Source: Garrett M. Graff. Watergate - A New History (2022)
The catastrophic miscalculations that cracked Watergate wide open started during February 1973, with Nixon’s decision to nominate L. Patrick Gray as the permanent FBI Director. With the Watergate Committee getting started, loyalty in key positions was the main reason why Nixon wanted Gray at that post. Nixon made it crystal clear to Gray that Mark Felt had to be dealt with, even wanting Gray to subject Felt to a lie detector test. On 23 February 1973, Gray convened the FBI Watergate investigators to prepare them for being questioned on Watergate during his Senate confirmation hearings. The meeting took a downward turn when Gray informed the agents that he’d been giving their 302s to Dean, with Special Agent Angelo Lano exclaiming, “You did what!”. At that point it all clicked for Lano now, in that he now knew why Dean had been one step ahead of him during the investigation. Lano immediately informed Silbert of the travesty involving Gray and Dean.
During his confirmation hearing in the Senate, Gray stumbled at every turn and became desperate, offering the same 302s he gave Dean to any of the Senators on the confirmation committee; Nixon thought Gray had lost his mind. The 302s were subsequently delivered to the Senate by two FBI agents. Felt truly believed that he would shortly be nominated as the permanent FBI Director after Gray tanked, and he tried to hedge his bet giving Time magazine a tip about the Kissinger wiretaps, which he hoped would finally destroy William Sullivan, whom he viewed to be his only rival for the position. However, Felt badly miscalculated, in that he was the only one in the FBI that knew about the Kissinger wiretaps, outside of those directly involved. Felt’s miscalculation would lead to a separate scandal that would sink him in due course.
During his confirmation hearing in the Senate, Gray stumbled at every turn and became desperate, offering the same 302s he gave Dean to any of the Senators on the confirmation committee; Nixon thought Gray had lost his mind. The 302s were subsequently delivered to the Senate by two FBI agents. Felt truly believed that he would shortly be nominated as the permanent FBI Director after Gray tanked, and he tried to hedge his bet giving Time magazine a tip about the Kissinger wiretaps, which he hoped would finally destroy William Sullivan, whom he viewed to be his only rival for the position. However, Felt badly miscalculated, in that he was the only one in the FBI that knew about the Kissinger wiretaps, outside of those directly involved. Felt’s miscalculation would lead to a separate scandal that would sink him in due course.
On 28 February 1973, the confirmation hearings in the Senate for Gray focused on Dean, who up to then had been on the periphery in the public eye on Watergate. Gray admitted that Dean had sat in on FBI interviews with White House staffers, and that Dean had been involved in the Dita Beard Memo scandal during the ITT controversy. The White House became very anxious, in that Dean and Ehrlichman might be called to testify during Gray’s confirmation hearings. Then Gray, whose naivete must have been shocking to all involved, nonchalantly mentioned that Herbert Kalmbach and Dwight Chapin have been involved with Donald Segretti, and that all their activities had been funded by CREEP. Gray’s admission ran counter to the constant denials of the use of CREEP funds from the White House, and Press Secretary Ron Ziegler had his hands full with the White House Press Corps.
Through February through April 1973, Watergate became a more substantial part of Nixon’s day, and Dean moved further into Nixon’s orbit. Up to that point, Dean had only met with Nixon alone once, but now he was often meeting Nixon alone face-to-face or talking to the President on the phone. No one in Nixon’s inner circle, including Nixon, understood who was involved or who was to blame for the Watergate break-in. In meeting after meeting among Nixon’s inner circle, the lies compounded; no one understood each other’s guilt, and none of them, including Nixon, understood criminal law, which meant they did not understand their legal vulnerabilities.
On 17 March 1973, Nixon met with Dean, and their conversation meandered through Liddy’s Gemstone operations, as well as Dean’s role in the White House cover-up. It became clear to both men that it would be impossible to blame a single member of the White House for Watergate, such as Magruder. Dean realized that after nine months, it was no longer believable that Liddy had acted on his own, and the pressure increased on Nixon to account for the administration’s role and its knowledge of the Watergate break-in.
Through February through April 1973, Watergate became a more substantial part of Nixon’s day, and Dean moved further into Nixon’s orbit. Up to that point, Dean had only met with Nixon alone once, but now he was often meeting Nixon alone face-to-face or talking to the President on the phone. No one in Nixon’s inner circle, including Nixon, understood who was involved or who was to blame for the Watergate break-in. In meeting after meeting among Nixon’s inner circle, the lies compounded; no one understood each other’s guilt, and none of them, including Nixon, understood criminal law, which meant they did not understand their legal vulnerabilities.
On 17 March 1973, Nixon met with Dean, and their conversation meandered through Liddy’s Gemstone operations, as well as Dean’s role in the White House cover-up. It became clear to both men that it would be impossible to blame a single member of the White House for Watergate, such as Magruder. Dean realized that after nine months, it was no longer believable that Liddy had acted on his own, and the pressure increased on Nixon to account for the administration’s role and its knowledge of the Watergate break-in.
Nixon and his inner circle settled on a plan to try and keep the Watergate Committee from gaining a foothold. The first part of their plan was to claim Executive Privilege, which would severely limit the committee’s investigation or to force the White House to comply. The second part was to publish the now-mythic “Dean Report”, which would clear the administration while also dampening public interest. Executive Privilege was not clearly defined at the time, with Eisenhower being the first President to actually introduce the idea that certain conversations and documents were protected. Nixon wanted it to be clear that Executive Privilege would not be used to protect information that might be embarrassing, but rather to protect information that might be harmful to US foreign policy or to the public interest.
The first part of the White House plan was actually a plan, but it turned out that the “Dean Report” didn’t actually exist. Dean never conducted an investigation of the role of the White House in the Watergate break-in, and worse yet Dean was the point man for the White House cover-up. However, Nixon didn’t see why Dean couldn’t write up something in order to pass it off as the “report”. On 20 March 1973, Dean met with Ehrlichman in order to relay Hunt’s latest demands: $75k for his family and $50k for his legal fees. It was becoming increasingly difficult to find laundered cash, since CREEP had used up its untraceable money stored in various secret locations. New hush money was found from Thomas Pappas, the very rich grocery magnate, in exchange for leaving in place the current US Ambassador to Greece.
The first part of the White House plan was actually a plan, but it turned out that the “Dean Report” didn’t actually exist. Dean never conducted an investigation of the role of the White House in the Watergate break-in, and worse yet Dean was the point man for the White House cover-up. However, Nixon didn’t see why Dean couldn’t write up something in order to pass it off as the “report”. On 20 March 1973, Dean met with Ehrlichman in order to relay Hunt’s latest demands: $75k for his family and $50k for his legal fees. It was becoming increasingly difficult to find laundered cash, since CREEP had used up its untraceable money stored in various secret locations. New hush money was found from Thomas Pappas, the very rich grocery magnate, in exchange for leaving in place the current US Ambassador to Greece.
One night Dean received a phone call from Nixon, who extolled the virtues of the “Dean Report”. Dean suggested they meet the next day, and the President said that he could meet with Dean at 10 am; when Dean hung up, he felt unrelenting pressure. In the Oval Office the next morning (21 March 1973), Dean bared his conscience to Nixon. During the next 103 minutes, Dean outlined how the administration had become entwined in a web of conspiracy entirely of its own making. It was Dean’s “Cancer Within the Presidency” meeting, where he advised Nixon that there was no guarantee that the dam could be kept from bursting. Dean offered a sanitized version of the conspiracy which made him look as good as possible to the President, doing his best to exonerate himself and to throw Magruder under the bus, since he was the one that didn’t control Liddy. Dean finally turned to the problem of the hush money, and how Caulfield and others had raised the possibility of pardons for McCord and Hunt in exchange for their silence. Dean brought up Hunt’s new demands for hush money, and that Hunt was clearly threatening to talk with investigators about Erhlichman and Krogh.
Then the conversation took an ominous turn, which led to Dean saying that perhaps a million dollars would be needed in the next two years, where Nixon responded by saying, “We could get that . . . You could get a million dollars. And you could get it in cash. I know where it could be gotten”. Again, confronted with something that was clearly illegal, Nixon did not reject or condemn, but chose to advance the scheme. The problem was where the new hush money would come from, and it was decided that Mitchell should handle it, working with Pappas.
Then the conversation took an ominous turn, which led to Dean saying that perhaps a million dollars would be needed in the next two years, where Nixon responded by saying, “We could get that . . . You could get a million dollars. And you could get it in cash. I know where it could be gotten”. Again, confronted with something that was clearly illegal, Nixon did not reject or condemn, but chose to advance the scheme. The problem was where the new hush money would come from, and it was decided that Mitchell should handle it, working with Pappas.
It dawned on Dean that while he was informing Nixon, the President knew a whole lot more than Dean realized, such as Ehrlichman’s legal jeopardy over the break-in at Dr. Fielding’s office concerning Ellsberg’s files. Nixon buzzed for Haldeman, and Nixon suggested to both men that they meet with Erhlichman and Mitchell to revisit what he had just discussed with Dean. Nixon closed by saying that pardons were out of the picture, but money would not be a problem. Nixon saw the danger of Dean’s “confessional”, knowing that Watergate was the proverbial Gordian Knot of a scandal, unable to be untied neatly or untied at all.
Later that same day, Nixon spoke to Rose Mary Woods, his long-time personal secretary, family friend, and confidant. It’s now become historically clear that Woods was a willing and key collaborator, holding on to some of the CREEP cash before it was dispersed. Nixon asked Woods how much “do we have", and Woods replied that she would have to check the safe, saying nobody here knows I have it. However, Pappas came through with $75k to Hunt’s lawyer, which was $120k short of what Hunt demanded. Hunt realized that there would be no more money coming his way from the White House.
Gray’s Senate confirmation hearing for FBI Director continued, with Senator Robert C. Byrd (D; WV) asking questions that led to Gray admitting that Dean lied to FBI agents concerning Hunt’s files that had been in Colson’s safe. Dean called Gray and pleaded with him to change his testimony, but Gray refused. As it turned out, the Senate never reconvened Gray’s confirmation hearing. A wounded Dean started to think how he could save himself, even if it meant torpedoing his colleagues.
Nixon met with Mitchell, Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Dean to discuss how to move forward after the debacle with Gray’s confirmation hearings. The decision was to keep up with the two-part plan against the Watergate Committee, if for nothing else to delay the committee for perhaps the entirety of Nixon’s second term. Haldeman told Dean to go on writing his “report”, and all agreed that they needed to keep Nixon above the fray with Watergate.
Later that same day, Nixon spoke to Rose Mary Woods, his long-time personal secretary, family friend, and confidant. It’s now become historically clear that Woods was a willing and key collaborator, holding on to some of the CREEP cash before it was dispersed. Nixon asked Woods how much “do we have", and Woods replied that she would have to check the safe, saying nobody here knows I have it. However, Pappas came through with $75k to Hunt’s lawyer, which was $120k short of what Hunt demanded. Hunt realized that there would be no more money coming his way from the White House.
Gray’s Senate confirmation hearing for FBI Director continued, with Senator Robert C. Byrd (D; WV) asking questions that led to Gray admitting that Dean lied to FBI agents concerning Hunt’s files that had been in Colson’s safe. Dean called Gray and pleaded with him to change his testimony, but Gray refused. As it turned out, the Senate never reconvened Gray’s confirmation hearing. A wounded Dean started to think how he could save himself, even if it meant torpedoing his colleagues.
Nixon met with Mitchell, Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Dean to discuss how to move forward after the debacle with Gray’s confirmation hearings. The decision was to keep up with the two-part plan against the Watergate Committee, if for nothing else to delay the committee for perhaps the entirety of Nixon’s second term. Haldeman told Dean to go on writing his “report”, and all agreed that they needed to keep Nixon above the fray with Watergate.