Source: Garrett M. Graff. Watergate - A New History (2022)
On 1 May 1973, Nixon entered the Oval Office as isolated and alone as he had ever been in his life. There were no pop-ins from Haldeman, no brief chat with Ehrlichman, and no phone call from Mitchell. FBI agents secured the offices of Haldeman and Ehrlichman, with Acting FBI Director William Ruckelshaus making sure that the Secret Service did not interfere. Haldeman showed up and tried to remove documents, but was stopped, with even Leonard Garment telling him that if he hadn’t destroyed those documents by now, tough luck, since they were in the possession of the FBI.
Meanwhile, Press Secretary Ron Ziegler faced an angry White House Press Corps. It was now clear to the press corps that Ziegler had lied, misled, or been ignorant of what had transpired since 17 June 1972. Ziegler surprised many in the media when during his press conference he apologized to the Washington Post. The White House Press Corps launched into full scandal mode, and Nixon’s friends and enemies fed the President to the media wolfpack. Hersh of the New York Times and Woodward and Bernstein of the Washington Post now had more than enough company and competition covering Watergate. As of 1 May 1973, the relationship between the White House and the media turned, in that never again would reporters be so trusting of information that came from the White House.
Before 1 May 1973, there had been an obscene affection in DC for the President’s version of the Watergate story, according to Woodward, who also asserted that Watergate proved that sycophantic reporting was no longer enough, or in vogue. The reporters that covered the Watergate Scandal during the first ten months in the relative wilderness, Time’s Sandy Smith, Rugaber and Hersh of the NY Times, Woodward and Bernstein of the Post, as well as the investigative reporters from the LA Times, were all DC outsiders, and therefore weren’t under the spell or influence of the White House. As of 1 May 1973, the “outsider” reporters had the greatest cache in the general media regarding Watergate; in many ways, they held the keys to the kingdom in terms of covering Watergate.
Meanwhile, Press Secretary Ron Ziegler faced an angry White House Press Corps. It was now clear to the press corps that Ziegler had lied, misled, or been ignorant of what had transpired since 17 June 1972. Ziegler surprised many in the media when during his press conference he apologized to the Washington Post. The White House Press Corps launched into full scandal mode, and Nixon’s friends and enemies fed the President to the media wolfpack. Hersh of the New York Times and Woodward and Bernstein of the Washington Post now had more than enough company and competition covering Watergate. As of 1 May 1973, the relationship between the White House and the media turned, in that never again would reporters be so trusting of information that came from the White House.
Before 1 May 1973, there had been an obscene affection in DC for the President’s version of the Watergate story, according to Woodward, who also asserted that Watergate proved that sycophantic reporting was no longer enough, or in vogue. The reporters that covered the Watergate Scandal during the first ten months in the relative wilderness, Time’s Sandy Smith, Rugaber and Hersh of the NY Times, Woodward and Bernstein of the Post, as well as the investigative reporters from the LA Times, were all DC outsiders, and therefore weren’t under the spell or influence of the White House. As of 1 May 1973, the “outsider” reporters had the greatest cache in the general media regarding Watergate; in many ways, they held the keys to the kingdom in terms of covering Watergate.
On 3 May 1973, the annual Washington Press Club’s roast charity dinner was held. Senator Howard Baker (R; TN) was the Republican Toast Master, where he zinged Nixon and members of his administration. On 4 May 1973, Haldeman and Ehrlichman appeared before Dash and his team, and he was surprised that both former Nixon senior aides were warm and respectful. Both men laid the blame squarely on Dean for all the travails experienced by the White House concerning Watergate. After the two former Nixon aides left, Dash and his team agreed that they had been very politely lied to and stonewalled.
Later that day, Senator Weicker (a Republican on the Watergate Committee) paid Dash a visit, having spent the previous evening with Dean, and handed Dash three pages of typewritten notes. For the first time, Dean outlined the extreme nature of Liddy’s original Gemstone Operation, which featured kidnappings, prostitutes, and recording devices galore. Dash and Senator Sam Ervin (Chairman of the Watergate Committee) came to the realization that the Watergate Committee hearings would stun the nation.
Now that his fall from Nixon’s inner circle to pariah was complete, Dean told his lawyer far more of what he knew since he was totally free of the White House. No longer was Dean held hostage by Nixon’s very suspect national security arguments justifying the administration’s shenanigans, which included the Huston Plan, of which Dean still had a copy, as well as keeping quiet on Nixon’s own involvement in the Watergate cover-up. Dean’s lawyer (Shaffer), carefully negotiated with Dash and Silbert, playing the prosecutors from different and competing investigations against each other, since there was no shortage of investigators wanting Dean. Part of the negotiations meant that the explosive documents in Dean’s possession, which he should no longer have as a private citizen, were placed in a safe-deposit box, with Shaffer delivering the key to Judge Sirica.
Later that day, Senator Weicker (a Republican on the Watergate Committee) paid Dash a visit, having spent the previous evening with Dean, and handed Dash three pages of typewritten notes. For the first time, Dean outlined the extreme nature of Liddy’s original Gemstone Operation, which featured kidnappings, prostitutes, and recording devices galore. Dash and Senator Sam Ervin (Chairman of the Watergate Committee) came to the realization that the Watergate Committee hearings would stun the nation.
Now that his fall from Nixon’s inner circle to pariah was complete, Dean told his lawyer far more of what he knew since he was totally free of the White House. No longer was Dean held hostage by Nixon’s very suspect national security arguments justifying the administration’s shenanigans, which included the Huston Plan, of which Dean still had a copy, as well as keeping quiet on Nixon’s own involvement in the Watergate cover-up. Dean’s lawyer (Shaffer), carefully negotiated with Dash and Silbert, playing the prosecutors from different and competing investigations against each other, since there was no shortage of investigators wanting Dean. Part of the negotiations meant that the explosive documents in Dean’s possession, which he should no longer have as a private citizen, were placed in a safe-deposit box, with Shaffer delivering the key to Judge Sirica.
Dash knew that Dean would be the crucial witness for the Watergate Committee, and that Dean would insist on immunity for his public testimony. The more Dash talked and questioned Dean, not only did more details emerge, but Dash increasingly believed that Dean was worthy of immunity. As his own mid-May 1973 deadline approached for the Watergate Committee hearings, Dash hadn’t yet decided on how to structure them, especially since the TV networks had become interested in televising the hearings. Dash settled on starting with small-recognition witnesses in order to build the narrative during the hearings.
However, Senator Baker and Fred Dalton Thompson (the committee’s minority counsel) thought Dash’s witness list was far too long, with over 40 names. Both thought that the nation would quickly lose interest, since it would take far too long to even get to the dirty tricks aspect of Watergate. Baker and Thompson suggested that Dash have limited short hearings, with each focused on a specific phase of Watergate, and wrapping up the hearings before the end of June 1973. Then, during the Summer of 1973, the Watergate Committee could write up their official report. The suggestions of Baker and Thompson were rejected in a vote by the Watergate Committee, which meant that Dash would have his way.
Nixon needed a new inner circle, and fast. As far as Nixon and Haldeman were concerned,
Alexander Haig was the only one that could be the new Chief of Staff. Haig had gone from colonel to a four star general in just four years, skipping over 240 more senior officers. In the Executive Branch, Haig had been on the staff of National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger.
However, Senator Baker and Fred Dalton Thompson (the committee’s minority counsel) thought Dash’s witness list was far too long, with over 40 names. Both thought that the nation would quickly lose interest, since it would take far too long to even get to the dirty tricks aspect of Watergate. Baker and Thompson suggested that Dash have limited short hearings, with each focused on a specific phase of Watergate, and wrapping up the hearings before the end of June 1973. Then, during the Summer of 1973, the Watergate Committee could write up their official report. The suggestions of Baker and Thompson were rejected in a vote by the Watergate Committee, which meant that Dash would have his way.
Nixon needed a new inner circle, and fast. As far as Nixon and Haldeman were concerned,
Alexander Haig was the only one that could be the new Chief of Staff. Haig had gone from colonel to a four star general in just four years, skipping over 240 more senior officers. In the Executive Branch, Haig had been on the staff of National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger.
On 2 May 1973, Haig (47 years old) got the call from Nixon, and two days later he was the President’s Chief of Staff, confident that the worst of the Watergate Scandal was over. However, Haig was a career military man who did not understand the politics of Washington, D.C, or those of the nation. Nixon understood that Haig would be in an awkward position, being immediately thrown into the frontlines of political warfare. Where Haldeman’s focus was to serve Nixon, Haig’s focus was to set himself up as a separate entity in the White House, which led to a great deal of resentment among the White House staffers. As Nixon became more-and-more consumed with Watergate, Haig in effect became the 37th-and-a-half President. Within a week, Haig recruited Fred Buzhardt, a former Pentagon lawyer, to be the White House’s legal counsel on Watergate. On 10 May 1973, John Mitchell was indicted in NY as was former SecCommerce Maurice Stans, both charged with obstruction of justice concerning investigations into CREEP donations.
After nearly a year of high-wire Machiavellian manipulations, Mark Felt’s role as a leaker unraveled during May 1973, which was of his own doing, in that he had leaked information concerning wiretaps on Kissinger. A NY Times article ran which covered the Kissinger wiretaps, which was buried on page 18. The main source for the NY Times reporter was the very disgruntled high-ranking FBI agent William Sullivan. Acting FBI Director Ruckelshaus ordered a special investigation to find the truth about those wiretaps, and eventually crucial evidence was found in Ehrlichman’s files, which were in possession of the FBI. Ruckelshaus kept a very close eye on his “#2”, since he had been briefed on Felt and was told to not trust him since he was almost certainly the leaker. An anonymous man called Ruckelshaus who identified Felt as the leaker of the NY Times article on the Kissinger wiretaps. Ruckelshaus informed Haig, and after Haig informed Nixon, they both agreed that Ruckelshaus had to quietly fire Felt.
After nearly a year of high-wire Machiavellian manipulations, Mark Felt’s role as a leaker unraveled during May 1973, which was of his own doing, in that he had leaked information concerning wiretaps on Kissinger. A NY Times article ran which covered the Kissinger wiretaps, which was buried on page 18. The main source for the NY Times reporter was the very disgruntled high-ranking FBI agent William Sullivan. Acting FBI Director Ruckelshaus ordered a special investigation to find the truth about those wiretaps, and eventually crucial evidence was found in Ehrlichman’s files, which were in possession of the FBI. Ruckelshaus kept a very close eye on his “#2”, since he had been briefed on Felt and was told to not trust him since he was almost certainly the leaker. An anonymous man called Ruckelshaus who identified Felt as the leaker of the NY Times article on the Kissinger wiretaps. Ruckelshaus informed Haig, and after Haig informed Nixon, they both agreed that Ruckelshaus had to quietly fire Felt.
When Felt met with Ruckelshaus, he claimed that Sullivan was the leaker. Felt’s protestations were to no avail, and Ruckelshaus ordered Felt to turn in his keys to his office, and that his letter of resignation was to be on Ruckehaus’ desk the next morning. That same month, William Sullivan retired, finally accepting that he would never be FBI Director. Felt and Sullivan had in effect destroyed each other, and in the process they helped unleash forces that ensured Nixon’s doom.
Just days after Felt resigned, he and Woodward met in their secret parking garage location. Woodward had no idea that Felt had been forced to resign, thinking that Felt would be in a good mood given recent developments on Watergate. But Felt was angry and worried, pacing and smoking, and their meeting only lasted a few minutes. During that brief time, Felt warned Woodward of how Nixon had tried to enlist the CIA to obstruct the FBI’s investigation on Watergate. A shocked Woodward got together with Bernstein, and they went to Bradlee’s house at 2 am to meet. None of the three knew what to make of “Deep Throat’s” bizarre behavior and information.
A few hours later, Bradlee discovered that Hersh of the NY Times had scooped the Post on the Kissinger wiretap story. Sullivan had made sure that Hersh received documents that had the original 17 Nixon administration wiretap requests, 16 of which had been signed by Kissinger. Before Hersh’s story ran, rumors of the not-yet-published article spread like wildfire in the White House. Haig called Hersh, half-pleading and half-threatening the NY Times reporter to hold the story. The first hints of the White House trying to use the CIA to obstruct the FBI’s investigation on Watergate came out during Senator Stuart Symington's (D; MO) hearings on the Huston Plan. During those hearings, it was discovered that the White House had tried to get Vernon Walters, the Deputy CIA Director, to do their bidding. Piece by piece on multiple concurrent investigations, the full scope of the Watergate break-in and cover-up were coming into focus.
Just days after Felt resigned, he and Woodward met in their secret parking garage location. Woodward had no idea that Felt had been forced to resign, thinking that Felt would be in a good mood given recent developments on Watergate. But Felt was angry and worried, pacing and smoking, and their meeting only lasted a few minutes. During that brief time, Felt warned Woodward of how Nixon had tried to enlist the CIA to obstruct the FBI’s investigation on Watergate. A shocked Woodward got together with Bernstein, and they went to Bradlee’s house at 2 am to meet. None of the three knew what to make of “Deep Throat’s” bizarre behavior and information.
A few hours later, Bradlee discovered that Hersh of the NY Times had scooped the Post on the Kissinger wiretap story. Sullivan had made sure that Hersh received documents that had the original 17 Nixon administration wiretap requests, 16 of which had been signed by Kissinger. Before Hersh’s story ran, rumors of the not-yet-published article spread like wildfire in the White House. Haig called Hersh, half-pleading and half-threatening the NY Times reporter to hold the story. The first hints of the White House trying to use the CIA to obstruct the FBI’s investigation on Watergate came out during Senator Stuart Symington's (D; MO) hearings on the Huston Plan. During those hearings, it was discovered that the White House had tried to get Vernon Walters, the Deputy CIA Director, to do their bidding. Piece by piece on multiple concurrent investigations, the full scope of the Watergate break-in and cover-up were coming into focus.