Source: Garrett M. Graff. Watergate - A New History (2022)
The next, and perhaps heaviest, show dropped on 30 October 1973 when Sirica gathered together Nixon’s legal team and the Special Prosecutor’s Office to discuss the process of turning over the nine subpoenaed tapes. During the meeting, Buzhardt said that two of the nine tapes didn’t appear to exist. Buzhardt claimed that the White House could not find the tapes from 20 June 1972, which was a phone call between Nixon and Mitchell, or the 15 April 1972 tape of a Nixon-Dean meeting. Sirica told both parties that their discussion would continue the next day, on the record and in public view.
Two days of testimony followed from Secret Service agents and White House aides which turned out to be borderline farcical in nature. Stories frequently changed describing recording device malfunctions or simply running out of tape, and the Special Prosecutor’s Office made Buzhardt look like a fool. Those courtroom antics combined with the public and Congressional pressure led to the reality that Nixon and Bork would have to appoint a new Special Prosecutor.
Haig frantically made many phone calls, and one name kept popping up, Leon Jaworski, who was a former president of the American Bar Association and a former war crimes prosecutor at the Nuremberg Trials. Haig felt that Jaworski could be “managed”, unlike Cox, and it appeared that Jaworski was a political ally of John Connally, which meant that Nixon was on board. Jaworski agreed to take the position as long as he was allowed to truly and independently operate and investigate. It was also agreed that it would be far more difficult to remove him compared to Cox, since it would involve leaders from both the House and the Senate to do so.
Two days of testimony followed from Secret Service agents and White House aides which turned out to be borderline farcical in nature. Stories frequently changed describing recording device malfunctions or simply running out of tape, and the Special Prosecutor’s Office made Buzhardt look like a fool. Those courtroom antics combined with the public and Congressional pressure led to the reality that Nixon and Bork would have to appoint a new Special Prosecutor.
Haig frantically made many phone calls, and one name kept popping up, Leon Jaworski, who was a former president of the American Bar Association and a former war crimes prosecutor at the Nuremberg Trials. Haig felt that Jaworski could be “managed”, unlike Cox, and it appeared that Jaworski was a political ally of John Connally, which meant that Nixon was on board. Jaworski agreed to take the position as long as he was allowed to truly and independently operate and investigate. It was also agreed that it would be far more difficult to remove him compared to Cox, since it would involve leaders from both the House and the Senate to do so.
Towards the end of October 1973, the House Judiciary Committee, by a partisan vote of 21 - 17, granted their chairman (Rodino) subpoena power in order to pursue the President. It would be a Democratic show run by Peter Rodino and Tip O’Neill. Also in play was Gerald Ford’s confirmation as Vice-President, which now needed to be completed as soon as possible. Nixon now faced a new Special Prosecutor that had real independence and expanded powers, an impeachment inquiry in the House, and his integrity under assault in court. Nixon was quickly losing the support of his own party, as well as public support.
On 1 November 1973, Bork formally announced Jaworski as the new Special Prosecutor. It would now be Leon Jaworski and Representative Peter Rodino, chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, that would carry the baton for the final stages of the Watergate Scandal. Newspapers started to demand that Nixon resign, and Senator Edward Brooke (R; MA) was the first Republican senator to publicly support the idea. From the New York Times to the Denver Post to the Detroit News and many other major newspapers, the opinion was trumpeted that Nixon was unfit to remain in office. Even Time magazine chimed in, breaking its half-a-century tradition of not featuring editorials.
On 1 November 1973, Bork formally announced Jaworski as the new Special Prosecutor. It would now be Leon Jaworski and Representative Peter Rodino, chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, that would carry the baton for the final stages of the Watergate Scandal. Newspapers started to demand that Nixon resign, and Senator Edward Brooke (R; MA) was the first Republican senator to publicly support the idea. From the New York Times to the Denver Post to the Detroit News and many other major newspapers, the opinion was trumpeted that Nixon was unfit to remain in office. Even Time magazine chimed in, breaking its half-a-century tradition of not featuring editorials.
On 3 November 1973 in Key Biscayne, Garment and Buzhardt urged Nixon to resign. Beyond their recent concerns over the many scandals that had come to light was Nixon’s recent behavior. Nixon was drinking more, derailed important meetings with his off-topic thoughts and rants, and offered solutions to the current crises that would make things even worse for him. Buzhardt and Garment talked to Haig, arguing that they needed to gracefully remove Nixon from office, and then focus on damage control afterwards. Haig and Zieger immediately rejected that idea, saying that Nixon wasn’t ready to resign, nor was the nation, that there were too many global crises, and that VP Ford was not yet up to the job. Buzhardt and Garment agreed with Haig, but they countered by saying that Nixon needed to prepare himself for the inevitable. The best Buzhardt and Garment could do was to get Haig to promise to bring up the topic with Nixon, which he may-or-may-not have done.
Those days in Key Biscayne were a turning point for Leonard Garment, who no longer was committed to protecting Nixon, and he would gradually phase himself out of his role focusing on Watergate. Nixon, Haig, and Ziegler hatched a plan which the media dubbed “Operation Candor”, where the White House would launch a public relations campaign to convince the nation of its innocence. On 5 November 1973, Jaworski arrived in DC to start his new job as Special Prosecutor. Respect for Jaworski in legal circles and in DC concerning the primacy of the law was unquestioned. To the holdover staffers from Cox, Jaworski’s sterling credentials were actually a source of suspicion, not reassurance, in that they initially viewed him as Nixon’s “fixer”.
Those days in Key Biscayne were a turning point for Leonard Garment, who no longer was committed to protecting Nixon, and he would gradually phase himself out of his role focusing on Watergate. Nixon, Haig, and Ziegler hatched a plan which the media dubbed “Operation Candor”, where the White House would launch a public relations campaign to convince the nation of its innocence. On 5 November 1973, Jaworski arrived in DC to start his new job as Special Prosecutor. Respect for Jaworski in legal circles and in DC concerning the primacy of the law was unquestioned. To the holdover staffers from Cox, Jaworski’s sterling credentials were actually a source of suspicion, not reassurance, in that they initially viewed him as Nixon’s “fixer”.
Also working against Jaworski with Cox’s holdovers was a generation gap, in that Jaworski was 68 years old, whereas much of the staff was half his age or younger. It fell to Henry Ruth to bridge the gap with Jaworkski. To the staff’s amazement, none of them were replaced by Jaworski with people from Texas, and he remained consistent with what he promised them in terms of being able to continue to do their jobs. Jaworski issued four requests for additional tapes and documents concerning such areas as the ITT controversy and the Plumbers. Jaworksi’s aggressiveness showed the team that he was willing to go after Nixon to get the truth on multiple fronts. Jaworski turned out to be far more aggressive than Cox, and he quickly won over the staffers in the Special Prosecutor’s Office.
The White House still played the delay game, with no word coming from Buzhardt concerning Jaworksi’s recent requests. Through channels, Jaworski made it clear that he would file suit against Nixon in two days unless he received what he requested, which led to Buzhardt calling the Special Prosecutor to start the process. One year to the day after Nixon won 49 states and 520 Electoral Votes in the re-election in 1972, the House voted 361 - 51 to appropriate $1m for the Judiciary Committee’s impeachment inquiry; the media didn’t miss that “Calendar Coincidence”.
During the late-Fall of 1973, Senator Lowell Weicker came across his neighbor John Dean, and asked him if there was something the Watergate Committee missed in terms of its investigation. Dean replied by saying probably not, “except for tax fraud”. Weicker was astonished, in that there was actually more on top of the mountain of other scandals associated with Nixon. It soon became clear to investigators on multiple fronts that Nixon had been running a scheme trying to bolster his legacy while at the same time reducing his taxes. Nixon basically copied what Lyndon Johnson had done, donating his pre-Presidential papers to the National Archives with the intention that they would be included down the road in his Presidential Library. Nixon then claimed a massive tax deduction for the donation.
The White House still played the delay game, with no word coming from Buzhardt concerning Jaworksi’s recent requests. Through channels, Jaworski made it clear that he would file suit against Nixon in two days unless he received what he requested, which led to Buzhardt calling the Special Prosecutor to start the process. One year to the day after Nixon won 49 states and 520 Electoral Votes in the re-election in 1972, the House voted 361 - 51 to appropriate $1m for the Judiciary Committee’s impeachment inquiry; the media didn’t miss that “Calendar Coincidence”.
During the late-Fall of 1973, Senator Lowell Weicker came across his neighbor John Dean, and asked him if there was something the Watergate Committee missed in terms of its investigation. Dean replied by saying probably not, “except for tax fraud”. Weicker was astonished, in that there was actually more on top of the mountain of other scandals associated with Nixon. It soon became clear to investigators on multiple fronts that Nixon had been running a scheme trying to bolster his legacy while at the same time reducing his taxes. Nixon basically copied what Lyndon Johnson had done, donating his pre-Presidential papers to the National Archives with the intention that they would be included down the road in his Presidential Library. Nixon then claimed a massive tax deduction for the donation.
LBJ faced quite a bit of outrage and blowback for that stunt, leading Congress to pass a law in 1969 that banned that practice. Nixon did the exact same thing LBJ did, making sure the deed was done before that new law took effect. Nixon turned over his VP papers to the National Archives, estimating their worth at $576k ($4.72m in 2022 dollars), planning to spread the equivalent tax deduction over his years as President. Nixon’s federal tax bills for 1968 through 1972 were ridiculously low, including $789 in 1970 and $878 in 1971. Nixon earned $525k during 1970 and 1971, but paid less in federal taxes than an American that earned $9800 a year. In 1972, Nixon only paid $4298 in federal taxes.
As investigators from the Watergate Committee looked further, the less altruistic and more sinister Nixon’s donations seemed. There was no record of his VP documents actually being turned over to the National Archives, and no official Deed of Gift indicating the donation registered at the Archives. There had been a deed delivered to the National Archives in April 1970, signed by lawyers (one of them from Kalmbach’s firm), with all signatures dated 21 April 1969, which was an attempt to illegally backdate the donation before the 1969 “LBJ Law” took effect. The transfer of the papers came with a stipulation that archivists could not fully access the records, which negated the “gift” under the new “LBJ Law”.
It soon became clear to the Watergate Committee that Nixon’s arrangement with the National Archives was not a tax-deductible gift, but rather a taxpayer-financed storage facility to enrich Nixon’s wealth and to drastically reduce his federal taxes. That knowledge of tax shenanigans led to other questions concerning Nixon’s personal finances. For years, investigators and reporters had tried to figure out the financial transactions behind his vacation homes in San Clemente and Key Biscayne. During the Fall of 1973, allegations came to light that such as Howard Hughes helped finance Nixon’s estate in San Clemente, and columnist Jack Anderson hinted that Nixon used a Swiss bank account. All of those allegations were proven to be false, but the real controversy centered on that as much as $10m was spent on “improvements” in Nixon’s vacation homes in CA and FL. It appeared that the “improvements”, especially in San Clemente, were not about Presidential security but far more about Nixon’s personal comfort. So an entire other scandal emerged on top of all the others concerning Nixon: the possibility that he profited at taxpayer expense, which was a sure way to lose public support.
As investigators from the Watergate Committee looked further, the less altruistic and more sinister Nixon’s donations seemed. There was no record of his VP documents actually being turned over to the National Archives, and no official Deed of Gift indicating the donation registered at the Archives. There had been a deed delivered to the National Archives in April 1970, signed by lawyers (one of them from Kalmbach’s firm), with all signatures dated 21 April 1969, which was an attempt to illegally backdate the donation before the 1969 “LBJ Law” took effect. The transfer of the papers came with a stipulation that archivists could not fully access the records, which negated the “gift” under the new “LBJ Law”.
It soon became clear to the Watergate Committee that Nixon’s arrangement with the National Archives was not a tax-deductible gift, but rather a taxpayer-financed storage facility to enrich Nixon’s wealth and to drastically reduce his federal taxes. That knowledge of tax shenanigans led to other questions concerning Nixon’s personal finances. For years, investigators and reporters had tried to figure out the financial transactions behind his vacation homes in San Clemente and Key Biscayne. During the Fall of 1973, allegations came to light that such as Howard Hughes helped finance Nixon’s estate in San Clemente, and columnist Jack Anderson hinted that Nixon used a Swiss bank account. All of those allegations were proven to be false, but the real controversy centered on that as much as $10m was spent on “improvements” in Nixon’s vacation homes in CA and FL. It appeared that the “improvements”, especially in San Clemente, were not about Presidential security but far more about Nixon’s personal comfort. So an entire other scandal emerged on top of all the others concerning Nixon: the possibility that he profited at taxpayer expense, which was a sure way to lose public support.
On 17 November 1973, Nixon spoke in Orlando at a newspaper editor convention, which was part of “Operation Candor”. Nixon started a lengthy narrative, very similar to his “Checkers Speech” in 1952, trying to portray himself as a modern day Horatio Alger, and that he converted his hard-earned assets into real estate after entering the White House. In effect, Nixon was holding a “Pity Party”, working his way to saying, “Let me just say this, and I want to say this to the television audience: I made my mistakes, but in all my years of public life, I have never profited from public service - I have earned every cent. And in all my years of public life, I have never obstructed justice . . . I welcome this kind of examination (referring to investigations concerning his personal finances and tax evasion), because people have got to know whether or not their President is a crook. Well, I am not a crook. I have earned everything I have got”. A few days later, Nixon faced Republican governors, where he said much the same thing as he did in Orlando. A governor asked Nixon if there were any more “Watergate Bombs”, and Nixon replied “If there are any more bombs, I’m not aware of them”. Within 24 hours, the nation would learn that Nixon had lied.
On 21 November 1973, Buzhardt called Jaworski to talk about a serious problem in the strictest confidence. In Jaworski’s office, Buzhardt (who had never been in that office before) told Jaworski that there was a problem with one of the subpoenaed tapes, which had the conversation between Nixon and Haldeman on 20 June 1972. The problem was that there was an 18+ minute erasure during the middle part of the conversation. It was a critical conversation, understood to have been the first time Nixon and Haldeman had talked since the Watergate break-in.
On 21 November 1973, Buzhardt called Jaworski to talk about a serious problem in the strictest confidence. In Jaworski’s office, Buzhardt (who had never been in that office before) told Jaworski that there was a problem with one of the subpoenaed tapes, which had the conversation between Nixon and Haldeman on 20 June 1972. The problem was that there was an 18+ minute erasure during the middle part of the conversation. It was a critical conversation, understood to have been the first time Nixon and Haldeman had talked since the Watergate break-in.
Buzhardt had been listening to the tapes in order to catalog them, and then turn them over to Sirica. Buzhardt had stumbled across the “accidental” erasure from Rose Mary Woods from the 14 November 1972 tape, but this time, he told Jaworski, he could see no way that an 18+ minute erasure was accidental. Buzhardt flat-out named Rose Mary Woods as the culprit in the intentional erasure. Jaworski replied that he better inform Sirica before the Thanksgiving break, not wanting any delay to further complicate this new complication.
That afternoon, Buzhardt, Garment, and Jaworski met in Sirica’s chambers. The judge was horrified by the 18+ minute gap, coming only three minutes into the conversation between Nixon and Haldeman. Buzhardt confirmed that the missing 18+ minutes dealt with Watergate, based on Haldeman’s handwritten notes from the meeting. Sirica ordered another hearing, wanting the problem and the explanation on the record and for the public to hear as soon as possible. Sirica only gave Buzhardt an hour to organize the response from the White House.
Sirica ordered the tapes delivered to him by the Monday after Thanksgiving, and he set a schedule for hearings to try and determine how the 18+ minute gap could have occurred, since it was supposed to be secured in one of the most tightly guarded locations in the world. One of Jaworski’s staffers told the media that the future hearings would expose obstruction of justice in the White House; so much for “Operation Candor”.
That afternoon, Buzhardt, Garment, and Jaworski met in Sirica’s chambers. The judge was horrified by the 18+ minute gap, coming only three minutes into the conversation between Nixon and Haldeman. Buzhardt confirmed that the missing 18+ minutes dealt with Watergate, based on Haldeman’s handwritten notes from the meeting. Sirica ordered another hearing, wanting the problem and the explanation on the record and for the public to hear as soon as possible. Sirica only gave Buzhardt an hour to organize the response from the White House.
Sirica ordered the tapes delivered to him by the Monday after Thanksgiving, and he set a schedule for hearings to try and determine how the 18+ minute gap could have occurred, since it was supposed to be secured in one of the most tightly guarded locations in the world. One of Jaworski’s staffers told the media that the future hearings would expose obstruction of justice in the White House; so much for “Operation Candor”.