Source: Garrett M. Graff. Watergate - A New History (2022)
Watergate: An Introduction . . .
By the time Nixon became President, Washington, D.C. had changed from doing part-time government business into the absolute center of federal power, directing the world’s largest economy and driving foreign affairs. Also by that time, Congress was no longer the most powerful branch in the federal government, in that the Executive Branch had become the driving force. One result of that shift was the exploding bureaucracy of the Executive Branch. For President Richard Nixon, that caused a great dilemma: who should he trust, and how to inspire and manage those who worked in the Executive Branch, which took a great deal of his energy, time, and focus.
Adding to Nixon’s travails as President was that he inherited the Vietnam War and LBJ’s Great Society. Nixon also inherited a shift in the national mood, from the belief that the future would be better than the present to that of insecurity, apprehension, anxiety, fragmentation, anger, and sometimes violent division. Nixon’s rise was largely due to the national sense that the nation was losing its way, as well as the tremendously tumultuous and violent year of 1968. All that sturm and drang directly impacted US politics, and an increasing number of voters, maybe not even realizing that they had taken a turn towards conservatism, voted against liberal candidates, programs, and ideas. For example, LBJ’s “War on Poverty” became Nixon’s “Welfare Mess”.
By the time Nixon became President, Washington, D.C. had changed from doing part-time government business into the absolute center of federal power, directing the world’s largest economy and driving foreign affairs. Also by that time, Congress was no longer the most powerful branch in the federal government, in that the Executive Branch had become the driving force. One result of that shift was the exploding bureaucracy of the Executive Branch. For President Richard Nixon, that caused a great dilemma: who should he trust, and how to inspire and manage those who worked in the Executive Branch, which took a great deal of his energy, time, and focus.
Adding to Nixon’s travails as President was that he inherited the Vietnam War and LBJ’s Great Society. Nixon also inherited a shift in the national mood, from the belief that the future would be better than the present to that of insecurity, apprehension, anxiety, fragmentation, anger, and sometimes violent division. Nixon’s rise was largely due to the national sense that the nation was losing its way, as well as the tremendously tumultuous and violent year of 1968. All that sturm and drang directly impacted US politics, and an increasing number of voters, maybe not even realizing that they had taken a turn towards conservatism, voted against liberal candidates, programs, and ideas. For example, LBJ’s “War on Poverty” became Nixon’s “Welfare Mess”.
Fears over desegregation, illegal drugs, crime, African-American Civil Rights, the Counterculture, and the New Left led to a conservative backlash in the US. Nixon became the target from the same New Left forces that had gone after LBJ. The sense that a small sliver of the US population was trying to foment revolution was a real thing to the Nixon administration. The result was a highly charged atmosphere in the Nixon administration where every day was “crisis mode”, and there were days where the White House became a bunker, where Nixon seemed to be under some sort of siege.
During 1966, Nixon and John Mitchell forged a unique bond when Nixon came to NYC to work in a law firm. Nixon’s decision to go to NYC was rooted in his reluctant realization that he needed to make connections with some Eastern Elites if his planned political comeback was to become reality. Nixon had great admiration for Mitchell (viewing him as a “Real Man”), which was not exactly reciprocated.
Mitchell was Nixon’s campaign manager in 1968, running point on what became known as the “Southern Strategy”, which in essence was political code for States Rights, which was code for anti-Civil Rights. The “Southern Strategy” succeeded in drawing the conservative wing of the Democratic Party to Nixon, setting up a platform of race-based politics which still permeates the Republican Party. Like the Red Scare of the 1950s, the “Southern Strategy” was poisonous and ugly for US politics, but sadly very effective, stoking fears to create a huge voting base.
During 1966, Nixon and John Mitchell forged a unique bond when Nixon came to NYC to work in a law firm. Nixon’s decision to go to NYC was rooted in his reluctant realization that he needed to make connections with some Eastern Elites if his planned political comeback was to become reality. Nixon had great admiration for Mitchell (viewing him as a “Real Man”), which was not exactly reciprocated.
Mitchell was Nixon’s campaign manager in 1968, running point on what became known as the “Southern Strategy”, which in essence was political code for States Rights, which was code for anti-Civil Rights. The “Southern Strategy” succeeded in drawing the conservative wing of the Democratic Party to Nixon, setting up a platform of race-based politics which still permeates the Republican Party. Like the Red Scare of the 1950s, the “Southern Strategy” was poisonous and ugly for US politics, but sadly very effective, stoking fears to create a huge voting base.
To Nixon and a growing number of his ilk in the US, the source of most of the nation’s troubles came from the liberal and permissive Eastern Establishment, which was the protective haven and the “encouragers” for the forces that were tearing down the US, such as hippies, drug abusers, aggressive activists, and left-wing radicals.
Nixon decided on having a very small inner circle of people that had direct access to him. Nixon had always planned on a minimalist staff once he became President, and also that the most important decisions would be made by the White House, not Cabinet departments. For example, Nixon would conduct foreign policy, not the State Department. Nixon didn’t waste time in centralizing power away from the various Cabinet departments to the White House, which also maximized Nixon’s solitude and “thinking time”. One of Nixon’s greatest passions was to be alone with a yellow legal pad and pen, brainstorming ideas, strategies, etc.
The three men of which Nixon allowed the most access were H.R. Haldeman (Chief of Staff), John Erhlichman (Domestic Advisor), and Henry Kissinger (National Security Advisor). As Dan Rather of CBS observed, never before had so much authority and so little accountability been delegated to so few. Haldeman had been with Nixon in one capacity or another since 1951, when Nixon was a US Senator. Haldeman deeply admired Nixon, in large part because he viewed Nixon as a fighter. Nixon had built his political career on fighting Communism, especially within the US. In exposing Alger Hiss as a Soviet informant in the State Department in the late-1940s, in effect Nixon started forces that became known as McCarthyism. Nixon continued to be on the attack, labeling his election opponents as being soft on communism, especially in 1950, running for the US Senate against Democrat Helen Gahagan Douglas, referring to her in campaign broadsides as “The Pink Lady”.
Nixon decided on having a very small inner circle of people that had direct access to him. Nixon had always planned on a minimalist staff once he became President, and also that the most important decisions would be made by the White House, not Cabinet departments. For example, Nixon would conduct foreign policy, not the State Department. Nixon didn’t waste time in centralizing power away from the various Cabinet departments to the White House, which also maximized Nixon’s solitude and “thinking time”. One of Nixon’s greatest passions was to be alone with a yellow legal pad and pen, brainstorming ideas, strategies, etc.
The three men of which Nixon allowed the most access were H.R. Haldeman (Chief of Staff), John Erhlichman (Domestic Advisor), and Henry Kissinger (National Security Advisor). As Dan Rather of CBS observed, never before had so much authority and so little accountability been delegated to so few. Haldeman had been with Nixon in one capacity or another since 1951, when Nixon was a US Senator. Haldeman deeply admired Nixon, in large part because he viewed Nixon as a fighter. Nixon had built his political career on fighting Communism, especially within the US. In exposing Alger Hiss as a Soviet informant in the State Department in the late-1940s, in effect Nixon started forces that became known as McCarthyism. Nixon continued to be on the attack, labeling his election opponents as being soft on communism, especially in 1950, running for the US Senate against Democrat Helen Gahagan Douglas, referring to her in campaign broadsides as “The Pink Lady”.
The communist threat within the US was never as real or grand as Nixon, Senator Joseph McCarthy (R; WI), FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover (and many others) feared or trumpeted, but doing so won elections and advanced political careers. Nixon was perhaps the greatest beneficiary of that strategy during that period, in that he went from a Representative in 1946, to a Senator in 1950, and in 1952 he was selected as Eisenhower’s Vice-President, in large part due to his anti-communist bona fides.
It wasn’t until 1956 that Haldeman became one of Nixon’s go-to guys, when he served as an advance man for the Vice-President in 1956, and in 1960 when Nixon was the Republican candidate for President. During Nixon’s “Wilderness Years” during the early-to-mid-1960s, Haldeman remained loyal to Nixon. Haldeman rose in the advertising world, developing sales and messaging skills that would prove useful in politics and campaigning. Haldeman had a knack of convincing people to buy things that they really didn’t need, or even considered purchasing.
It was Haldeman that convinced Nixon to use television as the main campaign vehicle in running for President in 1968 against VP Hubert Humphrey. While Nixon’s campaign messaging reached a broad audience immediately and repeatedly via television political ads, it also allowed Nixon more privacy during a hectic campaign, which meant that when Nixon hit the campaign trail, it was with high energy. Haldeman was a major factor in Nixon becoming the first losing President of the 20th Century to win the Presidency in a later election.
During Nixon’s first term, Haldeman quickly emerged as the President’s lead advisor as Chief of Staff, one of the very few that had unfettered access to Nixon. Haldeman was rarely more than a few feet away from the President during working hours, and he saw every document before it reached Nixon. Haldeman was also Nixon’s “Confrontation Guy”, who said “no” when Nixon couldn’t, and dealt with staffers so Nixon did not have to. Haldeman’s most important role was listening and absorbing Nixon’s fears, hopes, obsessions, insecurities, victories, losses, etc.
It wasn’t until 1956 that Haldeman became one of Nixon’s go-to guys, when he served as an advance man for the Vice-President in 1956, and in 1960 when Nixon was the Republican candidate for President. During Nixon’s “Wilderness Years” during the early-to-mid-1960s, Haldeman remained loyal to Nixon. Haldeman rose in the advertising world, developing sales and messaging skills that would prove useful in politics and campaigning. Haldeman had a knack of convincing people to buy things that they really didn’t need, or even considered purchasing.
It was Haldeman that convinced Nixon to use television as the main campaign vehicle in running for President in 1968 against VP Hubert Humphrey. While Nixon’s campaign messaging reached a broad audience immediately and repeatedly via television political ads, it also allowed Nixon more privacy during a hectic campaign, which meant that when Nixon hit the campaign trail, it was with high energy. Haldeman was a major factor in Nixon becoming the first losing President of the 20th Century to win the Presidency in a later election.
During Nixon’s first term, Haldeman quickly emerged as the President’s lead advisor as Chief of Staff, one of the very few that had unfettered access to Nixon. Haldeman was rarely more than a few feet away from the President during working hours, and he saw every document before it reached Nixon. Haldeman was also Nixon’s “Confrontation Guy”, who said “no” when Nixon couldn’t, and dealt with staffers so Nixon did not have to. Haldeman’s most important role was listening and absorbing Nixon’s fears, hopes, obsessions, insecurities, victories, losses, etc.
Haldeman translated Nixon’s thoughts and ramblings, both good and bad, into coherent notes on his yellow legal pads. Nixon’s desire to avoid dealing with very many people in the White House increased Haldeman’s power, seeing his duty to serve the President and his cause. Haldeman was the one that brought in John Ehrlichman, a friend he knew from UCLA, having worked together on campus politics. On the first day of Nixon’s Presidency, Ehrlichman was a low-ranking White House staffer, but with Haldeman’s guidance, advice, and influence, he worked his way up to being in Nixon’s favor by showing how others in the administration were not seeing things through the way Nixon wanted. And then, as a carefully orchestrated afterthought, Ehrlichman volunteered to do the job right, with one of those areas being domestic policy, which was an area of frustration for Nixon.
Nixon wanted the equivalent apparatus that Kissinger had created in foreign policy in place for domestic policy, except Nixon had far less interest in domestic policy compared to foreign policy. Once Ehrlichman was in as Nixon’s Domestic Policy Advisor, he discovered that he was handcuffed, in that Nixon was against far more than he was in favor of things, which led to a very negative approach and tone from Ehrlichman in his role for the President. Few outside the White House truly understood the power of Haldeman and Ehrlichman in the Nixon administration.
And then there was Henry Kissinger, who became a public figure of his own outside the White House. While Nixon’s men, such as Haldeman and Ehrlichman, kept to themselves, Kissinger embraced the fame of his role, and immersed himself in DC Society, loving the Georgetown dinner parties and the various galas, becoming a figure of glamor and distinction. Kissinger wasn’t afraid to throw Nixon and various members of his administration under the bus at these affairs if it advanced him in the eyes of the DC Elites, which of course meant that doing so was at Nixon’s expense (Nixon did the same to Kissinger in his small circle).
Nixon wanted the equivalent apparatus that Kissinger had created in foreign policy in place for domestic policy, except Nixon had far less interest in domestic policy compared to foreign policy. Once Ehrlichman was in as Nixon’s Domestic Policy Advisor, he discovered that he was handcuffed, in that Nixon was against far more than he was in favor of things, which led to a very negative approach and tone from Ehrlichman in his role for the President. Few outside the White House truly understood the power of Haldeman and Ehrlichman in the Nixon administration.
And then there was Henry Kissinger, who became a public figure of his own outside the White House. While Nixon’s men, such as Haldeman and Ehrlichman, kept to themselves, Kissinger embraced the fame of his role, and immersed himself in DC Society, loving the Georgetown dinner parties and the various galas, becoming a figure of glamor and distinction. Kissinger wasn’t afraid to throw Nixon and various members of his administration under the bus at these affairs if it advanced him in the eyes of the DC Elites, which of course meant that doing so was at Nixon’s expense (Nixon did the same to Kissinger in his small circle).
Despite their disdain and distrust of each other, Nixon’s and Kissinger’s ambition and insecurities meshed together in one of the most powerful, and perhaps successful, combinations of President-and-Advisor in US History. Both believed that ending the Vietnam War could cement their legacies as “Great Men”. Nixon had brought Kissinger into his fold in order to remake how US Foreign Policy was conducted, through the Presidency, not the State Department. Nixon combined the National Security Advisor and the National Security Council into a single entity under Kissinger in order to do so. Up to 1969, the National Security Council (established in 1947), had little to offer Presidents during a crisis or in planning foreign policy. Nixon wanted Kissinger to remake the NSC into the main instrument from which US Foreign Policy would be conducted.
Kissinger made sure that SecState William Rogers and SecDef Melvin Laird understood that Nixon and Kissinger ran the show over their departments. Both Nixon and Kissinger were obsessed with secrecy and not sharing credit with others (and as it turned out, with each other). Despite the concentration of power in terms of conducting foreign policy, a peaceful and honorable exit from the Vietnam War proved to be elusive. Early in his Presidency, Nixon tried to force North Vietnam to the bargaining table to end the war by escalating the war. Nixon ordered massive bombing strikes in neutral Cambodia in order to weaken the Viet Cong, and he kept the bombing raids as secret as possible. Nixon hoped the bombing would convince North Vietnam that it was time to end the war via negotiations, while at the same time hoping to avoid provoking the increasingly volatile anti-war protests to another level.
Kissinger made sure that SecState William Rogers and SecDef Melvin Laird understood that Nixon and Kissinger ran the show over their departments. Both Nixon and Kissinger were obsessed with secrecy and not sharing credit with others (and as it turned out, with each other). Despite the concentration of power in terms of conducting foreign policy, a peaceful and honorable exit from the Vietnam War proved to be elusive. Early in his Presidency, Nixon tried to force North Vietnam to the bargaining table to end the war by escalating the war. Nixon ordered massive bombing strikes in neutral Cambodia in order to weaken the Viet Cong, and he kept the bombing raids as secret as possible. Nixon hoped the bombing would convince North Vietnam that it was time to end the war via negotiations, while at the same time hoping to avoid provoking the increasingly volatile anti-war protests to another level.
However, word of the secret bombings leaked and was reported in the New York times on 9 May 1969. Both Nixon and Kissinger raged at the leak, and were obsessed with who had been the leaker(s). Kissinger contacted FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover in order to inquire if the FBI could investigate, and Hoover agreed to do so. Before the day was over, the FBI started to submit names as possible leakers via telephone wiretaps. The FBI investigation led to nothing more than further confusion and frustration for Nixon and Kissinger.
At that point, Nixon authorized Ehrlichman to illegally wiretap the phone of a specific reporter, Joseph Kraft, and eventually other reporters were added to the FBI’s legal wiretaps, including CBS reporter Marvin Kalb. The wiretaps continued and expanded, but did not lead to the leaker(s) of the secret Cambodia bombing raids.
However, that unsuccessful wiretapping episode laid the groundwork for Nixon’s response to the Pentagon Papers in 1971, feeding the Nixon administration’s desire for spying on its enemies, real or imagined. The Pentagon Papers were very damaging leaks about the history of the US Government’s actions and reasons concerning the Vietnam War. It would be Kissinger that convinced Nixon that swift surreptitious action was required in order to respond to the Pentagon Papers.
At that point, Nixon authorized Ehrlichman to illegally wiretap the phone of a specific reporter, Joseph Kraft, and eventually other reporters were added to the FBI’s legal wiretaps, including CBS reporter Marvin Kalb. The wiretaps continued and expanded, but did not lead to the leaker(s) of the secret Cambodia bombing raids.
However, that unsuccessful wiretapping episode laid the groundwork for Nixon’s response to the Pentagon Papers in 1971, feeding the Nixon administration’s desire for spying on its enemies, real or imagined. The Pentagon Papers were very damaging leaks about the history of the US Government’s actions and reasons concerning the Vietnam War. It would be Kissinger that convinced Nixon that swift surreptitious action was required in order to respond to the Pentagon Papers.