Source: Garrett M. Graff. Watergate - A New History (2022)
The Watergate Committee made a huge discovery. CREEP, in extreme overconfidence, had turned over its files to the National Archives during November 1972, thinking they would be an invaluable resource for historians, academics, even politicians. No one in CREEP sanitized or even previewed the files, which amounted to 1100 boxes and 32,000 pages; among those files were memos cc’d to Magruder. The Nixon White House and CREEP put far too much down on paper concerning their ideas and activities, both legal and illegal, than any other Presidential administration or campaign. For the first time in a Congressional inquiry, computers were used to track and catalog the ever-growing number of files. Using computer tapes (data storage in those days) and microfilm made cross-referencing events in those files much easier.
During early-April 1973, Senator Sam Ervin, the chairman of the Watergate Committee, called a press conference to address Executive Privilege. Ervin gave an old school law lecture where he decried the Nixon administration’s resistance to open testimony in front of the committee. Ervin asked the press “What meat do they eat that makes them grow so great?”. Ervin argued that Nixon was stretching the definition of Executive Privilege for his own ends, not the nation’s, citing Supreme Court decisions that undermined Nixon’s stance. Ervin was folksy in his mannerisms and speech, but it was clear that he was morally and politically outraged. That press conference started Ervin’s transformation into the President’s star inquisitor.
It was common practice for competing newspapers to monitor each other, and during the night of 16 April 1973, the Washington Post received word that the Los Angeles Times would have a major scoop the next morning. The LA Times was going to report that the White House would make a dramatic admission that one or more high-level administration officials bore some responsibility for Watergate.
During early-April 1973, Senator Sam Ervin, the chairman of the Watergate Committee, called a press conference to address Executive Privilege. Ervin gave an old school law lecture where he decried the Nixon administration’s resistance to open testimony in front of the committee. Ervin asked the press “What meat do they eat that makes them grow so great?”. Ervin argued that Nixon was stretching the definition of Executive Privilege for his own ends, not the nation’s, citing Supreme Court decisions that undermined Nixon’s stance. Ervin was folksy in his mannerisms and speech, but it was clear that he was morally and politically outraged. That press conference started Ervin’s transformation into the President’s star inquisitor.
It was common practice for competing newspapers to monitor each other, and during the night of 16 April 1973, the Washington Post received word that the Los Angeles Times would have a major scoop the next morning. The LA Times was going to report that the White House would make a dramatic admission that one or more high-level administration officials bore some responsibility for Watergate.
Woodward rushed to meet Felt, using the agreed-upon protocol for an emergency meeting. Woodward called Felt’s home from a specific hotel, saying nothing when Felt answered, and hung up after ten seconds. Felt then called Woodward at a specific phone booth in the hotel, where Felt told Woodward that Haldeman and Ehrlichman were both resigning. The next morning, the LA Times confirmed what Felt told Woodward. All that night, Nixon, Haldeman, and Ehrlichman worked on a damage control response, eventually crafting a press conference speech in which Nixon announced that he had personally looked into matters concerning Watergate, and he didn’t like what he discovered. Nixon continued, saying that he and Senators Ervin and Baker and agreed to ground rules for White House participation in the Watergate Committee’s investigation, which in his mind preserved the principle of Executive Privilege. Nixon promised that if any member of his administration was indicted, that person would immediately be removed from his position, and that no one would be given immunity. Nixon condemned any attempts within his administration to cover-up Watergate, no matter who was involved.
Dash immediately smelled a rat in Nixon’s announcement, since if White House or CREEP conspirators knew they would not receive immunity, then they would be incentivized to protect Nixon. Dean now saw that Nixon was circling the wagons, but he was on the outside-looking-in. Dean gathered up a box of Watergate documents and left the White House for what he believed would be the last time. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger’s view was that “We had all become passengers in a vehicle careening out of control in a fog”. Nixon’s announcement changed the whole tone of the Watergate Scandal, in that the media was now in a feeding frenzy, and Nixon’s aides started to turn on each other for self-preservation.
Dash immediately smelled a rat in Nixon’s announcement, since if White House or CREEP conspirators knew they would not receive immunity, then they would be incentivized to protect Nixon. Dean now saw that Nixon was circling the wagons, but he was on the outside-looking-in. Dean gathered up a box of Watergate documents and left the White House for what he believed would be the last time. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger’s view was that “We had all become passengers in a vehicle careening out of control in a fog”. Nixon’s announcement changed the whole tone of the Watergate Scandal, in that the media was now in a feeding frenzy, and Nixon’s aides started to turn on each other for self-preservation.
Sam Dash and Fred Thompson met with Earl Silbert to see if the upcoming Watergate Committee’s hearings would interfere with the Justice Department’ investigations and prosecutions. Silbert and his team weren’t sure how to proceed on their end, in that unlike the Watergate Committee, Silbert and his team were scared for themselves and their jobs, since they were a part of the Executive Branch. During April 1973, the Watergate Committee’s investigators pieced together the bugging plan in the DNC at the Watergate, the existence of Liddy’s Gemstone plan, as well as Magruder’s involvement. Liddy’s secretary at CREEP confirmed that there had been Gemstone stationary, which was not normal procedure if one wanted to keep a conspiracy under the radar.
During late-April 1973, Kalmbach outlined to Watergate Committee investigators how Dean had recruited him after the break-in to raise money and deliver payments to the burglars, which convinced the committee that the break-in at the Watergate was not a rogue operation. Kalmbach continued saying that with Dean’s help he’d brought on board Ulasewicz to be the bagman. Kalmbach also said that he eventually directly asked Ehrlichman if he needed to continue what he was doing, and Ehrlichman told him to proceed. Thompson commented that the focus was now on Nixon and his possible involvement in Watergate, and that the word “impeachment” would start to enter conversations on Capitol Hill. Thompson wondered if Nixon had participated in the planning of the break-in and/or in the cover-up afterwards.
Nixon kept up efforts to control the fast-spreading damage behind the scenes, with one being to try and keep Justice from investigating the Plumbers and their anti-Ellsberg activities, especially their break-in of Dr. Fielding’s office. When Henry Petersen called Nixon to inform him that Dean told investigators about the break-in at Dr. Fielding’s office, Nixon told him that it was a national security matter and that the Justice Department should stay out of it. The danger level to the Nixon administration concerning Watergate was growing, not lessening.
During late-April 1973, Kalmbach outlined to Watergate Committee investigators how Dean had recruited him after the break-in to raise money and deliver payments to the burglars, which convinced the committee that the break-in at the Watergate was not a rogue operation. Kalmbach continued saying that with Dean’s help he’d brought on board Ulasewicz to be the bagman. Kalmbach also said that he eventually directly asked Ehrlichman if he needed to continue what he was doing, and Ehrlichman told him to proceed. Thompson commented that the focus was now on Nixon and his possible involvement in Watergate, and that the word “impeachment” would start to enter conversations on Capitol Hill. Thompson wondered if Nixon had participated in the planning of the break-in and/or in the cover-up afterwards.
Nixon kept up efforts to control the fast-spreading damage behind the scenes, with one being to try and keep Justice from investigating the Plumbers and their anti-Ellsberg activities, especially their break-in of Dr. Fielding’s office. When Henry Petersen called Nixon to inform him that Dean told investigators about the break-in at Dr. Fielding’s office, Nixon told him that it was a national security matter and that the Justice Department should stay out of it. The danger level to the Nixon administration concerning Watergate was growing, not lessening.
During late-April 1973, Silbert asked a trusted lawyer within Justice to look into the question of whether the Justice Department could investigate and prosecute the President, and to do so with the utmost level of secrecy. Meanwhile, the non-stop coverage of Watergate in the media and the corresponding stress were wearing down senior administration officials even further. Citizens ignored Watergate during the previous months had now developed an insatiable appetite for the story.
On 27 April 1973 in Los Angeles, the presiding judge in Daniel Ellsberg’s trial for leaking the Pentagon Papers disclosed that Hunt and Liddy had burglarized the office of Ellsberg’s psychiatrist, Dr. Fielding, and that Ellsberg had been the target of government eavesdropping. The judge dismissed all the charges against Ellsberg: it was an ironic ruling, in that Nixon’s efforts to punish Ellsberg backfired, resulting in the leaker being a free man.
On 26 April 1973, Rugaber of the NY times reported that Gray had destroyed documents given to him by Ehrlichman and Dean; Rugaber had been tipped off by Senator Lowell Weicker, who was on the Watergate Committee. Gray continued to reveal information to investigators in a desperate attempt to become a witness, not a defendant. Seeing which way the wind was blowing, Gray announced his resignation as Acting FBI Director, first the FBI leadership team, and then to the media. Gray’s departure meant that Felt was now the Acting FBI Director, which didn’t quite last three hours in that Nixon named William Ruckelshaus to be the new Acting FBI Director. Ruckelshaus had been the head of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and it was a total surprise to him that Nixon tabbed him for the interim FBI post.
On 27 April 1973 in Los Angeles, the presiding judge in Daniel Ellsberg’s trial for leaking the Pentagon Papers disclosed that Hunt and Liddy had burglarized the office of Ellsberg’s psychiatrist, Dr. Fielding, and that Ellsberg had been the target of government eavesdropping. The judge dismissed all the charges against Ellsberg: it was an ironic ruling, in that Nixon’s efforts to punish Ellsberg backfired, resulting in the leaker being a free man.
On 26 April 1973, Rugaber of the NY times reported that Gray had destroyed documents given to him by Ehrlichman and Dean; Rugaber had been tipped off by Senator Lowell Weicker, who was on the Watergate Committee. Gray continued to reveal information to investigators in a desperate attempt to become a witness, not a defendant. Seeing which way the wind was blowing, Gray announced his resignation as Acting FBI Director, first the FBI leadership team, and then to the media. Gray’s departure meant that Felt was now the Acting FBI Director, which didn’t quite last three hours in that Nixon named William Ruckelshaus to be the new Acting FBI Director. Ruckelshaus had been the head of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and it was a total surprise to him that Nixon tabbed him for the interim FBI post.
Jack Anderson wrote a long column, almost certainly receiving information from the offices of Colson or Ehrlichman, accusing Dean of ordering Hunt to leave the country after the Watergate break-in. Anderson claimed that Nixon’s faith in Dean was wavering, and that Watergate Committee sources told him that investigators believed that Dean had lied to the FBI, raising the possibility of perjury charges.
On 25 April 1973, Ehrlichman first broached the word “impeachment” to Nixon. However, in Ehrlichman’s view, anything that Dean told the Watergate Committee investigators would fall far short of the level needed to pursue impeachment. During the next three days, Nixon was consumed by trying to deal with Dean, Gray, the hush money for the burglars, and the aftermath of the Ellsberg trial. Nixon started to think that he might have to cut Haldeman and Ehrlichman loose to try and end the bleeding on Watergate. Nixon simply could not wrap his mind around the possibility that he’d done anything illegal, and that Dean had the ability to bring down his Presidency. Nixon felt that he alone held together the Free World and was keeping it safe, while his reward was that his domestic enemies were trying to destroy him.
By the end of April 1973, Nixon decided it was time for action, and at Camp David the President hosted a seemingly endless number of staff and strategy sessions. On the last Sunday of April 1973, Nixon called Haldeman in DC to say that the President needed him and Ehrlichman to resign.
On 25 April 1973, Ehrlichman first broached the word “impeachment” to Nixon. However, in Ehrlichman’s view, anything that Dean told the Watergate Committee investigators would fall far short of the level needed to pursue impeachment. During the next three days, Nixon was consumed by trying to deal with Dean, Gray, the hush money for the burglars, and the aftermath of the Ellsberg trial. Nixon started to think that he might have to cut Haldeman and Ehrlichman loose to try and end the bleeding on Watergate. Nixon simply could not wrap his mind around the possibility that he’d done anything illegal, and that Dean had the ability to bring down his Presidency. Nixon felt that he alone held together the Free World and was keeping it safe, while his reward was that his domestic enemies were trying to destroy him.
By the end of April 1973, Nixon decided it was time for action, and at Camp David the President hosted a seemingly endless number of staff and strategy sessions. On the last Sunday of April 1973, Nixon called Haldeman in DC to say that the President needed him and Ehrlichman to resign.
Haldeman called Ehrlichman and said they both needed to go to Camp David. Ehrlichman was furious with Nixon, in that the President was going to tie both him and Haldeman to Dean. Nixon offered financial support for both men to soften the blow of their resignations, at one point offering each up to $300k for each; that money almost certainly would have come from Rebozo and/or Abplanalp. Both Haldeman and Ehrlichman turned down Nixon’s offer. For Nixon, probably for the first time as President, he had to have a face-to-face confrontation with people that had been totally loyal to him.
After Haldeman and Ehrlichman left Nixon in the Aspen Lodge at Camp David, Kleindienst told Nixon that he was resigning as Attorney General. After that, SecDef Elliot Richardson, who had only been the head of that department since 30 January 1973, arrived to see Nixon. Richardson, a Boston Brahmin (Boston Elite) whose goal was to become the governor of MA, already knew that Nixon would nominate him for Attorney General. Richardson did not want to be AG, but the timing was so tight that he was in essence powerless to keep it from happening.
Nixon told Richardson to investigate Watergate wherever it led, and that he understood that a Watergate Special Prosecutor very well may need to be appointed, leaving the choice of who to Richardson. Of course Nixon offered Richardson suggestions for who he believed could be named Special Prosecutor, while also advising him to be very careful of national security interests. Nixon went on, telling Richardson that above all he needed to protect the Presidency, not the President. When Richardson reflected back on that meeting, he viewed Nixon’s advice as a sort of warning.
After Haldeman and Ehrlichman left Nixon in the Aspen Lodge at Camp David, Kleindienst told Nixon that he was resigning as Attorney General. After that, SecDef Elliot Richardson, who had only been the head of that department since 30 January 1973, arrived to see Nixon. Richardson, a Boston Brahmin (Boston Elite) whose goal was to become the governor of MA, already knew that Nixon would nominate him for Attorney General. Richardson did not want to be AG, but the timing was so tight that he was in essence powerless to keep it from happening.
Nixon told Richardson to investigate Watergate wherever it led, and that he understood that a Watergate Special Prosecutor very well may need to be appointed, leaving the choice of who to Richardson. Of course Nixon offered Richardson suggestions for who he believed could be named Special Prosecutor, while also advising him to be very careful of national security interests. Nixon went on, telling Richardson that above all he needed to protect the Presidency, not the President. When Richardson reflected back on that meeting, he viewed Nixon’s advice as a sort of warning.
On 30 April 1973 (Sunday), Dean was questioned by a grand jury that was investigating Mitchell and Stans for CREEP’s shady finances. Later that day while still in NYC, Dean received a phone call from his secretary at the White House telling him that he’d been fired by the President. At the Washington Post, Bradlee was informed that Dean had been fired, and that Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Kleindienst were resigning, which told him that Woodward and Bernstein had been right all along.
That evening, Nixon addressed the nation from the Oval Office. Nixon’s speech was a mix of bluster, “Performance Outrage”, and righteous indignation about the investigations and attacks on the White House staff. Nixon informed the nation that he’d got to the bottom of things in his internal investigation in terms of Watergate. Nixon then announced that he had fired Dean, and that he was accepting the resignations of Haldeman and Ehrlichman. The only blame Nixon placed on himself was that he had focused too much on foreign policy and not enough on the politics of an election year, saying that in the process he’d delegated too much responsibility to CREEP. Nixon promised that he would restore integrity to the Presidency, and that now that the whole Watergate mess was done, he would turn his full focus to the larger duties of his office.
That evening, Nixon addressed the nation from the Oval Office. Nixon’s speech was a mix of bluster, “Performance Outrage”, and righteous indignation about the investigations and attacks on the White House staff. Nixon informed the nation that he’d got to the bottom of things in his internal investigation in terms of Watergate. Nixon then announced that he had fired Dean, and that he was accepting the resignations of Haldeman and Ehrlichman. The only blame Nixon placed on himself was that he had focused too much on foreign policy and not enough on the politics of an election year, saying that in the process he’d delegated too much responsibility to CREEP. Nixon promised that he would restore integrity to the Presidency, and that now that the whole Watergate mess was done, he would turn his full focus to the larger duties of his office.