On 24 November 1860, Thurlow Weed, publisher of the Albany Evening Journal and one of the most powerful Republicans, raised the possibility of a compromise between the North and the South. In essence, Weed suggested that the Missouri Compromise Line (36 degrees, 30 minutes North Latitude) be redrawn and extended. That suggestion proved to be a thunderbolt, in that a prominent Republican was openly suggesting that the containment of the expansion of slavery could be negotiable. The New York Times reported that “leading men” in DC were looking into opening some areas in the territories taken from Mexico below the 36-30 Line to slavery. At this juncture, Weed thought it preferable to avoid war by at least partially giving in to the odious stink of slavery.
The pressure on President-Elect Lincoln to compromise was great. Compromise in national politics had become a sort of tradition, with the most famous politician in that mold being
Henry Clay. Crises were always presenting themselves, and compromises were the solution to at least buy extended time. Incoming SecState Seward even pressured Lincoln to accept Weed’s suggested compromise. However, Lincoln wanted to preserve the Union and eliminate at least the expansion of slavery; to him, those two were linked together as a single cause. Seward firmly believed that a compromise would buy time where the sectional passions would cool down, especially in the South. Seward’s mistake (as well as all of those that wanted to pursue compromise in this instance) was that Southern politicians were not open to reason; to them it was all-or-nothing, especially since Lincoln had been elected President over the wishes of the entire South.
The pressure on President-Elect Lincoln to compromise was great. Compromise in national politics had become a sort of tradition, with the most famous politician in that mold being
Henry Clay. Crises were always presenting themselves, and compromises were the solution to at least buy extended time. Incoming SecState Seward even pressured Lincoln to accept Weed’s suggested compromise. However, Lincoln wanted to preserve the Union and eliminate at least the expansion of slavery; to him, those two were linked together as a single cause. Seward firmly believed that a compromise would buy time where the sectional passions would cool down, especially in the South. Seward’s mistake (as well as all of those that wanted to pursue compromise in this instance) was that Southern politicians were not open to reason; to them it was all-or-nothing, especially since Lincoln had been elected President over the wishes of the entire South.
On 18 December 1860, Senator John Crittenden (Constitutional Union Party; KY), who had been in public service since 1809 (the year Lincoln was born, and was a friend of the Todd family in Lexington), via a flurry of legislative proposals, formally suggested a compromise that would avoid war and defend slavery. Overall, slavery would be protected in DC, so long as it existed in VA and MD, and the Fugitive Slave Act would be further strengthened. Crittenden’s keystone idea was to extend the 36/30 Line, which would include any future territories acquired in Mexico, Cuba, and Latin America; these territories could join the Union as a free or slave state. Crittenden’s final legislative proposal was that Congress could never interfere with slavery in the future. It was an absolutely breathtaking pro-slavery series of proposals, yet petitions favoring the “Crittenden Compromise” flooded DC. The Richmond Whig was convinced that if Crittendon’s proposals were put to a national popular vote, they would be overwhelmingly accepted (Horace Greeley agreed with that view).
Many Northerners felt that Crittenden was asking them to give in on everything, and the South would get all they wanted. Some DC Republicans called Crittenden’s proposals an “unholy crusade”, and in both the House and Senate debate raged as to whether the US would remain a single nation or not. In the backdrop of all this political drama in DC, South Carolina was rocketing its way to secession. On 20 December 1860, the specially-called state convention voted unanimously (169 - 0) to secede from the Union. The rest of the Lower South (FL, GA, AL, MS, LA, TX) were sure to follow, with VA, TN, MO, KY, DE, and MD appearing to be “reasonable” and “reachable” if a compromise could be worked out.
Many Northerners felt that Crittenden was asking them to give in on everything, and the South would get all they wanted. Some DC Republicans called Crittenden’s proposals an “unholy crusade”, and in both the House and Senate debate raged as to whether the US would remain a single nation or not. In the backdrop of all this political drama in DC, South Carolina was rocketing its way to secession. On 20 December 1860, the specially-called state convention voted unanimously (169 - 0) to secede from the Union. The rest of the Lower South (FL, GA, AL, MS, LA, TX) were sure to follow, with VA, TN, MO, KY, DE, and MD appearing to be “reasonable” and “reachable” if a compromise could be worked out.
On the same day South Carolina seceded from the Union, Weed met with Lincoln. Weed’s view was that the North would go to Civil War in order to preserve the Union, but not to abolish slavery. Weed went on to argue that even if the Crittenden Compromise came to nothing, the effort to avoid war would have been made, and that would bolster support in the North for the upcoming war. Lincoln stated that Weed’s proposal, which had been outlined in the Evening Journal, will either do much good or cause far more trouble.
On 22 December 1860, Lincoln wrote in a letter that the best course was to wait and see how events unfolded, and he urged the Republican Party to stand strong. Lincoln, knowing that the desire for compromise remained strong in the North, did not shut the door on at least a partial compromise with Weed, and so the campaign to convince Lincoln to compromise to avoid war intensified. As additional ideas and details towards compromise were repeated or introduced, none of it mattered to the Southern states that had “Secessionitis”: those states had made their decision, were not even listening, and were very fearful of Lincoln.
During January 1861, MS, GA, FL, GA, and LA all seceded, and in February so did TX.
VA seceded in April, AR and TN seceded in May, and TN was the last to do so in June. Jefferson Davis argued that the soon to be established separate nation in the South would be a restoration of the original Constitution. Alexander Stephens (future VP of the CSA) saw the new nation as purely for whites, stating that the CSA was the opposite of the Declaration of Independence, in that whites were more equal and superior.
On 22 December 1860, Lincoln wrote in a letter that the best course was to wait and see how events unfolded, and he urged the Republican Party to stand strong. Lincoln, knowing that the desire for compromise remained strong in the North, did not shut the door on at least a partial compromise with Weed, and so the campaign to convince Lincoln to compromise to avoid war intensified. As additional ideas and details towards compromise were repeated or introduced, none of it mattered to the Southern states that had “Secessionitis”: those states had made their decision, were not even listening, and were very fearful of Lincoln.
During January 1861, MS, GA, FL, GA, and LA all seceded, and in February so did TX.
VA seceded in April, AR and TN seceded in May, and TN was the last to do so in June. Jefferson Davis argued that the soon to be established separate nation in the South would be a restoration of the original Constitution. Alexander Stephens (future VP of the CSA) saw the new nation as purely for whites, stating that the CSA was the opposite of the Declaration of Independence, in that whites were more equal and superior.
In order to defend the principle of “Liberty For All”, Lincoln came out in opposition to the Crittenden Compromise, which strengthened Republican unity and resolve. On 16 January 1861, by a vote of 25 - 23, the Senate refused to allow the Crittenden Compromise to reach the floor. However, overtures for compromise in the North continued, with one idea being to have former Presidents Martin Van Buren, John Tyler, Millard Fillmore, and Franklin Pierce come to DC and broker a workable compromise.
Before Inauguration Day on 4 March 1861, secession was a fact, and insurrection was the consuming fear. Rumors abounded, such as the VA governor raising 25k militia to march on DC to stop Lincoln’s Inauguration, as well as plots to take the Capitol by violence. Also, there were rumors that the official counting of the Electoral College votes, scheduled for 13 February 1861, would be stopped by violence. Edwin Stanton, Buchanan’s outgoing Attorney General, and Lincoln’s incoming Secretary or War, viewed the odds as small that the federal government would remain in control of DC after Lincoln’s Inauguration. Stanton had become AG very late, in December 1860, and was a secret Unionist, and a great source of information for key DC Republicans. Stanton made sure, even occasionally skulking about at night if necessary, that those Republicans knew what was being discussed in Buchanan’s Cabinet. Stanton reported that overall, the discussions far favored the secessionists over the Unionists. It reached the point where Buchanan’s SecNav surrendered the federal fort in the port of Pensacola to the Florida governor. The main fears in the North and in DC were that forces may interfere or stop the official Electoral Vote count in DC, and that Lincoln would be assassinated before being inaugurated.
Before Inauguration Day on 4 March 1861, secession was a fact, and insurrection was the consuming fear. Rumors abounded, such as the VA governor raising 25k militia to march on DC to stop Lincoln’s Inauguration, as well as plots to take the Capitol by violence. Also, there were rumors that the official counting of the Electoral College votes, scheduled for 13 February 1861, would be stopped by violence. Edwin Stanton, Buchanan’s outgoing Attorney General, and Lincoln’s incoming Secretary or War, viewed the odds as small that the federal government would remain in control of DC after Lincoln’s Inauguration. Stanton had become AG very late, in December 1860, and was a secret Unionist, and a great source of information for key DC Republicans. Stanton made sure, even occasionally skulking about at night if necessary, that those Republicans knew what was being discussed in Buchanan’s Cabinet. Stanton reported that overall, the discussions far favored the secessionists over the Unionists. It reached the point where Buchanan’s SecNav surrendered the federal fort in the port of Pensacola to the Florida governor. The main fears in the North and in DC were that forces may interfere or stop the official Electoral Vote count in DC, and that Lincoln would be assassinated before being inaugurated.
To Lincoln, the biggest vulnerability was to the official count of the Electoral College votes.
General Winfield Scott told Lincoln that he would carry out any orders the President-Elect gave in order to preserve order and control in DC. Scott told Lincoln that he had already mobilized artillery and militia companies to defend DC and the Capitol. So much rested on the shoulders of outgoing VP Breckenridge, since as VP and President of the Senate, he would preside over the official count of the Electoral College votes in the House chamber with both houses in attendance. Breckenridge performed his constitutional duty on 13 February 1861, supervising the official count of the Electoral College votes, certifying Lincoln’s election. That being said, Breckenridge and some Senators had to physically take the yet-to-be-counted Electoral College ballots to the House Chamber, and General Scott made sure they were blanketed by security forces. The successful certification of the Electoral College vote was a combination of Breckenridge “sucking it up” and doing his duty as VP under the Constitution, as well as General Scott’s overwhelming show of force.
On 8 February 1861, the Confederate States of America officially came into being, with the CSA narrowly beating out the “Republic of Washington” as the name of the newly created nation. The next question was who would be the President of the CSA. The election was held on
9 February 1861, and the top two favorites were elected President and Vice-President of the CSA: Jefferson Davis of Mississippi, and Alexander Stephens of Georgia.
On 11 February 1861, Lincoln started his journey to DC from Springfield. Lincoln didn’t want to get to DC too soon, and in part to make sure his arrival wasn’t too early, he scheduled speaking engagements on the way. Lincoln arrived in DC in secret, due to fears of assassination. The press, especially in the South, made much hay of Lincoln’s secret arrival in DC, basically labeling him a coward. On 25 February 1861, Lincoln paid a visit to the House and the Senate to pay his quiet respects as President-Elect. With his inauguration just days away, a committee proposed an amendment that restored the 36/30 Line from the Missouri Compromise, and that no future territorial gains in the nation could occur without separate majority votes by free and slave members of Congress. Even with Crittenden’s endorsement, the proposed amendment when nowhere in both chambers.
General Winfield Scott told Lincoln that he would carry out any orders the President-Elect gave in order to preserve order and control in DC. Scott told Lincoln that he had already mobilized artillery and militia companies to defend DC and the Capitol. So much rested on the shoulders of outgoing VP Breckenridge, since as VP and President of the Senate, he would preside over the official count of the Electoral College votes in the House chamber with both houses in attendance. Breckenridge performed his constitutional duty on 13 February 1861, supervising the official count of the Electoral College votes, certifying Lincoln’s election. That being said, Breckenridge and some Senators had to physically take the yet-to-be-counted Electoral College ballots to the House Chamber, and General Scott made sure they were blanketed by security forces. The successful certification of the Electoral College vote was a combination of Breckenridge “sucking it up” and doing his duty as VP under the Constitution, as well as General Scott’s overwhelming show of force.
On 8 February 1861, the Confederate States of America officially came into being, with the CSA narrowly beating out the “Republic of Washington” as the name of the newly created nation. The next question was who would be the President of the CSA. The election was held on
9 February 1861, and the top two favorites were elected President and Vice-President of the CSA: Jefferson Davis of Mississippi, and Alexander Stephens of Georgia.
On 11 February 1861, Lincoln started his journey to DC from Springfield. Lincoln didn’t want to get to DC too soon, and in part to make sure his arrival wasn’t too early, he scheduled speaking engagements on the way. Lincoln arrived in DC in secret, due to fears of assassination. The press, especially in the South, made much hay of Lincoln’s secret arrival in DC, basically labeling him a coward. On 25 February 1861, Lincoln paid a visit to the House and the Senate to pay his quiet respects as President-Elect. With his inauguration just days away, a committee proposed an amendment that restored the 36/30 Line from the Missouri Compromise, and that no future territorial gains in the nation could occur without separate majority votes by free and slave members of Congress. Even with Crittenden’s endorsement, the proposed amendment when nowhere in both chambers.