and “The Messenger” was very circumspect on the phone, aware of the possible eavesdropping (the procedure was 3 minutes or less on the phone). Matters of any significance were to be personally reported, but these security procedures were very often ignored, even by EM. As it turned out, on 4 January 1957, four telephone bugs had been planted by the FBI in EM’s palatial compound in Chicago, with additional wiretaps in other NOI locations by 1960.
EM summoned Malcolm X and Jeremiah X to make their way to Chicago as soon as possible. On the way to Chicago, Malcolm X tried to figure out a way to influence, if not control, the NOI response to the KKK telegram. Jeremiah X was EM’s overseer for the entire South, and he refused to assist Malcolm X with his planning, saying that EM was to be the decider in the matter. Conventional wisdom had Jeremiah X being selected as the NOI representative that would meet with the KKK, but Malcolm X had other ideas on that front. Without any evidence, EM concluded that the telegram was an Olive Branch from the KKK, yet to Malcolm X it seemed unsettling that the KKK didn’t take the harsh rhetoric of the NOI very seriously. Malcolm X was comforted, at least somewhat, that the telegram had found its way to him, albeit by accident. Malcolm X would have been insulted by a direct appeal, since he had made his hatred for the KKK very clear for quite some time.
Malcolm X was holding out to craft an aggressive response that would play well in Harlem, and with the media. Malcolm X told those assembled in Chicago that there should be no assistance from the KKK in terms of separating from white society, it had to be on the African-American side of the coin. There was consensus in the meeting that the Brown decision had undercut, at least somewhat over the last few years, their appeal/demand for separatism, since the unanimous Supreme Court decision convinced millions of African-Americans that it was possible to achieve integration. The tide seemed to be turning away from the NOI to mainstream Civil Rights leaders and organizations, especially MLK, who as a Civil Rights leader was gaining serious momentum in the Fall of 1960.
MLK’s arrest in Georgia in October 1960 proved to be a turning point in the Election of 1960. Despite advice from such pillars as Jackie Robinson, Vice-President Richard Nixon refused to make a telephone call to Coretta Scott King to at least express his concern. JFK (and soon enough RFK) realized the political advantage the phone call would have on their campaign, and it was Senator Kennedy that called Coretta Scott King. That phone call was a spark that caused a political seachange in African-American voting behavior in 1960. In 1956, 60% of the African-American vote went to President Eisenhower, but in 1960, 70% of that vote went to JFK, which in effect turned five states to Kennedy, and the election.
Malcolm X was holding out to craft an aggressive response that would play well in Harlem, and with the media. Malcolm X told those assembled in Chicago that there should be no assistance from the KKK in terms of separating from white society, it had to be on the African-American side of the coin. There was consensus in the meeting that the Brown decision had undercut, at least somewhat over the last few years, their appeal/demand for separatism, since the unanimous Supreme Court decision convinced millions of African-Americans that it was possible to achieve integration. The tide seemed to be turning away from the NOI to mainstream Civil Rights leaders and organizations, especially MLK, who as a Civil Rights leader was gaining serious momentum in the Fall of 1960.
MLK’s arrest in Georgia in October 1960 proved to be a turning point in the Election of 1960. Despite advice from such pillars as Jackie Robinson, Vice-President Richard Nixon refused to make a telephone call to Coretta Scott King to at least express his concern. JFK (and soon enough RFK) realized the political advantage the phone call would have on their campaign, and it was Senator Kennedy that called Coretta Scott King. That phone call was a spark that caused a political seachange in African-American voting behavior in 1960. In 1956, 60% of the African-American vote went to President Eisenhower, but in 1960, 70% of that vote went to JFK, which in effect turned five states to Kennedy, and the election.
In Southern states, the KKK did its best to whip up a frenzy of hate and fear against JFK, with his Catholicism a contributing reason. JFK’s election and inauguration led to a boom in KKK membership nationwide. The Civil Rights Movement believed that the power of the vote was the key to integration, and by 1960, it was MLK, not EM, that had caught the fancy of millions of African-Americans, while at the same time striking fear and extreme hatred among Southern whites, and murderous rage in the KKK. By 1960, Malcolm X was increasingly being challenged that the separatist rhetoric of the NOI exactly mirrored that of the KKK. Another factor in play was that, unlike the NOI, the Civil Rights Movement was aimed at both African-Americans and whites. Malcolm X had started to chafe at EM’s insistence that no organized form of self-defense (retribution) would occur.
In the meeting in Chicago, trying to figure out what to do with the KKK telegram served to show the differences between Malcolm X and EM. The key question was this: should the NOI bargain or challenge the KKK; or in other words, “Fight or Flight”. Malcolm X favored fight (retribution), whereas EM favored flight (separatism). Malcolm X at least hoped that EM would publicly state that irreconcilable differences existed between the NOI and the KKK, for example the KKK’s belief in racial superiority. By 1960, the KKK had become marginalize, on the fringe of society, compared to the 2nd KKK of the 1920s, which was mainstream.
Malcolm X hoped that there would be a public debate between the NOI and the KKK, and that he would be the NOI Debater-in-Chief. Malcolm X believed that in crushing the KKK in public debate, he would become more famous, as would EM and the NOI. Such a display of NOI fearlessness, Malcolm X believed, would also lead to a surge in recruiting, taking some of the momentum away from MLK et al.
In the meeting in Chicago, trying to figure out what to do with the KKK telegram served to show the differences between Malcolm X and EM. The key question was this: should the NOI bargain or challenge the KKK; or in other words, “Fight or Flight”. Malcolm X favored fight (retribution), whereas EM favored flight (separatism). Malcolm X at least hoped that EM would publicly state that irreconcilable differences existed between the NOI and the KKK, for example the KKK’s belief in racial superiority. By 1960, the KKK had become marginalize, on the fringe of society, compared to the 2nd KKK of the 1920s, which was mainstream.
Malcolm X hoped that there would be a public debate between the NOI and the KKK, and that he would be the NOI Debater-in-Chief. Malcolm X believed that in crushing the KKK in public debate, he would become more famous, as would EM and the NOI. Such a display of NOI fearlessness, Malcolm X believed, would also lead to a surge in recruiting, taking some of the momentum away from MLK et al.
EM appeared to have entirely different ideas on the topic compared to Malcolm X. EM knew all about the racist terror in the South, growing up in Georgia, but at his core, EM was “Flight”, not “Fight”. While Malcolm X was loyal to EM, his desire for conflict ran counter with EM’s wishes. Malcolm X almost seemed to be hardwired for conflict, as was seen in his criminal days. At the end of the meeting, EM calmly instructed a frustrated Malcolm X, and a resigned Jeremiah X, to meet with the KKK. EM told them that “they want what we want”, but he wanted the two to make it clear to the KKK that the NOI was for separation, not segregation.
Malcolm X now faced a major conflict of conscience. His hopes of a resounding victory in a public debate were crushed, replaced instead with what Malcolm X though of as “Begging Bowl” plea instead of an aggressive assertion. Malcolm X accepted the assignment, knowing that EM could not be budged from his stance. In the back of Malcolm X’s mind was the possibility that EM was exploring an unholy alliance with the KKK, and if so, how that would affect how he was perceived. The Chicago meeting about the KKK proved to be the first string that was pulled that started to unravel Malcolm X’s unquestioned loyalty to EM.
Malcolm X decided to exploit every inch of wiggle room available with the upcoming secret meeting with the KKK under EM’s instructions; the unquestioningly loyal disciple had started to doubt EM. Elijah Muhammad told both Malcolm X and Jeremiah X to tell the KKK that in effect White America owed reparations to African-Americans, and that the KKK should assist in that endeavor, or at least not interfere. Also, both men were to bargain for free movement of African-Americans throughout the South. It was as if EM was totally naive, or tone-deaf to the Civil Rights landscape of 1960. Malcolm X was concerned that EM had made a tactical mistake, conceding advantage to the KKK, in that he would not be allowed to negotiate as an equal. Malcolm X believed that EM simply assumed that the extreme hatred of the KKK towards African-Americans would actually cause them to assist with the NOI’s goal of separatism. Worse yet as far as Malcolm X was concerned, there wasn’t any incentive or threat to the KKK if the didn’t assist the NOI.
Malcolm X now faced a major conflict of conscience. His hopes of a resounding victory in a public debate were crushed, replaced instead with what Malcolm X though of as “Begging Bowl” plea instead of an aggressive assertion. Malcolm X accepted the assignment, knowing that EM could not be budged from his stance. In the back of Malcolm X’s mind was the possibility that EM was exploring an unholy alliance with the KKK, and if so, how that would affect how he was perceived. The Chicago meeting about the KKK proved to be the first string that was pulled that started to unravel Malcolm X’s unquestioned loyalty to EM.
Malcolm X decided to exploit every inch of wiggle room available with the upcoming secret meeting with the KKK under EM’s instructions; the unquestioningly loyal disciple had started to doubt EM. Elijah Muhammad told both Malcolm X and Jeremiah X to tell the KKK that in effect White America owed reparations to African-Americans, and that the KKK should assist in that endeavor, or at least not interfere. Also, both men were to bargain for free movement of African-Americans throughout the South. It was as if EM was totally naive, or tone-deaf to the Civil Rights landscape of 1960. Malcolm X was concerned that EM had made a tactical mistake, conceding advantage to the KKK, in that he would not be allowed to negotiate as an equal. Malcolm X believed that EM simply assumed that the extreme hatred of the KKK towards African-Americans would actually cause them to assist with the NOI’s goal of separatism. Worse yet as far as Malcolm X was concerned, there wasn’t any incentive or threat to the KKK if the didn’t assist the NOI.