Source: Garrett M. Graff. Watergate - A New History (2022)
Experts in audiotape technology were enlisted in many locations to analyze the tapes for tampering. That was just the first step, however, since next was deciphering the audio, which was of very poor quality, in that the Secret Service had decided to save money on blank tapes by running the recording speed at its slowest. Experts attempted to remove the background distortion which garbled the dialogue, using at that time a cutting edge technology tool called a “coherent spectrum shaper”. The problem was that the only government agency that had the technology was the CIA; Jaworski was stunned when he learned that Sirica convinced the CIA to loan the machine.
The spectrum shaper took 12 hours just to warm up and to be properly adjusted for the task at hand. Then the machine went to work, copying and enhancing the tapes, and when the job was done, the CIA covertly removed the machine. But even that step wasn’t enough, since investigators now needed to painstakingly transcribe the tapes, which was a long and arduous process, taking about 100 hours to transcribe one hour of conversation from a tape. As the transcriptions were completed and were read, investigators and Sirica were stunned to discover that Nixon never intended to “clean up” Watergate. Sirica wondered how Jaworski and the grand jury would respond when they heard the tapes and/or read the transcriptions.
The spectrum shaper took 12 hours just to warm up and to be properly adjusted for the task at hand. Then the machine went to work, copying and enhancing the tapes, and when the job was done, the CIA covertly removed the machine. But even that step wasn’t enough, since investigators now needed to painstakingly transcribe the tapes, which was a long and arduous process, taking about 100 hours to transcribe one hour of conversation from a tape. As the transcriptions were completed and were read, investigators and Sirica were stunned to discover that Nixon never intended to “clean up” Watergate. Sirica wondered how Jaworski and the grand jury would respond when they heard the tapes and/or read the transcriptions.
On 15 January 1974, the audiotape experts released their report, concluding that the 18+ minute gap was due to at least five separate erasures. The experts also concluded that those erasures came from hand keys, not a foot pedal, since their “signatures” were unique on the tape, which directly countered the testimony from Rose Mary Woods. It was now clear that Woods either lied, or someone else tampered with the tapes without her knowledge; there was no doubt that the 18+ minute gap was intentional. Sirica referred the matter to the FBI for further investigation and criminal prosecution. Volner did not charge Woods with perjury, seeing her as a blindly-loyal pawn in Nixon’s machinations.
On 16 January 1974, Jaworski appeared before the grand jury and told them that they were about to be given new and very sensitive evidence. Up to that point, the grand jury had not been informed that the tapes were in the possession of the Special Prosecutor. Twenty-three separate headphone stations were set up for the grand jurors, and as they listened to the tapes, a look of horror appeared on all their faces.
On 30 January 1974, Nixon delivered his State of the Union Address to a Joint Session of Congress. Nixon spent the vast majority of his speech outlining his accomplishments as well as analyzing the challenges faced by the nation (e.g. high inflation and energy prices). Nixon put forth a 10 Point Plan for the nation to face those challenges, both at home and abroad. It wasn’t until the last moments of his address that Nixon spoke of Watergate, arguing that it was time to stop the investigations concerning Watergate. Nixon stated that one year of Watergate was enough, and that he had no intention of resigning. At that point, Nixon’s approval rating was 27%, and the nation was split 46% to 46% on whether he should resign.
On 16 January 1974, Jaworski appeared before the grand jury and told them that they were about to be given new and very sensitive evidence. Up to that point, the grand jury had not been informed that the tapes were in the possession of the Special Prosecutor. Twenty-three separate headphone stations were set up for the grand jurors, and as they listened to the tapes, a look of horror appeared on all their faces.
On 30 January 1974, Nixon delivered his State of the Union Address to a Joint Session of Congress. Nixon spent the vast majority of his speech outlining his accomplishments as well as analyzing the challenges faced by the nation (e.g. high inflation and energy prices). Nixon put forth a 10 Point Plan for the nation to face those challenges, both at home and abroad. It wasn’t until the last moments of his address that Nixon spoke of Watergate, arguing that it was time to stop the investigations concerning Watergate. Nixon stated that one year of Watergate was enough, and that he had no intention of resigning. At that point, Nixon’s approval rating was 27%, and the nation was split 46% to 46% on whether he should resign.
Jaworski was now faced with James St. Clair’s strategy of battling every single point to the finish line, as he had been instructed to do by Nixon. The White House protested and/or delayed even routine exchanges with investigators. Haig told Jaworski that the White House could not cooperate with the Special Prosecutor since it would give oxygen to the impeachment inquiry in the House. Jaworski told Haig that he would battle the White House via endless litigation. By that time, Jaworski was completely disillusioned and disgusted with DC, the White House, and in particular Nixon. Jaworkski’s problem was that so much new information had come in concerning Watergate, especially during the last half or 1973, which drastically increased the pressure for immediate action. During early-1974, Jaworski had the goods on Nixon, but he didn’t yet have the ability to take on the President.
On Doar’s end, he had the mission of impeachment, but no real evidence. Another problem vexed Doar and the House Judiciary Committee in terms of their impeachment inquiry: should St. Clair be allowed to testify? Doar and St. Clair met, and immediately St. Clair insisted that only identifiable felonies should be considered, whereas Doar believed that Nixon should face charges related to serious misconduct and abuses of power that were not strictly criminal in nature. Doar was focused on developing a pattern of behavior, thinking multiple incidents, not just a single felony, would be necessary to obtain the committee’s recommendation for advancing the question of impeachment to the House floor. Doar assembled an incredible amount of legal talent, among them Hilary Rodham, one of four women on the team. All of Doar’s legal team were sworn to secrecy, and would be fired if they spoke/leaked to the media.
On Doar’s end, he had the mission of impeachment, but no real evidence. Another problem vexed Doar and the House Judiciary Committee in terms of their impeachment inquiry: should St. Clair be allowed to testify? Doar and St. Clair met, and immediately St. Clair insisted that only identifiable felonies should be considered, whereas Doar believed that Nixon should face charges related to serious misconduct and abuses of power that were not strictly criminal in nature. Doar was focused on developing a pattern of behavior, thinking multiple incidents, not just a single felony, would be necessary to obtain the committee’s recommendation for advancing the question of impeachment to the House floor. Doar assembled an incredible amount of legal talent, among them Hilary Rodham, one of four women on the team. All of Doar’s legal team were sworn to secrecy, and would be fired if they spoke/leaked to the media.
Doar and his legal team focused on six areas: 1) White House domestic surveillance; 2) Intelligence activities (dirty trick); 3) The Watergate break-in and cover-up; 4) Nixon’s personal finances/expenses; 5) Misuse of government agencies and illegal campaign donations; 6) A general category for everything else deemed even possibly relevant. One thread that came up right away was that Liddy hadn’t been fired by CREEP for at least a week after the Watergate break-in, despite knowing it was a Liddy operation. To Doar’s team, that indicated that Nixon had been part of the cover-up from the beginning.
Unknown to nearly everyone, Jaworski and his staff were working on two parallel tracks in order to become completely familiar with the potential guild of Nixon. The first was could a sitting President be indicted. The answer from the staffers was yes, but Jaworski shouldn’t, so the idea was to pressure Nixon with an overwhelming mountain of evidence that would convince him to resign (e.g. Agnew), if he wasn’t impeached/removed. The second parallel was to analyze the crimes that Nixon committed as President, which led to a 128 page memo, featuring criminal charges such as accessory after the fact, conspiracy to obstruct justice, and obstruction of a criminal investigation via bribery.
Unknown to nearly everyone, Jaworski and his staff were working on two parallel tracks in order to become completely familiar with the potential guild of Nixon. The first was could a sitting President be indicted. The answer from the staffers was yes, but Jaworski shouldn’t, so the idea was to pressure Nixon with an overwhelming mountain of evidence that would convince him to resign (e.g. Agnew), if he wasn’t impeached/removed. The second parallel was to analyze the crimes that Nixon committed as President, which led to a 128 page memo, featuring criminal charges such as accessory after the fact, conspiracy to obstruct justice, and obstruction of a criminal investigation via bribery.
That 128 page memo became the most secret and sensitive document during Jaworski’s tenure as Special Prosecutor. Jaworski wanted to make sure that his office didn’t act rashly and get ahead of public opinion, which meant that he had to rein in his zealous renegade staffers that wanted an immediate indictment against Nixon. Eventually Jaworski’s strategy was to have the grand jury name Nixon as an unindicted co-conspirator, and keep that decision secret as long as possible, which meant that the impeachment inquiry in the House could proceed without interference or distraction from the Special Prosecutor.
One of Jaworski’s senior staffers had the idea that would maximize secrecy and flexibility, in that the grand jury could stop short of formally naming Nixon as an unindicted co-conspirator and instead vote to authorize Jaworski to do so later if needed. The grand jury’s decision to do so would be entered in the secret minutes, which would maintain secrecy for the trial strategy of the Special Prosecutor while also not being forced to submit a disclosure (of evidence) timeline. That was all fine-and-dandy, but the problem was how would the grand jury’s evidence against Nixon be given to the House Judiciary Committee for their impeachment inquiry? Jaworski’s staffers found a historical precedent from 1811 in the Mississippi Territory, and it was decided that the evidence would be given to the House, but not to the Justice Department.
What needed to be done next was to write up a document that provided evidence against Nixon as well as showing many of his public statements and denials were lies, but that document would not feature any firm conclusions. On 25 February 1974, Jaworski and some staffers presented the idea to the grand jury. Most of the 23 grand jurors were fed up with Nixon upsetting their lives; two grand jurors had lost their jobs, since by then they had met over 100 times. The grand jury gave Jaworski what he wanted by vote of 19 - 0, with one abstention.
One of Jaworski’s senior staffers had the idea that would maximize secrecy and flexibility, in that the grand jury could stop short of formally naming Nixon as an unindicted co-conspirator and instead vote to authorize Jaworski to do so later if needed. The grand jury’s decision to do so would be entered in the secret minutes, which would maintain secrecy for the trial strategy of the Special Prosecutor while also not being forced to submit a disclosure (of evidence) timeline. That was all fine-and-dandy, but the problem was how would the grand jury’s evidence against Nixon be given to the House Judiciary Committee for their impeachment inquiry? Jaworski’s staffers found a historical precedent from 1811 in the Mississippi Territory, and it was decided that the evidence would be given to the House, but not to the Justice Department.
What needed to be done next was to write up a document that provided evidence against Nixon as well as showing many of his public statements and denials were lies, but that document would not feature any firm conclusions. On 25 February 1974, Jaworski and some staffers presented the idea to the grand jury. Most of the 23 grand jurors were fed up with Nixon upsetting their lives; two grand jurors had lost their jobs, since by then they had met over 100 times. The grand jury gave Jaworski what he wanted by vote of 19 - 0, with one abstention.
On 25 February 1974, Doar’s team met with Rodino and the ranking Republican member of the House Judiciary Committee. Doar presented a five page letter that requested the White House to give them access to “all tapes, dictabelts or other electronic recordings, transcripts, memoranda, notes or other writings” relating to “a specific list of conversations between Nixon, Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Kissinger, Dean, Kleindienst, and Petersen during February, March, and April 1973”. Doar’s thinking was that those requests would be a noncontroversial way to start the process with the White House. That letter was authorized, and it was delivered to St. Clair at the White House. The letter wasn’t a subpoena, but the letter made it clear that if there wasn’t cooperation from the White House, a subpoena would be forthcoming.
On 1 March 1974, 21 grand jurors were in Sirica’s courtroom (2 were absent), where they voted on conspiracy charges for Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Colson, Strachan, and Mardian, while others were charged with obstruction of justice and perjury, while also noting 18 unindicted co-conspirators. Newspapers barely had enough room on their front pages to run the photos of those that were charged by the grand jury. Days later, a California grand jury indicted Ehrlichman and Colson for the break-in at Dr. Fielding’s office, trying to steal the files on Daniel Ellsberg. That grand jury also indicted Liddy and two Cubans, all three of which were involved in the Watergate break-in.
The various threads were starting to connect with Watergate. It was now understood that the Watergate break-in was not an isolated event, but part of an entire umbrella of illegal activities by the White House and CREEP. Sirica allowed the “Impeachment Roadmap” document created by Jaworski and his team to be picked up by Doar on 26 March 1974, which was a 55 page outline of Nixon’s criminality supported by evidence, including the tapes. Rodino’s committee was still waiting for the White House to turn over tapes and documents from its initial request, and it became clear to even some Republicans on the House Judiciary Committee that Nixon’s stonewalling meant that the President had something to hide.
On 1 March 1974, 21 grand jurors were in Sirica’s courtroom (2 were absent), where they voted on conspiracy charges for Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Colson, Strachan, and Mardian, while others were charged with obstruction of justice and perjury, while also noting 18 unindicted co-conspirators. Newspapers barely had enough room on their front pages to run the photos of those that were charged by the grand jury. Days later, a California grand jury indicted Ehrlichman and Colson for the break-in at Dr. Fielding’s office, trying to steal the files on Daniel Ellsberg. That grand jury also indicted Liddy and two Cubans, all three of which were involved in the Watergate break-in.
The various threads were starting to connect with Watergate. It was now understood that the Watergate break-in was not an isolated event, but part of an entire umbrella of illegal activities by the White House and CREEP. Sirica allowed the “Impeachment Roadmap” document created by Jaworski and his team to be picked up by Doar on 26 March 1974, which was a 55 page outline of Nixon’s criminality supported by evidence, including the tapes. Rodino’s committee was still waiting for the White House to turn over tapes and documents from its initial request, and it became clear to even some Republicans on the House Judiciary Committee that Nixon’s stonewalling meant that the President had something to hide.