Source: Erik Larson. Dead Wake - The Last Crossing of the Lusitania (2015)
7 May 1915: Colonel House met with Sir Edward Grey, Britain’s Foreign Secretary, at a famous botanical garden. Grey asked what the US would think if a passenger liner was sunk by Germany, and House stated that the “flame of indignation” would rise to a point where it would be likely that the US would enter the war. The very same topic came up later when House met with King George V at Buckingham Palace. The king specifically mentioned the Lusitania in his hypothetical scenario.
Using binoculars, Schwieger saw a huge ship in the distance, which was heading in his direction, so he ordered U-20 into a dive, hoping to be able to target the liner. Once at periscope depth, Schwieger ordered maximum speed (9 knots), and set a course trying to converge with the liner, which was still miles away. When the liner was 2 miles away, it veered off on a different course which distanced the ship from the U-20, juast as with the cruiser Juno. Schwieger knew he was out of luck, but as with the cruiser, he followed the liner.
On the bridge, Turner faced a dilemma in which he had no experience, in that if the messages from the Admiralty were correct, there were U-Boats behind and in front of the Lusitania. Also, Turner had a timing problem, in that Liverpool was 250 nautical miles away, and he had to take into account that he could only approach the Mersey Bar at high tide. If Turner went top speed at 21 knots, he’d arrive at the Mersey Bar too early, and would have to circle in what he assumed would be U-Boat infested waters.
Using binoculars, Schwieger saw a huge ship in the distance, which was heading in his direction, so he ordered U-20 into a dive, hoping to be able to target the liner. Once at periscope depth, Schwieger ordered maximum speed (9 knots), and set a course trying to converge with the liner, which was still miles away. When the liner was 2 miles away, it veered off on a different course which distanced the ship from the U-20, juast as with the cruiser Juno. Schwieger knew he was out of luck, but as with the cruiser, he followed the liner.
On the bridge, Turner faced a dilemma in which he had no experience, in that if the messages from the Admiralty were correct, there were U-Boats behind and in front of the Lusitania. Also, Turner had a timing problem, in that Liverpool was 250 nautical miles away, and he had to take into account that he could only approach the Mersey Bar at high tide. If Turner went top speed at 21 knots, he’d arrive at the Mersey Bar too early, and would have to circle in what he assumed would be U-Boat infested waters.
No matter the speed, Turner was going to go through St. George’s Channel at night, which would be a major problem if there was fog. Also, he was further from the Irish Coast than he preferred, 20 miles instead of one mile in fine weather. After consulting his top officers, Turner decided that the first thing that he needed to do was to pinpoint his exact location, which might take 30 minutes, since he needed to see specific landmarks on the Irish Coast.
Once his location was confirmed, Turner planned on a speed of 18 knots so he would arrive at the Mersey Bar early the next morning at the perfect time to enter the harbor without stopping or circling. Turner felt comfortable with his decisions, since 18 knots was still faster than any U-Boat. Turner also planned on moving the Lusitania closer to shore before he entered the most narrow part of St. George’s Channel, which went against the Admiralty’s directive of sailing in mid-channel. Turner still felt it was the best course of action, despite the Admiralty’s advice.
At around 1:30 pm, Turner ordered a turn to starboard so the Lusitania would be in line with the coast, which would allow the process of pinpointing his location to begin. To many passengers, the the process of pinpointing seemed like zig-zagging, and at times, it appeared that the Lusitania was pointed towards open ocean.
Once his location was confirmed, Turner planned on a speed of 18 knots so he would arrive at the Mersey Bar early the next morning at the perfect time to enter the harbor without stopping or circling. Turner felt comfortable with his decisions, since 18 knots was still faster than any U-Boat. Turner also planned on moving the Lusitania closer to shore before he entered the most narrow part of St. George’s Channel, which went against the Admiralty’s directive of sailing in mid-channel. Turner still felt it was the best course of action, despite the Admiralty’s advice.
At around 1:30 pm, Turner ordered a turn to starboard so the Lusitania would be in line with the coast, which would allow the process of pinpointing his location to begin. To many passengers, the the process of pinpointing seemed like zig-zagging, and at times, it appeared that the Lusitania was pointed towards open ocean.
At around 1:35 pm, Schwieger saw the liner change course, and again it started to move straight towards U-20. To Schwieger, the ship could not have steered into a more perfect course; it was as if the huge liner was daring U-20 to fire a torpedo. It appeared that the ship was heading towards Queenstown, so Schwieger ordered a course so the U-20 would be in the perfect 90 degree targeting position; of the three remaining torpedoes, Schwieger selected a G6. Schwieger knew all the liner had to do was to make another turn, and U-20 would be denied the chance. Also, the liner’s lookouts might see the periscope’s wake, and change course and even alert destroyers in the area. Schwieger noticed that the liner was sailing alone; he wrote in his log that he couldn’t understand why the huge liner (he had to know it was the Lusitania at that point) was taking this route instead of the more traditional route. Schwieger ordered the torpedo set for a depth of 3 meters, and the torpedo was armed, and the tube was flooded.
The Lusitania was 16 hours away from Liverpool, or a lunch, dinner, and breakfast (in Liverpool’s harbor) away. When lunch was served, the Lusitania was well into the war zone, as passengers well knew. Schwieger’s best estimate of the speed of the liner was 21 knots, and he calculated the distance at 700 meters. At 2:10 pm, Schwieger gave the order to fire the torpedo, and it shot out of the tube traveling at 44 mph, which meant it would hit the ship in 35 seconds, which to the crew of U-20 seemed like an eternity.
The Lusitania was 16 hours away from Liverpool, or a lunch, dinner, and breakfast (in Liverpool’s harbor) away. When lunch was served, the Lusitania was well into the war zone, as passengers well knew. Schwieger’s best estimate of the speed of the liner was 21 knots, and he calculated the distance at 700 meters. At 2:10 pm, Schwieger gave the order to fire the torpedo, and it shot out of the tube traveling at 44 mph, which meant it would hit the ship in 35 seconds, which to the crew of U-20 seemed like an eternity.
7 May 1915, 2 pm: The Lusitania had burned 6000 tons of coal, and the bunkers that ran the length of the hull on port and starboard were mostly empty tunnels, layered/coated with coal dust. Turner ordered the Lusitania parallel to the Irish Coast to continue calculating position. 2nd Class was halfway through lunch, with 1st Class passengers done with lunch and moving about the ship, using the two electric elevators.
One of the watchers on the starboard side, open to the sea, saw the torpedo tracking towards the Lusitania, and he reached for his megaphone, and shouted “Here is a torpedo coming” (the track behind an advancing torpedo was referred to as a “Dead Wake”`). The smoothness of the ocean at the time meant that some passengers got a good look at the advancing torpedo. Had it been acknowledged that passenger ships could be targeted, and had submarine strategies been better understood, Turner would have had an option or two at his disposal at this moment. First, Turner could have ordered an immediate reversing of the engines to throw off the timing of the torpedo, or second, he could have slightly changed course to minimize the damage.. Two months after the Lusitania sank, the Mauretania turned starboard, directly into the U-Boat; the two torpedoes missed, and the U-Boat submerged and fled.
One of the watchers on the starboard side, open to the sea, saw the torpedo tracking towards the Lusitania, and he reached for his megaphone, and shouted “Here is a torpedo coming” (the track behind an advancing torpedo was referred to as a “Dead Wake”`). The smoothness of the ocean at the time meant that some passengers got a good look at the advancing torpedo. Had it been acknowledged that passenger ships could be targeted, and had submarine strategies been better understood, Turner would have had an option or two at his disposal at this moment. First, Turner could have ordered an immediate reversing of the engines to throw off the timing of the torpedo, or second, he could have slightly changed course to minimize the damage.. Two months after the Lusitania sank, the Mauretania turned starboard, directly into the U-Boat; the two torpedoes missed, and the U-Boat submerged and fled.
Schwieger entered into his log that the torpedo hit the liner on the starboard side close to the bridge. Schwieger also mentioned that the explosion was unusually large, and he wondered if the torpedo had ignited a boiler or coal dust. According to his log, it was only after Schwieger had his ship identification specialist look through the periscope that he found out that he had hit the Lusitania, but that seems very hard to believe that Schwieger didn’t already know. Schwieger took back the periscope, and what he saw shocked him.
When the torpedo hit the Lusitania, 350 lbs of explosives detonated on impact under the bridge on the starboard side about 10 feet below the waterline. The “phase change” in in the explosion, which turned solid explosives into gas, releasing heat at a temperature of 9000 degree Fahrenheit under tremendous pressure, meant that the hull of the Lusitania was nothing more than tissue paper. The geyser of seawater and debris rose to a level twice that of the height of the Lusitania, and since the ship was moving forward at 18 knots, the seawater/debris collapsed on the deck. A hole the size of a small house was below the waterline, more horizontal that vertical (40 ft x 15 ft), but thousands of rivets and steel plates were loosened in an area about 15 times the size of the hole. None of the designers of the Lusitania had a scintilla of an idea that the ship would be hit by a torpedo below the waterline, so there was nothing below to contain the explosion . . .
Addendum: Immediately After the Torpedo Hit the Lusitania . . .
When the torpedo hit the Lusitania, 350 lbs of explosives detonated on impact under the bridge on the starboard side about 10 feet below the waterline. The “phase change” in in the explosion, which turned solid explosives into gas, releasing heat at a temperature of 9000 degree Fahrenheit under tremendous pressure, meant that the hull of the Lusitania was nothing more than tissue paper. The geyser of seawater and debris rose to a level twice that of the height of the Lusitania, and since the ship was moving forward at 18 knots, the seawater/debris collapsed on the deck. A hole the size of a small house was below the waterline, more horizontal that vertical (40 ft x 15 ft), but thousands of rivets and steel plates were loosened in an area about 15 times the size of the hole. None of the designers of the Lusitania had a scintilla of an idea that the ship would be hit by a torpedo below the waterline, so there was nothing below to contain the explosion . . .
Addendum: Immediately After the Torpedo Hit the Lusitania . . .