Samuel Adams was correct, in that the British Ministry (what passed for the Executive Branch in Britain) did indeed intend to force the Colonies to recognize the supremacy of Parliament. Adams was also correct about London’s frustration and exasperation with Massachusetts. What accelerated and intensified the misconceptions and misapprehensions in London concerning the Colonies occurred in 1772, when the British East India Tea Company (BEITC), the second-largest corporation in Britain, stood on the verge of collapse.
Chests of tea choked BEITC warehouses, and to unload the surplus, the price of tea had to be reduced. However, the BEITC had to undersell Colonial smugglers, and also get rid of what had become an effective boycott of tea in MA. The BEITC needed one million pounds in revenue, and London wanted the Colonies to recognize the supremacy of Parliament. The idea was that if Britain could get the Colonies to consume BEITC tea as its #1 tea, the Colonies would be indirectly acknowledging Britain’s right to tax for revenue, while also recognizing Parliament’s sovereignty.
With hardly any debate, Parliament passed the Tea Act during the Spring of 1773, which allowed the BEITC to export tea directly, without any additional duty (fee), and to appoint agents to sell the tea directly to retailers, eliminating the Colonial merchant middlemen. In Britain’s view, no one could object to cheaper tea from Britain versus the more expensive smuggled Dutch tea. Adams assumed that Britain was acting strategically against the Colonies, when in fact the main reason for the Tea Act was to solve the vexing revenue problems of the BEITC.
Britain committed a huge blunder with the Tea Act in 1773, in that by then, tea and liberty had become inextricably linked in the Colonies. And on top of that, it simply didn’t register to Britain that the real issue was about the Colonies wanting back the control they had experienced for decades before 1764.
Chests of tea choked BEITC warehouses, and to unload the surplus, the price of tea had to be reduced. However, the BEITC had to undersell Colonial smugglers, and also get rid of what had become an effective boycott of tea in MA. The BEITC needed one million pounds in revenue, and London wanted the Colonies to recognize the supremacy of Parliament. The idea was that if Britain could get the Colonies to consume BEITC tea as its #1 tea, the Colonies would be indirectly acknowledging Britain’s right to tax for revenue, while also recognizing Parliament’s sovereignty.
With hardly any debate, Parliament passed the Tea Act during the Spring of 1773, which allowed the BEITC to export tea directly, without any additional duty (fee), and to appoint agents to sell the tea directly to retailers, eliminating the Colonial merchant middlemen. In Britain’s view, no one could object to cheaper tea from Britain versus the more expensive smuggled Dutch tea. Adams assumed that Britain was acting strategically against the Colonies, when in fact the main reason for the Tea Act was to solve the vexing revenue problems of the BEITC.
Britain committed a huge blunder with the Tea Act in 1773, in that by then, tea and liberty had become inextricably linked in the Colonies. And on top of that, it simply didn’t register to Britain that the real issue was about the Colonies wanting back the control they had experienced for decades before 1764.
In essence, tea was the only remaining item from the Townshend Act, and tea had become very political in the Colonies, even before the Tea Act. Many in the Colonies, especially in MA, viewed British tea as political poison; many MA colonists publicly stated that they would never again drink the vile brew. Of all the items that Britain exported to the Colonies, tea had become by far the most controversial and volatile, and among all the Colonial ports, Boston was the least accommodating towards Britain.
The six very well paid British tea agents in Boston were all part of Hutchinson’s “Circle of Trust”, in that two were his sons, two were relatives, and the other two were close friends of his. Interestingly, it was not Boston, but NYC and Philadelphia that took the initial lead, fully intending to keep the BEITC from physically being able to “land” the tea (deliver the tea from ship-to-shore). Both cities hoped Boston would join them in common cause against the BEITC and the Tea Act.
On 21 October 1773, Adams and Dr. Warren pointed out that Parliament cared far more for the profit margins of the BEITC than Colonial grievances or liberties. Both men pointed out that there was already something in existence that would be of benefit to their cause, the Committees of Correspondence
(C of C). Soon enough a secret committee was created in Boston whose mission was to demand that the six tea agents report to the Liberty Tree in order to resign their posts and to turn over the tea to Boston merchants. All six tea agents were notified during the night, some very rudely; the next day, Adams, Hancock, and others waited for the tea agents under the Liberty Tree, but all six were a no-show. Over the next few days, a cat-and-mouse game was played, with Adams, Warren, et al trying to corner at least some of the tea agents to get their resignations. When a tea agent was confronted, their responses were vague and non-committal; mostly though, the tea agents succeeded in eluding Adams and his allies.
The six very well paid British tea agents in Boston were all part of Hutchinson’s “Circle of Trust”, in that two were his sons, two were relatives, and the other two were close friends of his. Interestingly, it was not Boston, but NYC and Philadelphia that took the initial lead, fully intending to keep the BEITC from physically being able to “land” the tea (deliver the tea from ship-to-shore). Both cities hoped Boston would join them in common cause against the BEITC and the Tea Act.
On 21 October 1773, Adams and Dr. Warren pointed out that Parliament cared far more for the profit margins of the BEITC than Colonial grievances or liberties. Both men pointed out that there was already something in existence that would be of benefit to their cause, the Committees of Correspondence
(C of C). Soon enough a secret committee was created in Boston whose mission was to demand that the six tea agents report to the Liberty Tree in order to resign their posts and to turn over the tea to Boston merchants. All six tea agents were notified during the night, some very rudely; the next day, Adams, Hancock, and others waited for the tea agents under the Liberty Tree, but all six were a no-show. Over the next few days, a cat-and-mouse game was played, with Adams, Warren, et al trying to corner at least some of the tea agents to get their resignations. When a tea agent was confronted, their responses were vague and non-committal; mostly though, the tea agents succeeded in eluding Adams and his allies.
The next few weeks felt like 1765 all over again with the Stamp Act. Without Stamp Act agents, there was no Stamp Act, and without tea agents, there was no Tea Act. To Adams, the tea agents were far more obnoxious and loathsome than the Stamp Act agents, and Hutchinson was determined to not repeat the mistakes of Bernard, his predecessor.
On 6 November 1773, the Boston C of C communicated with every MA town. Adams claimed that British soldiers had crept back into Boston from The Castle, which was a threat to “our common liberty”. That missive was the first real use of the C of C as an alarm system, and the Boston C of C hoped that many from MA towns would attend the meeting the following week in Boston. It now seems that during November 1773, Samuel Adams formulated some sort of plan that he believed would bring resolution to the tea situation. As the days passed in November 1773, Philadelphia’s tea agents had resigned, and it slowly dawned on Hutchinson that he stood alone in MA as the only official remotely interested in safeguarding the interests of the BEITC. The public assemblies, occasional mobs, and the continued threats to the tea agents took a toll on Hutchinson and his allies.
During November 1773, the British ship Dartmouth arrived in Boston carrying 114 chests of tea, soon to be joined by two other tea-laden ships, the Eleanor and the Beaver (the William had been lost at sea). Once a ship sailed past The Castle (today Castle Island) into Boston Harbor, the ship’s owner had 20 days to unload and settle the duty on his cargo; the grace period for the Dartmouth expired at midnight on 17 December 1773, a date of which all of Boston was aware. If the duty was not paid before the deadline, customs officials could impound and auction off the cargo. To Adams and his allies, the moment the tea was landed, processed, sold, and consumed, Colonial liberties would be in ruins.
On 6 November 1773, the Boston C of C communicated with every MA town. Adams claimed that British soldiers had crept back into Boston from The Castle, which was a threat to “our common liberty”. That missive was the first real use of the C of C as an alarm system, and the Boston C of C hoped that many from MA towns would attend the meeting the following week in Boston. It now seems that during November 1773, Samuel Adams formulated some sort of plan that he believed would bring resolution to the tea situation. As the days passed in November 1773, Philadelphia’s tea agents had resigned, and it slowly dawned on Hutchinson that he stood alone in MA as the only official remotely interested in safeguarding the interests of the BEITC. The public assemblies, occasional mobs, and the continued threats to the tea agents took a toll on Hutchinson and his allies.
During November 1773, the British ship Dartmouth arrived in Boston carrying 114 chests of tea, soon to be joined by two other tea-laden ships, the Eleanor and the Beaver (the William had been lost at sea). Once a ship sailed past The Castle (today Castle Island) into Boston Harbor, the ship’s owner had 20 days to unload and settle the duty on his cargo; the grace period for the Dartmouth expired at midnight on 17 December 1773, a date of which all of Boston was aware. If the duty was not paid before the deadline, customs officials could impound and auction off the cargo. To Adams and his allies, the moment the tea was landed, processed, sold, and consumed, Colonial liberties would be in ruins.
At a large meeting in Boston, led by Adams, it was decided that the tea needed to be returned to London with not even a shilling paid for duty. In attendance at the meeting was the Dartmouth’s owner (age 23); he could not leave Boston without a permit, and that permit would not be given if he couldn’t unload the tea and collect the duty. If the owner attempted to sail without doing so, his ship would be seized by the Royal Navy, and a British warship was patrolling the harbor’s entrance. If the owner’s ship somehow evaded the Royal Navy and returned to London, at the very least his entire cargo would be impounded.
After hearing from the Dartmouth’s owner at the meeting, Adams offered a solution, in that an exception to all of those British shipping/cargo regulations was extreme weather. Adams suggested that the owner claim that he was in the middle of a political storm, and as a result his vessel was in danger. The owner of the Dartmouth agreed to submit an official appeal on those grounds. Adams warned both the ship’s owner and its captain that if they landed the tea, they did so at their own peril. The leaders of the meeting needed to protect the Dartmouth’s cargo, not wanting Boston to be blamed for any destruction to the ship or the tea, or any harm to those on board. Adams insisted that a volunteer watch be established to protect the Dartmouth, and Adams, Hancock, and 20 or so others patrolled the wharf. It was arranged that bells would be tolled if there was an attack on the Dartmouth, and six riders were ready to notify the MA countryside in case of emergency, most likely organized by Paul Revere.
After hearing from the Dartmouth’s owner at the meeting, Adams offered a solution, in that an exception to all of those British shipping/cargo regulations was extreme weather. Adams suggested that the owner claim that he was in the middle of a political storm, and as a result his vessel was in danger. The owner of the Dartmouth agreed to submit an official appeal on those grounds. Adams warned both the ship’s owner and its captain that if they landed the tea, they did so at their own peril. The leaders of the meeting needed to protect the Dartmouth’s cargo, not wanting Boston to be blamed for any destruction to the ship or the tea, or any harm to those on board. Adams insisted that a volunteer watch be established to protect the Dartmouth, and Adams, Hancock, and 20 or so others patrolled the wharf. It was arranged that bells would be tolled if there was an attack on the Dartmouth, and six riders were ready to notify the MA countryside in case of emergency, most likely organized by Paul Revere.
Hutchinson was helpless in terms of getting rid of the Adams-led watch, and the Council had no interest in breaking up any town meetings. On 30 November 1773, Hutchinson directed Sheriff Greenleaf to disband a town meeting. Adams, knowing the sheriff’s orders, recognized that he had a great opportunity in which to speak, where he gave a twenty minute tirade, rehashing his same arguments; Sheriff Greanleaf wisely slinked away. During that meeting, a suggestion was floated, not for the first time: couldn’t tea be made with salt water as well as with fresh water? At the end of the meeting, Hancock (almost certainly posing, having the spotlight on him) vowed that he was willing to risk his fortune and life for the sake of liberty, and his boast spread quickly throughout Boston.
Soon, two other British tea ships, the Beaver and the Eleanor, tied up at the wharf alongside the Dartmouth. Hutchinson ordered Boston Harbor sealed, taking comfort knowing that a British warship continued to patrol the harbor’s entrance. Hutchinson hoped that the tea cargoes in Philadelphia and NYC would land, which he believed would force Boston to do the same. By that time, it was clear to Hutchinson that the Committees of Correspondence was in control of most of the mechanisms of government, including the MA House. By 14 December 1773, there was a sense of impending violence in the air in Boston, and the six tea agents fled to The Castle, along with some customs agents . . .
Soon, two other British tea ships, the Beaver and the Eleanor, tied up at the wharf alongside the Dartmouth. Hutchinson ordered Boston Harbor sealed, taking comfort knowing that a British warship continued to patrol the harbor’s entrance. Hutchinson hoped that the tea cargoes in Philadelphia and NYC would land, which he believed would force Boston to do the same. By that time, it was clear to Hutchinson that the Committees of Correspondence was in control of most of the mechanisms of government, including the MA House. By 14 December 1773, there was a sense of impending violence in the air in Boston, and the six tea agents fled to The Castle, along with some customs agents . . .