Source: Garrett M. Graff. Watergate - A New History (2022)
On 17 May 1973, the Watergate Committee started its hearings, with each senator making opening remarks, which served as a collective opening statement, of course mixed with partisan overtones. McCord testified on the second day of the hearings, and it became clear to Dash and Thompson that they would need to recall witnesses as needed in order to keep the narrative clear. When McCord’s testimony was corroborated by Caulfield and Ulasewicz, the entire tone of the hearings shifted, in that now the main focus was to be the Watergate break-in and the cover-up.
Senator Ervin was the biggest surprise, in that Nixon and his new inner circle were convinced that Ervin would bungle the hearings as committee chairman; the White House badly misjudged the “Country Lawyer”. After the testimony of McCord, Caulfield, and Ulasewicz, Ervin followed Dash’s lead, allowing the majority counsel to question witnesses instead of the committee’s senators, which would probably ask unrelated questions. Ervin understood that Dash would remain focused on what was important, and would excavate information in real time.
Meanwhile, Elliot Richardson's confirmation hearings for Attorney General were being conducted in another Senate committee. Richardson’s confirmation became contingent on him promising to name a Special Prosecutor on Watergate. Richardson, as Acting AG, needed to find a Special Prosecutor, but he refused to ask Nixon who he might suggest, and the four that he had on his short list all turned him down. Richardson finally convinced Archibald Cox to be Special Prosecutor. Cox was a Harvard Law legend, and was a former US Solicitor General for President Kennedy. The more Richardson found out about Cox, the more he thought he thought he had the right man, in that Cox during his career had shown “unfailing fairness and firmness”. Also, Cox possessed a high degree of integrity, which was just as important to Richardson.
Senator Ervin was the biggest surprise, in that Nixon and his new inner circle were convinced that Ervin would bungle the hearings as committee chairman; the White House badly misjudged the “Country Lawyer”. After the testimony of McCord, Caulfield, and Ulasewicz, Ervin followed Dash’s lead, allowing the majority counsel to question witnesses instead of the committee’s senators, which would probably ask unrelated questions. Ervin understood that Dash would remain focused on what was important, and would excavate information in real time.
Meanwhile, Elliot Richardson's confirmation hearings for Attorney General were being conducted in another Senate committee. Richardson’s confirmation became contingent on him promising to name a Special Prosecutor on Watergate. Richardson, as Acting AG, needed to find a Special Prosecutor, but he refused to ask Nixon who he might suggest, and the four that he had on his short list all turned him down. Richardson finally convinced Archibald Cox to be Special Prosecutor. Cox was a Harvard Law legend, and was a former US Solicitor General for President Kennedy. The more Richardson found out about Cox, the more he thought he thought he had the right man, in that Cox during his career had shown “unfailing fairness and firmness”. Also, Cox possessed a high degree of integrity, which was just as important to Richardson.
Cox didn’t want the job, but he was late in his career tenured at Harvard, and didn’t have any ambitions beyond what he had achieved, so he thought he might as well do the job that was asked of him. On 18 May 1973, Richardson announced during his Senate confirmation hearing that he would name Cox as the Watergate Special Prosecutor. He also stated that Cox could only be fired personally by him as AG, and only for “extraordinary improprieties”; according to the agreement between Richardson and Cox, Nixon could not personally remove Cox as Special Prosecutor.
Nixon’s inner circle of Haig, Garment, Buzhardt, and Pat Buchanan (speechwriter) responded to the Watergate Committee’s first days of hearings with a 4000 word manifesto. That written diatribe was part national apology and political defense, with Nixon again arguing that he only had the nation’s best interests at heart. In that lengthy written statement, the White House bent over backwards claiming that Nixon didn’t authorize anything concerning the Watergate break-in or the cover-up. Included in the manifesto was that the President would waive Executive Privilege concerning Watergate, which led Cox to believe that he would have access to everything he needed to see in his investigation. Very soon thereafter, the Senate confirmed Richardson as Attorney General, and on 25 May 1973 he was sworn is as AG by Chief Justice Warren Burger in the White House. Behind the scenes, Nixon now viewed Watergate as a threat to his historical legacy, and his grumblings about resigning as President grew more common.
Nixon’s inner circle of Haig, Garment, Buzhardt, and Pat Buchanan (speechwriter) responded to the Watergate Committee’s first days of hearings with a 4000 word manifesto. That written diatribe was part national apology and political defense, with Nixon again arguing that he only had the nation’s best interests at heart. In that lengthy written statement, the White House bent over backwards claiming that Nixon didn’t authorize anything concerning the Watergate break-in or the cover-up. Included in the manifesto was that the President would waive Executive Privilege concerning Watergate, which led Cox to believe that he would have access to everything he needed to see in his investigation. Very soon thereafter, the Senate confirmed Richardson as Attorney General, and on 25 May 1973 he was sworn is as AG by Chief Justice Warren Burger in the White House. Behind the scenes, Nixon now viewed Watergate as a threat to his historical legacy, and his grumblings about resigning as President grew more common.
Once Cox was sworn in as Special Prosecutor, he had to navigate his position concerning the other active investigations into Watergate: Sirica’s grand jury, Ervin’s committee, Nixon’s “investigation”, the Justice Department, and the FBI. Two US Marshals accompanied Cox when the Special Prosecutor carried documents relevant to his investigation. Cox and his team of investigators and office workers would be called the Watergate Special Prosecution Force. Once his team was assembled, Cox met with Deputy AG Henry Petersen, where he learned that a conversation that Dean had with Nixon was on tape; other than that, Cox didn’t get much of anything else from Petersen. Cox also met with Silbert and his team, who thought that Cox’s appointment was an insult to them and their year-long efforts.
Cox next met with Dash, whom he’d known for years, since Dash was a former student of his. Cox wanted the Watergate Committee to adjust what they were doing in order to give him room to investigate, indict, and to try defendants. But Dash refused, and even after pressing Ervin and Sirica, Cox was unable to alter the Watergate Committee hearings. Cox’s last initial meeting with White House “investigators” on 6 June 1973 with Buzhardt, whose focus was solely on Watergate, and Garment, who had assumed Dean’s responsibilities.
The three men met in Cox’s office, where the Special Prosecutor brought up Petersen’s claim that a tape existed of a conversation between Dean and Nixon, as well as Petersen’s documentation of that meeting. Buzhardt told Cox that Nixon would not turn over tape recordings or dictabelts. Cox also asked for a year’s worth of White House meeting and call logs, in order to pinpoint the “who and when” in terms of Nixon’s interactions with his top aides. Buzhardt and Garment responded by saying that they would consider Cox’s request for the logs.
Cox next met with Dash, whom he’d known for years, since Dash was a former student of his. Cox wanted the Watergate Committee to adjust what they were doing in order to give him room to investigate, indict, and to try defendants. But Dash refused, and even after pressing Ervin and Sirica, Cox was unable to alter the Watergate Committee hearings. Cox’s last initial meeting with White House “investigators” on 6 June 1973 with Buzhardt, whose focus was solely on Watergate, and Garment, who had assumed Dean’s responsibilities.
The three men met in Cox’s office, where the Special Prosecutor brought up Petersen’s claim that a tape existed of a conversation between Dean and Nixon, as well as Petersen’s documentation of that meeting. Buzhardt told Cox that Nixon would not turn over tape recordings or dictabelts. Cox also asked for a year’s worth of White House meeting and call logs, in order to pinpoint the “who and when” in terms of Nixon’s interactions with his top aides. Buzhardt and Garment responded by saying that they would consider Cox’s request for the logs.
Jeb Magruder, with a great deal of trepidation, appeared before the Watergate Committee on 14 June 1973. Dash was dumbfounded by Magruder’s hypocrisy and playacting during their private preparation session. However, when he testified in front of the television cameras, Magruder was contrite, implicating all the senior White House staff, but not Nixon. In a last-ditch effort to clear himself, Magruder tabbed Dean as the mastermind of the White House cover-up.
John Dean had been working behind the scenes for weeks, finishing his lengthy opening statement for the Watergate Committee. Dash refused to accept Dean’s first draft, since Dean hadn’t implicated himself in any respects, with even Shaffer (Dean’s lawyer) confronting him with that reality. Revelations about what Dean would say in his testimony to the Watergate Committee leaked to the press. On 3 June 1973, in both the NY Times and the Washington Post, stories ran covering the collusion between Nixon and Dean.
On 25 June 1973, Dean read his opening statement to the Watergate Committee and to a national television audience. It took an entire day for Dean to read his 245 page opening statement, and the committee released a trove of documents that Dean had turned over, including Nixon’s “Enemies List”. Daniel Schorr, live on CBS, read a list of Nixon’s enemies, where he read his own name, #17 on the list. Dean was the first member of a President’s inner circle to testify in an open hearing against the President. The Post featured six full pages of excerpts from Dean’s opening statement the next morning. Dean had provided an almost minute-by-minute account of the entire White House scheme concerning the Watergate cover-up. The following four days of answering questions from the Watergate Committee didn’t shake Dean or his story at all. Polls showed that 70% believed Dean’s testimony.
John Dean had been working behind the scenes for weeks, finishing his lengthy opening statement for the Watergate Committee. Dash refused to accept Dean’s first draft, since Dean hadn’t implicated himself in any respects, with even Shaffer (Dean’s lawyer) confronting him with that reality. Revelations about what Dean would say in his testimony to the Watergate Committee leaked to the press. On 3 June 1973, in both the NY Times and the Washington Post, stories ran covering the collusion between Nixon and Dean.
On 25 June 1973, Dean read his opening statement to the Watergate Committee and to a national television audience. It took an entire day for Dean to read his 245 page opening statement, and the committee released a trove of documents that Dean had turned over, including Nixon’s “Enemies List”. Daniel Schorr, live on CBS, read a list of Nixon’s enemies, where he read his own name, #17 on the list. Dean was the first member of a President’s inner circle to testify in an open hearing against the President. The Post featured six full pages of excerpts from Dean’s opening statement the next morning. Dean had provided an almost minute-by-minute account of the entire White House scheme concerning the Watergate cover-up. The following four days of answering questions from the Watergate Committee didn’t shake Dean or his story at all. Polls showed that 70% believed Dean’s testimony.
After Dean’s testimony, the Watergate Committee adjourned until after the 4 July Congressional recess, when Mitchell, Haldeman, and Ehrlichman would be questioned. By that point, House Majority Leader Tip O’Neill (D; MA) believed that Nixon was done, and that he would be forced to start a House Judiciary subcommittee to consider impeachment. Soon enough, Peter Rodino (D; NJ), the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, allowed one of his staffers to meet with Dash in order to secretly broach the possibility of impeachment. It was agreed that Rodino would need to write a formal letter to Senator Ervin asking for cooperation and information.
Meanwhile on his end, Cox knew he needed to find his own first domino to fall in his investigation, one that would pressure conspirators to talk to him and to set the tone for the punishments that would follow. Cox set his sights on Fred LaRue, who seemed to be the easiest target, since his role in the hush money conspiracy was crystal clear. LaRue pleaded guilty to a single count of obstructing justice. Cox’s plan was to then go after Magruder, and then Dean.
Buzhardt listened to as many tapes as possible of Nixon’s conversations concerning Watergate. What he heard on the tapes was at the minimum obstruction of justice. Buzhardt’s most immediate problem was that he didn’t know what to share, or with whom to share, what he heard, given the limits of attorney-client privilege. Buzhardt decided to tell Melvin Laird, his old Pentagon boss who was currently filling Ehrlchman’s role, what he heard and learned. Laird and Buzhardt agreed that there was only one legal strategy left to pursue . . . delay.
Watergate: July 1973 . . .
Meanwhile on his end, Cox knew he needed to find his own first domino to fall in his investigation, one that would pressure conspirators to talk to him and to set the tone for the punishments that would follow. Cox set his sights on Fred LaRue, who seemed to be the easiest target, since his role in the hush money conspiracy was crystal clear. LaRue pleaded guilty to a single count of obstructing justice. Cox’s plan was to then go after Magruder, and then Dean.
Buzhardt listened to as many tapes as possible of Nixon’s conversations concerning Watergate. What he heard on the tapes was at the minimum obstruction of justice. Buzhardt’s most immediate problem was that he didn’t know what to share, or with whom to share, what he heard, given the limits of attorney-client privilege. Buzhardt decided to tell Melvin Laird, his old Pentagon boss who was currently filling Ehrlchman’s role, what he heard and learned. Laird and Buzhardt agreed that there was only one legal strategy left to pursue . . . delay.
Watergate: July 1973 . . .