Source: Garrett M. Graff. Watergate - A New History (2022)
Watergate: July 1973 . . .
Alexander Butterfield spent almost all of Nixon’s first term as Haldeman’s chief assistant, which allowed him to see and hear Nixon up close every day. However, Butterfield was part of Nixon’s shuffling of administration personnel at the beginning of his second term, so when the Watergate Committee hearings started, he was serving as the nation’s head aviation leader. Butterfield was very pleased with his new post, since it was a plum job for a former combat fighter pilot that received the Distinguished Flying Cross. Butterfield saw storm clouds on the horizon, and he had a sinking feeling in his stomach about where the Watergate Committee hearings were going.
Butterfield was one of only a handful of people that knew about Nixon’s secret taping system in the Oval Office, and he was waiting for that really big shoe to drop after the Watergate Committee finished with John Dean. Butterfield was asked by a Watergate Committee staffer to come in for a routine interview on 13 July 1973. After Nixon’s inner circle of Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Mitchell, Magruder, and Dean, he was next in line on the committee’s White House flow chart for Watergate. Butterfield didn’t think the topic of the secret taping system would come up during his interview, seeing it as a one-in-a-million chance. Butterfield told his wife that if he was directly asked about the secret taping system, he had to tell the truth.
Alexander Butterfield spent almost all of Nixon’s first term as Haldeman’s chief assistant, which allowed him to see and hear Nixon up close every day. However, Butterfield was part of Nixon’s shuffling of administration personnel at the beginning of his second term, so when the Watergate Committee hearings started, he was serving as the nation’s head aviation leader. Butterfield was very pleased with his new post, since it was a plum job for a former combat fighter pilot that received the Distinguished Flying Cross. Butterfield saw storm clouds on the horizon, and he had a sinking feeling in his stomach about where the Watergate Committee hearings were going.
Butterfield was one of only a handful of people that knew about Nixon’s secret taping system in the Oval Office, and he was waiting for that really big shoe to drop after the Watergate Committee finished with John Dean. Butterfield was asked by a Watergate Committee staffer to come in for a routine interview on 13 July 1973. After Nixon’s inner circle of Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Mitchell, Magruder, and Dean, he was next in line on the committee’s White House flow chart for Watergate. Butterfield didn’t think the topic of the secret taping system would come up during his interview, seeing it as a one-in-a-million chance. Butterfield told his wife that if he was directly asked about the secret taping system, he had to tell the truth.
Butterfield’s wife was certain that her husband one way or another would voluntarily mention the tapes, even offhandedly, since by that time his loyalty and gratitude to Nixon and to those with which he had worked alongside had long ago evaporated. Butterfield felt that Nixon had abused him and other senior staffers for far too long. Butterfield’s interview was viewed as so routine that none of the Watergate Committee’s senators attended. A Democratic investigator and a deputy Republican counsel asked Butterfield questions, joined by two other investigators and a stenographer.
The Democratic investigator was Scott Armstrong, who was a longtime friend of Bob Woodward. Armstrong got the job after Dash asked Woodward if he was interested. After Woodward declined, Dash asked him for the name of the smartest person he knew, which in Woodward’s opinion was Armtrong. However, it was the deputy Republican counsel, after three hours of questioning from Armstrong, that asked Butterfield why Nixon would take Dean over to a certain corner of the Oval Office to have a sensitive conversation. That question gave Butterfield his opening to tell the investigators that there was a secret tape recording system in the White House.
The investigators were beyond-shocked; it was as if they had been struck by lightning. For the next 40 minutes, Butterfield told them how the secret taping system worked, where the microphones had been installed, and who had access to the tapes. Everyone involved in the lengthy interview knew that Butterfield’s revelation was a game-changer. The deputy Republican counsel immediately reported what Butterfield had said to the Watergate Committee’s Minority Counsel, Fred Dalton Thompson, after which Thompson called Senator Howard Baker, the lead Republican on the committee. Armstrong went to find Dash, and told him that Nixon taped conversations, apparently including those with John Dean.
The Democratic investigator was Scott Armstrong, who was a longtime friend of Bob Woodward. Armstrong got the job after Dash asked Woodward if he was interested. After Woodward declined, Dash asked him for the name of the smartest person he knew, which in Woodward’s opinion was Armtrong. However, it was the deputy Republican counsel, after three hours of questioning from Armstrong, that asked Butterfield why Nixon would take Dean over to a certain corner of the Oval Office to have a sensitive conversation. That question gave Butterfield his opening to tell the investigators that there was a secret tape recording system in the White House.
The investigators were beyond-shocked; it was as if they had been struck by lightning. For the next 40 minutes, Butterfield told them how the secret taping system worked, where the microphones had been installed, and who had access to the tapes. Everyone involved in the lengthy interview knew that Butterfield’s revelation was a game-changer. The deputy Republican counsel immediately reported what Butterfield had said to the Watergate Committee’s Minority Counsel, Fred Dalton Thompson, after which Thompson called Senator Howard Baker, the lead Republican on the committee. Armstrong went to find Dash, and told him that Nixon taped conversations, apparently including those with John Dean.
Dash and the Watergate Committee needed to get Butterfield’s public testimony fast, since he was soon to leave for an aviation negotiation in the USSR. Butterfield was very reluctant to be the public source that admitted there was a secret taping system, and he repeatedly asked Dash to subpoena one of the others that knew about the system, but Dash refused to do so. On Sunday, three days before he was to leave for the USSR, Butterfield called Leonard Garment at the White House to let him know that the secret taping system would no longer be secret. Garment was stunned to learn about the secret taping system and the tapes, and he found that he had no legal strategy in which to respond. When Garment informed Chief of Staff Alexander Haig of the taping system, it was completely shut down.
On Monday, while Butterfield was getting a haircut in the late-morning, he was informed that he needed to be in Senator Ervin’s office by 1 pm, or US Marshals would be looking for him. Since it had been the deputy Republican counsel that uncovered the secret taping system from Butterfield, Dash and Thompson agreed that the Republican Senators on the committee would get to ask questions of Butterfield first. At 2 pm that same afternoon, Butterfield was announced as the Watergate Committee’s next witness, surprising those in attendance. Following six opening questions, Fred Dalton Thompson asked, “Mr. Butterfield, are you aware of the installation of any listening devices in the Oval Office of the President”. After a few moments of hesitation, Butterfield responded, saying “I was aware of the listening devices, yes sir”.
On Monday, while Butterfield was getting a haircut in the late-morning, he was informed that he needed to be in Senator Ervin’s office by 1 pm, or US Marshals would be looking for him. Since it had been the deputy Republican counsel that uncovered the secret taping system from Butterfield, Dash and Thompson agreed that the Republican Senators on the committee would get to ask questions of Butterfield first. At 2 pm that same afternoon, Butterfield was announced as the Watergate Committee’s next witness, surprising those in attendance. Following six opening questions, Fred Dalton Thompson asked, “Mr. Butterfield, are you aware of the installation of any listening devices in the Oval Office of the President”. After a few moments of hesitation, Butterfield responded, saying “I was aware of the listening devices, yes sir”.
Over the next series of questions and answers, Butterfield walks the committee, and millions of television viewers, through each of the recording devices, their locations, operations, and purpose. Butterfield revealed that there were recording systems outside the Oval Office, located in the EOB, the Cabinet Room, as well as Nixon’s most-used telephones, including the President’s cabin at Camp David. Butterfield asserted that the recording systems were in place for the sake of posterity, for the future Nixon Presidential Library, but he added that most of those in the President’s orbit had no idea of the taping system. As he watched Butterfield testify on television, John Dean breathed a huge sigh of relief, knowing that he was no longer out on a very long branch on his own, and that confirmation of what he testified about would be on the tapes.
Up to that point, Cox and his team were very put out and annoyed with the Watergate Committee, but all that changed with Butterfield’s testimony. Cox knew that Nixon would never just hand over the tapes, and there would be a huge ordeal in terms of obtaining them from the White House. By then, Buzhardt had turned over Cox’s request of the Presidential Daily Diaries from 15 June 1972 through 30 April 1973, which listed Nixon’s minute-by-minute movements, phone calls, and meetings. That information would allow Cox and his team to figure out which specific day’s tapes they would officially request. Very soon Cox discovered that Nixon was going to use Executive Privilege to keep from turning over any of the tapes.
Up to that point, Cox and his team were very put out and annoyed with the Watergate Committee, but all that changed with Butterfield’s testimony. Cox knew that Nixon would never just hand over the tapes, and there would be a huge ordeal in terms of obtaining them from the White House. By then, Buzhardt had turned over Cox’s request of the Presidential Daily Diaries from 15 June 1972 through 30 April 1973, which listed Nixon’s minute-by-minute movements, phone calls, and meetings. That information would allow Cox and his team to figure out which specific day’s tapes they would officially request. Very soon Cox discovered that Nixon was going to use Executive Privilege to keep from turning over any of the tapes.
Meanwhile, the Watergate Committee issued two subpoenas, one for the tapes, and the other for the same records that Cox had requested and received; they were the first-ever Congressional subpoenas for Presidential records. For the Watergate Committee and Cox, any attempts to access the tapes would go up against the power and privileges of the Presidency. The first problem for Cox was where to start in terms of pinpointing the specific days/tapes of which he would request from the White House. On 18 July 1973, Cox sent Buzhardt a polite letter requesting eight specific tapes which were selected based on information from the Presidential Daily Diaries. To Cox, those days/tapes seemed incredibly suspicious, such as the first Nixon-Haldeman-Ehrlichman meeting after the Watergate break-in, or because one of Nixon’s inner circle had already spoken publicly about the topics of those requested tapes, which weakened any claims of confidentiality. Cox’s game plan was to convince the courts that some tapes were indispensable to justice, and once some tapes were ordered to be turned over to him, it would be easier to go back and request more tapes.
Nixon was still at Bethesda Naval Hospital (being treated for viral pneumonia) when he received word of Butterfied’s testimony. Nixon was beyond-stunned, believing that the taping system could never be revealed. To Nixon, he needed to protect not only his conversations with his inner circle, but also to protect all future Presidents. In the White House, no one seemed to know what to do with the tapes. Buzhardt advised Nixon to destroy them, but others in Nixon’s inner circle weren’t so sure. Garment stated that if the President destroyed the tapes, he’d face obstruction of justice charges and almost certain impeachment. Nixon leaned towards the idea that the tapes would actually protect him, seeing the tapes as his best insurance against what he felt was the perjury of others, especially Dean.
Nixon was still at Bethesda Naval Hospital (being treated for viral pneumonia) when he received word of Butterfied’s testimony. Nixon was beyond-stunned, believing that the taping system could never be revealed. To Nixon, he needed to protect not only his conversations with his inner circle, but also to protect all future Presidents. In the White House, no one seemed to know what to do with the tapes. Buzhardt advised Nixon to destroy them, but others in Nixon’s inner circle weren’t so sure. Garment stated that if the President destroyed the tapes, he’d face obstruction of justice charges and almost certain impeachment. Nixon leaned towards the idea that the tapes would actually protect him, seeing the tapes as his best insurance against what he felt was the perjury of others, especially Dean.
There are two prevailing theories why Nixon didn’t destroy the tapes. The first is what he initially said while in the hospital, that the tapes would be of crucial assistance. Nixon felt the tapes would convince Americans of what he already knew, that he was on the right side of things, and that he was a “Great Man”. A corollary to that theory was that Nixon wanted those tapes in order to write his memoirs. The second theory was that Nixon believed that the tapes were too politically explosive to hide or destroy. In the end, Nixon crossed his fingers, and hoped for the best in terms of the tapes.
On 23 July 1973, Haig called AG Richardson to inform him that Nixon was going to publicly refuse to release the tapes, and that the President was very close to firing Cox. Nixon publicly argued that if he, as President, refused to release the tapes, that trumped Cox’s wishes, since the Special Prosecutor worked within the Executive Branch; of course, Cox and Senator Ervin believed otherwise. The Watergate Committee formally requested tapes of five conversations between Nixon and Dean, while Cox added a ninth request on top of his original eight. Both Ervin and Cox issued subpoenas, but their problem was how to serve a subpoena to the President. Normally, US Marshals did so, but they wanted no part of serving a subpoena to the President. Two days later, Nixon publicly refused to comply with both publicly announced subpoenas.
All involved knew that the battle for the tapes would wind up in the Supreme Court, but for Cox, none of the possible paths to the Court was ideal. One possibility was that the Court would uphold the subpoena, but Nixon would simply ignore it, which was Cox’s main worry, that Nixon would be able to keep the tapes by defying the Supreme Court. After Nixon’s refusal, Cox asked Sirica’s grand jury to petition Sirica to enforce Cox’s subpoena. The grand jury issued a “show cause” order, which directed Nixon’s lawyers to appear in the grand jury on 7 August 1973 to explain why the requested tapes and documents should not be turned over.
On 23 July 1973, Haig called AG Richardson to inform him that Nixon was going to publicly refuse to release the tapes, and that the President was very close to firing Cox. Nixon publicly argued that if he, as President, refused to release the tapes, that trumped Cox’s wishes, since the Special Prosecutor worked within the Executive Branch; of course, Cox and Senator Ervin believed otherwise. The Watergate Committee formally requested tapes of five conversations between Nixon and Dean, while Cox added a ninth request on top of his original eight. Both Ervin and Cox issued subpoenas, but their problem was how to serve a subpoena to the President. Normally, US Marshals did so, but they wanted no part of serving a subpoena to the President. Two days later, Nixon publicly refused to comply with both publicly announced subpoenas.
All involved knew that the battle for the tapes would wind up in the Supreme Court, but for Cox, none of the possible paths to the Court was ideal. One possibility was that the Court would uphold the subpoena, but Nixon would simply ignore it, which was Cox’s main worry, that Nixon would be able to keep the tapes by defying the Supreme Court. After Nixon’s refusal, Cox asked Sirica’s grand jury to petition Sirica to enforce Cox’s subpoena. The grand jury issued a “show cause” order, which directed Nixon’s lawyers to appear in the grand jury on 7 August 1973 to explain why the requested tapes and documents should not be turned over.